by Joe Parker
Download the Full Article: The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT's
The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle had a highly publicized entry into the military ranks of vehicles, first with the Marines in 2004, and then eventually filling requirements with the Army to provide a dramatic increase in IED and blast protection than the ill-suited HMMVW for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rushed in to production by as many as nine separate contractors, the endstate resulted in an accelerated production of multiple variations of the MRAP, with the types roughly categorized as Category I, II, and III and based on number of occupants and mission specific mine/IED clearance operations. Now, as the combat mission in Iraq has completed and leaders begin to discuss life beyond Afghanistan, the MRAPs usefulness is in question. The Department of Defense is actively pursuing a replacement for the HMMVW with the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program, and the MRAP is facing an identity crisis. Is it a troop transporter or a combat system? What capability beyond the blast protection does it bring and how does that translate into future utilization? It would appear that the MRAP does have a future beyond our current conflicts as Defense Secretary Robert Gates instructed the military to incorporate it into the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization (BCTMOD) plan. What is yet to be seen is how well the MRAP incorporates itself into the BCTMOD plan, what role and capability it fills in the Brigade Combat Team, and what additional requirements it places on existing force structure.
Download the Full Article: The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT's
MAJ Joe Parker is currently a student at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served three years in Iraq as a platoon leader, brigade maintenance officer, and company commander. He holds a BA in Communications from Wake Forest University, and is a graduate of the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course and the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Comments
Thaddeus...
I have seen the M-ATV but have never had to use it. Other leaders who have had to plan and execute missions with them can speak better to their limitations. In my AO even the HMMWV had its limits on some of the roads. Ironically, the only thing besides a HMMWV that had much utility in that sector would be an Abrams. But their use was discontinued in that area after 2005 (or there about) because they would invariably destroy farmland and roads. In fact, the area was mostly secured by AASLT infantry.
There were platoons in the squadron that would roll MRAPs, but it was clear that it limited their mobility. The biggest fans always seemed to be units that patrolled in urban terrain.
Excellent comment! So neither Bradleys nor MRAPs were useful to you in that AOR in that situation at that time. Your logic sound very similar to why the Marine Corps is returning to its expeditionary and amphibious roots. Like your Abrams/Evergade comment, the logic is obvious.
Would the M-ATV have been a useful alternative to you in SW Baghdad at that time?
I had 2 MRAP Caimans assigned to me to replace my 3 organic M3 CFV's. Given my sector, I never once rolled them. As a scout platoon leader on the tail end of the surge in sw Baghdad province I had 3 hardballs I could put them on in 100sq km of farms and villages. In the course of the deployment I played with the cool toggle switch for the auto-doors.....once.
The Bradleys didn't see much action either, much for the same reasons. Fact was, if I wanted to pay 90% of the locals a visit I either needed to walk there, drive there in a HMMWV or beg Bde to give me a UH-60 to ride. Of course, this is an anecdote and is no more instructive than trying to prove that an Abrams has limited use in the Everglades.
There is a more worrying point about the MRAPs as combat platforms that got my attention. When I tried imagining doing my METL mission as a scout in an HBCT with my modified equipment, I couldn't. The conclusion I kept coming to was that an MRAP was best thought of as a really well armored LMTV or 5-ton. Doctrinally, the MRAP is what I would produce if I wanted safer transportation on improved surfaces. It is not then, a combat platform any more than an LMTV with a .50 cal on top is; even though it is more survivable against HE blasts and impervious to small arms.
To put it bluntly, the only US Army formation an MRAP would be able to defeat is a light infantry fire team. Any EFP projectile, whether its an IED or weapons grade (RPGs, AT-4s etc), or API round goes through them like a hot knife through butter. I've seen small EFPs knock a Caiman out killing and wounding the entire crew and causing a roll-over. So their actual tactical utility is surviving encounters with mine fields (non-tank killer kind), indirect fire and light infantry squads. And unlike light vehicles such as the Striker, they are not able to target anything heavier than light infantry. So long as we are planning on only fighting those types of enemies on improved roads they are great. Otherwise, they don't belong in the front line TO&Es except as specialty equipment for COIN MTO&Es (think MPs and otherwise on hand for low intensity missions).
The article does make an excellent point of their utility as medevacs, EOD, route clearance and other support vehicles and even as troop transports on MSRs. The MRAPs do have some improvement on those support roles by giving the support Soldier better survivability. For those variants that can be so adapted the Army will benefit, the rest should be sold to other armies. They will never be a tactical threat to us while being great support revenue streams for the likes of BAE and International trucks.
Keep the MRAP out of IBCT/HBCT/SBCT combat formations. It's organic place in those organizations is in support elements. Keep enough on hand to equip a couple of brigades for COIN missions in built-up/flat terrain. Otherwise, we need to replace the HMMWV with something more survivable. In any system there are 3 trade-offs: firepower vs survivability vs maneuverability. The Army's force protection psychosis threatens the sacrifice of 2 of the 3 not as a simple tactical adjustment to a specific type of enemy and terrain but as a doctrinal catch-em-all. If that happens....I would like to be in Staff while the first MRAP'd scouts encounter conventionally armed forces. After they get mauled and the commanders have no choice but to pull them to support I'll jump on my HMMWVs and Bradleys and roll out.
CAV
<b>Theodore Jankowski:</b>
I do not question that the MRAP has and is saving lives. Hiowever, there's no way we can accurately assess the fiscal costs. Nor, probably, will we after the fact accurately assess the tactical costs for using a toolset simply because we had it...<blockquote>"If the tool is misused, it is not the tool's fault."</blockquote>Quite true. However, tools available tend to be used and misused whether they're really appropriate or not. To preclude marginally competent leaders and commanders from such misuse, do not provide them with the tool. Either that or do not provide such people. It has long been and I suspect will remain true that it's easier to get rid of the offending tool.<blockquote>"When we build something quickly, we accept certain inefficiencies. We need to be careful to not over-emphasize the inefficiencies of rapid maneuver in the support establishment while minimizing the benefits on the battlefield."</blockquote>Thanks, you just made several of my points. Given the first item, the solution is to plan better and not get in a hurry. The need for the capability that the MRAP partly provides poorly was identified by most Armies including ours back in the 60s. Many Armies were procuring their -- often better -- solutions long before we got interested.
The support establishment exists to support, not to be supported. The MRAP contributes to that flaw as well.
I agree benefits on the battlefield should not be minimized -- nor should detriments on that field be ignored. The MRAP is a fuel hog, has poor mobility, encourages riding and vehicle sitting as opposed to getting out and about. It has merits -- it has far more disadvantages. We have it, let's use it but realize that as big, non standard and unwieldy as they are, they won't last long...
Improving future vehicles is smart and long overdue. The MRAP is not smart and we should not procure more.
The Stryker was and is a marginal design purchased, like the MRAP because it was available and a pressing need was 'seen' so no points for that corollary. Comparing an MRAP to an F4U is tendentious at best. The Corsair worked, the carriers were adapted and the bird had a long service life. That, fortunately, will not be true of the MRAP.
I suspect that if we were to take the present value of future cash flows of the cost casualties avoided and compare that to the acquisition cost of this particular toolset we might just conclude that MRAPs are inexpensive. They did not save "some" lives, they actually save many lives (and limbs) all the time, every day. This is just using toolsets designed for the task at hand because they are available to use.
To be happy about a tool working when properly used for useful purposes does not imply confusion about the mission. If the tool is misused, it is not the tool's fault. We would not blaim the .50cal for being too bulky and too heavy if someone tried to hand-carry it fully assembled.
When we build something quickly, we accept certain inefficiencies. We need to be careful to not over-emphasize the inefficiencies of rapid maneuver in the support establishment while minimizing the benefits on the battlefield.
No one wants to go back to spiral 1 again. A mix of direct fire weapons from pistol to TOW missile emerged in our toolsets, and now a broader mix of vehicles is evidently required in warfare. This newest MRAP is now closer to the JLTV concept, and I see even more MRAP design principles are now coming out in Strykers. The multiple spirals have been great to see. Mr. Gates, Mr. Young and the JPO-MRAP office did a fantastic job, reminiscent of technology innovation from WWII. P51, Corsair and B29 innovations were not perfect out of the gate, either. The Brits had to insist on a bigger engine for the P51, the Corsair did not work so well on carriers, and the B29 had to fly from the assembly line directly to another assembly line for fixes. But we found a niche for them, and they all helped the war effort.
<b>Thaddeus Jankowski:</b>
We can disagree on most of your comment. Any program that takes three years from time of need to get to conception (2003-06) is not of itself a panic -- but the cause of that delay, bureaucratic intransigence, led to a panic buy in an effort to placate Congress and the media.
That panic status is proven by the plethora of vehicle types purchased and the additional four or five years to get it partly right.<blockquote>"...USA Today reported that 85% of the time, when a bomb goes off under a vehicle, no one dies. Perhaps that's one reason why today's COIN commanders keep putting their people in MRAPs for many missions."</blockquote>No doubt. The fact that "today's COIN" missions are farcical in many respects and that our announced draw down dates make many of the troops wonder why they're in either theater makes Commander's desire to preserve strength by risk avoidance almost an imperative. For that 'mission' the MRAP does serve its purpose.
While acknowledging the MRAP does have some uses in COIN and FID operations, this thread is not intended to address the fallacies of COIN theory and our very flawed practice thereof or even the 'whys' of our turning pipe instead of fixing the pump so I'll leave that for another day. Suffice to say that if you have a pipe wrench, you'll tend to look for places to employ it -- whether you should do so or not...
It was and remains a dumb and quite expensive procurement action of a vehicle with one redeeming value -- it's a big, marginally mobile armored box of virtually no combat utility which saves some lives.
That's important, no question -- but it is not <i>the</i> or even <i>a</i> mission...
Joe,
Well done!
In the 1920's and 1930's we had thinkers who could work out the tactics necessary to take on Japan, but we also had technologists who could create toolsets to support, augment and sometimes instruct those tactics. Even so, when the WWII started, we lagged with toolsets behind Japan in some areas, and we had rapid technology programs suspiciously similar to the MRAP program, which Mr. White termed as "panic". In reality, the MRAP initiation really started early in 2006 and was very well conceived, predicted, and then rolled out as predicted. Perhaps one day we will have the actual quantitative results available for analysis, but for now, USA Today reported that 85% of the time, when a bomb goes off under a vehicle, no one dies. Perhaps that's one reason why today's COIN commanders keep putting their people in MRAPs for many missions. Perhaps any military technology program not counted in decades feels like a panic in DoD, because that has been the habit for so many decades.
With COIN theory we have people working out the tactics with current units plus re-purposed legacy toolsets, but technological foresight for COIN toolsets has required Mr. Gates personal intervention at times--the exact same pattern of senior civilian technological interest of six senior leaders profiled in Cohen's "Supreme Command" book. New toolsets poured into Iraq in 2007, and not just MRAPs. The 2007 surge narrative focuses on tactics and troops, but if one looks at the record, toolsets added a lot of value. Tom Ricks (The Gamble) reported 10x incr in UAS in 2007 alone. CJCS was pretty pleased with toolset value-added on 22 June 2008 in USA Today.
COIN, as it turns out, needs toolsets that are as tailored for typical COIN contingencies as legacy tools are (and continue to be) tailored for traditional, state-on-state conflict. MRAPs are like pipe wrenches for carpenters stuck doing plumbing. They are not good for turning nuts and bolts, and they don't work well as hammers to pound nails, but they sure do help when many people end up turning pipe all day, every day after the first three weeks of the war.
When riding in MRAPs, I'D wait for the hot molten metal to come shooting through my TC window and into the side of my skull, since the vehicle is too top heavy to constantly change positions on the road without risk of flipping over; is too buttoned up to gain SA on what's on the road or around the corner; has been mapped out by the bad guys so they know the height of turrets and windows precisely and since it takes so long to stop and un-ass the vehicle the bad guy knows he can use primitive means of detonation such as command wire in order to defeat the hundreds of thousands of dollars of countermeasures we put on the front, rear, sides, top and bottom of these vehicles and it will then take us several minutes to park, dismount, and start any type of search or attack on his position.
The above was why I was enthused when the decision was made to use UAH rather than MRAPs within my unit. As a result I spent very little time in the MRAP, thankfully. The UAH has a lot of shortcomings, but the MRAP is an awful combat platform. Give them to the UN or farm them out across the globe to various peace-keeping formations, so long as they aren't being manned by US service members.
When you roll out do you want to be a porcupine or a tortes? There is a role for the MRAP but its size, high center of gravity and limited number of weapon systems in their standard configuration limits the ability to take the fight to the enemy. Variants like the SF Ground Mobility Vehicle -GMV- strike a balance between protection and fire power.
Ken said..."the argument can be made that they are in fact over-protective and thus encourage risk avoidance."
Agreed, though I don't think they encourage risk avoidance; they reinforce it.
Recommend that we (1) give them to our new Iraqi and Afghan allies or (2) store them in the prepositioned equipment fleet.
If we expect to continue fighting "small wars" as several publications have predicted, then we need to train more on dismounted skills, whether they be moving over terrain, engaging local nationals, and/ or killing the enemy using fire-n-maneuver VS playing "window-licker" in your MRAP.
They're good for long-distance travel (think MSR Mobile), but suck for maneuver in built-up areas or rough terrain (Kabul/ Wardak prov).
We spent time and effort buying large, heavy, over armored trucks with poor mobility and high fuel and maintenance costs. They are not combat vehicles and the argument can be made that they are in fact over-protective and thus encourage risk avoidance. They were a panic reaction, a stop gap fix and were not the best decision for what was required (as opposed to what was perceived as politically required...). As always, compromise quick fix Band Aids are more trouble than they are worth.
However, we bought them, spent Billions on them -- and they will <i>have</i> to be 'used.' That's totally understandable if regrettable. They can be employed until their early demise brought about by being overweight, overly expensive in terms of maintenance, fuel hogs and of marginal tactical utility. No problem, assign them and use them.
Just don't buy any more.