The Tribal Configuration Matrix

Joshua:

This is to show you just how long the concept of open source warfare has been discussed and based on the date of this article I am fairly sure OSW was not being discussed by this blog.

AND this is where the quant research work by Gourley and the other five Ph.Ds has in fact validated OSW---look at their characteristics and look at the article which was a flow of thoughts.

Friday, 24 September 2004
THE BAZAAR'S OPEN SOURCE PLATFORM
Earlier analysis (see the "The Optimal Size of a Terrorist Network" for more) indicates that the disruption of al Qaeda network mega-hub in Afghanistan has put strict limits on the size of the surviving virtual network elements. This size limitation may represent a barrier to attacks on the US, but is likely well within the capabilities of what is necessary for limited regional attacks. However, new innovations in group dynamics and the emergence of new unaffiliated guerrilla networks in Iraq may provide a method for regaining strategic capability.

The Bazaar
The decentralized, and seemingly chaotic guerrilla war in Iraq demonstrates a pattern that will likely serve as a model for next generation terrorists. This pattern shows a level of learning, activity, and success similar to what we see in the open source software community. I call this pattern the bazaar. The bazaar solves the problem: how do small, potentially antagonistic networks combine to conduct war? Lessons from Eric Raymond's "The Cathedral and the Bazaar" provides a starting point for further analysis. Here are the factors that apply (from the perspective of the guerrillas):

•Release early and often. Try new forms of attacks against different types of targets early and often. Dont wait for a perfect plan.

•Given a large enough pool of co-developers, any difficult problem will be seen as obvious by someone, and solved. Eventually some participant of the bazaar will find a way to disrupt a particularly difficult target. All you need to do is copy the process they used.

•Your co-developers (beta-testers) are your most valuable resource. The other guerrilla networks in the bazaar are your most valuable allies. They will innovate on your plans, swarm on weaknesses you identify, and protect you by creating system noise.

•Recognize good ideas from your co-developers. Simple attacks that have immediate and far-reaching impact should be adopted.

•Perfection is achieved when there is nothing left to take away (simplicity). The easier the attack is, the more easily it will be adopted. Complexity prevents swarming that both amplifies and protects.

•Tools are often used in unexpected ways. An attack method can often find reuse in unexpected ways.

Scaling the Bazaar
The bazaar dynamic -- replete with stigmergic learning and entrepreneurial ventures -- is vibrant enough to keep Iraq in a state of chaos. The statistics speak for themselves. However, can the bazaar be exported to regional nations or strategic targets? Can it serve as a post Afghanistan (post al Qaeda) model for global guerrilla warfare? Yes. Here's why:

•Leveraged attacks. As we see in Iraq, if appropriately planned, small attacks can have amazing impact. The reason behind this are the system dynamics that amplify results. ROIs (returns on investment) in excess of one million fold have been measured in Iraq. This means that smaller groups can have tremendous impact at the strategic level if they adopt the Iraqi method.

•Swarms vs. single group activity. The bazaar offers the potential of many smaller attacks that can in aggregate have an impact equal to several large attacks. Many hands make light work. Combined with system leverage, this could reduce a nation to economic chaos in short order.

•Rapid innovation. The bazaar's demonstrated ability to provide rapid innovatation makes defense much extremely difficult. Rather than a single 9/11 style attack, we may see small attacks (less planning and training, fewer people, less support) against a plethora of targets. With a sufficient number of guerrilla networks unearthing vulnerabilities (particularly ones with system's leverage), security forces will likey be outmatched.

Joshua:

"As its most basic, his team created the math to describe what SWJ authors discuss every single day."

SHOW me where in this blog site there is an open discussion of HOW insurgencies communicate, HOW do they evolve, AND how as a Cmdr one can take his or her decision put that decision into a model and generate an analysis result of whether the Cmdrs intended 4th degree levels of effect is being achieved or not.

SHOW me how the JIEDDO Attack the Network is actually working---their theory is if you kill or capture or neutralize key identified personnel THEN the other cell members will pull out of the fight.

NOT if you look at the research---one of the following or a combination occurs:
•Redundancy: If we remove the strongest group from the system another group will rise to replace the previous strongest group
•Splinter: When a group is broken it does not generally split in half but instead shatters into multiple pieces
•Redistribute: When a group is broken the components are redistributed amongst the other groups in the system. The redistribution is biased towards the most successful remaining groups.

So the JIDDO concept of AtN does not in fact eliminate the problem it in fact makes the problem more difficult IF the Cmdr did not take into consideration the effects or intended results especially in light of open source warfare.

I in fact heard from countless insurgent detainees that I interrogated the exact same things as the three points above mentioned AND I had no quant analysis to go on.

Joshua:

You responded in much the same way that a former CIA analyst initially critiqued the findings on the Zero Intelligence Agent blog.

1. you failed to take notice that it inadvertenly proved the "open source warfare" theory put forth by John Robb in 2004 and from which a number of bloggers seem to want to run away from as the concept directly challenges existing COIN FMs

2. peer types from the quant world have actually written that from the math side they could not find fault and when TED released the research which was actually exposed to over 150 peers in the presentation room and from them not a single complaint. NOTICE: they did show to the world their entire research papers and math on their website http://mathematicsofwar.com/

3. MOST CTC training scenarios that all BCTs attend and the JITCT at Ft. H, AZ have at the most a max of 5-10 key pointers to build off of NOW what would happen if 54,000 plus pointers were included WHAT could the training achieve?

4. You have exposed yourself for NOT understanding the value of OSINT---for those that have worked the IC world many will tell you that over 80% of all actual intel and actionable intel COMES FROM open sources-- you would have also known that at the height of the Cold war the KGB had over 27,000 personnel involved in OSINT Collection activities.

5. A large number of bloggers and military personnel seem to want to define media relased statements and videos from insurgency groups as "propoganda" when in fact many researchers tend to watch and read the media as a way of understanding what the insurgents are thinking, acting, and how they are communicating needless to say what their current TTPs are-- EXAMPLE: in Iraq the use of the RKG3 anti tank grenade which became a standard TTP and killer of US personnel was first released in a video and in subsequent videos you could watch the attack TTPs being deveolped and shown to other insurgent groups; EXAMPLE: what does a BCT Cmdr think of his Taliban opposite when he sees in a video a power generator being used to power a Statcom radio tied directly to a laptop in a mountain valley---kind of changes the view of that assumed "backwoods simple guerilla" does it not? NOTICE: if you truly read the research analysis on the communications aspects the research would have given you the answer to this question---they explained it and even showed us that the same characteristics exist for all insurgencies---think about it-not having to reinvent the wheel everytime we "see" a new group in a new country.

6. let's talk about the evolution of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan---just how did the Iraqi insurgency evolve into a very good thinking animal holding it's own in under three years? I mean 2500 IEDS per week and an ops tempo that kept the US Army jumping from place to place through 2008. Just how was it possible that the Taliban evolved from really nothing in late 2006 to a "shadow government" phase 2/3 guerilla war SINCE 2007.
Explain it using common HTS techniques and the COIN FM. This evolution was explained easily with their research especially if you understand open source warfare.

7. if you noticed in their research they concluded that in 2006 there were 100 plus insurgent groups active in Iraq NOW if you are of the IC world go back and look at IC reporting from that period as to 1) number of groups and 2) number of estimated insurgents and you will notice that just maybe we got it totally wrong!

8. all of the 54,000 plus open source media reports EXCLUDED actual insurgency media reporting and DOES NOT include CIDNE reporting.
NOW add those two data streams to the core research and I am assuming that it would be possible to really "see" a 3D view of a particular insurgency

9. explain to me from current COIN FMs and that includes the latest COIN FM on Tactics or from HTS Teams in the field HOW do you would develop a "rumor", insert that "rumor" into the insurgent cell or groups, track the effects of that rumor to the 2nd or 3rd degree level to achieve a stated effect?
Do not talk about it --show me concret examples.

If we are going to use SWJ as a blogger forum to discuss what is working and not working let us at least be honest about our personal hangups and get the egos out of the way as this topic is killing both US/NATO personnel as well as Afghan citizens.

AND just maybe there should be a blog section on whether open source warfare (OSW) is in fact 4G warfare or actually showing us elements of 5G warfare at a time when the military is struggling to reinvent itself while facing a true guerilla war in Afghanistan.

CL: Outlaw7 is referring to the "Common Ecology Quantifies Human Insurgeny" paper published in a recent issue of the journal Nature:

http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v462/n7275/full/nature08631.html

It is the (partial) result of a research team led by the physicist Sean Gourley to construct a quantitative model of how insurgencies behave. His research methodology, however, is deeply suspect, at least according to many conflict scholars:

http://www.registan.net/index.php/2010/01/27/a-comment-on-common-ecolog…

As for why people in the IC or military don't reference it: well, even assuming they keep up on the trendiest quant publications, the Gourley study doesn't say anything new. As its most basic, his team created the math to describe what SWJ authors discuss every single day. In terms of technique, the study has very serious sourcing issues (he relies entirely on media accounts to construct his model, which is an unreliable source of information, to say the least), so I would wager the IC doesn't see any utility in copying a model that doesn't really say much.

OK Outlaw&. Sounds interesting, but where can I find the report? I assume it is published.

In should be noted that in fact since December 2009, a six year quantitative analysis research project covering 11 conflicts and over 54,000 data inputs was released for review.

The project was peer reviewed and opened for challenges to the analysis and to this day there has been no challenge to the math.

Out of that research an ecology of an insurgency was defined and 15 characteristics identified that applies to all insurgent groups whether in Iraq, Columbia, Afghanistan or even to pirates in Somalia.

AND this is critical the research would allow Cmdrs for the first time to analyze their decisons and "see" the 2nd, 3rd, fifth or even sixth degree of effects of a decision WITHOUT having "boots on the ground" or worrying about the "human terrain".

It could in fact indicate attack windows, determine the effects of rumors on the individual cell member and or the entire cell or movement, or show the communications inside the group or explain the evolution of the group.

THIS cannot be done currently by any Human Terrain Team that I know of.

15 Charteractistics:

If we look at the results from our model we find that there are 15 key characteristics that that define a successful insurgent ecosystem; these are listed below with a short name to describe the feature.

•Many body: There are many more autonomous insurgent groups operating within conflicts than we had previously thought. For example there are 100+ autonomous groups operating in Iraq (as of 2006).

•Fluidity: The insurgents are loosely grouped together to form fluid networks with short half-lives. This is very different from the rigid hierarchical networks that have been proposed for insurgent groups.

•Redundancy: If we remove the strongest group from the system another group will rise to replace the previous strongest group

•Splinter: When a group is broken it does not generally split in half but instead shatters into multiple pieces

•Redistribute: When a group is broken the components are redistributed amongst the other groups in the system. The redistribution is biased towards the most successful remaining groups.

•Snowball: The strongest groups grow fastest

•Tall poppy: The strongest groups are the predominant targets for opposition forces

•Internal competition: There is direct competition amongst insurgent groups for both resources and media exposure. They are competing with each other in addition to fighting the stronger counterinsurgent forces.

•Independent co-ordination: Autonomous groups act in a coordinated fashion as a result of the competition that exists between them.

•Emergent structure: Attacks in both Iraq and Colombia become 'less random' and more coordinated over time

•Evolution: The strategies employed by the groups evolve over time where successful groups/strategies survive and unsuccessful strategies/groups are replaced.

•High dimensional: Connection occurs over high dimensions (i.e. Internet, cell phone etc) and is not dominated by geographic connections.

•Non-linear: It is approximately 316* times harder to kill 100 people in an attack than it is to kill 10 people. (*Results for a conflict with alpha=2.5).

•Independent clones: the fundamental structure and dynamics of insurgent groups is largely independent of religious, political, ideological or geographic differences.

Lastly we view stigmery communications as a critical element found in all insurgencies.

Stigmergy is a mechanism of indirect coordination between agents or actions. The principle is that the trace left in the environment by an action stimulates the performance of a next action, by the same or a different agent. In that way, subsequent actions tend to reinforce and build on each other, leading to the spontaneous emergence of coherent, apparently systematic activity.

Stigmergy is a form of self-organization. It produces complex, seemingly intelligent structures, without need for any planning, control, or even direct communication between the agents. As such it supports efficient collaboration between extremely simple agents, who lack any memory, intelligence or even awareness of each other.

AND GUESS WHAT---not a single notice of the research by the IC or DoD or a note of interest by Human Terrain people---WONDER why?

Liked the article. The need is clear. The technology required to integrate (collate) all of the data mentioned (link charts, geospatial, and narrative) is out there and ready to use. How is HTS currently doing it? See the following link:

http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/200…