Spotlight on Australian Jihadists in the Middle East

Spotlight on Australian Jihadists in the Middle East

Herman Butime

Abstract

This article examines the activities of Australian Jihadists in Syria and Iraq. The author traces the roots of Islamist militancy in Australia; its growth from being a domestic to being a trans-national security concern; the characteristics of Australian Jihadists; the challenge of disengaging these fighters from their current vocation; and the overall Australian response to the security challenge they pose. It is argued that the phenomenon of Australian Jihadists in Syria and Iraq is primarily a product of challenges in integrating Australians of Middle Eastern descent (and by extension Australian Muslims) into mainstream Australian society. The emergence of conflicts in Syria and Iraq to which Australians of Middle Eastern descent can relate have not only attracted them to these conflict zones but also exported the organizational dynamics of these conflicts to Australia making the country the highest per capita contributor of Jihadists to these war zones and Jihadists from Australia exhibiting greater commitment and representation in the Syrian and Iraqi insurgent campaigns. Given the above dynamics, Australia is now grappling with a choice between managing the Jihadist threat abroad and managing it at home.

Introduction

Recent history is not replete with many insurgencies which have culminated in the establishment of Islamist states. Since the turn of the new millennium, it is only possible to cite the Taliban and Islamic Courts Union (ICU) rebellions in Afghanistan and Somalia respectively.[1] 2014 has been remarkable in the way the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) formerly the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levante (ISIL) has joined the exclusive league of Islamist Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) that have managed to assemble a modicum of statehood. Although its stated goal is to establish an Islamist theocracy, ISIS is very much a product of the political meltdown in Syria and Iraq that has seen an array of insurgent groups emerge to challenge autocratic rule in these countries. [2]

Unlike the Taliban and ICU, though, ISIS has established what it calls the Islamic State (IS) that transcends internationally recognized boundaries. Currently, the IS covers parts of Syria and Iraq. Although primarily a regional (Middle Eastern) problem, the phenomenon of the IS has attracted international attention because of the threat it poses to secular and moderate Islamist regimes in the region; its global agenda that entails the exportation of radical Islamist ideals beyond the Middle East; and the sheer number of foreign nationals joining the group. The concern for many countries especially in the West is the possibility that when their nationals return to their countries of origin, they could pose a domestic security threat.[3] It is against this backdrop that the United States (US) is currently leading a coalition of Western and Arab countries in a military campaign to roll back ISIS.[4]

Among the countries of the West, Australia is in the spotlight because of its status as the highest per capita contributor of Jihadists to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.[5] Hundreds of Australian citizens are not only involved in active combat in the Middle East and have risen to the top echelons of ISIS’s leadership structures but have also participated in macabre propaganda campaigns for the group.[6] This article examines the activities of Australian Jihadists in Syria and Iraq. The author traces the roots of Islamist militancy in Australia; its growth from being a domestic to being a trans-national security concern; the characteristics of Australian Jihadists; the challenge of disengaging these fighters from their current vocation; and the overall Australian response to the security challenge they pose.

The author argues that the phenomenon of Australian Jihadists in Syria and Iraq is primarily a product of challenges in integrating Australians of Middle Eastern descent (and by extension Australian Muslims) into mainstream Australian society. The emergence of conflicts in Syria and Iraq to which Australians of Middle Eastern descent can relate have not only attracted them to these conflict zones but also exported the organizational dynamics of these conflicts to Australia making the country the highest per capita contributor of Jihadists to these war zones and Jihadists from Australia exhibiting greater commitment and representation in the Syrian and Iraqi insurgent campaigns. Given the above dynamics, Australia is now grappling with a choice between managing the Jihadist threat abroad and managing it at home. 

Roots of Communal Tensions

Australia’s Jihadist phenomenon traces its roots back to contradictions in the country’s social integration. Although Australia ended its ‘White Australia’ policy in 1973 and started admitting non-White immigrants, over the years, the country has to a certain extent struggled to integrate Australians of Middle Eastern descent into mainstream Australian society.[7] Given that this segment of Australian society is mainly Muslim, it is difficult to separate mainstream Australia’s perception of Australians of Middle Eastern descent from its perception of Australian Muslims. Indeed, in commenting on the phenomenon of Islamophobia in Australia, Akbarzadeh Shahram observes that “There is no doubt that some Australians feel uncomfortable with the Muslim presence. Muslim traditions, habits and beliefs are often seen as alien and confronting.”[8] The simmering communal tensions would then suggest that while increasing the population of Australia, the move to alter the racial and religious demographics of the country generated some social contradictions.

Muslims in Australia are a minority. Out of a population of 23.5 million, there are 500,000 people who profess the Islamic faith.[9] Whereas history is replete with peaceful co-existence between minority and majority ethnic and religious groups in societies, the case of Australia is one of those that stick out for their defiance of this norm. While changing the racial and religious demographics of the country, the end of the era of ‘White Australia’ was not followed by the institution of a proper policy of social integration.

The uncertain social position of Australian Muslims (and by extension, Australians of Middle Eastern descent) has been reinforced by their settlement patterns across the country. For example, according to the 2011 National Census, Australians of Lebanese ancestry in Sydney mainly live in Auburn, Lakemba (home of the Imam Ali mosque), Punchbowl and Granville.[10] The concentration of minorities in specific geographical areas against the backdrop of uneasy social relations in the country breeds a siege mentality in the minority communities. On the other hand, the dispersal of members of these minority groups would have prevented the collective crystallization of minority-majority group tensions.

Due to the above shaky communal relations, the Muslim community in Australia has tried to shift from being a reactive to being a proactive actor in its search for acceptance in mainstream Australian society.  Whereas in the past, Muslim organizations in the country were inward-looking, mainly concerning themselves with their own affairs and battling to dismiss accusations of acquiescence with terrorism, in the present, these bodies have adopted a more proactive approach where they engage civil society and government and generally work towards resetting the Australian communal relations agenda. Although this approach has fostered more open inter-communal engagement, it has at the same time generated a mandate dilemma for Muslim organizations in the country. These bodies now have to reconcile their drive to foster inter-communal harmony with the need to allay suspicions that they are ‘selling out’ to non-Muslim communities.[11]

Because of the above mandate dilemma, general perceptions of marginalization  and the evolution of a siege mentality in the Australian Muslim community, over the years, the lingering communal tensions have given rise to heightened Muslim (and to some extent Middle Eastern) social consciousness which has put this community on a collision course with the wider Australian society. The start of the era of socio-political awakening saw Australian Muslims cultivating international solidarity with their co-religionists in the different conflict zones in the Middle East and domestically challenging institutions they perceived to be keeping them in a state of social marginalization. In line with this proposition, this era was characterized by the state’s attention being drawn to inflammatory remarks made by some leading Islamic clerics in the country: For example, Sheikh Feiz Mohamed of the Global Islamic Youth Centre in Liverpool once labelled Jews ‘pigs’ while in a 2006 sermon, Sheikh Taj Din al Hilali likened scantily dressed women to ‘uncovered meat.’[12] Whereas these developments were a cause for concern, they did not constitute a critical threat to the security of Australia as at that time, they did not translate into attacks on state institutions.

It was the Lakemba attack that indicated a significant shift in relations between the community of Australian Muslims (and by extension Australians of Middle Eastern descent) and the wider Australian society. On 1^st November, 1998, Australians of Lebanese descent stole a car and using four different weapons, sprayed Lakemba police station in Sydney, New South Wales, with bullets.[13] Although the assailants had criminal backgrounds suggesting criminal motivations in conducting the attack (possibly getting back at the police for its law enforcement activities), the fact that all of them were of Middle Eastern descent and Muslim (with the exception of one who was a Maronite Catholic) was partly a reflection of Australia’s conscious or unconscious failure to socially integrate this demographic.[14] Partly supporting this view and commenting on the status of the Australian Muslim community, Gregg Barton, Director of the Global Terrorism Research Centre, Monash University observes that “It’s a troubled community as a group. So they are overrepresented in petty crime, in organized crime, in religious extremism.”[15] This assertion is backed by the fact that in Goulburn’s Super Max prison, Muslims are overrepresented.[16]

Gregg’s assertion begs answers to an intriguing question: Why is disgruntlement prevalent in the Australian Muslim community? The proliferation of grievances permeating the Australian Muslim community can be attributed to the evolution of a nexus that unifies three elements: limited career opportunities for Australian Muslims; on-going foreign conflicts to which they can relate their predicament; and the existence and availability of the kind of technology that allows for the internalization of the perceived predicament of Muslims in Australia and abroad. Illustrating this point, Hussin Goss, President of the Gold Coast Islamic Society observes that “There is unrest among Muslim youth. There is a lot of Muslim unemployment. They’ve got all the time in the world. Face Book all that kinda rubbish. They read about Palestine. They want to vent their anger.”[17]

Although the Lakemba attack showcased the start of the confrontational phase in relations between the Australian Muslim community (and by extension Australians of Middle Eastern descent) and the wider Australian society, the ideological precepts for this conflict were not clearly spelt out at that time. It was the Cronulla incident that moved the communal divide from the phase of confrontation over law enforcement to that of confrontation over ideals and values. On 12^th December 2005, Lebanese Australian men armed with weapons assembled at Punchbowl Park, South West Sydney and engaged in violent activity. According to Paul Sheehan, “Two convoys of cars then headed to the Eastern beaches. For the next several hours, an estimated 200 men, predominantly Lebanese Muslims engaged in a show of force, smashing hundreds of cars and windows, stabbing or bashing several people and threatening women with rape.”[18]

In addition, they wrote hate messages in the streets which included: “Aussie to die,” “Intifada,” “Its war,” “We fear no Ozy dogs.”[19] Unlike the Lakemba attack, Cronulla was distinct in the way the assailants defined the battle lines: The unfolding confrontation was perceived as an ‘Intifada’ suggesting that the assailants associated their struggle with the Palestinian uprising in the Middle East. By extension, this statement implied that Islam and Arabism (or Middle Easternism) was central to the identity of the attackers.  Those perceived to be in opposition to this identity configuration were the ‘Aussies’ (slang used in reference to Australians). Since the assailants were technically ‘Aussies’ themselves, their derogatory attacks must have been directed at other ‘Aussies’ who were different from them, most probably in terms of race and religion. For all intents and purposes, the out-group in this case, therefore, was the wider Australian society, mainly White and Christian.

From Communal Tensions to Terror Plots and Attacks

With the breakdown in communal relations having assumed ideological and violent dimensions, the stage was then set for the emergence of a more organized threat to the security of the country. Although this era was spurred by the intensification of foreign conflicts to which Australian Muslims could relate, a distinction can be drawn between two phases:

The first, where there were no known Australian Muslims actively involved in conflicts abroad: Here, terror plots and attacks were organized both domestically and internationally and they targeted the civilian, economic and military infrastructure of the country. Notable examples included the Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah plot to bomb Israeli targets at the Sydney Olympics in 2000; the Laskar e Toiba plot to collect information on bomb-making and Australia’s electricity grid system in 2003; and the terror plots in Sydney and Melbourne uncovered by Operation Pendennis in 2005.[20] Although these plots had connections to foreign conflicts and may have had domestic collaboration, there were no known Australian foreign Jihadists acting as catalysts. This factor could have limited the extent to which disgruntled Australian Muslims related to or participated in these plots.

The second, where some Australian Muslims were actively involved in conflicts abroad: Like the first phase, the plots were organized both abroad and at home. Notable examples included the Al Shabaab-inspired plot to bomb Holsworthy Barracks in Sydney in 2009;[21] 18 year old Numan Haider’s knifing of police officers at the Endeavour Hills Police Station in Melbourne in 2014; and the recent ISIS-inspired plot to conduct a random abduction in Australia with the intention of beheading the victim and draping their body in an ISIS flag.[22] What has been distinct about this phase has been the role of Australian Jihadists in inspiring these terror plots and attacks in the country.

Engaging Prospective Support Base From Abroad.

With the restiveness of Australian Muslims potentially in a state where it could be fuelled from both abroad and at home, it is imperative to examine how these two theatres have contributed to the growth of Australian Jihadism. In relation to the external theatre (abroad), the focus is on the propaganda and recruitment techniques that ISIS (from its bases in Syria and Iraq) uses to engage disgruntled Australian Muslims. In seeking to influence the emotions of its Australian constituency and conduct recruitment, the strategy of ISIS is not only geared towards exploiting contradictions in Australia’s social integration but also easing the trans-nationalization of the group’s activities by distinguishing it from Al Qaeda and positioning it as the leading Islamist militant group in the world.

Commenting on the nature of the terrorist threat emanating from the Middle East, David Irvine, the head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), observes that groups such as ISIS are engaged in social media wars: “Extremists use this new media to disseminate their message, interactively bringing their gory barbarity back to Australia, with the aim of radicalizing young Australians in real time as they sit at home or wait for buses or trains in the morning.”[23] This observation is consistent with three trends that have come to characterize ISIS’s Australia-bound propaganda campaign:

First, the group demonstrates its capability by spreading fear. One dimension to this tactic seeks to show the Australian establishment the kind of harm it should expect should it choose to confront ISIS. This measure is intended to act as a deterrent of sorts. The other aims to psychologically ‘empower’ prospective Australian Jihadists. It demonstrates to them the kind of ‘revenge’ they can inflict on the ‘enemy.’ A notable example of this propaganda approach posted on Twitter is a gruesome picture of the seven year old son of Australian Jihadist, Khaled Sharrouf holding the severed head of a soldier.[24] In addition to conforming to the propaganda objectives already mentioned, this Twitter post demonstrates to restive Australian Muslims that some of their ‘kin-and-kith’ as young as 7 years are already active against the ‘enemy.’ Since such propaganda images are potentially appealing to this constituency, the logical expectation is that targeted prospective recruits would feel embarrassed about their ‘poor’ Jihadist credentials. This would then lead to them abandoning their vocations and joining the ISIS campaign.

Second, the group masks the risks inherent in insurgent campaigns. Commenting on an ISIS video featuring Australian Jihadist, Zakarayah Raad, Trent Dalton and Greg Bearup note that “…he and a group of fellow fighters are seen seated cross-legged in a tranquil rural setting, their Kalashnikovs laid across their laps. It’s as though they have entered the Garden of Eden.”[25] By watching such propaganda posts without having had prior experience with armed conflict, prospective recruits may easily sign up with ISIS without caring to contextualize the serenity of the environment in the videos and alerting themselves to the distinction between ideal and real war situations.

Third, the group positions itself as the leading Islamist militant group by distinguishing its modus operandi from that of Al Qaeda. According to Richard Kerbaj, “The propaganda machine being run by the Islamic State makes both the grainy videos once generated by bin Laden and the messages they carried seem archaic and almost bordering on comical.”[26] This observation points to the notion that ISIS’s propaganda campaign is not only aimed at disorienting the Australian state and recruiting Australian nationals but it is also geared towards establishing an edge over the group’s competitors. In this direction, the great extent to which ISIS goes in posting some of the most grisly images is aimed at positioning the group as more ruthless than Al Qaeda. Since both outfits’ modus operandi is principally anchored in terrorism, ISIS’s calculation is that those attracted to this brand of warfare would choose ISIS over Al Qaeda. Indeed the performance of different radical Islamist groups in Iraq and Syria has determined the extent to which they have attracted recruits. Before joining ISIS, Musa Cerantonio, the Melbourne-born fiery cleric considered the option of joining other Islamist groups in the region.[27] The rapid battlefield gains and concerted propaganda campaign that ISIS registered are most likely to have swung him in the direction of this group.

With ISIS’s propaganda campaign based on the above principles, what strategy does the group then employ to recruit Australian nationals? ISIS uses Australians to enlist Australians. Australian Jihadists already serving in the group know the language and culture of Australia and are therefore better placed to communicate with prospective recruits in this country. To that effect, most Australia-bound propaganda and recruitment videos have been posted by Australian Jihadists. For example, the 13-minute ISIS video titled “There is no life without Jihad” featured Australian nationals Abu Yahya ash Shami from Sydney and Abu Nour al-Iraqi. Consistent with this argument, ISIS has designated Australian Jihadists Khaled Sharrouf and Mohammed Elomar as English language propaganda specialists mainly targeting Australia.[28]

While being able to relate to their prospective recruitment constituency, Australian Jihadist recruiters also employ additional tactics to fulfil their mandate. They brag to show what their newly found power can do; reiterate that their peers in Australia can also acquire this capability; and give reasons why Jihadism is worth a try. In the ISIS video mentioned above, Raad makes two critical statements: In the first, he says: “I don’t see myself as any better than any of you.”[29] This kind of appeal establishes parity between Jihadist and prospective Jihadist. The prospective Jihadist is made to understand that all they need to do to become a Jihadist is to sign up. In the second (while touching on the plight of Palestinians and Iraqis), he says: “wake up and see why this is happening.”[30] Here, a cause is tabled as a strong reason worthy of Australians joining ISIS.

The ISIS recruitment model is quite handy. It minimizes the role of middlemen in the enlistment process thereby speeding up the expansion of the group’s manpower base. Expounding on this point, Rafaello Pantucci notes that “In the new generation, it doesn’t have to be individuals who’ve met preachers and hung out in radical circles—they can very much find these radical (jihadists) and their ideas and understand and imbue them by themselves.”[31] This observation underscores the significance of the connection between technology and social interaction in supporting insurgent campaigns in the modern era.

It is also worth noting that while engaging its Australian constituency from its bases in the Middle East, ISIS is not only able to influence emotions and recruit members but it also tries to coordinate attacks in Australia. In one of his social media communication, Elomar posted the following message: “Anyone in Sydney who is after explosives (dynamite sticks, C4 sticks, orica mine sticks, grenades) lots more. If interested, DM me.”[32] Assuming that this was not a mere propaganda message intended to unsettle the state, ISIS is able to use its existing propaganda and enlistment framework to ease the trans-nationalization of its attacks from the safety of its bases in the Middle East.

Engaging Prospective Support Base At Home.

As already mentioned in the previous section, the restiveness of the Australian Muslim community is at a stage where it could be fuelled from both abroad and at home. The previous section dealt with how ISIS engages its prospective constituency from the safety of its bases in the Middle East. This one examines how ISIS (through its agents) engages its prospective members within Australia. It looks at who is likely to be recruited by ISIS. The central argument here is that young Australians who embark on the path to Jihadism are likely to have the following attributes: they may be from criminal or non-criminal backgrounds; they may hail from urban or suburban settlements predominantly populated with Muslims (and by extension Australians of Middle Eastern descent); and they are likely to have been exposed to the contradictions of Australia’s social integration and politics in the Middle East.

Australian Jihadists mainly originate from Victoria, Queensland and New South Wales.[33] Notable examples include Adam Dahman, the suicide bomber from Victoria;[34] Yusuf Ali, who was raised North of Brisbane in Queensland;[35] and Sharrouf, the ex-terror convict from New South Wales.[36] Unlike the three states from which these Jihadists originate, other states are not represented probably because they lack concentrated settlements of Australian Muslims (or by extension, Australians of Middle Eastern descent) where the contradictions of social integration have boiled over into tensions with the wider Australian society.

It is also apparent that within the restive states, the majority of Jihadists hail from urban or sub-urban areas. For example, Yusuf Toprakkaya, who died in a sniper attack in Syria in December, 2012 was a resident of Broadmeadows in Melbourne’s Northern suburbs;[37] Sharrouf was based in Sydney;[38] while Amira Ali (formerly Amira Karroum) grew up in suburban Gold Coast and Western Sydney.[39] The dominance of urban areas over rural ones in supplying Australian Jihadists could be attributed to the following factors: Either there is no concentrated settlement of restive Australian Muslims in the rural areas or in situations where there are, urban areas have an edge due to higher levels of development that allow for faster crystallization of discontentment.

In terms of age, Australian Jihadists range from the teens to the thirties. For example, Mounir Raad (of the radical Islamist Raad family) who travelled to the Middle East with Dahman is 19 years; Caner Temel, a former Australian soldier is 22 years; while Mohammad Ali Baryalei, a former Kings Cross bouncer is 33 years.[40] This age range provides a pool of recruits who are not only young, physically fit, adventurous and potentially with limited family commitments but also for those in their 30s, mature enough to assume leadership positions in ISIS.

Over the years, there has been a change in the occupational background of Australians who have gone on to pursue careers as terrorists. Those who orchestrated the earliest terror attacks in the country had criminal links. A closer look at the profiles of some of the Lakemba attackers backs this assertion: Michael Kanaan was later to be convicted on account of three murders while Saleh Mahmoud Jamal was a former drug dealer.[41] The predominance of individuals with criminal records at this stage could be explained in terms of the evolution of Islamist radicalism in Australia. During the early stages of this phenomenon, the strain in relations between the Australian Muslim community (and by extension Australians of Middle Eastern descent) and the wider Australian society had not yet assumed an ideological dimension. In this regard, the communal tensions boiled over more as clashes over such issues as law enforcement and not socio-political marginalization hence the predominance of outlaws within the ranks of the then emerging terrorist fraternity.

Although the subsequent injection of ideology into the restiveness of the Australian Muslim community increasingly saw scores of Australians from non-criminal backgrounds embarking on the road to Jihadism, ex-criminals have remained prospective terrorists-elect. While reiterating that not every Lebanese is a radical Muslim and that not every gangster becomes a radical, Matt Siegel observes that “…unlike fighters from Britain, France or Germany, who experts say are mostly jobless and alienated, a number of the Australian fighters grew up in a tight-knit criminal gang culture, dominated by men with family ties to the region around the Lebanese city of Tripoli, near the border with Syria.”[42] Since crime is partly a product of failures in social integration, even in the post-Lakemba era (where individuals from non-criminal backgrounds have embarked on terrorist careers), ex-criminals have continued populating Australia’s Jihadist community because they are partly a knock-on effect of the very contradictions that have given rise to Islamist militancy in the country. Outside of their criminal vocations, these individuals can only violently express their discontentment through terrorist activity.

With tensions between the Australian Muslim community and the wider Australian society assuming a clearer ideological dimension, there are now increasingly more Australians from non-criminal backgrounds embarking on the Jihadist path. It is important to note that these recent recruits do not belong to a category of what in the Western world may be considered elite professions or occupations. Among others, they are neither doctors, engineers, lawyers nor business tycoons. Some of the Jihadists were social celebrities: Roger Abbas is a former Melbourne kick-boxing champion; Mohamed ‘Moey’ Elomar is a former Australian boxer; while Baryalei is a former underbelly star. Others like Mostafa Mahamed also known as Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir (from Sydney) and Ahmad Moussalli (from Parramatta) are former preachers.[43] The absence of ‘elite’ professionals within the ranks of the Australian Jihadist community points to a possible correlation between the ‘successful’ pursuit of ‘mainstream’ careers (and the ‘mainstream’ societal acceptance that comes with it) and the propensity not to be pushed towards Jihadism.

Whereas it is possible to explain why the preachers may have easily embarked on the path to Jihadism (by virtue of their occupation, they are likely to have been knowledgeable about the prevailing social contradictions), it is somewhat hard to understand why the social celebrities may have joined them. Ordinarily, the attainment of social celebrity status should have signalled ‘full’ integration into mainstream Australian society. Partly due to exposure (through interaction with radical figures) to the domestic and global contradictions shaping their communities, it may have been just a matter of time before the social celebrities themselves were swayed onto the path to Jihadism.

Path to Jihadism

This section deals with the dynamics that dictate the process of Australians joining the ranks of Jihadists. It looks at such factors as the impact of inter-group competition in the Middle East on this phenomenon; the networks and tactics that facilitate recruitment; the role of proselytization in the recruitment process and the dynamics that shape the relocation of recruits to the war zones and their subsequent deployment. The central argument in this section is that inter-group competition in Syria and Iraq and the prospective destination (theatre) for enlistees determines how they embark on the road to a Jihadist career.

Before ISIS emerged to prominence, Jabhat al-Nusra (an affiliate of Al Qaeda) was the leading Islamist insurgent group in Syria.[44] During this era, there were a couple of Australian Jihadists-elect who joined the al-Nusra Front. Notable examples included Mohammad Ali Baryalei (a prominent al-Nusra commander), Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir (a former Sydney preacher) and Sammy Salma, the 22 year old Australian from Roxburgh Park in Melbourne’s Northern suburbs.[45] As recent as 2013, there was no inter-group friction between the al-Nusra Front and ISIS as both Sunni dominated organizations were united in their drive to depose the Alawite (Shia) regime of President Bashar al Assad of Syria. However, as the conflict escalated, a turf war erupted between the two insurgent groups.[46]

This inter-group competition instigated some high profile defections from al-Nusra to ISIS. For example, in 2013, Baryalei switched allegiance from the al-Nusra Front to ISIS.[47] Like Cerantonio’s eventual decision to join ISIS over other Jihadist groups in the region, Baryalei’s defection is most likely to have been influenced by the desire to be part of a winning outfit. The turf war between the two organizations has not only been characterized by peaceful competition for converts but also the brutal liquidation of each other’s members. Describing how Karroum and Yusuf Ali (her husband) both members of al-Nusra were killed by ISIS, Samantha Maiden notes: “It is believed she was lined up against a wall and shot multiple times and then dismembered.”[48] The deterioration in relations between the two groups is also seen in Sharrouf’s threats to kill al-Muhajir.[49]

The fall-out between the al-Nusra Front and ISIS and the need to guard against infiltration by state intelligence organizations significantly changed the facet of Jihadist recruitment in Australia. In order to enlist with any of the organizations, prospective Australian Jihadists required the endorsement of trusted agents associated with these groups.[50] This explains why certain family networks have particularly been at the centre of recruiting Australians on behalf of radical Islamist groups in the Middle East. A notable example is the Raad family that recruited Dahman. Over the years, this family has cultivated a high profile radical Islamist image for itself. Ahmed Raad and Ezzit Raad were convicted and sentenced for the Melbourne terror plot while their nephew, Zakarayah Raad at one time had a run-in with the authorities for whipping a Muslim convert 40 times for drinking and taking drugs.[51] In other cases, recruits have been radicalized by individuals not necessarily associated with known Islamist families. For example, Karroum was radicalized when she moved to Sydney where Fadl Sayadi lived. Sayadi was a convicted terrorist apprehended during Operation Pendennis.[52] In sum, having distinguished themselves as committed radical Islamists, people like Sayadi and the Raads were presumed trustworthy enough to recruit the right kind of people for groups like ISIS.

Having made up their minds to join the Islamist insurgent campaigns, Australian Jihadists have to devise ways and means of reaching the war zones. Although the most common excuse for travelling to the Middle East has been to participate in humanitarian work in the war affected areas, the desire to pursue studies has been fronted on one occasion. Roger Abbas, Mustapha al-Majzoub (a 30 year old Australian killed while fighting in Aleppo, Syria) and Yusuf Ali were all reportedly in the Middle East to engage in humanitarian work. Differing from these three, Moussalli’s excuse was to study Arabic in Egypt.[53] It would have been extremely difficult for Australian immigration authorities to have blocked these people from travelling. First, at the time they left Australia, the Islamist insurgencies in the Middle East had not yet emerged as a critical threat to global security. In this regard, there was no convincing national security reason for blocking their travel. Second, given their ethnic and religious connections to the conflict zones in the Middle East, their humanitarian assistance-related reasons for travelling seemed to make sense. Third, even if the Australian authorities had had some concerns about their intentions for travelling, the fear of being labelled racist may have dissuaded the state from blocking their departure. It is important to note, however, that those whose travel would potentially have been blocked had to devise alternative mechanisms for leaving Australia. Sharrouf who had already been a convict only managed to slip out of the country using his brother’s passport. [54]

Most Australian Jihadists use Turkey and Lebanon as ‘transit lounges’ to Syria and Iraq. Turkey is a particularly preferred route in light of the fact that it presents lower risks of arrest and death in comparison to other routes.[55] With regard to Lebanon, social connections and geographical proximity to the war zones constitutes this country into an ideal ‘transit lounge’ for some Australian Jihadists. According to Barton, “You had people from the neighbourhood and you flew into Tripoli or flew into Beirut and drove up to Tripoli and were taken across. It was a very smooth, easy pathway in.”[56]

The preference of Lebanon as a ‘transit lounge’ for Australian Jihadists underscores the challenges of socially integrating Australians of Middle Eastern descent (and by extension Australian Muslims) into mainstream Australian society. Most Australian Jihadists are children of refugees who fled the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s. What perplexes security officials and analysts though is why second generation Lebanese Australians would be drawn to conflict in their ancestral lands that their parents fled.[57] The Lakemba and Cronulla incidents demonstrated that although second generation Lebanese Australians had grown up in a peaceful country, the very failure to fit into its mainstream society made them restive. Thus, even though Syria and Iraq were high risk conflict zones, these young people travelled there because of three reasons: First, they felt they had a stake in what was going on given their historical, ethnic and religious connections to the region. Second, the so called choice between leaving a peaceful country and going to a violent one did not make immediate sense to them as they had never lived in a conflict-ridden country to fully comprehend the hazards of war. Third, but even if they fully understood the risks that came with an insurgent career, the limited meaningful career opportunities in Australia made enlistment with groups like ISIS worth the risk.

Whereas Turkey and Lebanon have evolved as preferred ‘transit lounges,’ some Australian Jihadists have used alternative routes. As already mentioned, Moussalli found his way to Syria via Egypt while Cerantonio first travelled to the Philippines where he hid and avoided extradition back to Australia before eventually relocating to the Middle East.[58] These two Jihadists may have chosen these ‘transit lounges’ not to arouse suspicion at a time the Australian government may have begun being apprehensive about the growing number of Australians heading to conflict zones in the Middle East.

Given that they have to make longer journeys to Syria and Iraq compared with their counterparts from Britain who only have to take shorter flights to Turkey, it could be asserted that Australians are exhibiting greater commitment to the Jihadist campaign in the Middle East.[59] This proposition is supported by Australia’s current status as the highest per capita contributor of Jihadists in Syria and Iraq.[60]

Just to illustrate this point: Out of a population of 2.8 million British Muslims, 500 to 600 are involved in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. By comparison, with a population of Muslims five times less than that of Britain, Australia reportedly has approximately 100 to 150 Jihadists.[61] Some estimates put the figure even higher. Whereas The Soufan Group, a terrorism monitoring organization puts the number of Australians actively fighting in Syria at 250, other sources put the number of those that have entered this country at 300.[62]  Variations in the estimates could be attributed to differences in monitoring periods and specifications of theatres and organizations where the Jihadists are operating. Whereas some figures incorporate fighters in all theatres and organizations, others only give figures for specific theatres and groups. These variations notwithstanding, it is apparent that approximately every 1 in 3,000 and 1 in 5,000 Australian and British Muslims respectively is susceptible to joining the Jihadist campaigns in the Middle East. In this regard, Australia has got a higher per capita contribution of Jihadists to Syria and Iraq than Britain.

The comparatively greater commitment and representation of Australians in the Islamist campaigns in the Middle East have not gone unnoticed with militant groups in the region rewarding them with positions of influence. In this connection, Australian nationals are now involved in leadership, mediation, propaganda, recruitment, combat and social support activities. This across-the-board representation gives them a stake in these insurgent campaigns and makes it difficult to disengage them.

Over the course of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, Australians have risen to top leadership positions in some of the insurgent groups in these countries. As already mentioned, Baryalei was a top al-Nusra commander before his defection to ISIS where he is currently a senior figure responsible for recruiting Australian nationals and transporting them from Turkey to Syria.[63] Australians have not only exercised leadership in expanding the manpower base of Islamist groups in the region but also played mediation roles. For example, when al-Muhajir travelled to the Middle East, his mission was to reconcile Al Qaeda with ISIS.[64] The presence of Australians in the leadership structures of groups like ISIS gives lower ranking and prospective Jihadists a sense of belonging and ownership of these organizations. They come to believe that if they can prove their worth, they too can become movers and shakers in these groups.

With the above motivation, Australians have taken up propaganda and recruitment assignments. This issue has already been extensively discussed in the preceding sections. They have also engaged in some high profile combat activities. Notable examples include Ahmed Succarieh also known as Abu Asma al-Australi, the first Australian suicide bomber who detonated a truck loaded with 12 tonnes of explosives killing 35 Syrian soldiers;[65] and Abu Bakr al-Australi, the suicide bomber who killed 3 people in Baghdad in July 2014.[66]

The debate thus far is dominated by the role of Australian males in furthering Islamist insurgent campaigns in the Middle East. This perspective would appear to point to negligible female involvement in the activities of Islamist groups in the region. Far from that, women are increasingly playing both combat and non-combat (mainly social support) roles in these conflicts. Before meeting her death, the Australian female Jihadist, Karroum was not only married to (socially supporting) Australian male Jihadist, Yusuf Ali, she was also a fighter. Neil Gaughan, Australian Federal Police Counterterrorism Manager backs this assertion: “There’s a couple of women who have gone over as fighters—shooting guns—in Syria. They are young women. Under 21. One is dead. Amira Karroum.”[67]

Whereas Karroum showcases female ‘encroachment’ on an otherwise male dominated combat role, the majority of women are engaged in social support roles—mainly acting as so called ‘comfort women’ for the fighters. British, Australian and Malaysian women are reported to have travelled to the Middle East to play this role.[68] Karroum herself, aside from being a combatant and wife to Ali, operated a matchmaking service for Australian Jihadists.[69] Although seen as controversial (given the conservative restriction of women’s participation in public life in some Muslim countries), the role of women in these insurgent campaigns should be understood in terms of the groups’ desire to provide their fighters with holistic support to accomplish their mission. Male fighters not only need food, shelter, clothing and fighting equipment but also sexual partners.

Responding to the Jihadist Threat

This section examines the challenges that the Australian government is facing in confronting the Jihadist threat and the measures it is taking to address this security problem. It can be argued that in seeking to address the home grown Jihadist threat, Australia is using ‘hard’ measures to weave around contradictions in her foreign policy and domestic legal framework. As a result, the country is now grappling with the dilemma of having to choose between managing the Jihadist threat abroad and managing it at home.

Whereas there are Australians who have already openly declared their Jihadist credentials (and therefore made it a lot easier for the security services to monitor their activities), there are those that remain anonymous and are already back in the country or are planning to return.[70] Normally, it would be expected that the state’s focus would be on those who have made their Jihadist intentions known. Although this is a prudent measure, it is not sufficient in addressing the Jihadist threat. According to Jamal Rifi, an advocate of the Sydney Muslim community, “These men had already made up their minds and they were never going to come back to Australia. They think they are taking the high moral ground above everyone else back home.” [71]

In this connection, the challenge for Australia then would regard how it deals with the ‘silent’ returnees. Broadly, two prospective response options emerge: The first advocates blocking the return of these fighters.[72] The second proposes admission back into the country followed by their subjection to the full force of the law. Those found guilty of contravening Australian law would be jailed while those cleared would remain under close security surveillance.[73]

The first option is rooted in the conviction that Australians fighting with Islamist groups in the Middle East are permanently radicalized. In this connection, Adam Lockyer and George Milad assert that “Jihadists rarely de-radicalize, but they can de-militarize.”[74] The fact that returning to Australia would not necessarily denote an ideological switch, the expectation then would be that at a future date, the Jihadists would re-militarize and pose a security threat. In this regard, blocking their return would seem like a prudent move. However, the emergence of Al Qaeda shows that this may not be the best solution to the problem. When some Middle Eastern states blocked their nationals who had fought in the Afghan war from returning, they joined Al Qaeda and continued with their Jihadist activities.[75] In similar fashion, were Australia to prevent its nationals from returning to the country, they would most likely stay with ISIS or join other Islamist groups thereby perpetuating the cycle of global Jihadism which would in the long run pose an external threat to the security of Australia.

The very idea of blocking Australian Jihadists from returning to their country is itself riddled with foreign policy and legal contradictions. The legal basis for this measure is rooted in the Garfield Barwick legislation of 1960-61. This amendment sought to introduce treachery as an offence under the Crimes Act. It targeted Australians who joined or sought to enlist in foreign fighting groups especially as mercenaries in Africa. In order for this law to have been enforced, both houses of Australia’s legislature had to declare or remove a country from a list of prospective destinations for Australian fighters. With regard to the ensuing conflicts in the Middle East, Australia has not made such a declaration. But even if the country were to consider doing so, it would be caught up in a foreign policy conundrum. Whereas it would be plausible to issue a declaration on Iraq (where the West is backing the government), Syria would be problematic. In Syria, the West (of which Australia is a part) is backing some of the rebel groups, notably the Free Syrian Army (FSA).[76] The legal challenge for Australia would be how it would manage to come up with highly selective legislation that targets Australian Jihadists fighting in the ranks of ISIS whilst turning a blind eye to the activities of those supporting the FSA.

The other challenge with the Barwick legislation is that at the time it was passed, dual citizenship was not common. Considering now that some Australians may be dual citizens, it becomes a complicated matter how Australia deals with such individuals. Australians are only permitted to fight in the service of Australia. In other words, they are only allowed to serve with any of the country’s armed services.[77] A problem would arise in situations where the laws of the other states of which Australians are citizens equally permit them to fight in defence of the interests of those states. Under such circumstances, how would Australia rationalize the decision to strip these nationals of their citizenship given their dual duties and responsibilities that come with dual citizenship?

The challenge with the second option is that it would not be easy to zero on the ‘silent’ returnees. These individuals would not have shot propaganda videos to publicize their activities and intentions.[78] Thus, narrowing down on them would largely be based on subjective assumptions which in some cases would potentially be misconstrued as racial prejudice. Also, where the ‘returnees’ would have been tried and cleared of wrong doing, continued surveillance of their activities would generate a siege mentality among them potentially pushing them to seek re-militarization hence posing a renewed  security threat to the state.

In responding to the above challenges, the Australian state has adopted a ‘hard’ across-the-board approach. By ‘hard’ approach, the author means a set of pointed measures harnessing the coercive and semi-coercive instruments of the state to neutralize the Jihadist threat. Targeting the threat at home, the state has incorporated legislative amendments that place emphasis on prosecution; increased funding for counterterrorism; and the enhancement of the power of security agencies to conduct surveillance and arrests and to liquidate ‘dangerous’ suspects.

To that effect, the Australian parliament is seeking to initiate measures that would see returning Jihadists prosecuted in Australian courts of law. There are also proposals to compel telecommunication companies to retain user data for at least two years to allow the country’s spy agencies to access it; funding to the tune of AUS $ 630 million has been set aside for bolstering security and the protection of public places;[79] while in two cases where the state felt there were very specific threats, the security services took pointed action. In the first, 800 police officers arrested 15 suspects in a countrywide operation to forestall a plan by ISIS sympathizers in Australia to publicly behead a random victim and drape their body in an ISIS flag. In the second, police shot and killed a terror suspect at a police station in South East Melbourne after he had stabbed two counter-terrorism agents. Earlier, his passport had been cancelled and he had made death threats to Tony Abbott, the Australian Prime Minister.[80]

The ‘hard’ counter-terrorism approach ought to be assessed in comparison to what could have been a ‘soft’ approach aiming to reach out to communities that are susceptible to Jihadism. While acknowledging the need to strengthen national security, Sheikh Mohamadu Saleem of the Australian National Imams Council stresses the need to consult community leaders.[81] This approach is an essential key to winning the hearts and minds of affected communities as a step towards cutting the supply of Jihadists to Iraq and Syria.

While domestically instituting a response mechanism that is intended not to allow the Jihadist threat to overwhelm the state, abroad, Australia is not only pursuing this objective but also preparing for the possibility of an ISIS take-over in Iraq. In pursuit of the former objective, the Middle East headquarters of the Australian Federal Police has been relocated from Beirut in Lebanon to Ankara in Turkey. As already mentioned, Turkey is increasingly becoming the gateway for Australians heading to Syria and Iraq. To that effect, the need to keep an eye on the frontier of this country is highly critical. With this measure, the priorities of Australian external policing and surveillance in the Middle East have changed. The emphasis now is more on tracking Australians returning from the war zones than those heading there. The rationale behind this switch in surveillance priorities is that whereas Jihadists going to the war zones may hide in villages bordering Syria and cross the unfenced frontier unnoticed, it would be easier to track those returning to Turkey  from Syria and Iraq as they would have overstayed their visas without valid explanations.[82]

Acknowledging the strength that ISIS has marshalled over the course of its campaign, Australia has not ruled out the group taking over the reigns of power in Iraq. To that effect, Canberra has dispatched a contingent of Australian troops including the elite Special Air Service (SAS) to secure its embassy in Baghdad. In addition, sensitive information that could potentially fall in the hands of the insurgents is systematically being removed and destroyed.[83] Contrasts in the way Australia on one hand appears to be rigorously participating in the counter-ISIS campaign and on the other preparing for a possible fall of the Iraqi government could be understood in terms of the external limitations of Canberra’s counter-terrorism efforts. It is not completely within Australia’s means to prevent ISIS from seizing the reigns of state power in Iraq. Thus, it becomes wise on the part of the Australian government to prepare for all sorts of scenarios including the worst-case one.

Conclusion

In this article, the author has cast the spotlight on the activities of Australian Jihadists in Syria and Iraq. The roots of this phenomenon have been traced back to contradictions in Australia’s social integration. Due to challenges in integrating Australians of Middle Eastern descent (and by extension Australian Muslims) into mainstream Australian society, over the years, this demographic has experienced heightened social consciousness which has put it on a collision course with the state. This development has principally been aided by a convergence of three elements: limited meaningful career opportunities for Australians of Middle Eastern descent (and by extension, Australian Muslims); ensuing conflicts abroad to which they can relate; and the availability of the kind of technology that allows for the social interactive crystallization of discontentment.[84] .

The movement from the phase of heightened social consciousness to a clash with the state has been occasioned by shifts in the participation of Australians in conflicts abroad. While there were no known Australian nationals involved in rebellions abroad, the Jihadist threat in Australia was restricted to inflammatory rhetoric and a few terror plots. When Australians started playing active roles in conflicts abroad, the Jihadist threat in the country heightened, with security agencies uncovering daring terror plots. In this regard, the participation of Australians in insurgencies abroad has been instrumental in inspiring some Australian nationals to pursue Jihadist careers.

The above development has determined how radical Islamist groups in the Middle East convey their propaganda and recruit Australians. For example, ISIS uses Australians to enlist Australians.[85] The logic here is that Australian Jihadists understand the culture of Australia and are therefore better placed to communicate with and recruit their peers in this country.  In addition to adopting this strategy, ISIS’s propaganda framework is geared towards exploiting contradictions in Australia’s social integration, the trans-nationalization of the group’s attacks and the establishment of an edge over its competitors.

Consistent with the above proposition, radical Islamist groups in the Middle East have tended to attract Australians ranging from the teens to the thirties and hailing from urban and suburban areas mainly populated with Australians of Middle Eastern descent (and by extension, Australian Muslims). These recruits, who have been exposed to the contradictions of Australia’s social integration and politics in the Middle East, come from both criminal and non-criminal backgrounds and their path to Jihadism is shaped by competition among the different Islamist insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq.[86]

Australia’s status as the highest per capita contributor of Jihadists to the Middle East has not gone unnoticed with radical Islamist groups rewarding Australian Jihadists with an across-the-board participation in insurgent campaigns in the region. As a result, it is becoming difficult to disengage these foreign fighters from their current vocation as they are increasingly having a stake in the continuation of the conflicts.

In responding to the home grown Jihadist threat, Australia is hamstrung by contradictions in its foreign policy and domestic legal framework. It requires highly selective legal gymnastics for Canberra to target its nationals serving with groups like ISIS while turning a blind eye to the activities of those fighting with the FSA that is backed by the West (of which Australia is a part). But even if the country were to overcome this legal conundrum, it would still have to grapple with the dilemma of having to choose between managing the Jihadist threat abroad and managing it at home.

End Notes