by Paul Overby
Download the Full Article: Are The Taliban And Al Qaeda Allies?
"In my view" should preface every statement here. It is likely the situation in Afghanistan is understood perfectly by no one, certainly not I. So I present these remarks as a prolegomenon or an extended suggestion to which others may compare their own thoughts. Any figures, for instance, are approximate. I combine references to some of my favorite books with personal experience garnered from a total of about two and a half years on the street as an independent observer in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the first nine months of which are described in my book Holy Blood.
In the challenge of extricating ourselves from the war in Afghanistan, the most critical element is the actual and emotional heart of the opposition we are facing--the Taliban. This war which is taking an American life every day and costing $2 billion a month is not, in all likelihood, militarily winnable. Though they are the reason we went to Afghanistan in the first place, al Qaeda is now marginal. After 9-11 our prime and overriding aim was to secure the American homeland against terror attacks by Islamist extremists like Osama bin Laden (inspiration, coordination, oversight) and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (planning, execution) by preventing al Qaeda and similar groups from enjoying a sheltered gathering space in Afghanistan. The safe haven happened to be provided by the Taliban, but the real villains were AQ. But now, ironically, it is the Taliban we are expending most of our energy fighting.
The assumption here that military victory is not to be expected (if not outright impossible) is very important, but is not the focus of this essay. In many ways the war in Afghanistan is very similar to Vietnam: an insurgency of guerrillas who are supported by a large portion of the people and motivated by a strong belief, however aberrant. Wrong but strong. Popular (or even semi-popular) insurgencies have commonly resisted attempts by foreign armies to break them, and Afghanistan is, I take it, another such case.
At the start of this war very small groups of CIA and Special Forces were able to target and wipe out most significant pieces of the enemy's formal structure--in three months! It was a brilliant campaign, and we had thereupon--in a view supported by Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (in conversation in Kabul, 2009)`--a window of perhaps two years to arrange things as best we could and get out. But, encouraged by the ease of our original victory, and determined on the one hand to make sure that al Qaeda and their local hosts the Taliban were rooted out properly; and on the other hand to set up a viable Afghan government, we overstayed our welcome big time. As a consequence, beginning in perhaps 2005, we fell into an uncertain guerrilla war with the Taliban, who were certainly not our friends but had not actually attacked us and were moreover an authentic Afghan phenomenon, unlike AQ, and were bound to present us with a deep-rooted and stubborn opposition.
During their five-year period in power, 1996-2001, the Taliban occupied a kind of limbo status (laid out in Steve Coll's Ghost Wars), neither friend nor enemy of the US-- until we were attacked by their AQ "guests." And here is the rub, again: though marginally acceptable themselves, the Taliban were —to accommodate people who were by no means acceptable to us and were, in fact, our deadly enemies. In the present situation, if we withdraw, which is my recommendation, what will the Taliban do? We can bank on their taking over the Pashtun part of the country, or most of it, which is bad enough, but the crucial question--absolutely integral to our basic goal--concerns their relation to AQ. Will they buddy up with al Qaeda as they did before? Or will they quietly shuffle them out the door as too expensive a luxury?
Download the Full Article: Are The Taliban And Al Qaeda Allies?
Paul Overby went to Peshawar independently in 1988 to witness the struggle of the Afghan Freedom Fighters; spent 6 months talking to exile Afghans; finally, for a brief moment, fought alongside the mujahideen in the hills of Kunar. In 1993, Holy Blood was published. That same year he returned to visit the major commander Mullah Naqeeb in Kandahar (and helped push start his Mercedes) and interviewed Ahmad Shah Massoud in Kabul. Since late 2007 he has made four trips to AfPak for a total of 20 months. Talking to hundreds of people on the street, staying as a special guest of his old friend Governor Sayed Fazlolah Wahidi in Kunar, and interviewing a few important figures, his goal was to understand the American position in Afghanistan and to find Osama--whom he tentatively placed in the Yarkhun Valley.
About the Author(s)
Comments
Any BITS OF knowledge I have are islands in a sea of ignorance.
I regard the Taliban as free-standing--not essentially dependent on ISI. No one seems to know the real story here, tho anti-Tal Afghans will commonly blame the Paks. The problem begins with the Tal in Afgh, but cannot end there. A "solution" is presumably only to be found in the larger compass--which must include Pakistan.
"Ally" is only a rough term to indicate they work for generally the same ends in the present situation. The basic hope in the article is that they are, in fact, different.
AQ is a non-state actor with a regional objective conducting UW across the middle east.
They leverage and support nationalist insurgencies, such as the Taliban movement; they also recruit foreign fighters from nationalist movements across the region to fight as guerrillas in locations where they believe they can advance their agenda directly.
AQ conducts UW with Taliban and supports them. In exchange the Taliban provide AQ with sanctuary.
AQ brings foreign fighters into the region, as they did in Iraq, to fight to hurt the Coalition as well.
To say they are "allies" over simplifies their distinct roles and missions and objectives; which in turn leads to poorly designed counters that do not take into account such differences with clearly distinct programs levied at each of these parties based upon WHY they fight, rather than where they fight, who the fight with, and who they fight against.
Paul Overby probably knows more about the situation in Afghanistan than most politicians!There is ,and allways has been,a large difference between the Taliban and AQ and though the remnants of AQ may be beatable,eventually,the Taliban are not.They are Afghanistan.They are a people defending their country against foreign invaders,doing what any person would do if their countrty was invaded.I'm an Aussie and believe that we should get out,that we had no right nor reason to ever be there and that now that Bin Laden is dead and AQ is apparently down to 100 men!,that all foreigners should get out and leave Afghanistan to its people to sort out.