COMPOUND MARITIME (IN)SECURITY

Epilogue ...

 

Imagine, ... in a tension-gripped year of 2028, the world inches towards a novel kind of warfare—one that sprawls across the arteries of international trade, the maritime chokepoints.

 

In the Strait of Hormuz, an insidious cyber onslaught disrupts the flow of oil, sending the United States and China into a scramble of military posturing and peace-brokering. A drone strike targeting a vessel in the Suez Canal escalates tensions, with fingers pointing towards Chinese military strategists, compelling the US to strengthen its Mediterranean fleet and Russia to show off its naval capabilities in response.

 

In the South China Sea, Chinese AI drones aggressively assert dominance, intimidating neighboring nations into a fraught dance of diplomacy and deterrence. The Panama Canal, too, falls prey to cyber interference, triggering delays that highlight the influence of Russian digital operatives and stretching American naval defenses.

 

Dramatically altering the naval chessboard, Russia and China join forces to pioneer the Northern Sea Route, proposing an alternative to the conventional maritime corridors dominated by Western powers and introducing a bold challenge to the status quo.

 

Even as the Black Sea burgeons with tension and Brazil's southern ports enter the stage as geopolitical prizes, the consequences of disrupted global commerce are felt worldwide—from soaring costs to shattered economies.

 

With the international community in tumult, the UN convenes to address the shattering potential of widespread conflict. Secretive diplomatic endeavors aim to forge a semblance of agreement, yet the enduring undercurrent of rivalry casts a long shadow over the future of international maritime law and the collective hope for enduring peace.

 

 

This foretold story is a near-future thriller.  "The Battle of the Straits: A Geopolitical Maelstrom," weaves a tale of clandestine cyber skirmishes and shadowy military maneuvers that threaten the delicate lattice of global commerce.

 

The storyline unravels across several strategic locations.  Terse and potent, the story captures the real-world implications of these clashes: disrupted supply chains, skyrocketing costs of trade, and an ever-complicating global political matrix of alliances and enmities. As nations grapple with these emerging threats, the narrative explores the repercussions for local economies, marking a stark rise in regional tensions and an accelerating arms race.

 

"The Battle of the Straits" ends as a stark allegory for the potential crises that might arise from the world's growing geopolitical fissures—where the all-too-real game of nations plays out in the waters that carry the lifeblood of global trade. 

 

Unfortunately, this stark allegory told as a useful fiction is now an actuality, of a world where the stability, security, and prosperity of the ‘Global (Maritime) Commons’, are now rapidly becoming a deadly “Un-Commons.”

 

Future security, prosperity, and profits lie in the balance of ‘winning’ this “Battle of the Straits” now begun; most importantly, doing so in preventive ‘ways’ that can achieve ‘wins’ without fighting.   

 

 

COMPOUND MARITIME (IN)SECURITY

Strong pointing Trade Security & Profitability in the Global ‘Un-Commons’ thru “3D+C” Integrated Statecraft Solutions

(a ‘compound security competition’ (CsC) use case)

 

By Isaiah (Ike) Wilson III, PhD

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Challenges to maritime security, especially in choke points like the Red Sea, threaten global trade and present complex, ‘compound security’ issues. These challenges include military threats to navigation that affect energy supplies, economic stability, and efforts to address climate insecurity issues, and especially through energy transition. The United States' Operation Prosperity Guardian seeks to safeguard the waters of the Red Sea and the Bab al Mandeb strait but has had limited success. Current military and diplomatic strategies are inadequate to fully protect these vital economic lifelines, hence the need for a multifaceted "3D+C" approach—combining Defense, Diplomacy, Development, and Commercial strategies.

 

Maritime security directly influences financial stability. Disruptions in choke points impact global markets, hindering trade and inflating costs. These threats pose economic risks at global, regional, and local levels, potentially affecting investment confidence, pricing, and livelihoods. An integrated "3D+C" approach is crucial for ensuring a secure and stable maritime trading environment to mitigate those risks.  Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) in choke point regions can bolster local economies, enhance security infrastructure, and contribute to regional stability. Strategic investments can transform local choke points into assets of regional stability by improving employment, economic planning, and governance.

 

The proposal promotes a state-centric, private-public partnered maritime security solution, where governments maintain control and leverage commercial investments. It contrasts with privatized security models, ensuring that key decisions are guided by collective good and strategic foresight rather than by purely profit motives.  Human security is a fundamental component of this strategy. Protecting and empowering individuals in choke point regions is essential, fostering safer conditions for maritime activity and reinforcing the socio-political fabric against potential security threats.

 

Conclusively, an integrated “3D+C” approach, with a focus on state control and investments in human and local security, offers a robust solution to maritime security challenges. It aligns defense, diplomacy, development, and commercial interests, ensuring safe navigation and stability in maritime choke points, contributing to global economic growth and prosperity. Such a holistic approach ensures the protection of commerce, local communities, and the global supply chain.

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Defining and Addressing the Proximate Challenge: The ‘world-system’s’[1] oceans and its related ecosystems are undeniably ‘shared’ (hence, the concept of a global oceans “commons”), but increasingly violently contested (and hence, a rising ‘un-commoning’ of the global maritime commons).  In the present-day context, 90 percent of global trade transport through oceans, which are laced by a network of shipping routes connecting continents and Islands with one another around the world (Alexander, 1992). Commercial shipping and warships often travel through straits, channels and narrows waterways to reduce transport costs; and time of transport is money. Similarly, these narrow areas of convergence prove geostrategically determinative, for their use and utility, throughout the ages, for purposes of interdiction of commercial trade traffic, to purposes of war-fare and peace-fare.  For millennia, at least fourteen (14) specific passageways, referred to as ‘choke points’ (Rodrigue, 2004), have proven historically determinative for world-system stability, in both geopolitical and geoeconomic terms.

 

Houthi attacks in the Red Sea today, hurt global trade and slow the energy transition. Recent attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea have underscored the importance of seaborne international trade and challenged the role of the United States in safeguarding commerce in the global commons. Maritime trade of energy, especially, is of fundamental importance to the security of supply for energy and to the price felt by consumers worldwide. In addition, the effects of a major disruption to freedom of navigation holds many damaging but indirect consequences—including slowing progress on addressing climate change.

 

 

These ‘intersectionalities’ define the Houthi anti-maritime attacks at the Bab al Mandeb Strait, and across the Red Sea, as a set of local ‘troubles’ for sure; but more strategically consequential, as a global compound security dilemma. The additional fact that these ‘local acts’ of resistance and/or terrorism (depending on your point-of-view) are also proxy and surrogate moves in a wider ‘great game’ afoot, only makes this compound security dilemma more complex and intractable to traditional forms of intervention treatments.   Again, let’s look clear-eyed and critically at the ongoing Iranian-supplied Houthi attacks in and around the Red Sea’s Bab al Mandeb chokepoint. The United States’ response to the attacks, Operation Prosperity Guardian, concentrates naval assets and command-and-control bandwidth on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, wedged between the Horn of Africa and the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula. Operation Prosperity Guardian has engaged Houthi drones, surface-to-ship ballistic missiles, small combatant vessels, and other arms in defense of merchant traffic and naval assets. However, the operation has thus far failed to deter further Houthi attacks and have equally failed to provide assurance of safe passage to commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea. 

rising insurance premiums to shipping industry

 

           

Appreciating ‘Compound’ Maritime Insecurity.

 

Compound maritime insecurity refers to the multifaceted threats that arise in strategic maritime zones, particularly around global chokepoints – narrow channels critical for international navigation. These chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Malacca, facilitate a significant portion of the world's trade and energy supplies, making their security paramount for global economic stability.

 

Quick Analysis: The dynamics that define compound maritime insecurity include, but are not limited to, piracy, terrorism, smuggling, illegal fishing, and geopolitical tensions. These threats are interconnected, with one often exacerbating another. For instance, piracy can be linked to weak state governance, which in turn may be exploited by terrorist groups, further destabilizing the region.

 

Quick Examination: In a detailed examination, we find that the negative consequences of compound maritime insecurity for shipping include the disruption of global trade flows, increased costs due to rerouting or heightened insurance premiums, and the physical risks to cargo and crew. These challenges have a pronounced impact on the supply chains and can lead to global market volatility.

For littoral states, or those adjacent to maritime chokepoints, compound insecurity can exacerbate existing governance and fragility issues. Weak coastal and port security can invite criminal activity, which can erode state authority. This erosion manifests in decreased economic growth due to diminished investor confidence and potential loss of shipping revenues, thereby straining the already fragile governance structures.

 

Quick Evaluation: The impact of compound maritime insecurity on shipping and littoral state governance and fragility is severe and has several dimensions:

 

 

Compound maritime insecurity at global chokepoints presents complex challenges that can have detrimental knock-on effects for shipping, global trade, and the governance and stability of littoral states. Its multi-layered nature requires a coordinated response that combines local governance strengthening, regional cooperation, and international support to ensure the security and free passage through these critical maritime arteries. Addressing the root causes of insecurity, such as economic disparity, political fragility, and inadequate law enforcement, is also crucial for sustainable solutions that benefit all stakeholders.

 

Given the complexity of these diverse maritime regions and their respective security dynamics, a fully detailed examination of each individual use case would be exceedingly lengthy and beyond the scope of this prospectus. However, what follows is a concise amended analysis that considers the compound maritime insecurity within these specific locations.

 

 

In evaluating the complexities across these chokepoints and regions, it is apparent that compound maritime insecurity takes on distinctive forms influenced by local and regional factors. The overarching negative consequences range from economic losses due to disruptions in shipping routes to heightened regional tensions and governance challenges posed by illicit activities, natural disasters, and geopolitical strife.

Each region demands tailored strategies that address not only immediate security concerns but also long-term regional cooperation and development. The imperative involves strengthening maritime governance, fostering resilient infrastructure, and ensuring a balance in great power involvement. It's particularly relevant for regions like the Strait of Hormuz and the Black Sea, where great power competitions intensify security risks.  Rapid responses to incidents like the Suez Canal blockage and the fortification of infrastructure against both cyber and environmental threats, as seen in the US Gulf Coast, are examples of measures needed to combat compound maritime insecurity. Additionally, multi-lateral frameworks that encourage cooperation, as seen in the Strait of Malacca through coordinated patrols by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, offer models for regional approaches to managing maritime security.

 

Understanding the ‘Proximate’ Problem in its ‘Enlarged Context’:  What’s unique about this new global security environment, and what are we missing?  War is, once again and everywhere, on the rise. And our existing structures and processes for planning and analysis, including our military-civilian campaigning ways, are not sufficient for todays and tomorrow’s needs. The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London’s annual Armed Conflict Survey paints a grim picture of rising violence and highlights a paradoxical global security landscape: where a popular sense of an “intractability” of crises coexists with a condition of unsober and unseriousness in realizing and coping with the full gravity of today’s security dilemmas. As historian Max Hasting further notes,

 

... One of the primary reasons Europe went to war in 1914 is that none of the big players were as frightened as they should have been, of conflict as a supreme human catastrophe. After a century in which the continent had experienced only limited wars, from which Prussia had been an especially conspicuous profiteer, too many statesmen viewed war as a usable instrument of policy, which proved a catastrophic misjudgment.

 

Our current 20th century approach to confronting our adversaries – state and non-state – will fail. This is due to cultural, political, and environmental forces that are rapidly altering the environment of global geopolitical competition and hence accelerating the evolution of compound security threats.  Our adversaries at every level, subnational to nation state to regional, are exploiting this changed environment to present us with more dilemmas – radicalization, transnational crime, climate insecurity, forced population movements, etc., than the Force is equipped and structured to handle with current strategy and tactics. And this wicked compound ‘great game’ is playing out at its fiercest, at or near the global maritime un-commons. What is required for us to proact, respond, and win, is first, to: change how we campaign; second, align all elements of national power (defense, diplomacy, development, and commercial enterprise – 3D+C); third, enlist allies and partners in a novel “polycentric” security architecture; fourth, re-emphasize the importance of geography in the global commons (commercial advantage - Belt and Road, commerce choke-points - e.g., Houthi’s attacks in the Red Sea); and lastly, impose full-continuum costs on our adversaries everywhere, and all of the time.

 

Academic theories related to strategic geography (Corbett, early 20th century; Loewenstein et al., 2019) and contemporary statecraft (Art and Waltz, 1993; Wilson, 2021) underpin the need for a geostrategic approach to security, focusing on choke points that not only hold historical significance but also current geopolitical and economic value.  Moreover, the concept of societal resilience (Stephan, Marshall, & McGinnis, 2019; CGIAR, 2011) adds an additional layer to the strategy, arguing for a shift toward polycentric governance and bolstering less resilient nations' abilities to face security threats. (Smitson 2024).

 

 

The concept of polycentricity^[2] we find promising here.  Polycentric arrangements demonstrate characteristics of order; as the degree of order increases, the arrangements coalesce into a broader identifiable system. Researchers working in Latin America, West Africa, and elsewhere have successfully applied pseudo-polycentric concepts of vulnerability and resilience by mapping where indicators of exposure to hazards, poor infrastructure, underdeveloped markets, or weak governance overlap in the same place, though compound security threats tend to recur in the same locations over time (Ibarrarán et al. 2008, CGIAR 2011, Busby et al. 2012, Busby et al. 2014, OECD 2022, Thiel, Blomquist, Garrick 2019, Ostrom, Tiebout, Warren (‘OTW’) 1961). However, none of these researchers have explicitly investigated the use of societal resilience and vulnerability indicators for geo-targeting deterrence treatments against political and economic coercion by China and other predatory adversaries, state and nonstate.

 

Geostrategic Nexuses and Converging Threats: The theory of ‘compound security competition’ (CsC) emphasizes the importance of key geographic locations. CsC highlights how threats often converge in historically significant areas, which are also nodes of expansive projects like the Belt & Road (BRI) Initiative (also referred to as ‘One Belt, One Road’, OBOR).  Control over these strategic nexuses can provide substantial advantages, suggesting that these are the areas where forces should be deployed and where international power struggles will likely unfold. (Loewenstein et al. 2019, Tobler 1970, Wilson 2022) Short of including the compounding of otherwise discrete lines of threats, national security, and defense calculations of Force Requirements (i.e., Structure, Development, Modernization, Design) as well as Risk Assessments will suffer from an under-count, resulting in an unintended discounting of multipliers. These repercussions dramatically alter the risk calculus, risk reward, and benefits-to-costs factors critical to strategy planning, military-civil campaigning, policy decision-making, and the achievement of ‘comprehensive joint-combined readiness.

 

Figure. Geostrategic “Faultline Confrontations” Key ‘Nexes’ and Xi’s China’s Belt & Road Initiative Key ‘Nodes’

 

Geo-Strategic Dilemmas: Todays and tomorrow’s global un-commons security dilemmas demand nothing less than an overmatching and comprehensive readiness-based and configured “3D+C” integrated statecraft intervention regimen;[3] one premised upon “maxi-min” strategies—i.e., strategies that produce maximum positional advantaging effects (outcomes), at geostrategically-profound and determinative times and places, i.e., at or proximate to the global ‘Commanding Heights’.[4] (Wilson 2024)   The global maritime ‘commons’, and the 14-straits and chokepoints that ultimately define the relative strength or vulnerability of these ‘Commons’, are the places and spaces of most determinative geostrategic importance, for security, defense, and prosperity. The theory of CsC, translated and transposed into real-world practical operations, actions, activities, and investments (OAAs; OAIs), advocates for and promotes a dual ‘preventive defense’-premised maxi-min strategy to confront great power competition, specifically the growing influence of China, Russia, and Iran. First, a direct response is necessary, involving geopolitical, geostrategic, and tech-savvy measures, along with force projection to deter adversaries by denial or punishment. Second, an indirect response calls for supportive interventions aimed at aiding less resilient states and ethnic groups worldwide, helping them resist the threats and inducements from major competitors.  (Art and Waltz 1993, Wilson 2021)

 

Compound Security Threats (CSTs) demand nothing less than overmatching compound solutions.  And to achieve such ‘overmatch’ nothing less than integrative (and integrated) comprehensive whole of governments/societies pursuits are sufficient. Our Integrated 3D+C Statecraft approach provides that new innovative way.  Global “compound maritime insecurity” is the key dilemma arena of our contemporary times.  Upon diagnosing the increasingly chronic contagion threat of compound maritime insecurity, the ‘disease’, if you will, is multi-nodal, and metastatic.

 

Compounding Environmental Degradation Consequences. 

Compound maritime insecurity can lead to a range of environmental negative consequences, affecting both the health of the marine ecosystem and the human populations that rely on it. Such insecurity often signifies a lack of effective governance, diminished law enforcement capability, and an increase in illegal activities, all of which can contribute to the environmental degradation of the world's oceans and coastlines. Here is an assessment of some potential environmental negative consequences related to compound maritime insecurity:

 

 

Compound maritime insecurity exacerbates risks to marine ecosystems and undermines sustainable development. The interconnected nature of security and environmental stewardship demands integrated solutions that address governance, enforcement, and conservation collectively to protect the marine environment. Effective maritime security measures, along with international cooperation, are essential for combating environmental degradation and ensuring the preservation of the world's oceans for future generations.

    

Compounding Global Financial Risks. 

Stable and secure maritime routes are paramount for sustained economic growth, and disruptions can have cascading effects on financial markets and economies worldwide.

 

Any blockage, whether due to conflict, piracy, or other forms of disruption, poses systemic financial risks—leading to increased shipping costs, delayed deliveries, and volatile commodity markets. These disruptions have the potential to escalate into broader economic instability and could trigger significant insurance premium hikes, affecting the cost of goods and profitability for companies and consumers alike (Lloyds, 2013; World Shipping Council, n.d.).  Regionally, financial risks manifest in the potential for decreased foreign direct investment and trade within affected areas. Uncertainty and instability around chokepoints can deter investment, stifle economic growth, and make regional economic planning challenging (Smitson, 2024). Moreover, regional banking and financial services sectors, heavily reliant on cross-border transactions facilitated through maritime trade, may face liquidity constraints and credit risks when such trade is disrupted (IMF, 2017). The economic impacts on littoral communities and countries surrounding the chokepoints are locally and regionally consequential; yet, globally determinative. These localized communities are often economically reliant on the maritime sector for employment, from port operations to fishing industries. Security threats and disruptions can hamper these employment opportunities, potentially leading to higher local unemployment rates, reduced income, and increased poverty, which could contribute to a cycle of instability that further endangers maritime corridors (United Nations Development Programme, 1994).

 

Figure. Crude Oil Flows Thru Key Straits

 

At the global level, the security of maritime chokepoints has direct implications for the stability of international markets and trade. Any form of disruption in these critical junctures, whether due to piracy, terrorism, geopolitical conflicts, or natural disasters, can lead to significant increases in shipping costs and insurance premiums, delaying the flow of essential goods and commodities (Stopford, 2009). These increased operational costs have a ripple effect through global supply chains, leading to higher prices for end-users and impacting global financial markets (UNCTAD, 2021). Security issues at maritime chokepoints can lead to disruptions in shipping lanes, causing delays in global supply chains and potentially significant fluctuations in international commodity markets (Kaplan, 2012). The uncertainty and unpredictability injected into global trade can discourage investment, raise the cost of goods, and destabilize financial markets (Bernanke, 2007).

                

 

The "3D+C" strategy aims to mitigate these risks by enhancing security and ensuring the smooth passage of trade, which supports stable global economic growth and minimizes price volatility (World Bank, 2021). 

The economic impacts on littoral communities and countries surrounding the chokepoints are locally and regionally consequential; yet, globally determinative.

 

 

Regionally, the stability of chokepoint areas is vital for economic integration and trade cooperation. Disruptions can induce substantial financial risks by deterring investment, elevating the cost of regional trade, and potentially leading to economic isolation. By fostering regional collaboration through diplomacy and development initiatives, the "3D+C" strategy promotes regional economic resilience and helps safeguard against such economic shocks (OECD, 2016). Additionally, the development component emphasizes infrastructure and capacity building, contributing to regional economic development and integration, which can attract further investment, creating a virtuous cycle of stability and economic growth (IMF, 2020).  At the local level, the inhabitants of littoral chokepoint regions often face substantial financial risks due to their reliance on maritime trade and related industries for sustenance and income (Pereira, 2003). Any threat to maritime security could jeopardize local livelihoods, exacerbate poverty, and possibly drive populations towards illicit activities, further undermining security.  The comprehensive "3D+C" strategy actively addresses these issues by targeting development projects – specifically within strait-littoral countries, and more pointedly, at those chokepoint states most fragile and non-responsive signatories to the UNCLOS – that improve local economic conditions and create alternative sources of income, thus enhancing community resilience. The approach also stresses the need for investment in human capital, such as education and training, which can enable locals to participate in and benefit more fully from global trade activities (UNDP, 1994).

 

            Fragility, Violence, & Conflict at and within ‘Chokepoint Countries’

Comprehensive preparedness and interference for anticipated threats is highly contingent on the nature of geography, and the Fragility, Violence, & Conflict (FVC) vulnerability and resiliency calculates of chokepoint/strait countries. 

Compound maritime insecurity refers to the multifaceted and interdependent security challenges faced by nations in strategic maritime areas, especially those with critical sea lanes known as chokepoints. These chokepoints, which include vital passages such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Malacca, are crucial for global trade and the movement of resources. Insecurity in these regions can emerge from piracy, terrorist activities, smuggling, illegal fishing, as well as geopolitical disputes. From the 'fragility, violence, and conflict' perspective, chokepoint countries often struggle with a mixture of internal and external pressures that compound their maritime security challenges. (World Bank 2023) Internally, political instability, weak governance, and lack of effective law enforcement exacerbate the risks of maritime insecurity. Externally, the global dependency on these chokepoints for trade places immense pressure on these nations to secure their waters, often with limited resources and support.  The implications of compound maritime insecurity for these countries are significant. Economically, it can threaten the very livelihood of nations through disruptions in trade and increases in insurance premiums for shipping companies, which can lead to higher global commodity prices. Politically, it can destabilize regional balances of power and exacerbate tensions between states. Furthermore, unchecked insecurity can spiral into increased violence, potentially leading to conflicts that could engage multiple nations with vested interests in maintaining open and secure sea lanes.  In summary, compound maritime insecurity poses a serious challenge to chokepoint countries, impacting their internal stability and the broader regional and global economic and security architecture. A focused approach addressing both the symptoms and root causes of fragility, violence, and conflict is crucial in mitigating these risks and ensuring the security of vital maritime passageways.

 

When chokepoint countries are left to fend for themselves in managing compound maritime insecurity, they often resort to forging numerous bilateral agreements with extra-regional actors. These agreements are usually sought with powerful nations that have strategic interests in ensuring the free flow of trade and security along these waterways. While such bilateral agreements can provide the immediate military and financial support needed to address security challenges, they often come at a significant cost to regional integration and sovereignty.

 

The reliance on extra-regional actors can undermine efforts towards regional cooperation and integration. Rather than developing a unified, collaborative approach to security that benefits all countries in the region, each chokepoint country may lean heavily on its individual partnerships with external powers. This can create a patchwork of security arrangements that may lack coherence and could potentially lead to a sense of dependency (Matunhu 2011, Herath 2008, Dos Santos 1970, Frank 1966), while also sidelining regional institutions that could otherwise play a stabilizing role.  Moreover, these agreements can lead to a geopolitical competition among extra-regional powers eager to extend their influence. Their interests often go beyond mere maritime security, touching upon establishing military bases, securing favorable economic deals, and enhancing their strategic presence.

 

The vignette of Djibouti (DJI) and Somalia (SOM) serves as an illustrative case. Djibouti is located at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, abutting the critical Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. It serves as a host to various international military bases, including those of the United States, China, France, and Japan among others. The presence of these bases contributes to Djibouti's economy but also reflects the geopolitical importance of the region. This has raised concerns about the potential erosion of Djibouti's sovereignty and the complicated dance of diplomacy that the country must engage in with multiple powerful countries.

 

Similarly, Somalia, with its long coastline bordering the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, has been of strategic interest to various countries due to its proximity to shipping lanes and its internal challenges with piracy and terrorism. The fragility of Somalia's government has led to various external interventions, but these have often been bilateral and focused on counterterrorism, occasionally overshadowing the broader need for political stability, economic development, and regional maritime security cooperation.

 

The heavy external military and political presence in Djibouti and Somalia, while contributing to certain aspects of maritime security, could also lead to an over-militarization of the region. Without the corresponding emphasis on socio-economic development and political stability, simply increasing military security can be unsustainable and may not address the deeper underlying issues such as poverty, unemployment, and governance deficiencies that often drive insecurity.  This dynamic complicates efforts for genuine regional integration, as neighboring countries and regional organizations might feel sidelined or overpowered by the strategic plays of global powers. The result is a fragmented regional security landscape with increased potential for tensions and conflicts fueled by external interests rather than a cohesive, sustainable approach driven by the regional stakeholders themselves.

 

While bilateral agreements with extra-regional actors can bring immediate security benefits to chokepoint countries like Djibouti and Somalia, without a balanced approach that includes investment in human development and regional integration, these nations may find themselves in a perpetual state of vulnerability, with their maritime security tied to the fluctuating interests and policies of distant powers. This can hinder comprehensive regional efforts to combat fragility, violence, and conflict—a critical component to lasting maritime security.

  

Geo-Strategic Responses: A shift towards a polycentric system of governance in security matters is recommended. By considering societal vulnerabilities and societal resilience, the strategy seeks to improve the collective security blanket, making 'distant' security concerns 'near' and actionable for more powerful, stable nations. (Stephan, Marshall, McGinnis 2019). Also, (Ibarrarán et al. 2008, CGIAR 2011, Busby et al. 2012, Busby et al. 2014, OECD 2022, Thiel, Blomquist, Garrick 2019, Ostrom, Tiebout, Warren (‘OTW’) 1961); and (Smitson 2024)

 

“All Politics is Local:” Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) in fragile chokepoint countries.

Foreign direct investments (FDIs) in fragile chokepoint states can generate substantial security dividends, underpinning regional and global maritime stability. The proposed "3D+C" maritime security strategy underscores the pivotal role foreign direct investments play in bolstering defense and security capabilities, specifically within vulnerable chokepoint states (Wilson, 2024). By focusing on strategic economic injections, FDIs can substantially enhance infrastructural resilience, governance capacity, and regional stability, thereby contributing positively to both local and international security landscapes (Busby et al., 2012).  The investment in chokepoint regions, deliberately allocated and governed by state entities, is poised to develop more robust physical and institutional infrastructures capable of mitigating risks associated with maritime transport and trade. This type of investment extends beyond mere economic gains and forms an integral component of a proactive defense strategy (Stephan, Marshall, & McGinnis, 2019; CGIAR, 2011).

 

 

As FDIs increase, chokepoint states receive the necessary capital to upgrade ports, enhance surveillance and monitoring systems, and improve response capabilities to security threats. Collectively, these improvements serve as a deterrent to possible aggressors and to maintain the uninterrupted flow of trade. In essence, prosperous, and stable chokepoint states are better equipped to administer and secure critical sea lanes, thus generating a multiplier effect on regional and global security (Ibarrarán et al., 2008).

 

On a broader scale, well-invested chokepoint states can lead to a cascade of security dividends: higher employment, reduced poverty, and more stable governance can culminate in diminishing the root causes of piracy, terrorism, and insurgencies that threaten maritime security. Such investments can transform these regions from security liabilities into pillars of regional stability (OECD, 2022; Thiel, Blomquist, & Garrick, 2019).  Moreover, strategic FDIs serve as a soft-power tool, promoting partnerships and yielding influence that aligns with regional security objectives. These economic engagements thus become a form of security investment themselves by building a network of interdependent states with vested interests in preserving the peace and stability of their waterways (Wilson, 2024; Smitson, 2024).

 

Our proposal highlights that sustained foreign economic investments in strategically located, fragile chokepoint states function dualistically as economic stimuli and strategic security enhancements. Such investments are advocated not only for their immediate economic benefits but also for their potential to significantly fortify maritime security and defense at regional and global levels. By harnessing the capabilities and resources of at-risk states, these investments can address underlying vulnerabilities and create a reinforcing cycle of security and prosperity.  Investments prioritized in sectors such as port infrastructure, maritime surveillance, law enforcement capacity building, and regional collaboration mechanisms directly contribute to a secure maritime environment (OTW, 1961). These infrastructural enhancements act to diminish the strategic appeal of chokepoint states as targets for hostile or criminal enterprises, thus precluding activities that would otherwise disrupt international shipping lanes and global commerce (Rodrigue, 2004).

 

Beyond hard security assets, FDI can foster socioeconomic development that indirectly stabilizes the region by reducing the societal drivers of conflict and piracy (Ibarrarán et al., 2008). A more prosperous state is a more stable one, which is less likely to serve as a breeding ground for actions that undermine security. Economic prosperity and security are inextricably linked, particularly in geopolitically sensitive regions (Busby et al., 2012). Additionally, strategic economic partnerships established through FDIs can increase the political will and capacity of regional states to adhere to international norms, such as those set forth in the Law of the Sea Convention (1982), thus enhancing governance and legal frameworks necessary for maritime security (OECD, 2022).

 

The proposed integration of strategic FDIs within the wider "3D+C" framework represents an innovative approach. It assures that while governments maintain direct control over security measures, the reinforcing support of commercially driven investments significantly reduces security risks in maritime domains. This integrated approach aligns economic development with geostrategic interests, creating a fortified, interdependent security environment that benefits all stakeholders navigating the vital arteries of global trade (Stephan, Marshall, & McGinnis, 2019).  Our proposal suggests that by adopting policies that drive targeted foreign direct investments into fragile chokepoint states, the international community can engender more robust and resilient maritime economies, thereby drastically reducing the risk of conflict and securing the global supply chains that hinge upon these critical maritime junctures (Wilson, 2024; Thiel, Blomquist, & Garrick, 2019).

 

We articulate that an integrated "3D+C" approach, combining the elements of Defense, Diplomacy, Development, and Commercial enterprise, offers a multifaceted strategy that not only bolsters maritime security but also amplifies profitability and overall prosperity.  The "3D+C" strategy is designed to transcend traditional security models by weaving together the capabilities of military defense with diplomatic negotiations, developmental initiatives, and commercial activities (Wilson, 2024). By integrating these realms, a comprehensive approach can stabilize maritime regions, thereby facilitating a safer and more efficient environment for commercial trade. 

 

Achieving Prosperity and Profits thru Enhancing Human Security.

Local inhabitants of chokepoint littoral countries are often directly affected by the security of maritime channels, as their economic stability is intimately tied to these waters. Issues such as piracy, illegal trafficking, and maritime disputes can have detrimental impacts on their livelihoods, ranging from fishing and tourism to the broader ancillary industries that serve shipping and trade (Waltz, 1993). 

 

Our "3D+C" strategy emphasizes the importance of human security within the broader context of maritime security, viewing the protection of individual rights and safety as inseparable from the preservation of international trade routes and national defense structures (Thiel, Blomquist, & Garrick, 2019). By focusing on human security, the strategy aims to address both the direct and indirect impacts of maritime insecurity on individual lives and livelihoods, establishing an environment where economic prosperity is matched by social well-being (United Nations Development Programme, 1994).  The defense component of the "3D+C" framework ensures the safety of human life at sea by deterring piracy, human trafficking, and other crimes that threaten individuals aboard commercial and private vessels (Rodrigue, 2004). The employment of naval assets and maritime law enforcement promotes a secure maritime space, thus upholding human security as a foundation for overall maritime domain stability. Diplomacy plays a critical role in establishing international treaties and agreements that protect the rights of seafarers, fisherfolk, and coastal communities, especially in conflict-prone choke point regions. Diplomatic efforts are geared towards creating binding commitments to uphold human security standards, prevent exploitation, and promote the safe passage of migrants and refugees (Stephan, Marshall, & McGinnis, 2019). Development initiatives contribute to human security by improving the socio-economic conditions in coastal and chokepoint regions. By investing in education, healthcare, and economic opportunities, the strategy aims to alleviate poverty and reduce the factors that lead individuals to engage in piracy or other forms of maritime crime. These initiatives promote social and economic resilience, which is crucial for countering the root causes of maritime insecurity (Busby et al., 2012).  The commercial aspect complements this by advancing corporate social responsibility, ensuring that the profit-driven motives of maritime trade do not come at the cost of human well-being. It advocates for fair labor practices, safe working conditions, and community development programs, thus integrating human security directly into business models and investments in maritime infrastructure (OECD, 2022).

 

By incorporating human security dynamics into its framework, the "3D+C" approach promotes a holistic perception of security that goes beyond the mere protection of territorial waters and economic assets. It encompasses the provisions of food security by safeguarding fishing areas, fostering the sustainability of maritime ecosystems, and ensuring that the right to livelihoods is preserved for coastal societies (FAO, 2021). This approach dovetails with the humanitarian aspect of maritime operations, which includes search and rescue missions and disaster response, ensuring the preservation of life and safety of those at sea (IMO, 1979).  Furthermore, the "3D+C" perspective integrates the concept of human security by upholding the rule of law and human rights in the maritime domain, recognizing that true security cannot be disentangled from the rights and dignity of individuals (United Nations, 1948). This underscores the need for capacity building in maritime governance, enabling states to effectively address issues such as illegal fishing, which can devastate local economies and endanger food security (United Nations General Assembly, 2015).  In integrating these human security concerns, the proposed "3D+C" strategy ensures that initiatives to secure maritime passages also facilitate and uphold the safety, well-being, and rights of individuals. This engenders trust and cooperation among states, private entities, and civil society, aligning economic ambitions with the imperative to protect and empower people across a broad spectrum (Busby et al., 2012; Thiel, Blomquist, & Garrick, 2019).  We assert that a maritime security framework that is sensitive to human security can not only avert conflict and promote commercial profitability but also supports a human-centric approach that prioritizes individual well-being, societal stability, and sustainable development. This comprehensive outlook broadens the scope of what it means to be secure in the maritime domain, encompassing economic, environmental, and human elements within the global security architecture (United Nations Development Programme, 1994; Wilson, 2024).

   

               

Enhancing Security, Prosperity, & Ecological Health and Stability.

Regionally, chokepoint security is essential for the economic interdependence that characterizes trade blocs and partnerships (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Security threats can compromise regional economies by disrupting supply chains and inflating insurance and shipping costs. (Rodrik, 1998).

 

 

Locally, the financial stability of littoral states and communities that rely on shipping revenues, port taxes, and related industries can be precarious. Insufficient maritime security can lead to underutilization of ports, loss of employment, and hindered economic growth, thereby heightening poverty and the potential for economic migration (Collier, 2007). By integrating diplomatic efforts and development projects at the local level, the "3D+C" approach aims to uplift these communities, diversify their economies, and reduce the allure of criminal activities that can threaten maritime security (Narayan and Pritchett, 1997).  The "3D+C" model directly correlates increased maritime security with economic stability and growth, advocating for investments that engender local stability and provide alternative livelihoods, thus strengthening communities' financial resilience (United Nations Development Programme, 1994). Foreign direct investments, encouraged under the Commercial aspect, not only enhance maritime capacities but can also stimulate local economies, creating jobs, and improving living standards, which contributes to reducing local financial risks (Wilson, 2024).

  

Local Security x Regional Stability = Global Prosperity and Commercial Profitability.

The defense element of the "3D+C" strategy therefore not only ensures the traditional aspect of state-led defense but also considers the safety and security of these communities. This might involve naval patrols that protect fishermen from piracy, or surveillance procedures that preserve the sustainability of the fisheries, which are essential for food security and local industry (Busby et al., 2012).  Diplomatic efforts within this comprehensive approach facilitate the forging of international agreements that aim to safeguard the regions against environmental degradation and overfishing, ensuring that the natural resources — which residents depend upon for sustenance and economic activity — are managed sustainably and equitably. Moreover, diplomacy aids in resolving conflict peaceably, prioritizing the welfare of affected populations over aggressive geopolitics (Stephan, Marshall, & McGinnis, 2019).  Development policies target the improvement of socio-economic conditions through better infrastructure, healthcare, and educational opportunities, which not only uplift the quality of life for local residents but also foster resilience against the allure of criminal activities related to maritime insecurity. Adequate investments in public services and economic development may prevent radicalization and contribute to a more stable and secure environment (United Nations Development Programme, 1994; Ibarrarán et al., 2008).

 

The commercial aspect of the "3D+C" model acknowledges the importance of inclusive growth, suggesting that economic activities should not disproportionately benefit the shipping companies or international trade alone. Instead, they must also account for the welfare of those living in choke points and their adjacent areas. It involves responsible business practices that create employment opportunities, respect labor rights, and contribute to the community, thereby ensuring that the economic dividends from maritime trade are shared with those whose livelihoods are intertwined with maritime commerce (OECD, 2022).

 

By integrating human security dynamics in this manner, the "3D+C" approach extends the scope of maritime security to include comprehensive support for local and regional populations, creating a buffer against the socio-economic vulnerabilities that can lead to instability and insecurity. Empowering these communities through targeted investments and cooperative security arrangements not only enhances the overall security posture but also ensures a durable foundation for ongoing prosperity in regional maritime domains (Wilson, 2024; Smitson, 2024).  Additionally, by elevating human security within the operational framework, states can foster greater trust and collaboration with local actors, which is crucial for intelligence gathering, community-based surveillance, and conflict prevention efforts. This participatory approach can provide early warning systems for various maritime security threats and help in developing culturally sensitive and effective responses that protect both national interests and the human security of locals (Smitson, 2024; Busby et al., 2012; United Nations Development Programme, 1994).

 

In short, our proposal advocates for a maritime security strategy that integrates human security as an indispensable element, acknowledging that the safety and well-being of individuals and communities in chokepoint littoral environments are critical components of global security. By protecting and empowering these populations, the "3D+C" approach champions a security paradigm that is not only comprehensive in its scope but also compassionate in its application, recognizing that the human aspect of maritime chokepoints is as vital to safeguard as the waterways themselves (Wilson, 2024; Thiel, Blomquist, & Garrick, 2019).  The "3D+C" approach, thus, becomes an embodiment of both a grand strategy and a moral compass, recognizing that the sea's bounties must be safeguarded not only for the economic interests they serve but also for the communities that they sustain and the lives that are intertwined with the oceans.

 

Importantly, our proposal delineates its propositions concerning maritime security from those typically offered by private security companies by emphasizing the maintenance and enhancement of state control over security measures.  We outline a maritime security strategy that stands apart from private security company solutions by reinforcing the principles of state sovereignty and authority over security operations, consistent with Weber's theory of the state's monopoly on violence (Weber, 1919). This approach is rooted in the belief that the responsibility for national and international security should remain firmly within the purview of government entities, ensuring that all actions are aligned with national interests, international law, and collective global security objectives (Rodrigue, 2004; Wilson, 2024).  Our "3D+C" strategy highlights a government-led initiative that integrates defense, diplomacy, development, and commercial efforts into a cohesive statecraft that extends beyond the capabilities of private security firms (Art and Waltz, 1993; Wilson, 2021). It suggests a framework in which governments retain ultimate control over strategic choke points and security programs, thus avoiding the pitfalls and potential conflicts of interest inherent in outsourcing key security functions to the private sector (Stephan, Marshall, & McGinnis, 2019; CGIAR, 2011).  Furthermore, we make it clear that this government-centric approach does not eschew commercial participation but rather redefines it to serve a support role within a broader, state-controlled security structure (OECD, 2022). This ensures that the authority over "all instruments of violence," including those used for defense and protection of critical maritime passageways, remains an exclusive prerogative of the state (Smitson, 2024).

 

In contrast to models that rely on private security measures, our recommendations advocate for a robust state-run framework, ensuring that crucial decisions impacting global trade, regional stability, and international navigation rights are made not for profit but for the collective good, adhering to strict governance, accountability, and strategic foresight standards (Ibarrarán et al., 2008; Busby et al., 2012). By asserting the state's role as the primary defender of the maritime commons, the proposals within this proposal proactively contribute to a security landscape that preserves and enhances government control over crucial areas such as choke points, rather than relegating these responsibilities to commercially driven entities. This approach aligns with the essay's overarching theme of leveraging integrated statecraft to safeguard international waters while upholding the integrity of state authority in defense matters and economic stability (Wilson, 2024; Thiel, Blomquist, & Garrick, 2019).  This strategy strives for a balance between the state's inherent responsibilities to protect and manage its sovereign territories and resources, and the efficiency that private sector entities bring to certain logistical and infrastructural aspects of maritime security. We propose a model where the state not only exercises its monopoly on legitimate violence but also capitalizes on private sector innovations under strict regulatory frameworks and strategic guidance from government agencies (OTW, 1961; OECD, 2022). Our proposals favor a state-led security apparatus that prevents the diffusion of the state's control over violence to private hands, ensuring that the sovereign government retains the authority to protect and regulate the passage through critical maritime choke points, thereby ensuring security and stability in a way that private security solutions alone cannot guarantee.

 

In conclusion, we call for – and propose – an integrated approach to sustain maritime security with a firm eye on strategic choke points (Wilson, 2024). Recommendations to mitigate the risk of choke point disruptions include modernizing technology for risk management, increased foreign direct investment in infrastructure within fragile chokepoint countries, promoting ratification and effective governance under the Law of the Sea Convention (1982), and developing more efficient shipping mechanisms such as larger DWT vessels (Busby et al., 2012; Ibarrarán et al., 2008; OTW, 1961). The integration of these prescriptions into policy measures aims to fortify global trade networks, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure security in a way that satisfies both commercial interests and strategic defense objectives, while also fostering international collaboration for enduring maritime security (Smitson, 2024; Thiel, Blomquist, & Garrick, 2019).  Finally, this approach underscores the importance of "compound" Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and the need for novel security coordination models, especially those that weave in commercial-business stakeholders into the supported-supporting architectures for operational planning and implementation (OECD, 2022). The goal is to build a robust, multifaceted integrative response that is proactive rather than reactive, and that addresses the security concerns at their geographic points of origin with a well-orchestrated symphony of international cooperation and strategic foresight.

 

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations:  Understanding of the intersectionalities of disruptive threats on maritime choke points will need a multifaceted integrative statecraft mechanism to build, assure, and secure strong maritime world-wide trade, and most importantly, at reduced vulnerability and loss of profits, particularly at or proximate to maritime choke points. We believe this “mechanism” needs to be an innovation-outside the standard security coordination models, with commercial-business stakeholders playing a more intimate integrated role in the supported-supporting architectures for planning and implementation of “compound” Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)-enabled operations, actions, and activities (OAAs). Thus, Some recommendations for mitigation of risks in choke points closures:

 

 

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Epilogue is prologue ....

 

Now Re-Imagine, ... as the “Battle of the Straits” throws global trade into jeopardy in 2028, a group of medium and smaller powers, observing the imminent threat of war, propose a new approach to ensure peace and stability.

 

Under the banner of "3D+C Integrated Statecraft Solutions," combining Diplomacy, Development, Defense, and Commerce, they set out to deter the great powers from progressing toward a potentially destructive conflict.

 

Diplomacy: They instigate a summit, under UN auspices, culminating in the Straits Compact, which aims to secure global chokepoints and uphold the freedom of navigation, supported by a task force of non-aligned nations.

 

Development: Recognizing the underlying economic vulnerabilities that fuel conflicts, the joint venture supports an international fund to advance infrastructure development around the strategic regions, improving local economies and reinforcing global trade routes.

 

Defense: This collaborative team advocates for joint military exercises and comprehensive surveillance between nations to build trust and deter aggressive postures at sea.

 

Commerce: The nexus promotes the renegotiation of trade agreements, ensuring fairer and more sustainable exchanges, with new insurance mechanisms to protect against disruptions at the maritime chokepoints.

 

Endgame: Through strategic interventions, these assembled powers’ 3D+C approach lead to the formation of Maritime Peace Zones, innovative global shipping routes, and a surge in equitable and prosperous trade.

 

The venture's diplomatic finesse, development acumen, defense strategy, and commercial insights transform the "Battle of the Straits" into a diplomatic victory, shaping not a theater of war but pioneering an era of Cooperative Securitization and global harmony. This outcome marks a new dawn, with once-contentious waterways becoming symbols of international unity and collaboration, driving economic growth, and downgrading the risk of future conflicts.

 

Their successful strategy showcases the crucial role integrated multi-domain approaches play in addressing complex global issues in a future marked by interconnectivity and mutual reliance.