Non-Linear Warfare in Ukraine: The Critical Role of Information Operations and Special Operations

Non-Linear Warfare in Ukraine: The Critical Role of Information Operations and Special Operations

Bret Perry

The overall purpose of this paper is to scrutinize the contemporary hybrid warfare employed by Russia in Ukraine and determine which elements have been most critical for Russia’s success.  After providing a brief overview of hybrid warfare, this paper asserts that information operations and special operations ultimately pave the way for success in hybrid warfare.  Since both of these components create a more favorable population, achieve the strategic initiative, and act as a force multiplier for insurgent elements, they result in early successes that provide the initiating actor escalation control.  For these two elements, this paper provides a brief background on their general concepts, an overview of how they are viewed among Russian military thinkers, a discussion of how they were employed during the Ukrainian crisis, and an analysis of their use.  After reaffirming its thesis, this paper concludes with a brief discussion of the consequences of hybrid warfare and how it enables propagators to hinder their adversaries’ decision-making process.

Introduction

Each encounter in war will usually tend to grow increasingly disordered over time.  As the situation changes continuously, we are forced to improvise again and again until finally our actions have little, if any, resemblance to the original scheme.[1]

The aforementioned quotation, from United States (U.S.) Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 Warfighting illustrates how actors—both state and non-state—change their military conduct in order to respond to the evolving environment.  The fundamental law driving military conflict, described by Carl Von Clausewitz as “War is the continuation of politics by other means,” remains the same.[2]  However, the gradual transition from a complicated environment to a complex environment is challenging military leaders in the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and most recently, Eastern Europe.[3]  Since the end of the Cold War, a significant amount of military thought has been invested in understanding irregular warfare, an old phenomena with historical precedent.[4]  However, the complex nature of conflict today is represented by the convergence of these different types of war throughout various domains in an unclear environment and consequentially challenging policymakers and military strategists alike.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine highlights the growing complexity defining war.  On February 27, 2014, unidentifiable well-armed trained gunmen stormed an airport and government building in Crimea—marking the beginning of a well-planned Russian military operation to seize Crimea.[5]  No shots were fired in anger and the surprise of the seizure provided Russia with the ability to outmaneuver the newly-installed Ukrainian government and international community.[6]  As the conflict continued to spread, destructive engagements between pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian forces emerged in the eastern Donbas region and persists as of June 2015.[7]^,[8]  Furthermore, the Kremlin’s continuous simultaneous criticism of Kiev and denial of involvement has created an ambiguous strategic picture hampering the decision-making process for Western leaders.  Commonly referred to as ‘hybrid war,’ the employment of this type of conflict in Ukraine highlights new challenges for military leaders and policymakers.[9]

Using the Ukraine conflict as a case study, this paper argues that hybrid warfare (known as nelineinaia voina, or non-linear warfare in Russian) is the simultaneous combination and employment of multiple military and non-military state tools in conflict, but its successful use ultimately relies on an effective information operations campaign supplemented by coordinated special operations conducting unconventional warfare.  Non-linear warfare is comprised of various elements from conventional warfare, unconventional warfare, political, and even economic means but its success hinges on an initial information operations campaigned that is subsequently exploited by special operations forces (SOF) once it has reached a specific point.  First, this paper will provide a brief overview of hybrid warfare and discuss its general employment in Ukraine.  Then, this paper will proceed to explore information operations in Russian military thought, detail its use in Ukraine, and analyze its impact.  After discussing information operations, this paper will transition and focus on the role of SOF operations in unconventional warfare, explore the recent evolution of SOF in Russia, and analyze their actions in Ukraine.  Lastly, this paper will conclude with a discussion of the significance of non-linear warfare and its strategic incentives.

A Brief Overview of Hybrid Warfare

As a result of its relative recent emergence in literature, there are multiple definitions of hybrid warfare.  With many military thinkers using the 2006 Lebanon War featuring Israel and Hezbollah as a case study, a significant portion of literature views hybrid warfare as an approach used by non-state actors.[10]  As demonstrated by the Russian intervention in Ukraine, states can employ hybrid warfare as well.  Thus, instead of attempting to further define hybrid warfare, the author will use an original hybrid warfare definition from Frank Hoffman.  Hoffman says that hybrid warfare, which can be conducted by both state and non-state actors, is the following:

Hybrid wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.[11]

He hones in on hybrid threats by describing them as the following:

Hybrid threats are any adversary that simultaneously employs a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior in the same time and battlespace to obtain their political objectives.[12]

The author embraces these definitions—especially the latter—as it offers the most utility not only because of its inclusion of both state and non-state actors, but also because it incorporates a defined battlespace and the actor’s ultimate political objectives.  For the most part, this definition sufficiently explains Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, but it does not incorporate “strategic coercion”—a characteristic unique to great powers such as Russia.  Lawrence Freedman defines strategic coercion as “the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another’s strategic choices.”[13]  In the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, this includes nuclear threats and large-scale ‘snap’ military exercises.  Due to the significance of strategic coercion in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, this paper will use the hybrid warfare framework defined by Phillip Karber.[14]

Graphic 1:  Karber Hybrid Warfare Framework[15]

As illustrated in Graphic 1, there are four components of hybrid warfare:  “Political Subversion,” “Proxy Sanctum,” “Intervention,” and “Coercive Deterrence.”  Political Subversion revolves around information operations and the encouragement of underground resistance.  For instance, components of Russia’s ‘humanitarian’ foreign policy in Ukraine are considered to be part of Political Subversion.  Proxy Sanctum is a step up in intensity as it calls for the employment of certain SOF units to conduct unconventional warfare; the mobilization of spetsnaz forces in Crimea illustrates this stage.[16]  Intervention is indicated by the usage of conventional military forces alongside an increase in intensity of information warfare and SOF operations.  The deployment of Russian Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) in Ukraine to conduct conventional operations against Ukrainian forces demonstrates this effort.[17]  Coercive Deterrence is essentially strategic coercion; Russia’s nuclear threats and large-scale regional military exercises exemplify this stage.[18]  Since information operations and SOF actions fall under Political Subversion and Proxy Sanctum respectively, this paper asserts that these elements pave the way for initial success and subsequent escalation dominance.

The term non-linear warfare is used most notably in Russian literature by Vladislav Surkov.  Surkov—who serves as a key political advisor to President Putin—published a science fiction short story on non-linear warfare under the penname Natan Dubovitsky.[19]^,[20]  Titled Without Sky, this short story discusses a futuristic war from the perspective of a child and was published shortly after the events in Crimea.  Beginning with hints of perpetual mobilization (a message projected internally by the Kremlin), Surkov introduces non-linear warfare.[21]  He says:

This was the first non-linear war.  In the primitive wars of the nineteenth, twentieth, and other middle centuries, the fight was usually between two sides:  two nations or two temporary alliances.  But now, four coalitions collided, and it wasn’t two against two, or three against one.  It was all against all…

…The simple-hearted commanders of the past strove for victory.  Now they did not act so stupidly.  That is, some, of course, still clung to the old habits and tried to exhume from the archives old slogans of the type:  victory will be ours.  It worked in some places, but basically, war was now understood as a process, more exactly, part of a process, its acute phase, but maybe not the most important [emphasis added].[22]^,[23]

Despite its status as a short story, Surkov’s writings provide some insight.  As a key Kremlin strategic adviser (who was sanctioned by the U.S. government for his role in the seizure of Crimea), his voice is influential.[24]  In addition to directly referencing non-linear warfare in this story, he envisions a world where the involved parties are not clear.  Furthermore, Surkov views military operations as “not the most important” part of non-linear warfare.  Although brief, this short story provides a glimpse into Russian strategic thought on non-linear warfare.

In addition, the following two articles shed some light on hybrid warfare in Russian military thought.  Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, authored what is the most cited Russian article on non-linear from February 2013.  Titled The Value of Science in Prediction, Gerasimov discusses the future of war and necessary measures in what is known informally as the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’.[25]^,[26]  In a separate article coauthored by Col. S.G. Checkinov (Res.) and Lt. Gen. S.A. Bogdanov (Ret.) titled The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War, the authors assert that information warfare, along with SOF and a coordinated escalation, will play a key role in future conflict; this document has occasionally been referred to as a “how-to manual” for the Crimean seizure.[27]^,[28]  This paper will eventually explore these two writings in further detail, but it is important to recognize that few Russian publications on hybrid warfare currently exist.  However, much has been written on specific elements of hybrid warfare, and some of these will be examined.

The Role of Information Operations in Hybrid Warfare

Background on Information Operations

Before exploring information operations in Russian military thought and its employment in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, it is necessary to briefly understand the basics of information operations.  The U.S. Department of Defense defines information operations as the following:

The integrated deployment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with others lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.[29]

In addition, psychological operations (a subset of information operations abbreviated as PYSOPs) are also aimed towards “shaping adversary perceptions and behavior.”[30]   This is done through targeting key decision makers, vulnerable population groups, and external mass audiences—as illustrated by Graphic 2.  Ultimately, information operations are critical because they shape the targeted group’s opinions and impact the adversary’s decision making abilities.

Graphic 2:  Targeted Audiences in U.S. Department of Defense Information Operations[31]

The Role of Information Operations in Modern Russian Military Thought

Information operations, and the concept of psychological operations, is not a new concept in Russian military thought as it has roots in the Soviet Union.  However, as a result of the Persian Gulf War, the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and the Arab Spring, Russian strategic thinkers greatly elaborate on the role of information operations in conflict.  Analysis of Russian military literature not only reveals the significant increasing emphasis on information operations, but also the sophistication of these operations as well, and their fusion into non-linear warfare.  In 1971, Pierre Nord, a specialist in PYSOPs wrote: 

Making ideology part of psychological warfare was a Soviet innovation, turning this into a massive and universal warfare.  Another innovation was the incessant use of psychological operations.  The point is that peacetime never exists for a government in Moscow [emphasis added].[32]

Russia’s information operations in Ukraine demonstrate that Nord’s comments remain true to this day.

In his article, Gerasimov begins with discussing the “Lessons of the Arab Spring.”  He asserts that “The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”[33]  Information operations are just one of several nonmilitary means that he is referring to.  Gerasimov continues:

The information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy.  In North Africa, we witnessed the use of technologies for influencing state structures and the population with the help of information networks.  It is necessary to perfect activities in the information space, including the defense of our own objectives.[34]

Gerasimov’s assertions contain three important aspects.  First, with the reference to asymmetrical warfare, it is evident that he views information operations as a force multiplier.  Second, with the population as the targeted audience, he considers it as the center of gravity in turning the tide.  Third, the concluding defensive comment stems from the contemporary popular theory that the West has been continuously conducting information operations against Russia. 

Yet, the article by Checkinov and Bogdanov not only echoes Gerasimov’s thesis on the significance of nonmilitary weapons, but expands on the importance of information operations.  One of their fundamental arguments is the following:

A new-generation warfare will be dominated by information and psychological warfare that will seek to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control and depress the opponent’s armed forces personnel and population morally and psychologically.  In the ongoing revolution in information technologies, information and psychological warfare will largely lay the groundwork for victory [emphasis added].[35]

They point out that ultimately, “No goal will be achieved in future wars unless one belligerent gains information superiority over the other.”[36]  Essentially, the framework for hybrid warfare presented by Checkinov and Bogdanov relies on a successful information operations campaign at the inception of conflict in order to shape favorable operating conditions.

Igor Panarin also asserts that information operations are critical for strategic geopolitical campaigns.  A former Committee for State Security (KGB) officer who worked with the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), Panarin’s emphasis on information operations is based off of his perception that Russia is, and has been continually under attack in the information domain by the U.S. and the West.[37]^,[38]  Furthermore, Panarin believes that the fall of the USSR, the “velvet revolutions,” and perestroika were all results of an efficient information operation waged by the West.[39]  As a result of his perceived ideological clash, Panarin classifies the Crimea seizure as a “defensive” information operation.[40]  Due to the USSR’s historical information challenges and the current ‘conflict’ between Russia and the West, Panarin calls for the creation of an “information KGB” manned by “information spetsnazes.”[41]  Although not officially confirmed, it is believed that the Russian government worked with Panarin to set up an office managed by a presidential special adviser “to oversee an international network of NGOs, information agencies and training institutions” for coordinating Russia’s whole-of-government information operations.[42]^,[43]

Panarin lists eight different components of information operations.  The first two are “social control” and “social maneuvering” which revolve around “influencing society” to achieve “intentional control of the public aimed at gaining certain benefits.”[44]  “Disinformation,” “fabrication of information,” and “information manipulation” all relate to supporting information operations through leveraging incorrect information.[45]  The last three are “lobbying,” “blackmail,” and “extortion of desired information.”[46]  Ultimately, Panarin’s framework for conducting information operations and suggestions for the Russian government have made inroads among many Russian strategic thinkers since many agree with his perceived geopolitical ideological information clash.

Alexsandr Dugin supports Panarin’s ideological assessment and also presents a framework for conducting information operations.  Dugin, who is an academic, is the founder of the Eurasian Youth Union—providing him access to a social network to spread his ideas.[47]  He furthers Panarin’s ideological beliefs through discussing the significance of the “colour revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan and how they are fueling “netwar” (It is critical to understand that some Russian information operations terms such as “netwar” and “netcode” have their own Russian definitions that are different from their meanings in English).[48]  For instance, Dugin believes that the “netwar” in the “colour revolutions” are “artificial processes plotted in the West aimed at destablising entire regions in post-Soviet area” leading to the “disassembly of Russian statehood.”[49]  Comprised of “netcode,” a student of Dugin says “Those who understand the netcode manage the processes, the motivation of ethnic groups and entire populations of countries, and foment conflict for their own purposes.”[50]  One member of Russia’s conservative Great Fatherland Party analyzed Russia’s “netcode” when he explained “Our Russian [net]code works perfectly owing to President Putin’s achievements which…have woken up people’s layers of the subconscious mind.”[51]  Like Panarin, Dugin advises for the Kremlin to create the “Eurasian network” in order to “reverse” Western information operations.[52]  Dugin’s works reinforce Panarin’s writings and details modern Russian views on information operations.

One of Dugin’s “netcode” playing a significant role in Russian information operations is the concept of ‘reflexive control.’  Reflexive control is defined as:

a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action.[53]

Reflexive control is considered a key element of Maskirovka, a Russian term lacking an English translation but a practice of using “dummies and decoys, disinformation and even the execution of complex maneuvers.”[54]  Essentially, actors employ reflexive control in order to secretly hijack the adversary’s decision making cycle. 

Although originally conceived by V.A. Lefebrve in the 1960s, reflexive control has been continually refined throughout the 21^st century.  For instance, in 2001, the Russian journal Reflexive Processes and Control was launched under the guidance of FAPSI, the deputy head of the Information Security Committee on the Russian Security Council, and others.  Major General N.I. Turko of the Russian Armed Forces assesses that reflexive control is “the most dangerous manifestation” and more influential than conventional military means.[55]  Reflexive control’s methods vary but include encouragement, blackmail by force, camouflage, and disinformation.[56]  The immediate impact of these tools confuses the subject and causes it to pursue a course of action unknowingly pre-planned by the actor.  In information operations, reflexive control not only targets state governments, but also key groups of the population.

The Role of Information Operations in the Ukrainian Crisis

Russia’s information operations in Ukraine were crucial to the successful seizure of Crimea and operational expansion into the Donbas region.  This effort can be broken down into the following three groups:  1) Russia’s preceding ‘humanitarian’ foreign policy, 2) pro-Russian media within Ukraine, and 3) global pro-Russian media aimed at the West.

Russia’s ‘Humanitarian’ Foreign Policy in Ukraine

Although not necessarily considered a direct subcomponent of information operations, elements of Russia’s ‘humanitarian’ foreign policy towards Ukraine enabled the success of Russian information operations.  These elements consisted of funding for schools teaching the Russian language, supporting pro-Russian cultural centers and compatriot non-government organizations (NGOs), and encouraging the attainment of Russian citizenship.  Ultimately, the goal of this ‘humanitarian’ foreign policy is rather simple:  to increase the number of Russian speakers in Ukraine and the number of Ukrainian citizens who identify with the Russian culture.  Individuals that consider themselves to be Russian speakers and Russian citizens are able to understand Russian propaganda, and subsequently enable Russian information operations.

The collapse of the U.S.S.R. marked a decline in the interest for Russian studies in Ukraine, but the promotion of the Russian language in Ukraine is still significant.   Within Ukraine, 2,100 schools teach both Ukrainian and Russian along with 1,340 schools that just teach Russian.[57]  Just under 1.3 million primary school students study Russian as a subject, and nearly 800,000 students conduct their studies exclusively in Russian.[58]  Furthermore, nearly 1.5 million Russian textbooks are printed and distributed to students at the expense of the Ukrainian government.[59]  Much of these efforts are the result of bilateral cultural promotion efforts between Kiev and Moscow.  However, closer inspection reveals that:

The comparison of Ukrainian policy on Russian minority and Russian policy on Ukrainian minority leads to the conclusion that the Russian Federation provides the policy of double standards when “defending the Russian language” in Ukraine.[60]

Essentially, the Russian government’s lobbying efforts have resulted in the promotion of the Russian language throughout Ukraine at the expense of the national government.

Complementing the promotion of the Russian language in the education system is the support of NGOs that focus on spreading Russian culture.  In 2009, there were 14 pro-Russian NGOs which were organized under the Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots.[61]  A number of informal organizations also exist and communicate with the Coordinating Council but are not formally part of it in order to not discredit it (such as the Eurasian Youth League and Crimean Proryv which clash with police forces).[62]  Over 400 million rubles from the Russian national government’s budget are sent to compatriot organizations and 34 million rubles from the Moscow city budget were provided for Russian compatriots in Crimea.[63]  Rosstrudnichestvo, the Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation, currently receives a $60 million budget that will rise to $300 million by 2020.[64]  These compatriot organizations conduct a variety of activities that include but are not limited to the organization of ‘Victory Day’ parades to celebrate Russia’s World War II victory, the financing of a Russian cultural center in Luhansk, and the destruction of Ukrainian state symbols on Hoverla Mountain.[65]  Many compatriot organizations maintain their own news websites and newspapers to propagate pro-Russian ideas.[66] Furthermore, Russian cultural centers have been established in Kiev, Simferopol, Lviv, and several other cities.[67]  These NGOs and compatriot organizations assist with the promotion of Russian language and culture throughout Ukraine.

Even though Ukrainian legislation prohibits dual citizenship, the Russian government has conducted several programs that provide Russian-inspired Ukrainian citizens Russian status.[68]  Russian officials deny allegations that they distribute passports at little or no cost to Ukrainians, but it is known that the Consulate General of Russia in Simferopol illegally hands out passports.[69]  Furthermore in 2008, the Russian State Duma announced a draft law titled “The Federal Law on the Russian Card for Compatriots Living Outside the Russian Federation.”  This law would allow for pro-Russian Ukrainian citizens to attain an identification card that would allow them to travel to Russia without a visa, work in Russia without a permit, receive an education in Russia, receive an energy allowance, and provide benefits to immediate family members.[70]  Ultimately, these efforts encourage the attainment of Russian citizenship.[71]

Pro-Russian Media Efforts Within Ukraine

Within Ukraine, Russia has effectively conducted information operations leveraging TV stations and newspapers to spread Russian propaganda.  Since Russia’s ‘humanitarian’ foreign policy efforts creates a Russian speaking population, its media efforts are able to fuel pro-Russian sentiment.

The proliferation of Russian newspapers in Ukraine is significant and contributes to the spread of pro-Russian ideas.  According to data from 2007, there were 3,966,113 newspapers in circulation in Ukraine.  Of these, 2,647,385 (66.7%) are in Russian while 1,141,877 (28.7%) are in Ukrainian.[72]  Although many Russian language newspapers do not necessarily contain a pro-Russian bias, many do propagate the Kremlin’s viewpoints (especially those owned by a political party).  Nevertheless, mass print is just one element of the information domain that Russia has focused on.

In addition to the newspapers, there are also a substantial amount Russian TV stations.  In July of 2008, there were 45 licensed foreign TV programs in Ukraine.  37 of these programs were Russian.[73]  Some of these programs only feature programming revolving around entertainment but those that focus on presenting news or discussions about current events often embody a pro-Russian bias.  For instance, the TV channel Peryvv Kanal Vsemirnaya hosted a discussion on the territorial status of Sevastapol.[74]  Many of these programs do not abide by Ukrainian government regulations governing broadcast stations.  In response, the Ukrainian government has tried to punish illegal stations, but has failed as a result of Russian government intervention.  For instance, in 2008, the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine cited four Russian TV channels (First Channel. Worldnet, RTR-Planet, Ren-TV, and TVCI) for violating the laws on Television and Broadcasting, On Public Morals, and On Advertising.  The Russian government immediately responded with Igor Schegolev (the Minister of Communications and Mass Media) demanding for Kiev to “stop the discrimination of Russian mass media in Ukraine.”[75]  As a result of these interventions by the Russian government, pro-Russian TV stations are rarely sanctioned for their violations.

Global Pro-Russian Media Efforts

Alongside its media efforts within Ukraine, Russia has also waged an effective information campaign against the international community leveraging a similar set of resources:  1) TV programs, and 2) a ‘swarm’ of pro-Russia internet commenters.  These efforts, which revolve around denial and deception, distract international actors—hindering their response to the Ukrainian crisis. 

Unlike its TV media efforts within Ukraine, Russia’s international TV programs are not in Russian, but instead English, Arabic, Spanish, French, German and other popular foreign languages.  The most notable program is RT (Russian Today).  With a budget of at least $300 million that is set to increase by 41%, RT is one of the largest TV networks as it reaches over 600 million people globally.[76]  Online, it is considered one of the most popular news channels as it was the first TV station to reach 1 billion views on YouTube.[77]  RT’s strategic importance is exemplified by the fact that Putin signed a presidential decree forbidding any cuts to the RT budget.[78]  Throughout the Crimea seizure and Ukrainian conflict, RT repeatedly propagated disinformation and false claims bolstering the pro-Russian view.  These ranged from asserting that Russians troops “are a stabilizing force” to an editorial monologue stating that Russia is “the only country in the world capable of turning the U.S.A. into radioactive dust.”[79]^,[80]  Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs Linas Linkevicus sums up RT’s effectiveness by saying “Russia Today’s propaganda machine is no less destructive than the military machine in Crimea.”[81]  RT is an example of how Russia attempts to confuse the West.

While RT promotes a deceptive narrative, Russia’s employment of informal news sites and commenters acts as an offensive ‘swarm’ geared towards suppressing the Western narrative.  Often referred to as trolls (internet users who purposely promote discord, anger, and confusion), these users attack social media posts and news pieces countering the pro-Russian narrative with a ‘swarm’ of disparaging and critical comments.[82]  Even though the comments are meaningless and often reflect poor logic, they distract and as one analyst explained, act as “suppressive fire” aiming to choke “users with a cloud of filth.”[83]^,[84]  Social network analysis displayed in Graphic 3 illustrates that many of 17,950 active pro-Russian accounts are related, indicating extensive coordination.

Graphic 3:  Social Network Analysis of 17,590 Pro-Russian Twitter Accounts[85]

Leaked documents show that the Internet Research Agency, based in St. Petersburg, is behind many of these incidents.  With a budget of over $10 million (half of which is destined to be paid in cash) and just under 1,000 employees, there are reports that this organization “was directly orchestrated by the government.”[86]  Furthermore, another report asserts that “any Internet operation originating in Russia are almost certainly monitored and overseen by the Federal Security Service’s (FSB’s) Information Security Center.”[87]  Ultimately, Russia’s “army of trolls” hamper’s its adversary’s efforts to attain legitimacy in the information space.[88]

Analysis of Russia Information Operations During the Ukrainian Crisis

Russia’s information operations in Ukraine can be characterized by a high level of sophistication and their complicated nature.  Rather than adopting a singular, uniform information operations strategy, Russia deployed a well-planned information operations strategy within Ukraine while simultaneously employing a different information operations approach outside of Ukraine against Western media.  Graphic 4 below illustrates this process:

Graphic 4:  Pattern of Russian Information Operations in Ukraine

 Internally, Russia’s investment in spreading the Russian language and culture essentially expanded the audience they would be capable of reaching out to.  Russia subsequently targeted this section of the Ukrainian population with information operations in order to secure their ‘popular support’ for military actions in Ukraine.  Externally, the combination of disinformation and criticism disrupted the Western narrative.  As a result, Russia was able to create an information space supporting its military operations in Ukraine.

Russia’s information operations are consistent with modern Russian thought on the subject.  The role that information operations played is consistent with the comments on its importance by Gerasimov, Checkinov, and Bogdanov.  Furthermore, Panarin’s advice for conducting information operations through a coordinated effort between government agencies, NGOs, and journalists is exemplified by Russian’s employment.  Dugin’s emphasis on ‘netcode’ is demonstrated by the careful use of misinformation to trigger actions among individuals; counters to misinformation were suppressed with swarms of criticism.  The emphasis on disinformation creates an environment well-suited for carrying out reflexive control.  Ultimately, Russia’s effective employment of information operations created a favorable attitude among sects of the population that allowed the Kremlin to transition to the Proxy Sanctum stage of hybrid warfare and conduct effective SOF operations.

The Importance of SOF Operations in Hybrid Warfare

Brief Overview of SOF Operations

Before dissecting the employment of SOF in Russian military thought and in Ukraine, it is necessary to provide a brief overview SOF operations.  Typically, SOF operations are informally broken down into two categories:  complex kinetic direct action operations (such as F3EA operations) and operations supporting unconventional warfare.[89]^,[90],[91]  Unconventional warfare is defined as: 

Operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.[92]  

Graphic 5 depicts unconventional warfare and its relationship with ‘Political Warfare’ (coined by George Kennan).[93]  Unconventional warfare does not revolve entirely around SOF operations, but they play a critical role.  Thus, this paper will mainly examine Russia’s employment of SOF in support of unconventional warfare.

Graphic 5:  Unconventional Warfare, Political Warfare, and Counter-Unconventional Warfare[94]

SOF Operations in Modern Russian Military Thought

The employment of SOF is not new in Russian thought.  In fact, unlike many states, Russia maintains an arsenal of SOF experience stemming from the U.S.S.R.  Known as spetsnaz units, these forces were conceived sometime during the second half of the 20^th century in order to conduct “special reconnaissance” missions.  Special reconnaissance missions are defined in Soviet military publications as the following:

Reconnaissance carried out to subvert the political, economic, and military potential and morale of a probable or actual enemy.  The primary missions of special reconnaissance are acquiring intelligence on major economic and military installations and either destroying them or putting them out of action; carrying out punitive operations against rebels, conducting propaganda; forming and training insurgent detachments, etc.  Special reconnaissance…is conducted by the forces of covert intelligence and special purpose troops.[95]

Essentially, spetsnaz forces were originally intended covertly advance ahead of Soviet Deep Battle operations, develop their own agent networks, and conduct special reconnaissance missions.  This paper will not dive into the history of Soviet spetsnaz, but it is important to recognize how their background has shaped their current modus operandi.[96]  Although relatively little is publicly written about spetsnaz and SOF operations in Russian literature, Gerasimov, Checkinov, Bogdanov, and Col. General Anatoly Zaitsev have discussed SOF operations in their works.

Gerasimov views SOF operations as a critical component of non-linear warfare due to their ability to operate as a force multiplayer relatively clandestinely.  He says:

Asymmetrical actions have come into widespread use, enabling the nullification of the enemy’s advantages in armed conflict.  Among such actions are the use of special-operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state, as well as informational actions, devices, and means that are constantly being perfected [emphasis added].[97]

Gerasimov also asserts:

All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces.  The open use of forces – often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation – is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict [emphasis added].[98]

Essentially, Gerasimov believes that SOF operations are the most effective military tool in non-linear warfare.  Unlike conventional forces, the clandestine nature and ‘small footprint’ of SOF provides them with greater operating flexibility; even when supported with effective information operations, conventional forces are still somewhat restrained in their employment.  Furthermore, his belief that they create a “permanently operating front” with “internal opposition” is similar to the role of SOF in unconventional warfare.  Although SOF operate on a smaller scale than conventional forces, their size allows them to continuously operate without abiding by any political constraints that conventional forces must recognize.

Checkinov and Bogdanov also call for the employment of SOF in two of eight phases in their interpretation of “new-generation war.”  After a lengthy series of information operations conducted throughout five phases, SOF represent the initial periods of military action.  They say:

The start of the military phase will be immediately preceded by large-scale reconnaissance and subversive missions conducted under the cover of the information operation. All types, forms, methods, and forces, including special operations forces, space, radio, radio engineering, electronic, diplomatic, and secret service intelligence, and industrial espionage will be used to detect and map the exact location of key government and military objectives vital to the country’s sustainability, designate targets for fire strikes, make digital topographic maps of enemy territory and load them remotely into onboard homing systems, and monitor the efficacy of fire strikes [emphasis added].[99]

Checkinov and Bogdanov’s interpretation of SOF operations is consistent with the Soviet concept of special reconnaissance.  Essentially, they view SOF operations as the immediate successor to information operations and responsible for applying precise military force against critical enemy systems in order to hamper their response.  In the final eight phase of “next-generation war,” SOF are employed to “roll over the remaining points of resistance” by leveraging fire support.[100]  Unlike Gerasimov, who views SOF primarily as a force meant to support unconventional warfare, Checkinov and Bogdanov focus on using SOF as shock infantry meant to outmaneuver the adversary.

In an article titled Partisan Warfare, Colonel-General (ret.) Anatoly Zaitsev argues that modern armies “must be able to fight without a front line” and that the effective employment of SOF in Crimea is a key lesson for the Russian military.[101]  Zaitsev, who has served in Abkhazia, praises SOF for their agility, small footprint, precise targeting, and asserts that “Offensive operations would begin only after the completion of operations by “the spetsnaz”.”[102]^,[103]  His analysis continues with the following key assessment:

Along that theme, some aspects of the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Crimea are instructive and can be utilized in the planning of future offensive operations.  The first relates to a method of sudden blocking of possible blocks of resistance by the potential enemy.  If the wider action of the blocking units is observed, the similarity of the tactics of diversionary [or “sabotage”] and reconnaissance groups of medium and small numbers (which we shall call “partisans”).  It is clear that their ultimate goal is to destroy the enemy’s critical facilities and disrupt or destroy his forces’ systems.  Carrying out diversionary [or “sabotage”] operations in partisan (in the sense listed above) activities will be one of the most important components of offensive operations in future wars of low and medium intensities [emphasis added].[104]

Zaitsev, who analyzes the potential operating speed of Ukrainian forces, believes that SOF operations are critical in non-linear warfare because of their ability to quickly maneuver and hamper the adversary’s ability to operate.  Essentially, Zaitsev views SOF operations as a mechanism in achieving “systems disruption,” which “leverages network structure and dynamics to turn small attacks into large events [emphasis added].”[105]  Ultimately, Zaitsev’s view of SOF is an extension of Gerasimov’s, Checkinov’s, and Bogdanov’s views at the operational level.

Before discussing the types of SOF operations employed in Ukraine, it is necessary to briefly discuss the recent history of SOF units in Russia.  After the Russian military’s disappointing performance in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the entire Russian defense establishment was scrutinized, including the GRU’s spetsnaz.  As a result, Anatoly Serdyukov (the Minister for Defense at the time) decided to abolish the GRU’s spetsnaz wing and transfer them to regional military commands.  This created controversy and the spetsnaz lost many personnel.  However, Sergei Shoigu (Serdyukov’s successor) and Geraismov disagreed with Serdyukov’s action, reversed his actions, and created the Komanda Spetsial’nikh Operatsiy (KSO).[106]^,[107]  With organic air assets and under the command of former FSB Alfa counterterrorism team member General Aleskandr Miroshnichenko, the approximate 500 operators from the 346^th Independent Spetsnaz Brigade marked Russia’s first ‘tier-one’ force (the KSO is often compared to the U.S’ Special Operations Command—SOCOM.  This comparison is considered to be inaccurate as Russian SOF units are not all merged under a single Ministry of Defense command.  Instead, the KSO contains more similarities to Germany’s KSK or the FSB’s Alfa units).[108][109]  The creation of the KSO represents the continued interest in SOF operations among Russian military thinkers.

Russian SOF Operations During the Ukrainian Crisis

As mentioned, Russia has conducted SOF operations within Ukraine since the inception of the conflict.  However, since some of these Russian SOF operations are unique, this paper will first look at SOF operations conducted in Crimea, and then examine SOF operations conducted in the Donbas region.  Nevertheless, due to the clandestine (and covert) nature of SOF operations, it is necessary to recognize that this analysis is not complete; there are probably many unknown Russian SOF operations in Ukraine.

Russian SOF Operations in Crimea

On February 22, 2014, various elements of spetsnaz forces were put on alert and mobilized.  Within five days, spetsnaz operators from the newly-created KSO and the 45^th opSpN (the spetsnaz detachment to the 45^th VDV—Russia’s airborne troops) were transported via helicopter to the barracks of the 810^th Independent Naval Infantry Brigade in Russia’s Black Sea naval base in Sevastapol.[110]  These operators struck the first blow by seizing the Crimean parliament building, the Simerfopol airport, and a couple of key Ukrainian military facilities.[111]^,[112],[113]  Following this first phase, they were supported by other infantry from the 810^th, pro-Russian private security contractors, and elements of other spetsnaz units (often company size detachments) including but not limited to the 431^st omrSpN (naval spetsnaz), the 10^th Brigade, the 25^th Brigade, the 3^rd Brigade, the 16^th Brigade, and the 25^th Brigade.[114]^{, [115]}  Between March 1 and March 17^th, these forces allegedly conducted 16 different seizure operations—9 of which were confirmed to be immediately successful.[116]  Targets ranged from airports, surface-to-air missile batteries, Ukrainian military bases, military hospitals, and fuel depots.[117]

The way these spetsnaz units operated led to their tactical success and played a significant role in the Kremlin’s strategic victory.  First, the spetsnaz units were visibly well-armed—providing them the capacity to engage Ukrainian military forces and deter opposition from intervening.[118]  Second, the spetsnaz were very mobile and leveraged Crimea’s line of communications in order to pursue a “systems disruption” approach.  For instance, agile wheeled vehicles were employed (such as the GAZ Tigr and BTR-80) and the BTR-80 was the heaviest vehicle used in the Crimea seizure.[119]^,[120]  Third, spetsnaz forces wore no unit or national insignia—providing the Kremlin ‘plausible deniability.’[121]  Fourth, the spetsnaz forces focused on engaging the population and winning over ‘hearts and minds.’  They were considered to be “polite” as they worked with the population, encouraged Ukrainian soldiers to defect, and only fired their weapons in the air to deter individuals from traveling along certain lines of communication.[122]  As Zaitsev pointed out, the spetsnaz were successful because of their speed and precision.

Russian SOF Operations in the Donbas

The employment of SOF in the Donbas region is different in the sense that it occurs on a much smaller scale resembling unconventional warfare more than the overt “systems disruption” approach witnessed in Crimea.  For the most part, Russian spetsnaz have focused on training and aiding pro-Russian separatist forces at the platoon level.  Although the Russian military has involved itself on a larger scale with the deployment of BTGs, there is no evidence suggesting that spetsnaz are driving or participating in these BTG operations.[123]  Furthermore, spetsnaz have been employed in the Donbas to enforce the chain of command among the separatists.

A report from IHS Jane’s assesses that squad—or at most platoon—sized elements of the KSO, the 2^nd Brigade, the 10^th Brigade, the 22^nd Brigade, and the 24^th Brigade have conducted SOF operations in Eastern Ukraine.[124]  In addition, elements of the 100^th Brigade have possibly been deployed to provide security for Russian trainers educating separatists on technical weapon systems.[125]  Unlike the spetsnaz forces conducting seizures in Crimea, these units have primarily provided tactical training and strategic advice to pro-Russian separatists fighters (many of which are under the command of Colonel Igor Strelkov who is allegedly a member of the GRU).[126]^,[127]  Furthermore, a unit known as the ‘Vostok Battalion’ (an “ad-hoc Spetsnaz force” run by the GRU with a history in Russia’s Chechen conflicts) stormed the separatist headquarters in May in order to instill a stronger chain of command among pro-Russian fighters.[128]  Initially comprised of Russians, the Vostok Battalion was eventually transformed into a force of highly trained fighters from Ukraine, Chechnya, and other Eastern European areas and handed over to Aleksandr Khodakovsky—the former commander of Ukraine’s Alfa counterterrorism spetsnaz unit.[129]^,[130]  Additionally, some reports indicate that 300 members of the FSB’s Alfa and Vimpel have been deployed to strengthen the separatist’s chain of command.[131]

Although less complete information regarding Russia’s employment of SOF in Eastern Ukraine exists, it is clear that they are supporting separatist forces.  The small-scale deployment reflects Putin’s decision to have the separatists act as Russia’s primary force in the region.  GRU spetsnaz forces are conducting unconventional warfare by training and advising the separatists while FSB spetsnaz forces appear to be resolving any internal separatist disputes and handling any principal-agent problems.  Ultimately, these SOF operations act as a force multiplier for pro-Russian separatist forces.

Analysis of Russian SOF Operations in Ukraine

Russia’s SOF operations in Ukraine offers insight into non-linear warfare and will serve as a valuable case study for special operations as more information is discovered.  The employment of SOF in both Crimea and the Donbas is consistent with the Soviet interpretation of “special reconnaissance” and the views of Checkinov, Bogdanov, Zaitsev, and Gerasimov.  Nevertheless, Russian SOF were initially used in a “systems disruption” manner in Crimea but deployed different in the Donbas to conduct “partisan warfare.”

Checkinov, Bogdanov, and Zaitsev not only viewed SOF as the initial component of a military intervention, but also responsible for targeting “key government and military objectives.”[132]  In Crimea, this is precisely what spetsnaz forces did; they initially captured key government buildings and military airports in manner described by Zaitsev consistent with “systems disruption.”  Within two weeks, their capture of key facilities and blockades of key lines of communication paralyzed the Ukrainian military’s Crimean forces—preventing them from responding; this is a clear example of “systems disruption.”

The conduct of Zaitsev’s “partisan warfare” in the Donbas is consistent Gerasimov’s views of SOF.  As discussed, Gerasimov views SOF as a method for creating a permanent front for the enemy to deal with.  In Donbas, Russia employed spetsnaz differently by having them focus on assisting separatist “partisan” forces and defending the established chain of command.  These efforts led to the creation of a somewhat effective separatist force capable of countering Ukrainian military operations.  As a result, one year after the beginning of the crisis, Kiev is still struggling to break through and defeat a capable separatist front in the east. 

Conclusion

Using the Ukrainian crisis as a case study, this paper argues that Russia’s sophisticated information operations and effective employment of SOF were ultimately the most important factors in its non-linear warfare campaign.  Russia’s effective use Political Subversion and Proxy Sanctum elements provided escalation dominance—allowing the Kremlin to leverage conventional forces and strategic coercion in its non-linear warfare strategy.  Russia’s effective information operations not only disoriented and hampered the West’s response, but also helped create a substantial portion of the population with pro-Russian beliefs willing to support the Kremlin’s military operations; a significant portion of the remaining population in Dontesk (which is estimated to only contain 25% of its pre-war population) still support the Kremlin even after a year of war.[133]  With a population willing to defy Kiev, Russia’s SOF entered the region and conducted operations aimed at paralyzing Ukrainian opposition (Crimea) and empowering a pro-Russian insurgency (Donbas).  Although this conflict remains ongoing at the time of writing, the blend of military and non-military means provided the Kremlin with initial strategic successes.

A video posted on YouTube on November 28, 2014 contains a compilation of footage of combat between the Ukrainian military and pro-Russia separatist forces.  One particular scene allegedly filmed in Dontesk is recorded at night by an unknown number of men from an apartment building.  The camera is positioned near the window and overlooks a large field.  A continuous stream of gunfire with occasional words exchanged between the recorders fill the sound.  But outside, the viewer sees dozens of tracers from heavy weapons flying past each other in both directions.  Both sides are relentlessly engaging each other within view of an urban environment.[134]

This video amplifies the fact that ultimately, there is nothing “hybrid” about the conflict in Ukraine.[135]  Russia is employing a variety of military and nonmilitary tools in a somewhat unprecedented fashion that surprised the international community, but few—if any—of these tools are new.  States have used propaganda, SOF, economic warfare, and other elements of hybrid warfare for years; Russia is just one of the first actors to employ these elements in a simultaneous, coordinated manner against another state.  In the end, at the heart of hybrid conflict is war (over 6,000 people have died within a year of the conflict).[136]  Yet, the nature of hybrid warfare enables the propagator—in this case Russia—to essentially hijack the adversary’s decision-making cycle and solidify its sudden gains.[137]^,[138]  With Russia demonstrating how non-linear conflict effectively conceals the use of conventional forces, an increasing number of state and non-state actors will likely incorporate non-linear warfare into their military doctrine and operations.  Since few states possess the resources for a sustained military operation (especially against a worthy opponent), many will use hybrid warfare to achieve their strategic objectives within a quick timeframe before their opponents and the international community can efficiently react.  Therefore, it is critical for military thinkers, politicians, and strategists to not just further their understanding of hybrid warfare, but also develop and implement a practical response to hybrid warfare at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Anton Smaliak with translations during research for this paper.

The opinions and views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity.  They do not necessarily reflect those of any organization.

End Notes