by Michael Clauser
It's time for national security conservatives and soft power advocates to call a truce and stand shoulder to shoulder. This new approach to the budget debate means working together to make public arguments for the importance of each other's top line budget numbers — as Gates has — and ending bureaucratic budget sniping.
Much more over at Politico
Comments
I have just three words for you, Africa Command.
Great idea conceptually, but when you think about it, so was the Ford Pinto to someone.
I fully support DOD and SECDEF Gates attempts to support DOS. It is the right approach for the future, but never put the carrot in the same kit as the Big stick.
It confuses the recipients of the message you are trying to deliver.
Right now, when one of our big gray boats approach a foreign shore, or a camo-covered, weapon-toting troop comes over the horizon, our enemy shouldn't be thinking, I wonder what flavored MRE they are going to pass out.
They should be digging in for a fight, raising their hands to surrender, or running for the hills.
On the other hand, we should not be going into foreign lands that we are trying to help and / or influence with DOS, HHS, CDC, USAID support worth billions of dollars of aid, while threatening with the Big Stick. It turns the act of compassion into "Take it or leave it" proposition.
What DOS, USAID, HHS, and CDC need is to hire some 5th Avenue Ad Men/Women and flood the airwaves with what they are doing. These ads and programming need to be on every channel, to not only educate the world on what we are trying to do to help the recipients of our aid, but to counter the negative propaganda that our enemies already spew over their airwaves. Strategic communications - what a concept.
And OBTW, target some of these ads for U.S. consumption. Most taxpayers think we just spend gazillions of their dollars on feeding and curing the unappreciative masses, while a large percentage of aid is spent on buying more "Sticks."
The USGOV does great things outside our borders for others, but no one (for the most part) inside or outside those borders really know. We need to use our support as an influencial tool in our foreign policy.
And to those that argue that isn't in line with our morals, I am talking about aid and support, not HA/DR situations. Our country will always come to the rescue during HA/DR situations to help any country friend or foe.
Over two years ago I wrote the following comment to another blog at this site. Those comments are as relevant today as they are now, unfortunately little in the way of policy has changed during that time, other than introduction of <a href="http://ntm-a.com/wordpress2/?p=2749">INSPEAD: Going Beyond Goldwater-Nichols</a> in September 2010. However, it's just lip service until something is approved and made into law.
I find it very disappointing with all of the key players (see below) now within the Administration we can't get something done.
My comment of February 2009:
Did you review the recent work and study by the <a href="http://www.pnsr.org/">Project for National Security Reform</a>? (PNSR)
The PNSR, headed up by former Assistant Secretary of Defense <a href="http://www.pnsr.org/web/page/599/sectionid/554/pagelevel/2/interior.asp… R. Locher</a>, did a comprehensive study on improving and possibly reorganizing our national security system for the 21st century. Locher was also a principal architect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Four former key PNSR personnel have top posts in the Obama Administration:
<a href="http://www.state.gov/s/d/">James B. Steinberg - Deputy Secretary of State. </a>
<a href="http://www.dni.gov/blair_bio.htm">Admiral Dennis C. Blair - Director of National Intelligence</a>
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_L._Jones">General James L. Jones - National Security Advisor</a>
<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/leadership/">Michele Flournoy - Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</a>
I highly recommend reading the executive summary in their final report: <a href="http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging%20a%20new%20shield.pdf">F… a New Shield</a>
One of our faculty members also blogged about this in <a href="http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/reflectionsfromfront/arch… a New Shield: Massive Changes to the National Security System</a>
Additionally, there have been numerous reports that Jones may be making radical changes at the NSC, as reported by The Washington Post in <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/07/AR20090… NSC Will Get New Power: Directive Expands Makeup and Role Of Security Body</a>
With the influence of the former PNSR staffers, we may see some type of <i>Beyond Goldwater-Nichols</i> legislation introducted to revamp our national security system.
Hi, it's the author. Glad SWJ posted my POLITICO op-ed, but I don't understand the title under which they did, "Time to Merge DoD and DoS?" It might draw readership, but misses entirely what my op-ed was about. Nowhere do I make any argument whatsoever that State and DoD should be "merged" into some singular department. Heavens, no.
Instead, what I argue in my POLITICO op-ed is that in the Washington battle for dollars, supporters of a robust defense spending (ie national security conservatives) and supporters of the non-military international affairs spending (ie soft power buffs) should not see the other's loss as one's potential gain. To be more clear, cutting DoD DOES NOT mean more money for State. So instead of working at cross-purposes, why not work together to stave off the budget cuts to the defense/international affairs and redirect the scalpel to where it should go: long-term drivers of debt and functions currently done at the Federal level that can be devolved to the states and localities.
I understand that's a hair more boring than a grand idea of merging DoD and State. But it's what my piece was about: being nice to other. :)
I don't think the author made any supportable arguments on why we should merge DOD and DOS. That would simply militarize our diplomacy more than it already is. There is no war between DOD and DOS, so no truce is required. Even the SECDEF said DOS should be better funded, and most CDRCOCOMs concur that diplomacy is the tool of choice and should be adequately funded. Excessive spending on defense (and 20 cents to every tax dollar if correct is definitely excessive spending, especially if we assume DOS needs at least 5 cents to the dollar, then that implies we are spending 25% of our national income on non-productive things for the U.S. taxpayer, while our unemployment soars and our infrastructure rots). The author used the term essential for a number of things (Civil Affairs, reconstruction teams, etc.), but failed to explain why they are essential? We are in a true economic crisis with our debt, so we need to be honest about what is essential, and justify it. What is essential for diplomacy and the military will differ, and the authorities for spending on each of these are covered by different statues. I think what is essential is to first define what is essential, and ensure that is funded. Then identify what is nice to have, and if we get the funding we can purchase it. I think merging DOS and DOD is the wrong road to go down for a number of reasons. We already have military personnel assigned to the State Department and in the various embassies to ensure a supported-supporting relationship, and DOS has personnel in the Pentagon and the GCCs for the same reason. Disagreements sometimes emerge over the best policy, but that is hardly a war between two Departments, that is simply educated and dedicated government servants trying to work out the best approach to achieve policy objectives. Disagreement is healthy, the greatest force in history is two ideas meeting. Integration will discourage open dissent, and that is not healthy for a nation that will have to rely more and more on soft power in the future.
Would suggest this is not suitable for the American psyche (i.e. political culture).
We were founded on anti-colonialism and branches of this belief system include having checks and balances on too much central authority.
The Congress has a duty to ensure power in the executive branch is dispersed (this includes foreign adventures and the prevention of imperial-like activities).
The funding streams and authority streams designed in legislation keep a check on a "proconsul" approach to "governing the world." The mainstream political culture disdains the idea of exportable governance (aka imperialism). While the idea is seductively "efficient," our form of government does not place efficiency at the highest tier of policy. Rather it is sustaining decentralized forms of political power.
My argument is that this will not happen. Maybe some incremental changes to improve coordination, but not wholesale integration (i.e. a corollary to the GCC or JTF).