An Operational Perspective
by Tim C. Leival
Download the Full Article: Combat Advising the ANA 205th Commandos
One of the goals of the Operational Art is to effectively translate the expression of national will, in the form of strategy, into concrete tactical tasks; preferably ones that can be assigned metrics to mark progress. This paper reflects the application of the Art in the small example of the Afghan National Army 205th Commandos and Special Forces Operational Detachment A 2132.
ODA 2132 received the mission to Combat Advise the 205th Commandos at literally the worst time imaginable. We had just lost our Detachment Commander to an IED attack that also gravely wounded our Junior Engineer. We were down to eight personnel, one of whom, our Intelligence Sergeant (18F), would be serving as escort for our Commander and would be gone for almost a month. Our pre-mission training had been focused on the more usual ODA mission set. We were grieving and dispirited, but eagerly looking to get back into the fight.
When we received our change of mission brief from LTC Heinz Dinter (Task Force 32 Commander), he made it very clear that he was assigning us to the CJSOTF-A Commander's (COL Haas) designated Main Effort not because of our limitations, but because of our strengths. As a National Guard Detachment, we have a collection of experience and education of unusual breadth and depth as well as a wealth of time spent working with indigenous soldiers in many venues. Events proved his concept to be correct and, more germane to the thesis; we had already demonstrated an adherence to the principle of Cognitive processes in prosecution of Irregular Warfare. This principle is commonly and incorrectly expressed as "putting an Afghan face" on tactical operations. Because of our life experiences, our detachment was able to correctly interpret this principle into the action of avoiding creating dependencies at any level. Properly expressed by our Junior Communications Sergeant, "An Afghan Solution to an Afghan problem" became our mantra and rallying cry when less flexible minds tried to make the Commandos into institutional mirror-images of their own light infantry organizations.
Download the Full Article: Combat Advising the ANA 205th Commandos
CW3 Tim Leival was the Detachment Commander on SFODA 2132, Co C, 1/20th SFG(A). He has served as Executive Officer, Commander, Junior Weapons Sergeant, Intelligence Sergeant and Assistant Detachment Commander on 2132, as well as XO, S4, S3, S2 and Assistant Training NCO in the same Company over the last 26 years. Prior to that, he served as Mortar Platoon Ammo Bearer and Platoon Leader in various Reserve Component Infantry units.
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Comments
During the same time period, I had the opportunity to go out a couple of times with another 20th Group ODA that worked the Arghandab, Shah Wali Kot, and Khakrez Districts in partnership with a CSTC-A Police Mentoring Team. They were an impressive and very professional group of individuals. I also learned a lot in some intellectually stimulating COIN and FID discussions with Matt, the Det Commander, and Andy, the Assistant Team Leader.
Anon,
Agree there are many ODAs who have done as well and continue to do well. Where we may differ in views, is that it is my opinion that we have many in our ranks that are only comfortable with creating units that replicate the our model and doctrine. I do recall a time before we were so doctrine focused and more focused on doing what it took to get the job done, but I digress.
I will take your argument even further and say that most ODAs are doing great work with their partners, but if they're focused on teaching our doctrine and leading them instead of advising them (there is a big difference) that is normally effective only when you are partnered with the host nation unit.
You probably recall the constant struggle in Iraq between the culture of two Groups. One would advise and only send in a few U.S. Soldiers on target with a larger indig force, which was in charge if they were capable. The other Group "normally" would go in U.S. heavy with a few indig and the U.S. guys would lead the charge. Both Groups did great work, but one method makes a greater contribution over time (in my opinion). This is my point about Tim's article and their ODA's approach.
The point that Tim surfaced in his article that I seldom seen addressed (if ever) is to avoid dependencies and judging when advising. I think that lesson is critical. It may result in less capture/kills during their rotation, but in my opinion that is the wrong metric.
Hopefully that clarified my position.
Tim,
Really enjoyed the article and your team's focus on not only allowing, but encouraging the Afghans to do it their way instead of trying to make them a carbon copy of us. I think your focus on avoiding dependencies is a mind set all advisors should adopt, but that requires a degree of acceptance seldom found in Special Forces and almost completely absent in the General Purpose Forces. This also speaks well of your chain of command for putting the right folks in the right place at the right time and apparently supporting you.
If we see a few more examples like this it will result in a positive change across Afghanistan, because Afghans will be encouraged to do things their way without the discouragement of our trainers telling them if you don't it our way you're wrong. On the other hand, not everyone will be fortunate enough to be partnered with a capable HN leader.
Sorry for the loss of your team leader, but in my opinion your team honored him by continuing mission (Charlie Mike).
Bill
All,
The Commandos have become the jewel of the ANA through efforts of the SF community in Afghanistan over the past few years. It sounds like Tim's team helped set the course for the type of Commando units that exist today.
These guys plan, rehearse, and lead their own operations. The untold story of the Marjah operation was that the entire southern sector was secured by two companies of Afghan Commandos who went in several hours prior to the larger Marine operations kicking off, seizing key objectives, pushing out the perimeter, and immediately establishing an incredible rapport with the local populace that no coalition unit can replicate. The SF teams with them did not lead or drive these men, but rather advise and share hardships as peers, and provide critical enablers as well. These Commandos were then relieved by an ANA Kandak that came down from Uruzgan with their ODA advisors as well, and that battalion was extremely effective as well.
The other untold story is the severe pressure that was placed upon the SF Battalion Commander to abandon this proven SF approach to developing security force capacity.
The Marines adopted a 1-1 integration model. Afghan units were absorbed into Marine units and followed Marine leaders. Time available, the difficulty of the mission ahead, lack of enduring relationships between the units prior to the operation, etc all drove this decision. I don't fault the Marine CG, I respect him tremendously, and he is a man of action and results. I saw his approach as an in extremis ways to partner with the ANA and accomplish the mission he had be handed.
At the RC level, however, the Marine approach was adopted as "what right looks like" and anyone not doing 1-1 integrated partnering was seen as not understanding how to work with host nation forces. "Merely mentoring, and not partnering" was a common accusation.
Logical arguments such as the fact that the SF model is one that has 60 years of history behind it, and that ODAs are selected, trained, organized, equipped, and then practice day in and day out for their entire careers this model carried little weight. The ODAs were often seen as an obstacle by many of the staff who were busy with their tracking charts and seeking to achieve 1-1 partnering ratios across the force.
Following Marjah this pressure lightened up. The success of the Commandos and the conventional ANA Kandak in Southern Marjah was indisputable. And it was built on a foundation of persistent effort and trust by guys like the Author and his team.
(As an aside, the US SF model is also very different than that employed by Brit SAS as well. Theirs is much more the colonial approach, with British unit designations assigned and British leadership in charge; and Afghans, well trained and effective, filling the ranks. Both types of units were extremely effective in their operations, but it was the Commandos that are becoming more and more independent and self-sufficient daily.)