Iraq

Dave Maxwell testified last week before the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.  The topic was "Understanding Future Irregular Warfare Challenges."  The prepared testimony transcript can be found here and a video of the testimony here.

In reaction to public criticism that the military was unprepared for what followed after the defeat of the Iraqi military and destruction of its government, the military embarked on a rapid doctrinal development effort that resulted in the famed FM 3-24 as well as new concepts and forces laid out in the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews. By 2008 the Secretary of Defense issued an instruction (DODI 3000.07) that brought together Unconventional Warfare, Counterinsurgency, Foreign Internal Defense, Counterterrorism, and Stability Operations under the umbrella of Irregular Warfare.

But with this came the proliferation of new terms and concepts that were (and remain) redundant and of little additional value. Examples of such terms include Security Force Assistance (SFA), Building Partner Capacity (BPC), Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA), Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/build and Advise (OTERA), Stability Security, Transition, Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO), Provincial (originally provisional) Reconstruction Teams (PRT), and Military Transition Teams (MiTT), again, just to name a few. In addition, re-establishing Irregular Warfare as one end of the spectrum of conflict has also led to the rise of new terms to describe conflicts other than state on state high intensity maneuver warfare. Although a number of these terms were being put forth prior to 9-11 examples of the names for war and conflict included not only Insurgency but also Asymmetric Warfare, 4th Generation Warfare (and 5th as well), Hybrid Warfare, Network Centric Warfare, and a host of other rather esoteric terms such as “post-heroic warfare,” “matrix warfare,” and “holistic warfare.” And we should not forget the Chinese “Unrestricted Warfare.”

If Clausewitz were alive today he would repeat what he wrote in the 19th Century:

“Again, unfortunately, we are dealing with jargon, which, as usual bears little resemblance to well defined, specific concepts.”

But Clausewitz also wisely remarked that before you embark on war you have to determine the type of war to be fought. Unfortunately this wise counsel has been focused on naming rather than understanding the war.

SWJ contributor Bob Tollast interviewed me last week on a few points regarding the developing transition in Iraq.  An excerpt of one of my answers is below.  The whole interview can be found here.

The tenets of pop-centric COIN have come under increasing question recently, as has FM 3-24. I do not want to try to enter that debate in a few sentences here. I will just say that FM 3-24 is written from an outsider’s perspective as to how to conduct COIN, which is one of its major flaws – that being, conducting COIN on behalf of someone else instead of letting others take care of their own problems with some assistance (e.g., foreign internal defense as the military terms it). I question how much AQI is really conducting, much less winning, a campaign to win over the Sunni populations. While there are increasing references to Maliki’s growing strongman status and his relationship to Iran, I don’t see that as driving the Sunni population into the arms of AQI.

Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Anthony Shadid of the New York Times died Thursday in Syria, reportedly of an asthma attack.  He was 43.  Shadid was well known for his nuanced reporting on the Middle East.  His book, Night Draws Near, was one of the better books on the Iraq war, and one of the few to put a face to the Iraqis who lived amidst the tragedies of war.  The Times reported that photographer Tyler Hicks carried Shadid's body across the border into Turkey after his death.

In a statement on Thursday, Jill Abramson, the executive editor of The Times, said, “Anthony died as he lived — determined to bear witness to the transformation sweeping the Middle East and to testify to the suffering of people caught between government oppression and opposition forces.”

Bob Tollast interviews Hayder al-Khoei on developments in Iraq and the Iraqi view of events in Syria.  See the interview for more of al-Khoei's views on the tenuous political situation in Iraq.

As for Syria today, generally speaking, the Shia fear a post-Assad Syria and what they see as a Saudi-backed plot to weaken regional Shia power. These voices may not like Assad and some may even see the Alawis of Syria as a heretical sect, but they view Saudi influence in the Middle East as a bigger threat to the region and that is why they stand behind Assad, or refuse to undermine him. Iran sees Syria as vital ally in the region and a corridor to Lebanon. Iraq, by abstaining from the Arab League vote on Syria, made it clear that it, too, fears it will become the victim of a destabilised Syria. The New York Times ran a piece in August saying that Iraq was nudged by Iran on this issue, but what many Westerners fail to understand is the fear of many Iraqis, who have been subject to a brutal sectarian campaign over the years, who believe a post-Assad conflict in Syria would spill over.