Al Qaeda

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point released 17 declassified documents today gleaned from the trove taken out of Osama Bin Laden's Abbottabad lair.  These are available online, along with analysis of their importance.

This  report is a study of 17 de-classified documents captured during the Abbottabad raid and released to the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC). They consist of electronic letters or draft letters, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English translation. The earliest is dated September 2006 and the latest April 2011.  These internal al-Qa`ida communications were authored by several  leaders, most prominently Usama bin Ladin.  In contrast to his public statements that focused on the injustice of those he believed to be the “enemies” of Muslims, namely corrupt “apostate” Muslim rulers and their Western “overseers,” the focus of Bin Ladin’s private letters is Muslims’ suffering at the hands of his jihadi “brothers”. He is at pain advising them to abort domestic attacks that cause Muslim civilian casualties and focus on the United States, “our desired goal.” Bin Ladin’s frustration with regional jihadi groups and his seeming inability to exercise control over their actions and public statements is the most compelling story to be told on the basis of the 17 de-classified documents. “Letters from Abbottabad” is an initial exploration and contextualization of 17 documents that will be the grist for future academic debate and discussion.

Mohammed Merah, a young radicalized Frenchman, traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2010 and 2011.  Over an eight-day period in March 2012, he killed three military personnel, three Jewish children, and one Jewish teacher in a shooting spree that horrified and shocked the French nation.  On March 11, he shot dead Staff Sergeant Imad Ibn Ziaten in a parking lot in broad daylight. Four days later, on March 15, he killed first class private Mohammed Legouad and Lance Corporal Abel Chenouf and wounds seriously Lance Corporal Loic Lieber in a small strip mall near their barracks amidst a crowd of bystanders. On March 19, he killed three Jewish children and a Jewish teacher as they arrived at the Ozar-Hatorah school in Toulouse.  Another older student was wounded. The R.A.I.D., the French version of a SWAT police unit, killed him after a 32-hour siege.   

A Plot Inspired and Driven by Al-Qaeda?

Merah’s modus operandi was chillingly efficient and savagely barbaric.  The murderer approached his victims on a scooter, clad in black, and wearing a helmet. He opened fire on his victims at point blank range with a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol, aiming precisely at their upper bodies and heads.  There was no escaping his wrath.  “I can still see the flames coming out of the barrel.  He killed the last soldier like an animal,” reported an employee of the newspaper stand nearby the automated teller where Merah shot the three soldiers.

The killer was a 24 year-old French citizen of Muslim faith.  During conversations with the police negotiator publicized by Prosecutor Michel Molins, Mehra claimed to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda and trained by Al-Qaeda in Waziristan.  He further indicated that he had received guidelines from Al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan to conduct terrorist attacks in France and warned that his actions were part of a larger campaign.  He also said that he had planned to continue his killing spree by killing more police officers and soldiers.  According to Michel Molins, he had already identified the individuals to be killed.  Organizational links to Al-Qaeda have yet to be proven, but intelligence officials are convinced that Merah radicalized himself watching al-Qaeda video propaganda on the Internet.    

In a telephone call to France 24 two hours before the police laid siege to his apartment, Merah claimed responsibility for all three attacks.  He said he carried out the attacks against the soldiers to protest the French law forbidding the wearing of the head-to-toe veil known as burqa and to protest French intervention in Afghanistan.  He chose to target soldiers because they are a symbol of the State, but chose the individuals randomly.  He chose to attack Jewish children supposedly to avenge his “Palestinian brothers and sisters.”  Here again, he chose Jewish targets as a symbol of Israel but targeted the individuals randomly.

New Challenges for French Counter-Terrorism

These attacks and the failure to prevent them pose the series of new unexpected challenges to the French government. 

• The modus operandi is strikingly different from past Salafist-Jihadist attacks in France.  Handgun attacks are more reminiscent of radical Marxist Palestinian factions such as Abu Nidal or Corsican or Basque terrorist attacks.   Up until a few weeks ago, Salafist-Jihadists’ preferred mode of action consisted of planting bombs in the public square.  Merah’s M.O. is consistent with Abu Musab al Suri’s recommendation to engage in small-scale independent acts of anti-Western terror.  Moreover, Salafist-Jihadist attacks have largely been mass attacks geared at killing as many as possible regardless of their individual status in society.  Merah’s attacks are different.  He carefully chose his victims in accordance with Al-Qaeda’s definition of its enmity: French soldiers representing the crusaders who occupy Islamic lands, and Jews who represent the state of Israel.  In the past, mass attacks that killed indiscriminately made it easier for the government to mobilize all forces of society against the terrorism, as everyone could easily identify with the victimized bystander.  Selected targets might complicate the government’s task as ordinary people not belonging to the categories targeted (the vast majority of people) might feel less connected to or concerned with such attacks. 
• According to French authorities, Mohammed Mehra is a loner, the product of an “atypical Salafist self-radicalization,” without connection to any “jihadist organization structure known to the services.”  If accurate, this is a major departure from past attacks where terrorists were part of a logistical cell affiliated to a larger movement, principally the GIA (Algerian Armed Islamic Group) that provided the resources and expertise necessary to successfully conduct the planned attacks.  The absence of a logistical cell threw the surveillance of the DRCI off as they rated Merah at low-risk of carrying out attacks because they saw no cell-related activity.  Whether there were no cells, or the cells went unidentified for too long remains to be seen.   Either way, it indicates that the painstaking work of monitoring and preventing new attacks will need to be adapted. The government is bound to propose new legislation to close what has appeared as loopholes in the current legislation.
• Last, Merah behaved like a ‘serial killer.’  In the past, single terrorists carried out one operation, but Merah successfully conducted three attacks and told the R.A.I.D negotiator that he was planning on attacking more soldiers and police officers on the morning the police laid siege to his apartment.  Criminologists noted that Merah displayed a deeply narcissistic motivation and a pathological desire to eliminate all those whom, he believes, do not deserve to live; traits consistent with serial killers.  He acted with the cold determination and the violent savagery of serial killers.  In Monday’s attack, he pursued the frightened daughter of the school’s principal into the schoolyard as she was seeking refuge into the building, to shoot her to death. Moreover, he expressed no regrets for the deaths he caused.  Prosecutor François Molins said: “He expressed no regrets.  He only regretted not having killed more victims.  On the contrary, he boasted that he brought France down to its knees.” The confluence of terroristic and criminal motivations and tactics present new challenges for both the French government and French society.  Among those challenges: how does the government detect those individuals before they spur into action? How does society cope with an extended terroristic shooting spree? What is the impact on local socio-economic life if a shooting spree causes of local lock-down?  

Political Controversy and Announced Reforms

However unusual the circumstances of the attacks and the profile of Mohammed Merah, the failure to prevent him and the length of time (eight days) it took to identify and neutralize him prompted unusually vocal criticisms of the Intelligence Services and calls for reforms.

Amidst a tough presidential campaign, opposition leaders openly wondered whether the Intelligence Directorate (DCRI) did all that was necessary in a timely manner.The fact that Merah was identified as a potential suspect after the first attack but left to his own device until after the murderous spree at the Ozar hatorah school eight days later remains a key point of criticism.François Hollande, the candidate for the Socialist Party, suggested that a full review of all counter-terrorism laws and structures might be in order.Subsequently, the socialist group in the Senate requested that the chiefs from the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (Erard de Corbin de Mangoux) and from the Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (Bernard Squarcini) appear before a Senate panel.Meanwhile, the extreme-right candidate Marine Le Pen lambasted the government for being too soft on radical Islamists.

In response to the political firestorm, the government has adopted a four-prong approach.First, it publicly defended the State’s services, praising the actions of both the DCRI and the police.Second, the government quelled the Socialist request for a hearing of the two Intelligence chief, accusing the Socialist Party of playing politics ahead of the elections.Third, the government announced a new anti-terrorism legislation aimed at criminalizing radical Islamist Internet surfing and as well as traveling to insurrectionary countries.  A government spokesman announced a draft law for the end of April.  Lastly, the government cracked down on presumed radical Islamist groups in two nationwide operations. So far, 13 militants are under arrest.  These operations indicate that the government may be attempting to neutralize not only groups that act violently, but also those who advocate the use of violence. 

It is likely that serious internal reassessment of how to detect radicalized individuals is already underway as the French government does not want a repeat of the Merah episode.More serious legislative initiative and/or organizational reorganization will probably have to wait after the Presidential Elections in May 2012.

A new RAND occasional paper by Brian Michael Jenkins takes a look at Al Qaeda and what it means to different people. Note - you can click on the read online link to download a free PDF version.

More than ten years after 9/11, there is still remarkable lack of consensus among analysts' assessments of al Qaeda's current condition and future capabilities. Almost every issue is debated: Whether America has won the operational battle but lost the ideological contest; whether homegrown terrorism is a growing threat; whether maintaining American troops in Afghanistan is essential; whether the United States ought to declare on its own an end to the war on al Qaeda. Part of the debate is driven by political agendas, but the arguments derive from the fact that al Qaeda is many things at once and must be viewed in all of its various dimensions. This essay examines a number of these issues in light of recent developments — the death of Osama bin Laden, the Arab Spring, and the American withdrawal from Iraq. In each case, it drives toward a bottom line. In the final analysis, it is a personal view.