By Brigadier General Jeff Buchanan & Major Todd Clark
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Task Force Mountain assumed responsibility for Coalition Forces (CF) in Multi-National Division-Center in June, 2008. Upon the completion of its tour, the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) -- now as Multi-National Division-South -- oversaw nine provinces encompassing the entire southern portion of Iraq. Within these provinces, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) included nine Provincial Directorates of Police (PDoP) of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), three Iraqi Army (IA) divisions, three National Police (NP) brigades, and three regional Directorates of Border Enforcement along both the Saudi Arabian and Iranian borders.
Through this collection of observations regarding teaching / coaching / mentoring the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), we intend to provide a holistic view of ISF professionalization endeavors in MND-S. We do not focus on a specific ISF component, but rather generalize to cover the IA, the NP, the IPS, and the Department of Border Enforcement.
Coalition Forces (CF) operations in the sovereign Republic of Iraq changed significantly with the implementation of the Security Agreement. The primacy of CF for both operations and national decision making yielded to elected Iraqi officials and ISF leaders regarding both political and operational decisions. The significant transformation from having CF "in the lead" with a token attempt to "put an Iraqi face" on operations has developed into fully Iraqi-led and inspired endeavors. In effect, CF now serve in a "supporting" instead of "supported" role.
The change to the operational environment required aggressive endeavors by CF leaders to set the conditions for Iraqi partners' success. This does not mean that the CF must acquiesce to every Iraqi concept. It does require that the CF both understands and appreciates the nuances of the Iraq operational environment. The key to assisting the goals of the Republic of Iraq -- particularly the ISF -- lies in developing influence with ISF partners.
We believe that the key operational demand in Iraq is developing cultural intelligence within CF partnership units. Cultural intelligence is a broad term that denotes gaining the ability to work in different cultures with a minimum of friction. The friction -- often caused by cultural ignorance -- threatens both relationships and force protection. This is primarily because the two are largely intertwined. BCTs may improve their capabilities by developing intellectual capacities, honing social skills, and through regular exposure to the local populace and environment. In addition, it is critical to understand the limitations of western culture. Many "best practices" are counter to the "American Way." It is important to be cognizant of such things as pride and vanity -- and the different views of these traits in differing societies.
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I clearly agree with the concepts BG Buchannon and MAJ Clark have described. As the Army's AAB proof of principle brigade, we have expended considerable effort to change the mindset of the brigade's leaders to place building their relationships with their key counterparts at the forefront of their efforts. Part of the relationship building process is insuring leaders understand the political, social and cultural dynamics that each ISF leader has to operate in before asking them to do something or before passing judgment on their performance. Setting the conditions that influence or allow an ISF/GOI leader (or leaders) to take a particular action have become crucial to our operations.
Three things we protect at all costs in Southern Iraq today are the legitimacy of our Advise and Assist Mission, our relationships with our counterparts, and the transparency of our operations in support of the GOI and ISF.
Success of the mindset change speaks volumes. Today we operate with more Soldiers in the cities than we did before June 30th because they are drawn their by their counterparts to train and to solve problems. Likewise we enjoy better COP and intelligence due to the strength of the relationships we have with the ISF leaders we support.