SOF vs. SOF-like

As I understand US Special Forces (USSF), their primary mission has always been to train & advise, or teach-coach-mentor, foreign security forces. Given that the past decade has shown that general purpose forces (GPF) are quite capable of such duties, perhaps now is the time to relook what SF should do and what GPF should do regarding security force assistance (SFA) and foreign internal defense (FID), possibly using this analysis as another part of Army end-strength determination.

Several years ago, a young captain explained his views of the duties of SF teams and military transition teams (MTT)….the former train irregular forces, the latter train regular forces…..and I agree with this differentiation. After recent experiences with SF/ SOF, I think it may be time to standardize this delineation with SF focused exclusively on irregular and special operations forces with a concentration on tactical level capabilities while GPF regionally aligned teams, whether they are called MTTs, security force assistance teams (SFATs), embedded transition teams (ETTs), etc…become the primary elements that focus on advising & assisting foreign conventional forces with emphasis on staff functions.

Based on my direct observations of SF and other SOF elements, I’ve noticed a lack of understanding of staff functions when assisting & advising formed units, even those designated “special operations”. I suspect part of this “friction” may be the result of SF team members being experts in very specific, tactically focused tasks with little to no experience/ expertise in staff functionalities due to lack of formal schooling and/ or successfully avoiding staff assignments (after all, who really wants to be on staff?). As a result, SF members who are tasked with developing a staff, whether battalion, brigade, or higher, are at a disadvantage resulting in slower progress than anticipated.

By delineating & defining more specific areas of focus for SF and GPF advisor teams, each element can capitalize on their inherent strengths. SF elements (and other SOF elements) are experts at tactical tasks that are required when advising small elements engaged in bullet-slinging exchanges. GPF advisory teams are experts (or at least very experienced) in staff functions including short-term and long-term planning, coordination between staff sections and between various levels (BN to BDE, BDE to DIV, etc), resource management & accountability as well as being able to convey the significance of such efforts as it relates to long-term effectiveness.

This perspective may not sit well with the SF/ SOF types that read this but, after a year of direct observation, this is what I’ve come away with. That’s my take on the “SOF vs. SOF-like” discussion…..give SOF and GPF more specific areas to focus on when assisting foreign forces.

Schmedlap and Ken...

You both covered my thoughts and I felt thought the paper started out pretty well but then by the last paragraph read like a chest thumping baby we're the best soapbox.
The one other thing that the writers of these type papers never do is postulate a way ahead, that is they NEVER address the how to's of the future. If your going to state the problem and lament it, give my your plan to fix it or make things better.

Boot

I wasn't going to comment on this even though the "SOF-like" term was annoying. That from one who's been on both sides of that really unnecessary and harmful divide.

However, the comment by Schmedlap triggered an allied thought. While I agree with the author of the paper on the value of SF -- and of SOF -- I thought it surprising or interesting that he who is bound to be very much aware of the difference conflated the two to an extent. Regardless, he spends most of his effort citing the benefits of of SF and the difficulties in obtaining and training SF troopers. I can certainly agree with all that.

Still, "SOF-like" as a term is perhaps not beneficial. Quoting someone less informed who used that term is understandable but it has connotations that can feed erroneous perceptions. Given the huge variety of SOF missions, there are some that only SOF could or should do so there is no question of GPF units being totally 'SOF-like.'

Many missions, however, effectively migrated to SOF in the 1975-2000 period due to the Army's very poor training system (about which more below). As a result of service in Afghanistan and Iraq, units have regained much of that lost skill and we should insure it does not again disappear. I think it's also important to note that for many good combat units "SOF-like" is not a heartfelt goal -- they are not SOF, know it and do not wish to be SOF. Nor do any of the SOF folks I know have any desire to see a lot of imitations.

Perhaps we just need to say that units other than SOF need to, like SOF elements, accentuate initiative, delegation and competence; the short form would just be "Tactically and technically competent units."

To achieve that --as well the author's endorsed goal -- Schmedlap's recommendation will serve quite well. The one item that twitches my antennae is number 4. Laudable aim and I very much agree. However, that gets into the area of 'turf' and it should not be allowed to do that. The issues are tactical competence and mission differentials, no more.

The current Army training system, by the way, was designed by civilian educators in the mid-70s based on US industrial training methods of the time and -- this is critical -- those were based on training poorly educated entry-level workers to do elementary tasks by taking an action and drilling down to the simplest component 'tasks.' It was quickly realized that there were problems with system, notably in the varying conditions for performance which the system didn't address and in the combining of tasks but the Army, having invested in it was not going to acknowledge those problems; they <i>would</i> make it work. They did. It is a tribute to Army leaders and trainers that the Army is as well trained as it is in spite of a badly flawed system. In spite of its faults, that system is good for training a large mobilization Army so keep the plan but go to processes adapted to todays professional force and train for outcomes, not methods.

The current system needs to go, it makes production of "Tactically and technically competent units" far more difficult than it need be -- and it causes other very highly and lengthily trained people to have to stoop down, waste time and perform missions a good Infantry Battalion can easily handle. We can do better.

That comment kind of jumped off the page at me, as well. However, I'm guessing that he meant to highlight the "trained to be" angle, as opposed to those not specifically trained for the task, but doing it anyway.

I think that there were two reasons for this paper. The first was this: <I>"I thought it would be helpful to describe the complexities associated with creating those Special Operation Forces..."</I>
With that in mind, I think the General was politely providing us with the facts about the resources necessary and the high failure rate that will result if we try to make the rest of the military into a SOF-like force.

However, he then went beyond the training/selection and into the nature of how SOF operates. I take issue with this: <I>"We send our Special Forces Soldiers to the most dangerous countries in the world, working in their 12-man operational detachments, isolated and far removed from any support or protection, other than that provided by the forces they are training."</I>

I'm sure that some teams are living that lifestyle, but most aren't. And because they aren't, they enjoy the significant advantages provided by the owning unit of the AO that the team operates in. Every operation conducted when I was attached to a JSOTF was conducted with a platoon of infantrymen standing by as a QRF. Furthermore, I know of only two team houses that were more than 10 minutes from a FOB, PB, or COP. The blanket of security and the firepower on call that a nearby conventional force provides is pretty valuable and makes life a lot simpler.

Perhaps what we need is this...
1) Determine what SOF does that conventional forces a) also, b) can, or c) should do.
2) See who does those things better.
3) Reconsider whether those tasks should continue to be shared/divided.
4) As necessary, bring SOF and conventional up to par with one another on those things.
5) For other things, recognize that there are inherent differences between the two forces and recognize that there is a good reason for this.