by Braden Civins
Download the Full Article: FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, published in 2006, quickly became doctrine for the U.S. armed forces. While the manual has its share of detractors, even its fiercest critics acknowledge that it is regarded as "transcendent" and has "become the defining characteristic of the...new way of war." This critique (1) explores the validity of a key assumption underlying the manual; (2) analyzes specific guidance offered as a result of that assumption; and (3) argues that the manual makes a significant omission of no small consequence.
The manual's primary assumption appears on its first page: "[a]chieving victory...depends on a group's ability to mobilize support for its political interests." The population, then, is the center of gravity in COIN. The population-centric strategy accords with the conclusions of preeminent asymmetric warfare scholars such as Mao Zedong and David Galula; and the historical case studies described in the manual support the argument that COIN should be oriented towards winning "hearts and minds" through increased reliance on soft power (e.g., strengthening host nations, creating freedom of movement, providing stability, etc.). However, the manual advocates the population-centric approach as the only path to success and does not consider the merits of alternative strategies, thereby assuming, rather than proving, its primacy.
Download the Full Article: FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique
Braden Civins, a native Texan, is in his fourth and final year of study at The University of Texas, pursuing a J.D. from The School of Law and a Master of Global Policy Studies, with a specialization in Security Studies, from the L.B.J. School of Public Affairs. At the law school, he is a member of the Texas International Law Journal and former participant in the National Security Clinic, where he co-authored an ultimately successful appellate brief on behalf of a Guantanamo Bay detainee. During the academic year, he works as a student employee of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. He spent recent summers working at the Criminal Prosecutions Division of the Texas Attorney General's Office, the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Department of State.
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Comments
<i>If our mission is to transform a society, which was a stated mission in Iraq (de-Bathistifcation sp?), and we at least implied as much in Afghanistan, we go in big, and "we" in effect subvert the government by interacting directly with the populace by implementing security, development, CA, PYSOP, etc. instead of assisting the host nation do it. Of course the challenge then is how do we transition those responsibilities effectively to the new and reformed host nation government?</I>
Hmmm...democracy?
Skilled, local political folks assemble their economic and technical teams and rise through the political strata to represent their respective constituencies via a bottom up process as opposed to authoritarian top down models.
The process is chaotic, takes time, and is dependent upon a number of important variables to include the provision of security and rule of law. Broad based historical surveys suggest success rates are less than 50%.
I would suggest it's still very early in the game to declare success or failure. Advocates and converts alike are still breathing....
Bill C., perhaps another way to put it (so my simple mind can grasp it) is that if the mission is too assist the host nation with their security challenges, then we go small and provide guidance, training, equipment, etc. We do not get between the people and their government, instead we focus improving the government's means to influence its populace.
If our mission is to transform a society, which was a stated mission in Iraq (de-Bathistifcation sp?), and we at least implied as much in Afghanistan, we go in big, and "we" in effect subvert the government by interacting directly with the populace by implementing security, development, CA, PYSOP, etc. instead of assisting the host nation do it. Of course the challenge then is how do we transition those responsibilities effectively to the new and reformed host nation government? Because no doubt we'll being doing business in a way that only we can afford to do it.
The question of security, I think, depends on the mission.
If the mission is to use the opportunity presented by the insurgency to (1) separate the population from their old political, economic and social arrangments and (2) connect the population to new governing and societal norms (those such norms as are favored by and which better utility to a foreign power and its society), then in such a wrenching task as this, the requirement to achieve security first may be indespensable.
In cases such as these, wherein, the mission (to transform and incorporate the state/society) is the "conflict driver," then the establishment of security would seem paramount.
Grant,
As many have noted I'm a strong advocate for security first, but security is not simply providing armed guards/militia to protect a person or place, it is a holistic security environment. I think Bob addresses a "part" of that environment by potentially removing conflict driver. However, the weakness with his argument in my opinion, is that the argument as stated assumes everyone will play the rules if they are acceptable. That everyone will pursue peaceful means to achieve their objectives if the means are available. This simply is not true. We frequently misdiagnose the real drivers of conflict (and there are usually several of them), and I suspect we do so in an effort to transform reality to fit our preconceived views, thus the focus on development, liberation, etc. All too often the conflict is a power struggle, and not all insurgents (or even most) own the moral high ground (another overly American view where we often cheer the little guy against the big bad government). If I want power, and violence is a means to acquire it (coercion/intimitation) why wouldn't I employ it if the security situation permited? People have employed violence throughout history to achieve their objectives, not because other options were not available, but because it is frequently the simpliest and most effective way to achieve power (not the most moral). Higher societies strive to find ways to conduct business and other affairs within an advanced legal framework. This doesn't apply to the majority of the world outside of the West. I think we are fooling ourselves if we argue that security isn't first among other other "possible" equals if our goals is to counter the insurgents.
Grant,
Looked at as "war" and a military problem, then yes, security is what we are taught and security is what we do.
Looked at in the broader perspective of a civil emergency within a society where the populace and the government are in conflict it is not so clearcut.
What if President Johnson had reasoned that he needed to establish security first and control over the African American populace before he get around to passing the three landmark civil rights bills that got our country back on the path to stability?
Or, in the alternative, what if King George had recognized the grievances sent to him by the colonial officals and sent a commission to help resolve them rather than sending the Navy and Army to Boston to enforce the rule of law??
One a case where we did not establish security first, and insurgency was resolved; the other where the king sought to establish security first and a regional subversive movement was pushed into a 13 colony armed revolt.
Our narrow definition of insurgency as war blinds us to broader examples of such conflicts between people and their government that did not go kinetic.
More recently Gorbachav's decision not to reestablish security over the Eastern European states that rose up in revolt (ending the cold war, the US merely set the conditions); or Mubarak's decision not to establish security first over the people in Cairo?
Even in Afghanistan it is far easier to secure a justice center and its employees; and to secure a circuit court package that travels about the rural communities than it is to bring the entirety of the country under continuous control and security while the populace believes it recieves greater justice from the Taliban than from GIRoA. We just need to stop defining this as a military problem, or as a war to be won. It is insurgency, there are no winners unless everyone wins.
Bob
<em>"Security first" is a false premise. Bring justice to a community and security will follow. Grant a populace control over their own government, and security will follow. Ensure equitable systems of political and economic opportunity exist, and security will follow. Lead with security and one most likely ends up with suppression and continued oppression. One need not "destroy the village to save the village."</em>
Bob- you may be right... but I'm not convinced you're right (I just don't know). My concern is that when we make generalizations like these we box ourselves in to perhaps a false extreme. Are you saying that "security first" never works? Is that even provable?
Bringing justice to a community without doing it through ensuring security seems to me to be impossible. The actual practice of ensuring equity seems to me to imply that security is not a priority anymore. Lastly, I don't know of many investors who are willing to put money into a place that can't guarantee a minimum level of security FIRST.
This reminds me of what one smart prof once said to me, "these are arguments between elites". I'm tempted to believe that the actual folks we're talking about- who we have little ability to be empathetic with- really require security first above all else.
I'm willing to admit that the reality might be much more nuanced and situation-specific than just "security first", but I'm not convinced that security is not at least a "first among equals"- if not much more.
Gian,
I can only assess by what you post. We will continue to disagree in regards to our respective assessments of what happened in Malaya (and other places). I recognize the order of events, but I disagree as to what effects came from what action, or that the events had to occur in that order to work. In fact, if the order had been reversed, must of the earlier engagement would not have been necessary. Governments do not concede control easily though, so they typically attempt to police the symptoms, or when that fails defeat the symptoms, rather than to resolve the problem. I suspect that Great Britain got this one right primarly because they had tried the first two COAs so often, and that the cost/benefit of such approaches was deemed as no longer viable.
In Afghanistan we we the US coming to the same realization that the cost/benefit of sustaining control over everything, everywhere, is no longer a viable option.
The Brits didn't get smarter, they just got smart enough to realize that they could no longer afford to be ignorant. The US is still ignorant, but economics are taking us to school as well. Control of other is not all it is cracked up to be, and in the current information environment is probably finally as obsolete as the smoothbore musket.
But please, do not patronize that because I disagree I do not understand. I learn more every day, but you may want to pause just long enough to conisder why I draw such different conclusions than your own.
Smart people believed for centuries that the sun revolved around the earth; and that disease was a result of sin. New information and fresh perspectives led them to consider the same facts in a new light. I don't argue your facts, I just suggest you may want to consider them in a new light.
Bob
You dont understand what happened in Malaya Bob, you really dont. The accommodations that the British brought about only served to solidify the support that they had with the ethnic Malayans, it had no real substantial effect on the population that was supporting the insurgents (the Chinese squatters). If you go to sources that show the Emergency from the side of the Chinese squatter population you will see that the infrastructure work, improvement of police and so on in the resettled villages only really had the effect of controlling this population. They were not "won" over to the side of the government, thus then turning on the insurgents. It just didnt happen this way.
You also really dont understand what we teach at West Point by the statement above. But you are welcome any time to stop by and sit in on classes to see for yourself.
gian
Gian,
We are all products of our environment, and I believe Armor is still considered "conventional", and there is no insult in that term. I proudly began as a Field Artillery officer prior to going SF, and spent a great deal of time wearing crossed rifles in key positions in light infantry during my time in Guard while back in the civilian community.
But I think I am catching most of your pitches, but you're having a hard time seeing some of my "unconventional" stuff that I'm sending back at you. We largely agree that DoD as a whole has gotten way off track during the GWOT and that our nations vital national interests are best served by a military trained, organized and equipped for the peace we live in, but with a focus of deterring, and if need be, fighting wars that threaten those interests. IW, nation building, GWOT, etc and the flocks of "experts" who proclaim that geo-politics and state on state conflicts are obsolete all have combined to take us down a path that makes us weaker and less influential as a nation. But that is Geo-politics and warfighting. We were talking insurgency.
Insurgency is not war at all, it is internal to a state and it is an illegal (often violent) politcal response by a populace against their government. Typically this is when legal means either prove ineffective or simply do not exist. Equally typically our history of such events are written from the perspective of an intervening foreign power that is primarily involved to promote and protect their own interests as they define them, not those of the people in question.
In this context it is typically the military sent forward by these colonial (or more modernly, "containing") powers to resolve these problems, so they are seen in that context: military problems to defeat some threat to resestablish the status quo of foreign dominion over some other land and people.
You talk about tactics applied in Malaya, but you fail to mention how the British also removed the office of high commissioner, recognized Malaya as a member of the common wealth as a sovereign peer rather than as a subordinate colony, ensured suffrage extended past the historic collaborative populace of Malaya and into the ethnic Chinese and Indian populaces; and that when the ethnic Chinese insurgents came back in from the jungle with their communist ideolgy that they found that no one was interested in what they were selling any longer. This was not a "win" for British COIN, this was a "win" for the people of Malaya. In fact, the insurgents actually won independence, they just didn't physically survive to implement their design onto the new process. The Brits pulled the thorn from the paw of the populace in removing their illegitimate, controlling influence from over their political system and in guiding the new government to one that equitably included the entire populace.
The US is less adept. In the Philippines we left governance in the very biased hands of the same people who had collaborated with the Spanish, the US, the Japanese, etc. The political survivors who continue to see the masses of the Philippines populace as existing to serve them. Endless insurgency is inevitable there until that is addressed. It cannot be fixed on Jolo or Basilan, or even on Mindanao or rural Luzon. It must be fixed in Manila.
In Vietnam we elevated Diem to office, blocked unification under a Vietnamese-selected form of government, and then dedicated ourselves to enforcing our solution for those people. The tactics and programs applied are interesting, but they are not decisive. The resultant conflict was a symptom of the problem, not the problem itself. Miltary history studies such symptoms and approaches to addressing such symptomes, but typically ignores the base problems or misses their importance when they are addressed.
"Security first" is a false premise. Bring justice to a community and security will follow. Grant a populace control over their own government, and security will follow. Ensure equitable systems of political and economic opportunity exist, and security will follow. Lead with security and one most likely ends up with suppression and continued oppression. One need not "destroy the village to save the village." One need not "Clear-Hold-Build" to save the District. This is the fiction written by generations of military interventions to guide generations of future military interventions.
I realize my viewpoints are "unconventional" (i.e., not taught at West Point). I am comfortable with that. I am also happy to help remedy that ommission...
Keep up the good work. Yours is an important voice in the current national security debate.
Bob
Bob... "conventional officer,"? come on man.
you and me are still talking past each other.
my expanation and conclusion with regard to malaya are both i believe correct and are supported by current scholarship and by my own primary research in the archives. I am only pointing out what defeated the insurgency in Malaya. Now to be sure after the insurgency was crushed the British could move on to some sort of political accomodation, but the insurgency was defeated by the means that i said.
To ADTS the manual is flawed because it is based on a theory of countering an insurgency that doesnt work; has not worked in the past, nor is it working today in current practice.
gian
I want to clarify what I was trying to convey, because I'm not sure I did so adequately. I think my comment was intended to probe the way in which FM 3-24 was drafted. In essence, what methodology was used to determine what should be COIN doctrine? I was trying to determine whether and how using comparative cases, with different values on different variables, was used as the intellectual groundwork of FM 3-24. I also was trying to illuminate certain logical fallacies that ought to be acknowledged and hopefully avoided in such an endeavor. One example is variation on the dependent variable, the values being whether a case can be considered one of success or one of failure. To make successful inferences from a comparison of a "success case" with a "failure case," it would be necessary to do more than just identify different causes between the two cases, and ascribe the difference in outcomes to said causes. One would have to, rather, examine whether the causes found and highlighted in the success case are present in other success cases. For example, if one makes the argument that the US succeeded in the Philippines because there was no external sanctuary, one ought to look at other success cases and observe whether external sanctuary was absent. If it was absent, that lends support to the proposition that absence of external sanctuary is a cause of successful COIN. Conversely, if external sanctuary was present in a successful COIN case, then that casts doubt upon the proposition that absence of external sanctuary is a cause of successful COIN. Similarly, one can make a comparison of success cases alone, and perhaps find consistent regularities or inconsistent results. For example, if one considers Malaya a success (a contestable proposition, I know), and attributes this in part or in total to a favorable force:population ratio, then one ought to examine other success cases to see if such a force:population ratio was present elsewhere. Maybe another success case (?) had a lower force:population ratio, which might imply that the force:population ratio was not all that important. Conversely, a success case with a greater force:population ratio would seem to imply support for the proposition that the force:population ratio was a cause of success. Essentially, to conclude, I was querying the epistemic basis of FM 3-24. Far be it from me to put words in others' mouths, but I suppose the argument of Gian would be that FM 3-24 is flawed in that revolves too much around a finite number of (misinterpreted) cases; I suppose the argument of Robert would be that a significant variable (i.e., the existence of colonial status) is being overlooked or omitted omitted and also that the nature of insurgency and of the cases are fundamentally misunderstood (e.g., Robert would not agree with a simple win/lose dichotomy); and I suppose I am saying is, precisely how was the doctrine formulated - did it use comparative cases, to what extent, and in what manner?
ADTS
Where one stands on such issues depends on where one sits. As an example, Gian, a conventional officer, studies the art, science and history of war as a member of the military edcuation system and not surprisingly focuses on a war-context for insurgency. The authors of FM 3-24 were overly influenced by a hand full of "old wives tales" of a COIN history derived from a number of colonial and neo-colonial interventions designed allow some external power to restore stability in some foreign land, while at the same time seeking to retain control over that foreign land and its people; all overly colored by a short experience in Iraq and some flawed assumptions about what activities actually produced the rusults that emerged following the "surge". I too have my own biased perspectives as a former SF Colonel who focuses on trying to understand the dynamic of insurgency itself, the nature of that troubled relationship between a populace and their government, and then layer on top of that various historic cases of engagement; civil, military, "wins", "ties" and "losses."
I think Gian's recitation of facts are spot on. I think his conclusions, however, are dead wrong. Those military actions shaped conditions, certainly, but true political change brought enduring stability. Look at the quote from FM 3-24 that Drew highlights in his post:
"1-4. Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the governments rule."
What a load! So, the people just need to submit??? Whatever happened to governments working for the governed?? This is a classic colonial perspective; go in and help the puppet regime to "take charge of their own affairs" (within the constraints that we have defined for them) and make the people "consent" to this arrangment we have made for them.
I would rewrite that sentence as follows:
"1-4.Bob. Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own government away from foreign powers or special interests and that government submitting to the control of their entire populace."
Insurgency is often violent, but it is rarely war. We cast it as war and engage it as war, always driven by our own interests over some people and region. It colors our thinking. It is not the narrow number of examples employed in 3-24 that spoil the document, it is the failure to distil the colonial, controlling perspectives of the intervening power from those examples and the insistence on typing insurgency as war that converts a lot of good information into a very bad total product/message.
Cheers!
Bob
Robert C. Jones
Director of Strategic Understanding
Center for Advanced Defense Studies
ADTS:
If you read the Paradoxes Section in the manual it is an implicit critique of what the manual perceives the way the US failed in Vietnam. Most of the paradoxes point to the standard Coin critique of US failure in Vietnam; too much focus on tactical application of firepower, not enough focus on population protection, overly centralized operations, and so on.
gian
I'm jumping into the thread rather late, so permit me to offer a preemptive mea culpa if I'm ignoring points already made. I'll leave aside the question of whether the COIN success stories are indeed "success stories," or whether their processes and outcomes deserve to be classified differently. I don't have FM 3-24 handy, so I'll ask: Does it contain, and/or was it drafted including consideration of, examples of COIN "failure stories?" To me, that would seem absolutely crucial in terms of epistemology. If one asserts a cause as helping or completely (or partially) determining a successful outcome, but fails to see if that cause was also present in a case of "failure," then one really has not tested the impact of that cause and/or the processes by which that cause manifests itself. Similarly, even without comparing successful versus unsuccessful cases, comparisons could also be done by expanding the number of successful cases examined. If one asserts Malaya presented a ratio of 1:20 security forces:population, and draws from that the conclusion that a 1:20 security forces:population ratio is necessary for COIN success, one should also seek out other COIN success cases to determine whether equivalent - or disparate - ratios were present. I don't know if the above is more relevant for the manual itself - which, I suppose, is intended to prescribe doctrine rather than to explain its formation per se - or rather instead for the drafting and genesis of the manual, but these are basic methodological issues I would offer as worthy of consideration.
ADTS
"FM 3-24 uses a handful of "successful" campaigns, what should we have use instead to deconstruct and rewrite the manual - the Philippine Insurrections, the United States Marine Corps history in Latin America during the 1920's and 1930's or something else" posted by Drew
I dont't know why but nobody (except me) talks about or studies "Operation Power Pack" The Domican Republic 1965-1966 where the USA completly defeated the insurgency. We didn't have to ask any British Folks or Austrailian Folks or German Folks what to do we just figured it out and did it. I guess because it didn't last a long time and didn't cost a bloody fortune and nobody got promoted nobody is interested.
Well the campaigns that the manual uses as "success" stories were really not that way at all. In Malaya the British won because they physically relocated half a million people who supported the insurgents, and they used effective military operations to sever the links between the insurgents and the resettled populations. This strategy was put into place before the savior general, Templer, ever arrived on the scene.
Too in Vietnam the example of the marines caps is overdrawn; while effective in fighting the VC at the local level, the idea that the US Army should have copied that program writ large is really just quite silly.
Clausewitz said that history should inform the commander's judgment but not accompany him to the battlefield. His was a prescient critique of the idea of "lessons learned."
The problem in Afghanistan is not one of tactics but of strategy. Yet folks continue to be seduced by the promise of better tactics saving a failed strategy. Secretary Gates even today was quoted as saying that we have only had the right inputs in place since 2009; or to put it in other words the right inputs are better generals employing so called correct counterinsurgency methods.
Bing West has it right when he argues that the strategy today is broken because it employs an operational framework of hearts and minds counterinsurgency that it isnt working.
Yet the field army--seemingly the majority of its colonels and generals--appear to be blinded from seeing this reality. Instead there is a rock solid consensus among senior officers that it is working and we just need many more years of sticking it out to achieve our (army's) definition of victory.
It smacks of militarism and dogmatism and it is indeed quite worrisome.
gian
The central problem I find with using FM 3-24 in Afghanistan is in its fourth paragraph of the OVERVIEW
"1-4. Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the governments rule."
Karzai's government has authority limited to about the city limit's of Kabul and that is it. Until there is a national acceptance of the legitimacy of the government over that of tribe, clan or elder the mission is doomed to failure.
FM 3-24 relies on a population-centric approach, Maoist in its approach when talking about a nation where there are resources and a degree of education. But when the worth of a person is measured in the numbers of goats and how many versus of the Koran are memorized; the battle is not uphill - it is up a cliff.
We cannot ever defeat the Islamic threat fully because we perceive the war in regards to stability, while our foe perceives it as a global religious war. You cannot change what a man believes is moral by providing a clinic or a well. Our own religious history shows how faced with a choice of conversion or martyrdom - martyrdom was accepted without question.
We have yet truly identified who is our enemy or do look the other way? We know its the local warlords, the Taliban and AQ, but do we now consider the Pakistani Intelligence Agency as our enemies with their collaboration with the various groups? What layers of government are truly supportive as long as the cash keeps flowing in or are truly anti-terrorist?
FM 3-24 uses a handful of "successful" campaigns, what should we have use instead to deconstruct and rewrite the manual - the Philippine Insurrections, the United States Marine Corps history in Latin America during the 1920's and 1930's or something else?
COL Gentile I am at a quandry on how to address this in the big picture - any suggestions?
Move Forward,
After looking at Ken's comments above, most of which I agree with, I think we all generally agree with you "if we're going to do the fighting", then we need to surge and sustain pressure on the Taliban. The "tactics" you suggest seem reasonable in that case, but those of us that disagree with you, are doing so based on the strategic question. First, does our direct involvement in COIN there really in our national interest? Now it is a matter of national pride, while important, doesn't necessarily make it a matter of national interest. Our objective has been to defeat AQ, do we have to defeat the Taliban to do so? If the answer is yes, then do we need to expand the war to the real safehavens they enjoy? Is that feasible? If it isn't, is the war winnable?
One point I do disagree with you on is the Afghans need more time to be able to defend themselves. The argument that it takes time is only valid if we're making progress. If we're not, then spending more time doing the same thing won't accomplish our objectives. This gets back at the core of our debate, are we fighting the right war? If the Afghans can't defeat the Taliban after 10 years of billions of dollars of aid and capacity building, how much more do we need to spend and how much longer do we need to stay there and fight their fight for them? It doesn't take this long to develop proficient security forces, I think part of the problem is we're trying to convert them into a 1st world force instead of simply enabling to fight better the way they fight (and have fought for centuries). They don't need our fancy C4I systems, they just need better tactical skills at the small unit level. If the Taliban can still outfight them (and I'm not convinced they can), then we need to look at Pakistan's SFA process and see what they're doing right. The reality seems to be that the Afghans responded reasonably well to Taliban attacks on Kabul and Kandahar in recent months with minimal U.S. support. As long as they can protect the major urban and economic centers that is good enough for a start. When they're ready they can start pushing out into the villages using the oil spot tactic which is sustainable. There are lot of ways this problem can be solved without our guys doing their fight. Our fight is AQ. We can assist the Afghans with theirs, but not fight it for them.
<b>Bill C.:</b><blockquote>"...(It has been suggested, I believe, that all non-violent means have been tried and have proved wanting and that, accordingly, due to present need, push has come to shove.)."</blockquote>I'm sure that has been suggested and am even more sure it applies to a few cases -- while not applying to a great many other cases. Sometimes, violence is indeed required. The issue is what type of violence is best suited to remedy the problem. What we have been trying for the past 60 years, 'limited war,' has <u>proven</u> not to work very well...
An important reason for our resorting to more lengthy and less effective means of violent response is the factor you mention:<blockquote>"...(3) may take much more time than that which is available for this probject. In all of these instances, our interests may not be provided for."</blockquote>That is actually not a function of time required or available for a 'project' but rather of our political cycle which dictates generally a four year program with occasional but far from guaranteed excursions to eight years. The issue is getting it finished, hopefully (or at least initiated) on one's watch.
Violence is necessary occasionally but it is most effective if it is sharp, focused and rapidly applied. That entails a change in many of our plans and programs.
<b>Move Forward:</b><blockquote>"None of this sounds like we are playing by the opponent's rules since he has no COPs, insufficient forces and firepower to mass effectively against our surge, poor logistics, and has no Army and Joint airpower."</blockquote>If he did or had all that, he'd be playing by our rules.
To use a well worn simile, we're playing American Football against an opponent who's playing Soccer. The Referees are Reality -- and they are using the Soccer Rule Book...
I agree with your points on forces required <u>IF</u> one is going to do what we are doing. The problem is that we do not need to do what we are doing and our actions and techniques accord the opponent the initiative more often than not. We are playing on his turf, using an adaptation of our rules to play the game he <i>wants</i> us to play and where he wants us to do so. If you believe that's smart, we can disagree.
With respect to Viet Nam, the "light forces on the ground" were misused by Several General Officers who didn't know how to employ them and who tried to fight a land war in Europe while wandering (verb of choice...) around in the rice paddies of Southeast Asia. Due to their errors -- and US domestic politics -- it was decided to 'do more' and commit heavier forces who tried to continue and expand the same flawed euro-centric TTP (sound familiar?). With predictable results...
We didn't leave prematurely, we left -- as we went -- due to US domestic political considerations. That same flaw applies to Afghanistan and to Iraq. As does the use of euro-centric TTP...
The so-called "sanctuary" problem was known in both cases before we went in -- to ignore the potential problem thus posed was the height of strategic foolishness but it was done because it kept the Dollars flowing, offered promotion and other opportunities and silenced some domestic critics.<blockquote>"...the true threats lie there and simply leaving prematurely does nothing but allow some in Pakistan to mount an eventual assisted but "covert" assault on weak Afghanistan"</blockquote>So? Threat to whom, us? Very doubtful. Define prematurely. How long would you suggest we stay; another five years? Ten? Thirty? Sixty? Those folks, both nations, live there -- we do not. We cannot change that.
The problem with this entire Afghan operation is that it's due to a failure of US political will to address the problem when it first became apparent in the mid 1950s -- or when it reached earlier 'crisis' proportions in the mid-1970s. Even then it could have been salvaged after the USSR withdrew in 1989 and again we did nothing. We are not going to rectify those failures with what we are now doing.
Libya is a fiasco and we had no business even getting involved, not a whiff of US interests there. The so-called R2P is a fallacious communitarian construct that is dangerous and will most always do far more harm than good -- as will the intervention in Libya prove.
COL Jones:
Thanks.
The only trouble is, I am not sure what you are suggesting can be done.
When the will of the affected people of other lands runs counter to our interests, and if we no longer believe that it is prudent to overcome this difficulty in the old fashioned way (install and/or employ a local government who will [1] implement our policies anyway and [2] deal with the resistance that we know will be forthcoming,
Then, in such cases as these, we would seem to have few other options, for example:
a. We could attempt to win over the population in other ways (dialog, development, diplomacy). Problem with this approach is that such (a) may also be considered as unwanted encroachment/intervention/interference by the populace, (b) may not be successful and/or (3) may take much more time than that which is available for this probject. In all of these instances, our interests may not be provided for. Or
b. We can compromise and doom our security and the future wellbeing of our society by giving up on obtaining the foreign assets that we require (access, resources, stability).
Thus, given the choice of [1] using a host nation government to secure our interests and having/helping them deal with insurgencies as part and parcel to this process, [2] trying other methods to achieve our goals (where does history show us equal or better results in this regard; only feasible if it can be done in the time available using these methods) or (3) retreating to insignificance and danger; given these options, how then do we proceed?
(It has been suggested, I believe, that all non-violent means have been tried and have proved wanting and that, accordingly, due to present need, push has come to shove.)
Bill C.
My assessment is that you are focusing on the sizzle rather than the steak.
COIN Sizzle: Transforming of state and society (your words)
COIN Steak: Ensuring the survival of a government over some region/populace where the intervening party believes itself to have vital interests and that believes this "puppet"/partner government is the best option to manage the same.
Insurgent Sizzle: (as characterized by the COIN team) abhorent and radical change.
Insurgent Steak: Throw off excessive external influence over national government; force reform or removal of governments that are not recoginized as legitimate, or that have come to act with impunity, or that perhaps treat certain segments of the populace with injustice or disrespect compared to other equally situated segments.
For the West in particular, but for any intervening power in general my advice is to find new ways to manage your interests. Time honored approaches that are dedicated to the adoption or creation of some government, and then to the defense of the same against all challengers, foreign and domestic, is IMO obsolete and dangerous.
We will always have interest in foreign lands. We will always need to manage those interests. Old techniques based in such dysfunctional governmental relationships and that discount the will of the affected people are no longer the right answer. In fact, they were already the wrong answer when they led to the retirement of the British Empire. Far more so today.
Cheers!
bob
COL Jones:
If "the problem" is that the foreign intervening power has installed and/or is supporting a local government, whose job is to carry out our wishes (for example: to fundamentally transform the state and society so that these might [1] cause us fewer problems and [2] better meet our needs).
And if the insurgency is based on an abhorance of and complete disagreement with this (radical state/societal change) or some other initiative of the foreign intervening power,
How then does the intervening power, by focusing primarily on the local government it has installed and/or is supporting:
a. Quell the insurgency yet, at the same time,
b. Still achieve its goal (again as an example: fundamental state and societal change); especially when such a "foreign" endeavor must often be pursued against the will of a significant portion of the population (thus, the insurgency)?
Move Forward,
I believe you are missing the main point. To fight a major war effort one certainly needs to employ a large professional army for best effect.
The problem is, that when sent to deal with a problem where there is a "threat" and "violence" the tendency of such large professional armies is to turn that problem into a major war. In your listed examples this was certainly the case.
This is natural, for when one doesn't know what to do, the do what they know. In Nam the SF guys went out and built guerrilla forces among the tribesmen, conducted capacity building with the conventional forces, and began a range of programs for the people. That really missed the real crux of the problem. When big Army rolled into town they similarly defined the problem along lines that met their training and experience and sat out to defeat the enemy, secure terrain and win the war. That too missed the main crux.
Insurgency is politics, albeit illegal politics. To focus on the violence is to miss the main point. To focus on the insurgent is to miss the main point. To focus on the populace is to miss the main point. All of those must be understood, but the focus of engagement must be on the government. Too often intervening powers, who are there to protect that same government, turn their back to the problem from the outset and dedicate their efforts to attacking the symptoms instead.
How did that "light forces on the ground" thing work out in the early years of Vietnam? How did it work when we left prematurely?
Historians like to point to the COIN relationship between Afghanistan and Vietnam but conveniently omit similar sanctuary problems that then and now tie our hands. At least we could bomb North Vietnam and other areas of the Ho Chi Minh trail.
But as bin Laden and Lashkar e Taiba show us in Pakistan, the true threats lie there and simply leaving prematurely does nothing but allow some in Pakistan to mount an eventual assisted but "covert" assault on weak Afghanistan...perpetuating the terror problem, oppression of women, and other ethnicities that together form the population majority that wants nothing to do with the Taliban or Islamic extremism.
How is that "no forces on the ground" thing working out in Libya?
Ken,
The Brits had many bases near Sangin but Michael Yon reports indicated they could not venture far from them due to IEDs because of insufficient forces spending too much time on COPs.
In constrast, the Sangin U.S. Marines patrolled nearly constantly. That implies adequate forces to have multiple patrol shifts while retaining forces to guard the COP.
That cannot occur without sufficient forces to man multiple COPs with multiple platoons of conventional forces. It also is less effective unless general purpose MEDEVAC and attack/lift aviation is close enough to respond as a QRF force. Adequate logistics forces also are required.
None of this sounds like we are playing by the opponent's rules since he has no COPs, insufficient forces and firepower to mass effectively against our surge, poor logistics, and has no Army and Joint airpower.
<b>Move Forward: </b><blockquote>"How did that light forces on the ground work out for us in Iraq and early years of Afghanistan?
Oh contrair, if you abandon the villages to the ANA before they are ready, the reinforcing SOF/SF are the ones stuck retaking the hill over and over again.</blockquote>I think you just made the point the three of us are approaching from different directions. The first question could more properly be "Why did we stay in either country?
Your above quoted second point just reinforces what <b>Bill M.</b> said: "<i>...We don't (need) our men patrolling the villages endlessly, because in this case there is no end game with that tactic. We are doing little more than retaking the same hill again and again."</i>
I'll again mention that it seems foolish to play by the opponent's rules on his turf...
Bill M,
Near as I recall, we were in Panama before and after 1989. Grenada was a non-threat to begin with and it along with El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua all were truer examples of "small wars" and we were there for a while in two out of three.
How did that light forces on the ground work out for us in Iraq and early years of Afghanistan?
Oh contrair, if you abandon the villages to the ANA before they are ready, the reinforcing SOF/SF are the ones stuck retaking the hill over and over again.
It seems we either win by going in large and decisively with clear objectives (Grenada, Panama) and then get the heck out quickly (at least the major forces), or we go in very small like we did in Greece and El Salvador for a long time, by going small the host nation must do the fighting, and we must adapt to them (the way it should be) instead of trying to force them to adapt to our way of doing fighting war. In my opinion, Moving Forward's arguments are actually moving us backwards. If "we" are doing the heavy lifting, then the heavy lifting needs to be decisive, not a 100k troops stuck in a quagmire. SOF can do Afghanistan with minimal conventional support if we limit our fighting objectives to CT, CAS support for Afghan forces that are being overwhelmed, and capacity building. We don't our men patrolling the villages endlessly, because in this case there is no end game with that tactic. We are doing little more than retaking the same hill again and again.
Size and degree of violence are poor variables for defining conflicts.
"Small War" or "Large Wars" may either both be very similar or very different. The large one may be very unconventional and a small one may be extremely conventional. Size matters, but it does not define.
Same with violence. tactics don't define nature, and nature does not dictate tactics.
But you miss my point. When the Army abandon's Army things to focus on expeditions one has to wonder who is organized, trained and equipped to do Army things?
As to the massive missions you describe however, I would ask you to consider this:
Were/are they so massive that they require the Army to perform them?
or
Are they so massive because they were given to the Army to perform?
<b>Move Forward:</b>
Robert C. Jones can and I'm sure will answer your post to him, but just for grins, I'd like to intrude and address four points based on personal experience.<blockquote>"Was Vietnam a small war at half a million troops? Was it a counterinsurgency? Korea a small war? Is any war with 100,000 U.S. troops and 40+ other allies a small war? Could the Marines have led any of those wars and supported years of deployments with 7 month tours?"</blockquote>More like a couple of million fighters based on all players on both sides, yet Viet Nam was essentially indeed a Small War -- we didn't fight it at all well but it was small and was contained. It was part counterinsurgency, part not.
Korea with much the same numbers, all told, was also small. It was not a counterinsurgency,
Both those were domestic politically inspired foolishness wherein the Administrations of the day tried to achieve a policy objective requiring a scalpel or two while employing a Chainsaw -- but still not allowing said saw to work at full throttle. Limited war is an oxymoron.
The answer to the metric based question is the always loved "it depends." Quality of opponent. Numbers of them. Equipment available. Degree of intensity. Contained or not area of operations. Strategic goals and limitations. Those and more, a number of factors play into an answer to that question. Using your metric approach, Both Afghanistan and Iraq would apparently qualify as being larger wars -- yet, IMO based on the parameters I cited they are both small...
Finally, no, the Marines probably could not have led any of those wars and supported years of deployments with 7 month tours. That's really the point. Avoiding long wars, small or large.
With the possible exception of Korea, all of those could have been avoided -- should have been, I believe -- and though all required some action and some war like activity, far better strategic and operational choices could have been made and such choices would have likely made seven months more than enough time.
Clearing and holding villages is a fools game, it's to be avoided as it makes no military sense to play by the opponent's rule on his turf. There are better ways. Our business as usual mode has nor worked all that well for us. We need to chuck it...
Robert C Jones said:
<i>"1. "Expeditionary Intervention" rather than "war"
Problem: The Army hates that, because that is the solid historic truff of the U.S. Marine Corps, SOF, even the Navy and Air Force; but not the Army. I suspect the service-based concerns of the Army are a big reason we have over branded these interventions that are merely subsets of a larger AQ Campaign Plan as "wars."
Solution: Chairman directs the Army to get over it. Just like the Marine Corps does big wars to assist the Army; the Army gets to do Expeditionary Interventions to support the Marine Corps. Allowing the Marines to set the tone for these operations would keep the mindset and scale more appropriate, and would also keep the Army (and the nation) reminded that this isn't a war that we are staked to the ground on and that many other things have higher priority for our nation as a whole."</i>
Bob,
Was Vietnam a small war at half a million troops? Was it a counterinsurgency? Korea a small war? Is any war with 100,000 U.S. troops and 40+ other allies a small war? Could the Marines have led any of those wars and supported years of deployments with 7 month tours?
Seem to recall that FM 3-24 is a joint Army/Marine publication and that the Marines are some of the best at practicing COIN. The recent clearance of Sangin followed by the current hold is one such example. The "don't be a jerk" school of thought practiced elsewhere in Helmand is another Marine and Army example yielding results.
Now please tell me how SF/SOF alone could seize Helmand, Kunar, Khost, Paktia provinces and hold them...along with the 7,000 Pashtun villages with 11 million Pashtuns that Mr. West mentions elsewhere. Obviously they cannot, nor can 100,000 U.S. troops and ANA and allies. But obviously these conventional forces can clear and hold more villages than a few thousand SF/SOF.
Would you not agree that 100,000 conventional forces can train and lead by example more ANA than a few thousand SF/SOF? What happens if we pull out prematurely and these SF/SOF forces start doing raids into villages laced with IEDs and waiting in ambush?
I see this article in today's news explaining how Qaddaffi's forces are hiding amongst buildings and under trees and thwarting airpower.
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2011/05/08/world/africa/news-us-libya-mi…
So again, given the number of Marines we have, the number of potential small and larger wars that could occur in the Middle East given current disruptions (seen Syria, Lebanon, and Iran problems lately?), and the inability of airpower to bring down Qaddaffi or Hussein before that...just how exactly are Marines, Naval forces, and airpower going to win these possible wars and practice stability operations afterwards?
When was Lebanon the quietest, when Israel occupied it or in 2006 when they attempted their version of EBO? Why does the USAF always hype up the success of Kosovo without mentioning the ground success of peacekeeping forces there?
Perhaps you noticed that Army helicopters emplaced the SEALs and one had problems. Due to temperatures 15 degrees higher than forecast and vortex ring states, just how would a CV-22 or MV-22 have fast-roped in the SEALs since their hover performance in high density altitudes is limited at best?
How would Marine and SOF/SF aircraft and trucks alone resupply all these dispersed ANA and SF/SOF after we pull out conventional forces too soon?
Posted by Bob,
""Insurgency does not happen when the civilian government loses control of the populace, but rather when the populaces loses control of the civilian government. Shifting our intervention and preintervention focus to that of helping populaces gain and maintain control of their governments would go a long way to getting back in line with our professed core national principles.""
The comment above is another one of your moments of brillance. I agree this is a helpful way of viewing it (also for UW planners), but I think it is useful to continue to look at through the eyes of the government also. Both views will provide unique insights to those developing our policy objectives and the plans that support them. They may in many cases actually convince them that employing the military to achieve the objectives is the least desired option. Some in the know may correctly disagree on this, but in Afghanistan and Iraq it appears we didn't consider either view; only our own. Then we tried to bribe or force those affected to support our view (ties into Bill C's suspicion).
I don't know if you met to say insurgency is not war or warfare, but insurgency more frequently than not is warfare. Not the type of warfare described by Clausewitz. It is an election of sorts and the winning side is the one that employs violence the most skillfully to achieve their political objectives.
<b>Robert C. Jones: </b>
I very much agree that it's "<i>Time for a little internal shake up of our own...we do need to do a bit more coloring outside the lines...It should not mean 'you break it and then hand it to the miltary to go punish it for being broken.'</i> "
I also agree that letting the petty little law stuff getting in the way is tedious -- however, been my observation that it trumps what you and I may <i>want</i>.
Reality is so darn boring...
<b>Bill C.:</b><blockquote>"Are we, in all truth, actually doing state and societal transformation -- under the guize of and/or via "expeditionary intervention" or "war?"</blockquote>I knew you'd pare it down to the essence eventually... ;)
I believe the answer to be yes -- in the eyes of some. I also believe <b>Bill M, Robert C. Jones</b> and <b>gian p gentile</b> are correct. That is fallacious logic and those constituting that "some" need to cease supporting that approach.
Even were it realistic and decent logic, we do not do it at all well. We should try other methods...
As to the "war" title/status, yes civilians used the term first, and they used it incorrectly. I didn't hear anyone in the Army correcting them.
As to Gian's comment, I can't go there. "On War" is a great bit of thinking on war theory; but it is wildly off the mark and inappropriate for Insurgency theory. One is external, legal violent competition between states; the other is internal, illegal, violent or nonviolent competition within a state. Very different animals, and the conflation of the two is a major contributor to much of the bad doctrine and theory we have on the shelves today.
As to Ken's comment, if one let the law get in the way of a good idea we would never have any insurgency to begin with! Time for a little internal shake up of our own. Seriously though, no need to begin forming cells or organize "million man marches," but we do need to do a bit more coloring outside the lines and perhaps put a new emphasis on the words of Colin Powell's Crate and Barrel rule: "You broke it you fix it." It should not mean "you break it and then hand it to the miltary to go punish it for being broken."
First step is to simply recognize that insurgency is natural and rarely warfare, and can indeed be managed by civilian leaders. It is only when the civilian leadership has completely lost their focus for an extended time that things tend to devolve to where military support is necessary. Insurgency does not happen when the civilian government loses control of the populace, but rather when the populaces loses control of the civilian government. Shifting our intervention and preintervention focus to that of helping populaces gain and maintain control of their governments would go a long way to getting back in line with our professed core national principles. But that would mean surrendering some control of outcomes, and that is a pill we have not quite swallowed yet.
Back to the basics, expeditionary intervention to punish those who attacked us (then leave) much like the air strikes on Libya after the Disco Bombing in Germany. Foreign Internal Defense to aid our allies (not those who have no intention of being our allies). NATO invoked Article 5, collective self defense after the 9/11 attacks, so we have some basis to conduct expeditionary intervention (or OCO) as required to defend ourselves and our NATO allies from potential attacks (or respond to such attacks).
Bill C's constant drum beat on global integration sounds like a conspiracy theory, but unfortunately I think there is some truth to it. Until we purge the influence of those who push these ideas like Paul Wolfawitz and Tom Barnet from our national strategy we will probably continue to tilt against the windmill of history.
I pretty much agree with all of Bob's comments in his last post except it this theory that we're calling it a war because the Army wants to call it a war? I'm pretty sure the President and his administration decided to call it a war for various reasons that had nothing to do with the Army's desire. I also recall the Army being reluctant to get involved, and GEN Shinseki didn't have a lot of influence on the administration at the time. The services saluted and moved out after the orders were issued (just as they should have). Of course after that the interservice rivalries were a normal part of life. The Army also focused on ways to do expeditionary operations more effectively long before 9/11. Part of the Stryker concept was to enable the Army to better support expeditionary operations, as were the independent airborne brigades. We'll never be as good at expeditionary operations as the Marines based on their ability to base their combined arms team onboard ships (the sustainment package and it reduces the need for logistical bases to support short expeditionary operations in the littorial region). However, there is no advantage to the Marines conducted expeditionary operations in Afghanistan (landlocked country) compared to the Army. There may be a disadvantage in that we have diverted our best expeditionary force into a long term landlocked battle, and have less capability to respond to crisis globally in the litorial region where the vast majority of the global population resides. Just a thought.
<b>Robert C. Jones: </b>
Re: your Problem number 1:
I agree that the result sought is mostly desirable but suggest you reconsider the approach. The Chairman -- presumably of the JCS -- has no real directive or legal authority over the Army and what you want done will require the assent of Congress and a reordering of budgets. IOW, good idea but the implementation is significantly impacted by US domestic politics.
You always seem to forget that little detail. I provide this little reminder in the spirit of aid for your quest and destination, with which I agree -- but yet again suggest you relook your route.
I doubt you can get there unless you do that...
This may seem odd, but should we consider that our primary goal is not to defeat the insurgency but, rather, to use the opportunity presented by the insurgency to achieve substantial and fundamental state and societal change?
Resistance to this endeavor (state and societal transformation) being expected as part and parcel of this process.
Herein, the insurgency being important in that it provides us the opportunity, the opening, which allows us to intervene so as to pursue this, our primay goal (fundamental state and societal change).
Does this possibly more-correct characterization re: our goals and intentions (to wit: we are not pursuing counter-insurgency via the state-building approach so much as we are using the opportunity presented by the insurgency to get at the "root causes" of all such outlier state and societal difficulties); does this help us to better understand such things as:
a. The problems we are experiencing with this approach (host nation government and population not too "hep" on doing fundamental state and societal change -- exactly as we require) and
b. Thus, the need for such large quantities and various types of security forces and other capabilities; needed to achieve our primary objective (not defeating this insurgency -- but fundamentally transforming the state and society so that such difficulties as these will be less likely to occur in the future)?
What we are most accurately doing based upon pre-Iraq COIN frenzy is:
1. "Expeditionary Intervention" rather than "war"
Problem: The Army hates that, because that is the solid historic truff of the U.S. Marine Corps, SOF, even the Navy and Air Force; but not the Army. I suspect the service-based concerns of the Army are a big reason we have over branded these interventions that are merely subsets of a larger AQ Campaign Plan as "wars."
Solution: Chairman directs the Army to get over it. Just like the Marine Corps does big wars to assist the Army; the Army gets to do Expeditionary Interventions to support the Marine Corps. Allowing the Marines to set the tone for these operations would keep the mindset and scale more appropriate, and would also keep the Army (and the nation) reminded that this isn't a war that we are staked to the ground on and that many other things have higher priority for our nation as a whole.
Problem: We call our support to the COIN efforts of some foreign power COIN as well, consider it warfare, and assign military lead. This in turn leads us to get way outside our lane militarily, while strangly and tragically avoiding many political aspects of the problem that are much more part of the root causes.
Solution: Supporting a foreign nation on an internal security concern (regardless of where the threat came from, or who is supporting the threat)? That is Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Keeps us in our lane and keeps Civilian leadership empowered, and keeps our eyes open to the bigger picture.
Do we need to know COIN? Certainly, that is the mission the Host Nation we are supporting is executing. Do we need to understand insurgency? Absolutely. That is the larger dynamic at work, and if one does not understand insurgency, then one is not apt to be able to support the COIN efforts of their host.
If this were basketball instead of insurgency, FM 3-24 would be a manual on how to come is as a sub on defense while playing roadgames, and the relative benefits of playing a zone or man to man.
What we really need is a manual on Basketball as an entire game, from theory, to offensive and defensive tactics; road games vs home games; starting or coming off the bench; etc.
Because we have taken such a narrow and situational perspective on the problem, and then drilled deeply into it like only the the US Army can, it is no wonder we have gotten so far off track.
I've always said that it is better to right thing poorly than the wrong thing very well. In this case, we have become masters of the wrong thing.
a. Does FM 3-24, as presently written, acknowledge -- by noting the need for our GPF, the necessity to do much BPC and the requirement for significant WOG capabilities -- that counter-insurgency done in this manner (via state-building) can be expected to garner, from the population, a negative rather than a positive response? This, because the 180 degree governing, economic and social changes that we are attempting to implement -- via our host nation government -- we know and understand, up-front, are likely to anger, frustrate and alienate significant numbers and important portions of the population?
b. This explaining the unique need for such massive numbers and diverse kinds of foreign and host-nation security and other forces when doing counterinsurgency in this manner (via the state-building approach). Such forces and capabilities being needed to hold the population at bay and deal with the resistance that we readily expect will be forthcoming. Such to be expected when one, for example, tries to "liberalize" (make more-open, more-accessable and more-user-friendly) states and societies which presently, and traditionally, have had a more-insular and more-conservative nature.
Now, giving full and due weight to this idea that the significant and fundamental state and societal changes we are attempting may be expected to garner, from the population, a negative rather than a positive response (thus -- to deal with this reality -- the need for such amazing numbers and types of foreign and host-nation security and other forces), then:
a. Should we really say that we are doing "counter-insurgency" via the "state-building" approach?
b. Or would it be more accurate to say that we are, instead and in all reality, attempting to do "state-building" via the opportunity -- the opening -- presented by the insurgency?
From reading Braden's comments, most of it is a disclaimer of some sort...not a big motivator for really analyzing his work. If I want to see a product followed by disclaimers and apologies I'll go watch some LTs at work.
Reading the remainder of the posts reminds me of all the COIN I've read, done, failed to read, failed to do, and failed to understand, etc. As with most subjects on this site, I'm thankful for their existence and can't help but feel (often times) that I'm part of the problem.
As someone pointed out, the military does not encourage intellectual rigor - and I've lost count of the times my cohorts have told me, "fight the battle, not the book". It was always related to me trying to have a discussion with them about the merits of what we do and how we do it, from the fundamentals of EA Development, to what does social capital look like?
As a result, at times I feel I've abandoned my personal reading and development in order to play along and fight the battle, which translates to, "stop reading/thinking and do more PT" in garrison and "stop reading/thinking and just keep shooting" in combat.
I think Publius is on to something regarding the salience of Intel/SOF. However, I just don't think we have the Intel/SOF communities equipped for that fight. The biggest limitation I see are numbers. But, this takes us (me) back to the intellectual rigor - perhaps if our military embraced more rigor and self-analysis, we'd spur growth in our maneuver, intel, and sof communities to create the numbers we need.
Good comment about true COIN experts: although I wouldn't say there are none. I'd just say I'm not smart enough to identify them. But, I do believe they're out there, although I hope they are not as elusive as the Yeti. What I'm trying to say is that I think we have the brainpower to find some right answers and the fortitude to see them through to completion. To date though, the only 'truths' I believe to be true and effective enough for me to live by are the following: respect costs nothing and rapport is everything. All the other stuff is up for debate on a case by case analysis.
While not entirely feasible, I try to distill many of the topics here down to the following: at its essence, what's being said, how can I take a lesson learned and bring it all the way down to the METL & OPORD levels, changing how I operate once I hit the LD? Hard to do, but worth the effort.
I suspect this COIN thing will be discussed well after the last BCT leaves Afghanistan. That's good. I'll be truly worried if we substitute these discussions with AR 670-1 talks, or how to assign points to the new physical readiness test so we can really parse out our officers on the OER, etc.
Good talk.
Bill- sorry for my poorly worded post. I was responding to anon's attack on COL Gentile with that paper. That paper isn't a strong one in my opinion- especially the way they treat Afghanistan pre-2001 as a case study backing their thesis. And regardless of their cases- 30 years just isn't enough time (if there was such a thing as "enough") to "prove" something about the future.
Bob- totally agree with your comment wrt good governance. That is an ISAF "fact" (or unquestioned assumption): that the insurgency is fueled by "bad" governance. Even if that were true, the follow-on assumption: that we can support the establishment of governance- instead of it emerging over time the way they want it- is just as problematic IMO.
Bob,
One of your old friends in SOCPAC actually claimed you were a trained dancer and quite good, but I'll accept your humble denial :-).
I recall EUCOM prior to the 9/11 attacks trying to encourage the old colonial powers to do more throughout Africa and join us in the ACRI program. Seemed reasonable since they were largely responsible for the lingering mess and humanitarian crisis, but not surprisingly we ended up doing the bulk of the work and spending (while they pointed out our flaws over cappuccinos). Despite the occassional set back, I think we made some progress in parts of Africa with the gradual approach led by State and supported by DOD (and others) on a shoe string budget. However, in the end you still had the residual States that were created by Europeans for exploitation or buffers, and their boundaries don't reflect the boundaries of the actual nations based on culture, nor were most economically viable (so much for Bill C's claim that our goal is integration into the modern world). This is just one example that illustrates the more we interfer the more problems we seem to create. Now we carry the guilt of our fathers and want to undue all the wrongs, but is impossible for "us" to do so.
It is complex stuff, but not necessarily complex stuff that we need to load the shoulders of our military. We should deploy military forces to achieve the M objectives in DIME, and those should be relatively well defined, acheivable, and adequately supported (the military is given the right forces, funded, and given the right authorities to execute their mission), and clearly in the interest of the U.S.. We can and should pursue more idealistic policy by gradually influencing certain situations with our DI&E to help shape (not force) the world over "t-i-m-e....." to become more integrated and peaceful. It is long past time to reject the doctrine of occupation to achieve global stability, it is simply counterproductive to all concerned. If we're conducting COIN, then we're an occupying force, so really FM 3-24 is a guise (although incomplete) for occupation.
Bill M,
Those who know me know I don't dance well. More like I stumbled around the State building. That is indeed another well intended, but misguied and almost inevitably going to produce negative effects.
A state has borders. Securing and reinforcing borders drawn by colonial powers for thier own purposes, with little cultural relevance, creates far more problems than goodness. Good commerce more than bad commerce travels across such borders in the regions we agonize the most over (the seas between Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia; the Maghreb; the AFPAK border; etc.) We disrupt this "legitimate" trade far more than the illegitimate trade we target.
A State has government. Same situation. Colonial forms and current pushes for "democracy" often have little relevance in the cultures we seek to develop them within; also, populace groups most likely to submit to a common governnace are often broken up by the afore mentioned borders.
I don't know how we undo the damage of generations of colonial disruption. I suspect the best answer will be in getting similar states to join with their neighbors to form more effective unions that can be more self-sufficient and that make more cultural sense. Or breaking off corners perhaps in places like the Kurdish people with several modern states all poking into their homeland. Or maybe lesser included forms of sovereignty, more like an American Indian Reservation, that allows Self-governance and multi-state citizenship for certain peoples, such as the Kurds or Pashtuns, as an example. This is complex stuff. Probably best to leave well enough alone and stop agonizing over the fact that not everyone looks like us or governs like us. They are not us.
Bob, I think you danced around Bill C.'s point about State building. Development is only a part of that, and agreed development in itself isn't "necessarily" bad, unless we're reinforcing bad actors by carelessly throwing around $$$. State building (at least the way the West does it) is forced cultural change, and that is an offensive action and as demonstrated by ancient and new history will always be rejected by the people. We want to believe we're doing the right thing (and we are according to our values), so we find it hard that are acts of kindness are largely frowned upon by those we're trying to help.
I agree with your point about correctly identifying the context (which we fail to do) or political/social ecology of the country we're operating in, and then determining how to best pursue whatever interests "we're" pursuing. Our stated objective in Afghanistan is stability (to end safehaven), yet our presence is what creates a great deal of instability. I think your earlier point about a decent interval will become the necessary fall back option.
CIA put out in the news today (part of the continuing media circus post UBL's death) that intelligence indicates there are AQ cells in over 70 countries, and I bet a good number of those countries are quite stable. Regardless we can't afford to invest billions/trillions in an attempt to stabilize the world in order to defeat AQ. We need to find and neutralize the cells (unilateral, with partners, or encourage partners to do it). Separate defeating AQ from stability, we only pursue stability operations when it supports a greater interest than defeating AQ.