How the United States Can Avoid Losing a War in Yemen

How the United States Can Avoid Losing a War in Yemen

April 24, 2024

Elizabeth Turnage

On January 17^th, 2024, the United States redesignated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).[1] In the weeks that have followed, the United States has become increasingly active in the Gulf, shooting down Houthi drones and striking Houthi targets in Yemen.[2] Given the United States’ increasing involvement with the Houthis, this paper seeks to review the conflict to evaluate both the insurgent and counterinsurgent performance to date. In this evaluation, I argue that not only does the insurgency possess key indicators of success, but the counterinsurgency’s weaknesses debilitate the possibility for success.

To make this argument, this paper first presents the primary actors within the Houthi insurgency before presenting a concise modern history of the case. It then outlines the strengths and weaknesses of both the insurgents and counterinsurgents before concluding with an outlook for the insurgency.  

The Actors

According to U.S. counterinsurgent doctrine, there are three primary actors in any given insurgency: The state, the insurgents, and external actors.[3] This characterization holds true in the Houthi case.

The State: The Republic of Yemen

The state of Yemen is located on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, bordering Saudi Arabia to their north, Oman to their east, the Red Sea to their west, and the Gulf of Aden to their south. Within the country, Yemen contains the Asir Mountains in the west, where most of the population resides, and the large (mostly uninhabitable) Rub’ al-Khali desert in the east.[4]

The Government of Yemen (GoY) as it stands today was created in 1990, when the northern and southern sections unified as the Republic of Yemen.[5] From its inception, the GoY has had three primary actors that have engaged with the Houthis: President Ali Abdallah Saleh, who served as the president of the republic from 1990 to the Arab Spring in 2012;[6] and his successor Abdu Rabbu Mansor Hadi, who led the republic until his abdication in 2022.[7] The current president is President Rashad Mohammed Al-Alimi.[8]

While the country is majority Muslim, it contains significant religious, tribal, and political divisions within its population. The country has a large (35%) Shia minority and is composed of numerous tribes with complex loyalty and alliance structures.[9] In part due to these divides, Yemen has several non-state actors that operate within the country. In addition to the Houthis, who will be discussed momentarily, the GoY faces dissent from the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a successionist movement based in the south of the country.[10] The country has also experienced a persistent al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) presence in the southeast of the country.[11]

Figure 1: Map of Yemen[12]

The Insurgents: The Houthis

The Houthis are a group of Zayid Shiites consisting of a number of allied tribes in Northern Yemen, based primarily in the city of Saada.[13] While a number of economic, religious, political, and demographic grievances central to the movement traces its roots to the 1960s - when the Zaydi imamate that ruled Northern Yemen fell – the modern roots of the group trace to the creation of the al-Haqq political party and Believing Youth Forum (BYF) in the 1990s, which respectively promoted political representation of Northern Yemen and a Zayid revival.[14] From these political recognition and Zayid revival aspirations, the Houthis objectives have evolved significantly, with the group currently aspiring to consolidate and legitimize their rule in Yemen.[15]

The Houthi movement was originally led by Hussein al-Huthi, who served as a prominent member of the al-Haqq party and the leader of the BYF, would be the first leader and namesake of the Houthi movement.[16] Following his death, his father Badr al-Din al-Huthi became the spiritual leader of the movement, with other members of the Huthi family and al-Haqq politicians leading military operations.[17]

The External Actors: The Coalition(s) and Iran

The external actors in the insurgency can generally be divided into three groups: the Saudi coalition, the new U.S. coalition, and the Iranians and their proxies.

As a Sunni regime and geographic neighbor, Saudi Arabia has significant interest in the stability of Yemen. As such, Saudi Arabia has supported the GoY, a Sunni government, throughout most of the insurgency through a Saudi-led Coalition. The Coalition is comprised of several Sunni states: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates (who left the coalition in 2019), in addition to Pakistan and Eritrea, who joined the group in 2018. This group also received nominal support from western nations, including Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.[18] As outlined below, this coalition opposed the Houthis until 2023.

The United States has emerged as a significant opponent of the Houthis in recent months. While the United States had historically opposed the Houthis via their support for the Saudi Coalition, they have recently entered the conflict directly – launching airstrikes and establishing a naval presence in the Red Sea – with a U.S. led coalition of western states. The coalition consists of approximately 20 countries, including Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the Seychelles, and the United Kingdom.[19]

Iran and Iranian proxy groups have supported the Houthi insurgency, but the Houthis should not be viewed as a direct proxy of Iran. Throughout the insurgency, Iran – and proxies like Hezbollah – have provided the Houthis with crucial weapons and training.[20] Yet, the Houthis are not reliant on Iranian support, and thus maintain autonomy from Iran.[21] Instead of a proxy, the Houthis act as a partner for Iran driven by mutual benefit: The Houthis gain material support, and the Iranians gain an ally against Israel, the UAE, and the United States within the Red Sea region.[22]

The Eras of the Houthi Insurgency:

The Houthi insurgency can be divided into four modern eras: the rise of the movement following 9/11, the establishment of military capabilities and alliances in the Sa’ada Wars, the rise of the Houthi State and proximate Civil War following the Arab Spring, and the Houthi’s attempt to emerge on the global scale in the context of the Israel-Hamas war.

~9/11 and the Arrest of Hussein al-Huthi:

While the buildup to the Houthi insurgency traces its roots to religious divisions, a historically autonomous population in northwestern Yemen, and political opposition to the Government of Yemen in the latter half of the 1900s, the proximate causes of the insurgency can be traced to the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States. Following the attack, President Saleh announced that Yemen would act as a partner to the United States in the War on Terror. This resulted in two significant changes. First, the announcement sparked increasing criticism of President Saleh by Hussein al-Huthi in Sa’ada, presenting an increased threat to GoY’s legitimacy of rule in the region. Simultaneously, GoY’s partner status with the United States led to an increase in military aid, training, and support, which inflated GoY’s coercive capabilities. The combination of an increasing threat and coercive capabilities led President Saleh to arrest Hussein al-Huthi in June 2004, forgoing a longstanding precedent of mediation between the Zayids and their Sunni neighbors and sparking the insurgent conflict.[23]

~The Sa’ada Wars:

The arrest of Hussein al-Huthi sparked a series of six Sa’ada Wars. This rolling conflict was driven primarily by the GoY and encompassed an era of near consistent conflict in Northwestern Yemen from June 2004 to February 2010, when a ceasefire was signed. Figure 2 provides an outline of the six waves of conflict. The conflict originally began in Sa’ada, and gradually expanded in geographic scope to encompass most of northwestern Yemen. Additionally, the conflict is notable for the GoY’s use of irregular militias (led by local Colonel Sheikhs) instead of or in addition to the GoY army.[24]

Figure 2: The Sa’ada Wars

The Sa’ada wars led to two key developments for the Houthi insurgency. First, the Houthis established military capabilities.[25] While the group began the wars with no true military structure, they became adept at irregular tactics, such as ambushes, by the Third Sa’ada War. Second, the Sa’ada wars impacted the allegiances of local tribes.[26] While most had supported GoY at the start of the conflict, widespread discontent stemming from GoY’s economic and political neglect of the region, poor treatment of GoY aligned militias, death of civilians in GoY attacks, and kinship ties to the Huthi family resulted in many tribes shifting allegiances to the Houthis by the final war.[27] Thus, by 2010, the Houthis had gained both military capabilities and domestic support from the population.

~The Arab Spring and a Proxy Civil War:

In 2011, the Arab Spring created a power vacuum in Yemen, allowing the Houthis to expand. The prodemocracy movement began in January 2011, and ultimately resulted with President Saleh’s removal from office and general chaos within the GoY. Capitalizing on this chaos, the Houthis moved south, and with the help of Iran, Hezbollah, and former President Saleh - who had formed an alliance with the Houthis - the group captured Yemen’s capital of Sana’a with only limited resistance.[28] During this time, the Houthis expanded their capabilities by taking control of Yemenis weapon caches and state media, which the group used to control narratives and disseminate propaganda.[29]

In early 2015, the Houthis seized control of the Yemeni government and deposed of the newly elected President Hadi, inciting the Yemen Civil War.[30] On the counterinsurgency side, a Saudi Arabia led coalition launched Operation Decisive Storm and Operation Restoring Hope with the “goal of restoring Yemen’s internationally recognized government.”[31] On the other side of the conflict, Iran and Hezbollah provided extensive support - in the form of training and weapons - to the Houthis.[32] In concert with Iranian support, former GoY President Saleh also joined forces with the Houthis in an attempt to settle his political vendettas, bringing his tribal support base over to the Houthi cause.[33]

Over the civil war, the Saudi coalition implemented airstrikes, a land, air, and sea blockade, trained local Yemeni forces, and conducted traditional military operations against Houthi targets.[34] Despite heavy pressure from the Coalition, the Houthis continued to gain territory, and began launching counterstrikes on Saudi Arabia. This offensive effort is exemplified by Operation Victory from God, a Houthi operation launched in 2019 targeting Saudi oil infrastructure.[35]

When a United Nations brokered truce was signed in April 2022, the Houthi insurgency celebrated a relative victory.[36] Despite a new alliance between the Hadi GoY and the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) in 2020 and numerous strikes by the Coalition, the Houthis had succeeded in gaining and holding a large swath of territory in Yemen.[37] As a result, the Houthis gained “quasi-legitimacy” as a governing body in Yemen, and now controls approximately 70% of the Yemeni population through coercive force, a taxation system, and the weaponized control of food and water.[38] Figure 3 depicts Houthi territory as of January 2022.

Figure 3: Houthi Controlled Territory in Yemen, January 2022.[39]

~Houthis in the Hamas-Israel Context

The Houthis have used the Israel-Hamas war as a platform to project their power and attempt to gain legitimacy on an international scale. As a result, the conflict has seen the entrance of new actors and an altering of the operational environment for the Houthis. Following the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel and subsequent Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis began disseminating propaganda to global audiences, branding themselves as the defenders of the Palestinian people.[40] Using the wave of pro-Palestine sentiment as justification, the Houthis conducted operations with their “Yemeni Armed Forces” in the Red Sea, disrupting global trade flows.[41] In response, the United States led coalition entered the conflict, patrolling the waterways to protect international shipping routes and launch strikes on key Houthi targets.[42] Thus, by threatening global trade, the Houthis have changed the scope of their conflict from facing a regional counterinsurgent force to a global one.

While the Houthi’s Red Sea campaign has galvanized the United States, this modern era of the Houthi insurgency can also be characterized as a decrease in opposition from Saudi Arabia. This decrease began in the months before October 7^th, when Saudi officials began peace talks with the group, citing a growing desire for economic development in southern Saudi Arabia that would not be feasible without durable peace with the Houthis.[43] This position has not wavered since the Houthis began disrupting trade in the Red Sea: In December 2023, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister stated that “We are committed to ending the war in Yemen and we are committed to a permanent cease-fire that opens the door for a political process.”[44]

The jury is still out on the future of the Houthi insurgency. Some project a decline in Houthi power, citing that increased U.S. operations may make it difficult for Iranian weapons to reach the Houthis, potentially curbing their military capabilities.[45] Others contend that the Houthis are closer to their goal than ever, citing the aforementioned withdrawal of Saudi Arabia from the conflict.[46] In addition, some posture that increasing U.S. action could strengthen Houthi political support within Yemen, as garnering support from the cross-sectional Palestinian cause - in addition to growing anti-western sentiment in the region - may give the insurgency the legitimacy needed to consolidate control over the rest of Yemen and gain international recognition and legitimacy.[47]

Evaluating the Houthi Case

Given the uncertain future of the Houthis, it is vital to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of both the insurgents and counterinsurgent forces to understand where these forces stand – and gain insight into who is winning the conflict. To accomplish this, one must first understand what success looks like for both players.

Defining Success

U.S. Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine outlines success for COIN forces in their definition of counterinsurgency. According to U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, “Counterinsurgency is comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.”[48] Building on this design, the U.S. Government’s Counterinsurgency Guide outlines three key conditions which indicate the counterinsurgent forces have succeeded:

1. The state is seen as legitimate, and has the social, political, economic, and security capacity to “address the grievances that may have fueled support of the insurgency.”
2. The insurgency – including their leaders – are “co-opted, marginalized, or separated from the population.”
3. The insurgency has disarmed or dissolved.[49]

The CIA's Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency defines insurgencies as “a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.”[50] With this definition, the guide provides four indicators of insurgency success that can be simplified into three conditions:

1. The insurgency acquires domestic and international legitimacy relative to the afflicted state.
2. The insurgency acquires “control over population and territory.”
3. The insurgency acquires coercive power over the population.[51]

In short, the indicators of success for insurgent and counterinsurgent forces are inverse – with both groups fighting for (1) legitimacy, (2) control over population and territory, and (2) a monopoly on force. With these goals defined, it is now possible to evaluate the Houthi case.

Evaluating Strengths and Weaknesses in the Context of Success

Houthi Strengths:

1. Geography: Several factors in Yemen’s geography have served as key aids in the Houthis’ ability to control territory. First, the Haraz Mountain Range, with its peak in the now Houthi-controlled governorate of Sana’a, has provided significant sanctuary for the insurgents, with the rough terrain shielding them from counterinsurgent attacks and making it difficult to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Further, Yemen’s numerous seaports have allowed the Houthis consistent access to weapons and supplies.
2. External Support: Iran’s support – both directly and through proxies – has been crucial in the Houthi’s access to training, weapons, and other supplies. As recently as February 2024, CENTCOM intercepted Iranian weapons shipments destined for Yemen.[52] Notably, while the Houthis have greatly benefited from Iranian support, they maintain autonomy from the will of the Iranian state, as highlighted by their domestic production of weapons.[53] Thus, the Houthis have benefitted by increasing their capacity for coercive power without the risk of losing legitimacy from their domestic base, who could be alienated from subordination to Iran.
3. Domestic Support: The Houthis’ network of allied tribes has allowed the group to establish domestic legitimacy and control over a large portion of the Yemeni population. While their support was originally limited to the minority Shi’a population, the Huthi family’s strategic marriages to neighboring tribes allowed them to establish alliances from the outset of the movement. Over time, these alliances broadened, with the Sa’ada Wars and President Saleh’s defection during the Yemeni Civil War creating a robust network of domestic support.[54] Using their influence, coercive power, and leverage of sectarian divisions between supporting tribes, the Houthis consolidated power by imposing Houthi appointed sheikhs and councils.[55] As a result, the tribal network has not only served as a source of domestic legitimacy, but has also cemented the Houthis’ control over the Yemeni population.

Houthi Weaknesses:

1. Lack of Capacity: The Houthis’ limited “state” capacity is a critical weakness that could impact both their legitimacy and territorial control. While the Houthis have created an extensive tribal support network and created taxation and civil laws, two factors highlight the group’s inability to control Yemen. The first factor is socioeconomic instability within their territory. Within areas of Houthi control, famine runs rampant, showcasing the group’s inability to secure the needs of the population. Should the famine continue, it may result in the Houthis losing support - and thus legitimacy – from their domestic population. Second, the continued presence of both AQAP and STC in Yemen highlights the group’s military limitations, they have been unable to control the state in its entirety.
2. Tribal Divisions: While a diverse network of tribal support currently supports the Houthi insurgency, tribal divisions could be detrimental to the insurgency should this alliance falter. As exemplified by the al-Qaeda in Iraq case, tribal divisions can serve as fault lines for groups of supporters to turn against the insurgency.[56] Thus, the diverse ethnic and sectarian divisions within the Houthi support base may act against the insurgency’s domestic legitimacy and control over the population.

Counterinsurgent Strengths

1. International Legitimacy of the GoY: The primary strength of counterinsurgency is international legitimacy. Currently, the international community continues to recognize the GoY as the legitimate government of the country.[57] Further – the United States has designated the Houthis as a terrorist organization.[58] If the precedent with the Taliban – who was also designated as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT), and has yet to receive recognition from much of the international community - stands, it is highly unlikely that the international community would choose to legitimize a Houthi state.[59]

Counterinsurgent Weaknesses

1. Military-Dominant Strategy: The counterinsurgency effort has largely overlooked the civil factors in Yemen that contribute to the insurgency. As stated previously, the U.S. Army FM 3-24 underscores the necessity of both civilian and military efforts in a successful counterinsurgency. Yet, the U.S. Coalition has not only taken an almost purely military approach to the strategy through their use of airstrikes, but has also caused aid organizations to suspend operations in the country, exacerbating the socio-economic factors that underpin the insurgency.[60] By ignoring the civil factors of this conflict, the counterinsurgency limits their capabilities to address root causes of the issue.
2. Limited State Capacity: Best practice in COIN is to support the afflicted state, not lead the effort. Yet, in the case of the Houthis, the GoY does not have sufficient state building capacity to provide adequate security or civil support to their population. Given that the Houthis control 70% of the Yemeni population, its arguable that the GoY has existed until this point primarily at the will of the international community, who continue to recognize it as the legitimate ruler of the state.[61] Thus, unless external counterinsurgent forces attempt to establish a new state entirely – an extremely difficult task, as the United States discovered in both Iraq and Afghanistan – counterinsurgents are doomed to artificially supply state capacity indefinitely.
3. Internal Divisions: The numerous ethnic, sectarian, and political divisions within Yemen pose a significant challenge to the counterinsurgents. To successfully reestablish legitimacy from the domestic population and regain control of the Yemen, counterinsurgent forces would need to address the grievances of the Shia minority, the various tribes, the STC separatists in the south, and the grievances of the AQAP in the east. These grievances are historic, complex, and likely contradictory to each other, given the rivalries between Sunni and Shia and between tribes. As a result, it is unlikely that counterinsurgents will be able to mend these divisions, and thus they are unlikely to succeed in addressing grievances and co-opting the insurgents back into the GoY.
4. Fragmented Forces: The counterinsurgency does not have the unity or willpower to conduct sufficient counterinsurgency measures in Yemen. History has proved time and time again that implementing any successful counterinsurgency strategy requires long-term commitment from counterinsurgent forces.[62] Yet, counterinsurgents in the Houthi case have failed to make this long-term commitment. As demonstrated by the Saudi-coalition, the forces are fragmented, with a host of countries joining and leaving, and as of 2023, even Saudi Arabia has cut their losses.
5. Lack of Political Interest: The new U.S.-led coalition does not have the political interest or willpower to conduct a counterinsurgency. As stated by FM 3-24, U.S. counterinsurgency “must be understood within the larger sphere of U.S. policy.”[63] For the new U.S. Coalition, their goals have near nothing to do with the internal politics of Yemen, and everything to do with the security of global trade. This is illustrated by the redesignation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization only when the Red Sea route was threatened. Thus, it's doubtful that the Coalition would ever gain political support to do more than secure the Red Sea route – especially as the Israel-Hamas and Ukraine wars rage in the background. Given that counterinsurgency requires long term, multifaceted commitment, this lack of interest is detrimental to the success of the counterinsurgency.

The Current State of Affairs

            Insurgency is a zero-sum game for insurgents and counterinsurgents – and as it stands, the Houthis are winning. The weaknesses in both groups underscore the current tide: while the Houthis have weaknesses that may occur in the future, the counterinsurgents are presented with fundamental challenges to their current strategy, which impacts their ability to address the root causes of Yemeni grievances.

In addition to these counterinsurgent weaknesses, the Houthi case has several late-stage indicators of a successful insurgency. According to the CIA’s manual, historical analysis of insurgencies has revealed typically, four developments occur before an insurgency becomes successful:

1. “Progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the government.
2. Progressive withdrawal of international support for the government.
3. Progressive loss of government control over population and territory.
4. Progressive loss of government coercive power.”[64]

Given the Houthis’ tribal support and that approximately 70% of the population is under Houthi control, factors one, three, and arguably four – as the Houthis are using coercive power within areas of their control - have already occurred. Further, Saudi Arabia’s statement that they are “open [to a] door for a political process” with the Houthis could indicate a withdrawal from their previous support of the GoY.[65] Thus, despite these indicators not being definitive signs of counterinsurgent defeat, they underscore the uphill battle that counterinsurgents would need to climb to win against the Houthis.

Conclusion: What Happens Next?

The jury may be officially out on the insurgency's future, but an evaluation of the insurgency within COIN doctrine illustrates that the Houthis are far outperforming the counterinsurgents. Not only do the Houthis have the advantages of geography and both internal and external support, but the counterinsurgency’s weaknesses may be fatal to the counterinsurgency effort. Further, the counterinsurgency failed to address the civil aspects of the conflict, and a lack of GoY state capacity and diverse Yemeni divisions present the need for a concerted, extensive, long term COIN effort. The fragmented forces and lack of political interest mean that these counterinsurgency needs will never be met.

So, where does that leave the United States? Perhaps it is time to consider letting the counterinsurgency fail – with the goal of protecting our interests in the Red Sea. Instead of using military force, we could tempt the insurgents with a carrot: recognition of a Houthi-led Yemen from the international community. Using leverage within international organizations, the United States should negotiate terms in which the Houthis could gain legitimacy – contingent on several civil factors like facilitating economic growth to mitigate the humanitarian crisis and developing a fair and just political system that ensures reconciliation with the GoY. In fostering this new Yemen, the United States should follow the principles of counterinsurgency doctrines – such as acting as a supporting advisor for the new government to build state capacity. The result has great potential: a reality where Yemen is relatively stable and the Red Sea trade route is once again secure, but without the deployment of counterinsurgent forces in a long, drawn-out conflict. Thus, while the Houthis may win in this reality, that reality does not require the United States to lose – a far better scenario than an expensive and protracted loss.