by Gene Kamena with Roy Houchin
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The Global War On Terror (GWOT), or as we now call it, Overseas Contingency Operations, has cost our nation dearly in terms of loss of life, the number of wounded and the amount of national treasure expended. Operations over the past decade exacted an additional casualty--the ability of military leaders to communicate effectively at the strategic level. Our track record for clear, concise and honest communications is indeed lacking.
When most military leaders attempt a foray into the realm of Strategic Communications (SC), their product tends to be a labored affair. A review of messages gone awry since the attacks of 911 includes, but is not limited to: the rescue of Jessica Lynch, the Abu Ghraib scandal, Haditha's killings, civilian casualties and intentional civilian killings in Afghanistan, the disappointment in standards at Walter Reed Hospital, loss of accountability at Arlington Cemetery, and released Navy tapes of on-ship antics involving questionable judgment. To be fair, there have also been SC wins, for instance: the surge in Iraq, the turnaround in Al Anbar province, and the military's response to the Haiti earthquake. Unfortunately, when it comes to SC, a win never negates a loss--a win fades quickly, but a bad message lingers and is difficult to overcome.
Senior military leaders are smart people, they are experienced and they work hard. Consequently, why is communicating at the strategic level so difficult for many of them? In his 25 January 2011 memorandum, titled "Strategic Communications and Information Operations in the DoD," Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates stated that "...a rapidly changing strategic environment. The Erosion of traditional boundaries between foreign and domestic, civilian and combatant, state and non-state actors, and war and peace..." contributes to difficulties with regard to SC. The factors mentioned by Secretary Gates certainly add to the complexity of the communications environment; however, even a superficial review of SC missteps indicates some basic reasons for the difficulty to communicate--over confidence, ego, hubris, and poor judgment top the list. I posit that a bad message begins with the leader who crafts it and sends it out to the world.
Senior leaders are at fault for poor SC messages; it is neither the environment nor the complexity of operations. To help make this point, the following examination, albeit cursory, of three case studies might be insightful. The following stories highlight several critical errors. The details of the stories have been truncated with the intent of focusing on the actions of our leaders and what we should remember in the future.
Download the Full Article: Muffled Voices
Professor Gene C. Kamena currently teaches Leadership and Ethics at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama. He is retired from the Army as a Colonel of Infantry. He holds a B.A. in History from Auburn University and a Masters Degree in Military Art and Science from CGSC at Fort Leavenworth. He graduated from the Army War College in 1998 and Commanded the 2nd Brigade, 1AD. He also served as the Chief of Staff for the 1st Infantry Division, Director of Staff of U.S. Space Command and the Deputy Chief of Staff for U.S. Northern Command, Director for Iraqi Security Forces and formed and led an Iraqi Special Border Commando Brigade on the Syrian border. His operational deployments include; Desert Shield Desert Storm, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Iraq (OIF.)
Dr. Roy F. Houchin II joined the faculty of the Air War College in 2006 following his retirement from active duty with the Air Force. He has taught previously at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air Command and Staff College and in the Department of History at the US Air Force Academy. While on active duty, Dr. Houchin served as Director of Operations and Chief, Combat Operations, 607th Combat Operations Squadron, Osan, South Korea.
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Mr. Kamena states:
"Operations over the past decade exacted an additional casualty--the ability of military leaders to communicate effectively at the strategic level."
I don't believe that our senior leaders had any greater ability to deal with SC prior to the last 10 years of war. In fact, one of the examples in this essay takes place in the infancy of the GWOT when the senior leaders in charge would have grown up in the pre-9/11 military. I don't think that the mistakes outlined in this essay demonstrate a loss of capability, rather it just shows that our SC training and skillsets in the pre-9/11 military weren't up to the task of dealing with a real conflict.