Deception vs. Risk in War
by Bing West
Reprinted with Permission by Marine Corps Gazette
Garbage, Lies, and Uncertainties (Full PDF Article)
This article addresses why assessments were poor in Iraq and what can be done to improve risk assessment in Afghanistan. Seven months after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, retired Marine Gen Anthony C. Tony" Zinni gave a blistering speech. My contemporaries, our feelings and sensitivities were forged on the battlefields of Vietnam," he said, where we heard the garbage and lies, and we saw the sacrifice. I ask you, is it happening again?"1 The audience of Navy and Marine officers rose in applause, presumably cheering a criticism of civilian officials, and not of themselves.
That was a misleading illusion. In Vietnam, generals as well as policymakers and politicians contributed to failure. In 1966 President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered GEN William C. Westmoreland, the commander in South Vietnam, to undertake a strategy to attrit [sic]... [the Communist forces] at a rate as high as their capability to put men into the field."2 Westmoreland enthusiastically championed the attrition strategy. Inside the military, only the Marines dissented. Overall, the U.S. military command agreed with a strategy that substituted physical for moral determination and led to body counts as the measure of progress. McNamara gradually came to disbelieve the military reports and quietly turned against the war.
Thus there was garbage" in the form of body counts inflated by the military and lies" (deception) by a Secretary of Defense who did not believe in his own strategy, plus a Joint Chiefs of Staff that did not demur in a flawed strategy. Generals and civilian officials alike shared responsibility for the conduct of the war.
About the Author(s)
Comments
Very good article. A few points...
The Marines were not the only people in Viet Nam who dissented on attrition strategy -- all the Army light infantry units who had three years or so of COIN emphasized training and, of course, Special Forces also tried to change to focus. Unfortunately, the Army was Euro-centric at the time and the upper echelons would not be budged. I submit that was initially at least part of the problem in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan.
One might even discern that it still intruded today...
Mr. West says that the organizational culture causes a dilemma in candidly assessing risk. I'm long retired, so this is from past wars but that has not been my observation in a couple of wars. My belief is that the assessment is well done, strongly articulated -- and then muted by domestic political concerns at the top or, regrettably, by someone in the chain who <i>believes</i> such muting is desired by those further up the chain.
To amplify one point made in the article, I'd also suggest that, specific to Iraq in earlier years, the potential flaw of an air centric SecDef, CJCS and third CentCom Commander trying to comprehend a ground war was quite harmful. Our system insists that such anomalies occur and the wrong LTG in Baghdad early on as opposed to a light infantry or Marine general who had a btter grasp on requirements is indicative -- thus it becomes incumbent upon all concerned to be candid, frank and forceful in providing assessments and recommendations. My sensing is that is not sometimes done as well as it should be due to a proclivity by some on high to shoot messengers, a trait that should be rigorously suppressed.
For Afghanistan, he suggests assessing what works at the tactical level and applying it across all battalions and advisory teams. That is an excellent suggestion but should not be pursued too diligently -- a little competition is good and too harsh impositions of uniformity stifle initiative and creativity. Generally, if someone come up with a method that works well, others will adopt it rapidly and voluntarily.
While it is true that, as he says: <blockquote>"Every battalion cannot be correct when the variance in patrol frequency, duration, and style is extreme",</blockquote> neither are any, certainly not all, necessarily wrong. His suggestion to amalgamate operational TTP and provide standards and expectation about performance is good but the 'how' should not be too prescriptive. METT-TC will always intrude ans what works in one Valley may not be appropriate in another, mountain fighting -- and people -- can be tricky that way...
<blockquote>"Second, one man must be charged with risk assessment, separate from the operational commander in Afghanistan. There are three candidates for that job -- the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the NATO commander, or the USCent-Com commander."</blockquote>Leaving aside NATO for national purposes, seems to me the job belongs to the Commander, CentCom -- and if he is not a ground warfare light Infantry or Marine type, he should have advice from someone who is -- and is or has been on the ground and well traveled in theater. The Chairman's job is to provide the CoCom assessment to the SecDef and the President and, collegiality aside, if he has ANY questions about that assessment, should commission his own (same criteria for the assessor) and, if it differs from that of CentCom, provide both to the decision authority.
Mr. West also says this:<blockquote>"I asked Sheik Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, who led the Sunni Awakening until he was assassinated by al-Qaeda, why the tribes had not swung over in, say, 2005 and avoided needless bloodshed on both
sides. He said, <i>"We Sunnis had to persuade ourselves. You Americans did not persuade us."</i>
.
His reply was a warning about the limitations of analyzing other cultures."</blockquote>That last sentence is extremely critical and should be remembered...