Area Denial & Falklands War Lessons Learned - Implications for Land Warfare 2030-2040: After the Army’s Theater Arrival - The Coming Complex Fight

The final scenario using the Duffer's Drift approach:

<strong>North Korea/China/Taiwan 2030</strong>

<strong>Background.</strong> Given their economic links, a superpower war made little sense due to mutually assured economic destruction. Nevertheless, China’s labor force declined due to the one-child policy and aging seniors. Their real estate bubble burst with mortgage payments proportionally far too high compared to what U.S. home-owners pay. Income levels did rise but the net effect was manufactured goods no longer were cheaper. This eliminated China’s double-digit export-based economic expansion in the 2020s. This and China’s perception of containment by Air-Sea battle also led to a Chinese relationship with Russia in the Pacific and Arctic for oil drilling and land trade and pipeline routes.

In addition, China and Russia developed a contingency for invading Taiwan and disputed northern Japan islands in the event of another Korean war. If seized, these islands would position China and Russia to threaten ports and airfields within and beyond the first island chain. The logic was a Korean war distraction coupled with an adversary coalition would leave the U.S. in a dilemma. How could the U.S. defend South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Hawaii, and parts of Alaska and our mainland ports simultaneously from the air and sea alone. U.S. land forces were no longer forward-deployed or prepositioned in the Pacific in adequate numbers.

The adversary opportunity came when North Korea’s middle-aged leader died of a heart attack with an heir too young to take charge. Subsequent chaos developed as some Army elements sought to reunite with the South while others favored closer relations with China leading DPRK Army elements divided on whether to attack or support South Korea.

<strong>Air.</strong> The air war against North Korea’s and ancient jets was no contest. However, some North Korean missiles had hit airfields causing runway, aircraft, and fuel storage damage while infiltrators also attacked with mortars and portable missiles. The Russians also infiltrated special operations mortars with precision munitions into the U.S. and the Chinese similarly struck Guam to attack the few U.S. bases hosting B-2s and LRS-B bombers.

The specter of a limited DPRK nuclear attack threatened Korean ports and major airfields. Our nuclear retaliation would necessarily be limited due to fallout proximity of North Korea to allied and adversary neighbors and fears of ICMB attacks on the U.S. west coast and Hawaii cities. The U.S. instead attempted to destroy most of the North’s nuclear missiles and tunneled artillery with conventional cruise missiles, bombers, and fighter airpower from the U.S., Japan, the Philippines, and Guam. However, the air-based offset strategy had lost some of its edge given the enemy’s asymmetric response attacking vulnerable massed bombers on the ground.

With many bombers out of the picture, our F-22s and F-35s bore the brunt of defending the Pacific. Taiwan and South Korean F-16s were ineffective against China’s modern stealth fleet. China and Russia launched hundreds of short-range DF-15 and Iskander missiles against Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. These further hampered U.S. and South Korea airfield operations and U.S. land force sea deployment. However, J-20s firing ling-range missiles downed several non-stealthy refueling and AWACS aircraft. Our stealth jet fleet was effective against Chinese and Russian fighters but also had to disperse to defend Japan, Korea, Guam, Alaska, the Philippines, and Hawaii, without massing aircraft on the ground and presenting a lucrative missile target.

<strong>Sea.</strong> The sea war against North Korea should have been no contest. But surprise Chinese assistance from submarines and shore-based anti-ship missiles put our ships and carriers in danger. The simultaneous Russian and Chinese targeting of our ships and aircraft in and near U.S. ports also surprised us. DF-21D missiles missed our carriers because their over-the-horizon radars and satellites were destroyed and our jamming and missile defenses were effective. Carriers also maintained stand-off and employed aerial refueling.

One sortie of periodic Russian bomber flights into the Gulf of Mexico suddenly launched cruise missiles. This coupled with Iskander missiles out of Cuba, and Klub missiles launched from Russian submarines and container ships off our southeast coasts engaged U.S. southern and eastern bases. This damaged mission command nodes, carriers, destroyers, and numerous aircraft on the ground at Oceana Naval Air Station, Langley, and Tyndall. Attacks also occurred against the Pentagon, Norfolk, CENTCOM, and USSOCOM headquarters, Army and Navy flight training facilities, and Air Force Special Operations aircraft.

Simultaneously, China was attacking San Diego, Hawaii, Seattle bases, Guam, and Japanese bases and ports with its own container ship-disguised Klub-K missiles and submarines. The near-absence of forward land forces left the air and sea parts of Air-Sea battle and its related “offset strategy” looking weak. Plus, now even effective air and seapower was split between attacking North Korea and Chinese crossings against Taiwan, and Russian attacks on some Japanese islands.

<strong>Land.</strong> Someone had convinced several Presidents to withdraw most U.S. ground forces from Korea and Japan in the 2020s so now the limited missile and port attacks in the Pacific and homeland were making it difficult for the U.S. to reinforce the ROK Army let alone mount a defense against the Chinese invasion of Taiwan, or Russian advances on northern Japanese islands. When China and Russia surprisingly assisted what remained of the North Korean Army, even the superb Republic of Korea (ROK) army had problems without U.S. ground assistance.

Massive casualties resulted as the Chinese and DPRK troops pushed south with little U.S. ground force assistance due to 2020s withdrawals. Simultaneously, ground forces were unable to support Taiwan since offers for hosting greater ground forces in the Philippines and Japan had never been adopted by U.S. administrations and Marines had withdrawn from Okinawa under pressure from local governments.

An offshore control strategy had been planned using Soldiers, Marines, and seapower to board and stop oil and other ships at Malacca and other chokepoints. However, it was proving difficult to deploy ground forces to board ships. Also, Chinese pipelines to Russia now exploited land and arctic sea drilling, and ample South China Sea oil existed. The Chinese export economy now was less critical since improvements in Chinese wages meant a greater GDP emphasis on Chinese consumers and East Russia and Arctic oil-producing customers.

<strong>North Korea/China/Taiwan 2030 Alternate Path</strong>

<strong>Background.</strong> Instead of reliance on an “offset strategy” that resulted in a smaller Army, new administrations had acknowledged how critical is was to retain a credible forward land presence. Earlier wars in Iraq/Syria and deterrence re-attained in part with ground forces in Europe had verified the need for a large Active Army.

These forces were prepositioned and rotated in small elements to reduce costs and present a small, less lucrative missile target. This dispersion at many locations of the Philippines, Japan, Australia, and South Korea also maintained a broader forward presence for multiple points of entry and envelopment of threats. The potential for war with North Korea, Chinese aggression against Taiwan, and the need for ground forces for other Pacific contingencies added to the wisdom of keeping a balanced Joint force.

<strong>Air.</strong> With U.S. ground elements close to Taiwan and on South Korea, air and seapower no longer had to exclusively handle all the heavy-lifting. Small F-35 and F-22 teams deployed rapidly to many airfields beyond Chinese short-range missiles employing aerial refueling. These originated from multiple inland U.S. bases removing any realistic possibility of a surprise attack. Marine F-35Cs operated near and on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea using roads and short airfields. The LRS-B built by this time had been well-protected by laser defenses against precision munitions employed by enemy SOF. They pummeled North Korean and Chinese land and amphibious forces, and dispersed sea mines as amphibious ships attempted to seize Taiwan and disputed Japanese islands.

After bombing, LRS-B refueling/airdrop variants with slightly less stealth and optionally-manned F-35s and F/A-XXs performed aerial and buddy refueling of stealth fighters. Conventional aerial refuelers concentrated on topping off stealth refuelers from Guam, Hawaii, and northern Japan and refueling carrier-based fighters maintaining standoff from DF-21Ds. AWACS and E-2Ds provided ample warning to conventional refuelers to avoid long range Chinese air-to-air missiles. They also overwatched C-130s and LRS-B airdrop version landing and parachuting Army Rangers and airborne troops onto Taiwan’s east coast masked by the large center-island mountain range. These forces conducted guerilla attacks against Chinese forces that made it to Taiwan as the PLA attempted to hug civilians to avoid air attacks.

<strong>Sea.</strong> Given a divided focus on Taiwan, Korea, and Japan, the Navy and Air Force destroyed many but not enough amphibious ships and aircraft allowing China to gain a Taiwan and Japanese island foothold.. As the Navy continued attacking reinforcements and supply ships, Army and Marine future vertical lift (FVL) aircraft conducted island- and ship-hopping air assaults from Japan and the Philippines, and even Australia, Hawaii, and Alaska. This landed conventional infantry elements to secure Joint High Speed Vessel ports and Marine beachheads bringing Army and Marine armor to primitive Pacific sites.

Mobile landing platforms fired MLRS rounds from their wide decks and supported FVL aircraft lily pads. Littoral combat ships and small surface combatants (SSC) provided ship to shore indirect fires and additional FVL lily pads for ground force support. These ships also supported mine and submarine detection, and supported boarding and diversion of China-bound merchant and oil ships. EA-18G jamming and miniature air-launched decoys/jammers confused Chinese and Russian fighters, long-range air-to-air missiles, and ship-to-air radars. Navy Trident high altitude unmanned aircraft and P-8s provided wide area security to pinpoint Chinese and Russian ships and submarines. High-powered lasers and rail guns on Navy surface vessels provided close-in air defense against fighter aircraft, unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles, and even ballistic missiles.

<strong>Land.</strong> Thankfully, the ROK Army and forward presence manned and unmanned U.S. ground forces were proving effective and less vulnerable to DF-15s given their dispersion and armor. Prepositioning of Army heavy armor, Strykers, and Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) in the Philippines, northern Japan, and other small islands outside PLA short-ranged missile range, assisted and protected intertheater entry into the Pacific. Even more critically it demonstrated commitment to Pacific allies and a willingness to share risks and training challenges against short and mid-range missile attacks. Shorter-distance intratheater air and sea deployment was then enabled to Taiwan and Korea as applicable. Army and Navy air defenses protected many non-Taiwan ports and airfields. Army armor with rotational forces protected those air defenses from covert ground attacks.

One prepositioning strategy included storage aboard 100-car trains with a mix of armor, trucks, fuel, ammunition, and supplies/equipment inside covered cars. Trains frequently were moved, and cars looked alike so any missile targeting would be unable to discern which cars held higher value armor and which held trucks and lesser value gear. This complicated submunition attacks even if missiles and other sensors found the moving train. Trains also had ramps doubling as sides that permitted truck and armor offloading without requiring a station. This assisted dispersion at field sites and offload of cars even if tracks were targeted. This same technique had been implemented in NATO, the Pacific, and Kuwait in the 2020s.

Examples of high value forward-deployed armor included Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). These had special unmanned aircraft rounds for initial employment against aircraft and cruise missiles. Each minimal signature unmanned aircraft in an MLRS four-pack carried two AIM-120 AMRAAM radar missiles for engaging air targets. AWACS and E-2D radar aircraft and Patriot missile mission command sites provided radar vectors via data link to MLRS-launched unmanned aircraft to engage inbound targets. Other MLRS systems had anti-ship rounds on standby in the event enemy ships closed within range. Philippines-based and Mobile Landing Platform parked MLRS also could target ships crossing the Taiwan Straits.

<strong>Whole of Government.</strong> The State Department assured China and Russia that no deep penetration of their mainlands would occur but that shore, off-shore drilling, and arctic pipeline targets and seas between China and around North Korea or Taiwan would be fair game for bombing, mines, ship engagements, and ship-or drilling-platform boarding via future vertical lift fast rope. Thus, the U.S. conveyed intentions for an offshore control tactic upfront to inform the Chinese and Russians that this was not going to be a “short, sharp war,” nor would it likely escalate to nuclear weapons. By guaranteeing no deep penetration, the Chinese and Russians would not worry that penetrating LRS-B were carrying a nuclear rather than a conventional warheads. In addition, the State Department assured allies of their commitment as a coalition and that post-war aid would occur.

Land force support of Korean, Taiwan, and Japanese stability operations was enhanced by 3-D printers mounted on palletized loading system (PLS) flatracks. These melted and molded lighter plastic cubes that were airdropped, trucked in unmanned vehicles, and slung-load to be shaped into fencing and dirt-filled barriers. These barriers would canalize traffic into checkpoints, host embedded sensors, and block line-of-sight at known ambush/sniper/IED sites. They would surround and protect combat outposts and secured villages to keep infiltrators out or insurgents in with a few entry/exit checkpoints. Some 3-D printer molds constructed COP buildings and remote weapons and sensor towers. National Guard units had extensive prior U.S. experience using 3-D printers to construct northern and southern border fencing and to build flood, hurricane, and fire barriers and shore supports against rising sea levels.

The Duffer's Drift approach continues:

<strong>Baltics/Ukraine 2016</strong>

<strong>Background.</strong> After Putin’s Crimea and East Ukraine seizures, he grew greedier in 2016 attempting similar aggression in eastern Baltic States and more of the Ukraine. Our Special Forces had taught Ukrainians to sabotage pipelines and down Russian aircraft. Putin retaliated by placing new conventional Iskander ballistic and cruise missiles in Cuba (after the new Congress blocked renewed relations) and West Russia thus threatening key military installations along the U.S. southern coasts and NATO East and Central Europe. Unfortunately, NATO states had not increased defense spending to even 2% of GDP and had dismantled most tank armor. Little except a “rapid reaction force” of 5,000 was available to battle “ Russian “separatists” spread across numerous Baltic and Ukrainian states. Putin knew the lame duck American administration’s attention was diverted to Iraq/Syria which would limit U.S. commitments to battling “separatists,” just as they largely had been ignored in 2014 and 2015.

<strong>Air.</strong> With a minimal stealth fighter and B-2 fleet in 2016, the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marines faced severe radar air defense threats from Russia. B-52s and B-1Bs could not survive that threat other than using stand-off missiles nor could A-10s or other 4th generation fighter aircraft. Even the new Eurofighter was at grave risk. Limited Army AH-64s remained in Germany but only in a single combat aviation brigade. By now Russia had fielded more effective and numerous Mi-28 Havocs and Ka-50/52s. Air defenses and Russian fighter jets also threatened our helicopters and remotely piloted Reapers.

<strong>Sea.</strong> Much had been made of Chinese anti-access/area denial capabilities but of course the Russians had their own capabilities that threatened NATO seapower in the Black and Baltic Seas. F/A-18E/Fs and even Navy Tomahawks also were non-survivable against Russian radar air defenses. The two Russian amphibious ships purchased from France were now available off Romania’s coast along with other ships threatening any sea-based U.S. amphibious reinforcement. Russian mines and anti-ship missiles could deny U.S. and NATO access to both east Baltic and Black Seas if a large Marine or NATO amphibious and surface ship group approached. Iskander and sea-based missiles in and near Cuba and the Gulf and east coasts also threatened U.S. bases and ports given a large U.S. commitment to NATO.

<strong>Land.</strong> Without prepositioned armor in East Europe, NATO countries had few realistic options against Russian “separatist” armor in the east Baltics and southwest Ukraine. Apaches and German Tigers inflicted losses but several also were lost to radar air defenses and Russian helicopters. NATO armored defenses were minimal, and the U.S. was already committed against ISIS and Syria. American Strykers reinforced the Baltics from Germany and European “rapid reaction” armor finally arrived to prevent further aggression but not in numbers sufficient to retake lost ground. Sea-deployment of additional U.S. armor from stateside would be hazardous and slow given potential Russian A2/AD and sailing speeds. Air deployment was not an option due to airlifter payload and quantity constraints and inability to put any heavy brigade armor in a C-130.

<strong>Baltics/Ukraine 2025 Deterrence</strong>

<strong>Background.</strong> NATO European nations had greatly enhanced ground deterrence in East Europe and increased defense spending in reaction to Russian aggression in the Baltics in 2016. Many European bases now dispersed small U.S. air and land elements. Prepositioned U.S. Army armor, artillery, and helicopters moved to field sites frequently and air-deployed forces dispersed immediately after landing at numerous East Europe sites. This complicated any surprise Russian missile attacks. There were no Iskanders in Cuba after the U.S. had renewed trade and relations and Russian support evaporated given low oil prices. Missile defenses in East Europe were installed despite Russian protests.

<strong>Air.</strong> The Rapid Raptor concept was applied to F-35 European basing that could host small aircraft numbers at multiple bases each with teams of four F-35s, two F-22s, fuel and ammunition trucks, and C-17 carried CONEXs with common parts and tools. Conventional bombers, if necessary, could launch joint stand-off weapons from well over Western and Central Europe to stay outside Russian air defense range. The first of the USAF Long-Range Strike Bombers also were available along with B-2s but had strict orders not to penetrate Russian airspace lest it lead to nuclear escalation.

<strong>Sea.</strong> As required, carrier F-35Cs could launch from the Mediterranean and off Great Britain and France so as not to be constrained within the smaller Black or Baltic Seas closer to Russian air defenses, missiles, and fighter jets. Once Russian air defenses were reduced, sea-launched cruise missiles also would become a greater factor. U.S. LRS-B bombers could mine harbors and chokepoints where Russian ship originated in the Baltics and Black Sea. Navy small underwater unmanned systems could pinpoint Russian subs along with P-8 aircraft and LCS-launched airborne systems. Land- and sea-based Aegis systems augmented THAAD and Patriot systems to protect East Europe as well.

<strong>Land.</strong> Prepositioning of U.S., German, Dutch, and British armor in East Europe provided a visible commitment that a still-ruling Putin could understand. Each Eastern NATO country facing Russia had small company team-sized elements of U.S. heavy armor, engineer, and artillery systems were parked and moved frequently on special trains to prevent Iskander targeting. Contractors and host nation forces dispersed these assets off trains during times of high tensions as U.S. forces deployed to theater as a show of commitment. Newly-developed MLRS-launched unmanned aircraft could launch and loiter with each carrying two AMRAAM missiles to attack Russian cruise missiles and aircraft attacking NATO nations. HEMTT-mounted laser weapons could destroy precision munitions launched by Russian special forces. Each year as part of the peacetime deterrent, Army forces rotated through multiple NATO nations over several months using their prepositioned equipment and training with allies while maintaining and exercising their armor. Army Aviation also was flown into theater to rotate through numerous countries during exercises. Army air and missile defenses also provided permanent support along with Ground Aegis systems.

<strong>Whole of Government.</strong> Sanctions continued throughout the 2016 to 2025 timeframe reducing Russian military modernization capabilities. Greater American fracking on federal lands commencing in 2017 coupled with the Keystone Pipeline bill passed after a veto override in 2015, brought down worldwide energy prices limiting Russia’s ability to use energy sales to finance offensive military capabilities. NATO avoided provocative expansions, and negotiated sales of some Baltic state lands to Russia who would pay using energy resources. All seemed resolved, however, Russia grew closer to China and expanded arctic drilling partially to compensate for a stronger NATO and European Union and partially to benefit from China’s expanding economic power to finance a viable Arctic/Pacific coalition.