A Response to "A Shot in the Dark"

Interesting dichotomy cited by LTC Hollister:<blockquote>"My point in using the Laird document was to show that the Services would not adopt a well constructed strategy from the SecDef if it did not match their vision of the future."</blockquote>That statement raises the question of whether the vision of the SecDef or that of the Services should apply.<blockquote>"A recent interview with GEN Peter Chiarelli sounds eerily familiar to previous interviews with Army leadership regarding FCS."</blockquote>I think that statement by the Vice Chief as well as history give the nod to the SecDef version. In fairness, there were many in the Army at the time who also believed in the Laird vision. They were told to hush so the Army could speak with one voice.

Logically, a balanced view would be nice, one not affected by blatant and short sighted parochialism.

The Service track record in the last 50 years is really rather poor. Some might say we did better in earlier times, the pre-WW II period is often cited as exemplary -- yet our initial performance in that War showed many failures...

A significant part of the problem is shown in this quote from the original article of a statement by the then FCS Program Manager :<blockaquote>"But we would ask that you remember, this is the Army program and youre in the Army."</blockquote>That from a rather shortsighted lecture to CGSC Students on how to group think.

All that and reading of both articles which have merit and the response above could lead one to ask "How did we get this stupid?"

The answer is complex and starts with the premise that this is not new -- we've been blundering about like this for over 200 years. The problem is the governmental process -- which is not likely to change -- and the very human tendencies toward parochialism and resistance to change -- both of which <i>can</i> be reoriented.

For the Nation, those latter two aspects really require modification. I doubt any of the services will change of their own volition -- but they should.

Id like to thank Mr. Purser for reading my paper and developing a thoughtful response. That is the point of writing such things, after all.

Mr. Purser seems to have missed the main point of my paper. I do not advocate that "strategic planners should avoid attempts to describe the future," but rather warn against using those descriptions as justification for developing leap-ahead capabilities at great expense that may not be feasible or relevant when complete. Mr. Pursers accurate statement that "Service bias for and against certain military missions overwhelms the ability to objectively develop long-term futures studies, and prevents logical force development based on those predictions" supports my thesis as much as my paper supports his. Individuals making these types of modernization and procurement decisions will not soon lose this "institutional bias," and identifying it as such wont change the poor application to future predictions.

Mr. Purser takes issue with my "completely contradictory comparative analysis of the futures predictions" found in the current QDR and the 1970 Strategy for Peace written by then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. First of all, I didnt compare the two documents to each other. I was using the QDR to illustrate how the lack of a single focal point for defense (such as the Soviet Union) made mission specificity difficult. Mr. Purser disagrees, stating that the QDR is "quite specific when describing future missions for the DoD." This is somewhat surprising, as the QDR basically tells the services to be able to do everything along the full spectrum of operations without outlining how they will do it:

"This QDR likewise assumes the need for a robust force capable of protecting U.S. interests against a multiplicity of threats, including two capable nation-state aggressors ... the U.S. Armed Forces must be capable of conducting a wide range of operations, from homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities, to deterrence and preparedness missions, to the conflicts we are in and the wars we may someday face." (2010 QDR, p.42)

Further, Mr. Purser says that the QDR is not the place for providing a description of how DoD should be "prepared to accomplish each of the missions it prescribes." In fact, legislation describes fifteen very specific pieces of information that must be contained in the QDR, which, if answered, would describe how DoD would accomplish its assigned missions. These items include:

"The assumptions used in the review, including assumptions relating to (A) the status of readiness of United States forces; (B) the cooperation of allies, mission-sharing and additional benefits to and burdens on United States forces resulting from coalition operations; (C) warning times; (D) levels of engagement in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies and withdrawal from such operations and contingencies; and (E) the intensity, duration, and military and political end-states of conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies.

The effect on the force structure and on readiness for high-intensity combat of preparations for and participation in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies.

The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the reserve components can capably discharge those roles and missions.

The strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and ground transportation capabilities required to support the national defense strategy.

The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory deployments necessary under the national defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts.

The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.

The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the national defense strategy.

The effect on force structure of the use by the armed forces of technologies anticipated to be available for the ensuing 20 years." (CRS Rept RL 34505 May 2008)

Mr. Purser felt that my use (and praise) of Lairds Strategy for Peace contradicted my thesis. I disagree. Laird was not predicting the future nor did he intend to. He was recommending a coherent, holistic strategy to deal with the current environment (which, by the way, contained a major Nation-State enemy, which greatly simplified the equation). In Lairds words, he wanted "to give you [President Nixon] my view of the basic approach we should follow in seeking to implement your Foreign Policy and Strategy for Peace in the 1970s." My point in using the Laird document was to show that the Services would not adopt a well constructed strategy from the SecDef if it did not match their vision of the future.

Finally, in my recommendations, I do not say that "long-term futures predictions should be avoided." In fact, I state that I "do not suggest that the Army should stop looking far into the future for promising technology and new capability requirements." My concern is that too often capabilities designed to address a particular vision of the future are prematurely adopted at the expense of everything else. A recent interview with GEN Peter Chiarelli sounds eerily familiar to previous interviews with Army leadership regarding FCS. When asked if the Army had a plan B for the development for the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), such as upgrades of current systems, GEN Chiarelli responded "Were totally committed to GCV." He was then asked "So, no?" and repeated the same line.(Defense News, 25OCT10, p.102) Hopefully the fact that the Army has already withdrawn the GCV RFP once for rewrites is a sign we are not going down the FCS road again.