Small Nuclear Reactors: Enabling Energy Security for Warfighters

Last month, the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University released a report entitled Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications. Authored by Dr. Richard Andres of the National War College and Hanna Breetz from Harvard University, the paper analyzes the potential for the Department of Defense to incorporate small reactor technology on its domestic military bases and in forward operating locations. According to Andres and Breetz, the reactors have the ability to solve two critical vulnerabilities in the military's mission: the dependence of domestic bases on the civilian electrical grid and the challenge of supplying ample fuel to troops in the field. Though considerable obstacles would accompany such a move -- which the authors openly admit -- the benefits are significant enough to make the idea merit serious consideration.

At its heart, a discussion about military uses of small nuclear reactors is really a conversation about securing the nation's warfighting capabilities. Although the point that energy security IS national security has become almost redundant -- quoted endlessly in government reports, think tank papers, and the like -- it is repeated for good reason.

Especially on the domestic front, the need for energy security on military bases is often overlooked. There is no hostile territory in the United States, no need for fuel convoys to constantly supply bases with fuel, and no enemy combatants. However, while bases and energy supplies are not directly vulnerable, the civilian electrical grid on which they depend for 99% of their energy use is -- and that makes domestic installations highly insecure. The U.S. grid, though a technological marvel, is extremely old, brittle, and susceptible to a wide variety of problems that can result in power outages -- the 2003 blackout throughout the Northeast United States is a prime example of this. In the past, these issues were largely limited to accidents including natural disasters or malfunctions, however today, intentional threats such as cyber attacks represent a very real and growing threat to the grid.

Advances in U.S. military technology have further increased the risk that a grid blackout poses to the nation's military assets. As pointed out by the Defense Science Board, critical missions including national strategic awareness and national command authorities depend on the national transmission grid. Additionally, capabilities vital to troops in the field -- including drones and satellite intelligence/reconnaissance -- are lodged at bases within the United States and their loss due to a blackout would impair the ability of troops to operate in forward operating areas.

Recognition of these facts led the Defense Science Board to recommend "islanding" U.S. military installations to mitigate the electrical grid's vulnerabilities. Although DOD has undertaken a wide array of energy efficiency programs and sought to construct renewable energy facilities on bases, these endeavors will fall far short of the desired goals and still leave bases unable to function in the event of long-term outages.

As the NDU report argues though, small nuclear reactors have the potential to alleviate domestic base grid vulnerabilities. With a capacity of anywhere between 25 and 300 megawatts, small reactors possess sufficient generation capabilities to power any military installation, and most likely some critical services in the areas surrounding bases, should a blackout occur. Moreover, making bases resilient to civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for an opponent to disrupt the grid in the event of a conflict as military capabilities would be unaffected. Military bases are also secure locations, reducing the associated fears that would surely arise from the distribution of reactors across the country. Furthermore, small nuclear reactors, by design, are significantly safer than prior generations of reactors due to passive safety features, simplified designs, sealed reactor cores, and lower operational requirements.

On the foreign side, Andres and Breetz contend that mobile small reactors also have potential applicability in forward operating locations. Although this is a far riskier proposition than domestic reactor siting, the logistical burden of transporting energy via convoy to forward operating locations to meet base generation needs is both burdensome and extremely expensive. More importantly, the constant fuel convoys are sitting targets for attack and the drivers and troops who die every month in such convoys are constant reminders on the military's complete dependence on consistent fuel deliveries through hostile territory.

As with the incorporation of reactors on domestic installations, this proposal is not without risk -- in this case the possibility that a reactor could conceivably fall into enemy hands. When considering costs versus benefits, however, how does this play out? What is the likelihood that a U.S. forward operating base is overrun and captured? Additionally, the risk of loss or capture in the battlefield does not deter the use of other military technologies -- such as weapons systems, intelligence equipment, and operational vehicles -- so judgment by that cost alone is difficult. On the other hand, the ability of the reactors to reduce the need for fuel convoys and thus save lives is an assured benefit.

At the end of the day, small nuclear reactors offer a host of potential benefits in both areas where Andres and Breetz consider their use. On the domestic military installation side, they offer the ability to island domestic bases from the fragile civilian grid, ensure the availability of the nation's military assets in the event of a cyber attack or blackout, and provide a clean and assured supply of power to bases. On the foreign side, the use of small reactors in forward operating areas can reduce the use of liquid fuel to power base generators, lessening the need for constant convoys and ultimately saving lives in the field. Even when taking into consideration the potential hurdles to small reactor adoption on these fronts, the benefits are tangible and real enough to make serious discussion and pursuit worthwhile.

Micah J. Loudermilk is a Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent those of National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.