Comments
cross-posted from the lengthier comments over at the original site on Ricks' blog (now with a good back and forth between myself and MAJ Wharton)....
Although these comments are cynical, ISAF still can't see the forest through the trees and continues its sisyphean efforts at US-pushed anti-corruption efforts. Ive sat through the Shafafiyat and anti-corruption meetings between ISAF and the international community on one side and GIRoA on the other since the joint effort formally got underway through Karzais directive in the Presidential Palace. Since 2010 when ISAF really started getting on top of the anti-corruption effort jointly with GIRoA, their partners across the aisle have not been so forthcoming, nor will they. No matter the carrots or sticks we try and use. Karzai, nor the people he has appointed and chartered to deal with the anti-corruption issues, are not interested in jointly and openly working with the international/US military effort. Theyre interested in shuffling ineffectual and/or corrupt officials around the different corruption commissions, shifting all the blame to international (read as 'primarily US) contracting efforts as causative factors for all of Afghanistans endemic problems, maintaining existing patronage networks because they know these are the only things holding Afghanistan together and will be in the future, and most importantly, keeping the obscene amounts of money flowing.
TF Shafafiyat had the right of it 1000% - that corruption is the single most existing reason why we are still at war in Afghanistan in 2011 (2010 when that comment was first made) and that corruption presents a fatal national security risk for the future of the Afghan state. But more importantly, its questionable whether the Afghans see it that way and care to do anything about it. I say no, they dont. They have a different definition of 'functional corruption than Westerners - always have and always will. Thats not necessarily bad but it chips away at any effective action we try and force upon them. If certain CPNs are part of the patronage framework GIRoA at any level from Kabul down to the municipality has to rely on to keep things working at Afghan good-enough, then far be it from them to want to change the status quo. They know who butters their bread. Well, the US taxpayers do, but they know who to pay off to keep the night letters away at least. But we cant throw stones, can we? Weve been paying off and bribing the same powerbrokers and CPNs for years now to keep our LOCs and supply routes open. Weve always known about that and continue to look the other way when it really comes down to it.
All of ISAF and now MAJ Wharton suffer from the same misplaced enthusiasm that GIRoA really cares about what we say with respect to corruption and actually wants to do something about it. Ive seen GIRoA officials behind the scenes, after ISAF leaves the room, figure how to throw them under the bus just to please Karzai; how to shift the focus away from GIRoA and on to ISAF itself; how to do enough to keep ISAF happy (which isnt a lot apparently) to ensure the dollars keep flowing in on one side and make sure Karzai has the political excuses necessary that GIRoA is actually making an effort to remain in line with Kabul Conference commitments on the other. All they want is enough powerpoint and white papers drafted to send up to the Council of Ministers to ensure it looks like theyre doing something because they know no real GIRoA effort will be made to act on any of the resolutions or recommendations. They know when it comes down to it, well be gone soon, with most of the money, but the patronage networks that support and feed political capital will remain. Theres nothing we can do about that.
The state department has a "zero tolerance" attitude toward corruption that, along with positions that Democracy is the only form of government, and that US values are somehow "universal," are like three anchors around our neck in getting toward reasonable solutions that work well for the people affected by problems such as the crushing degree of corruption in Afghanistan that we agonize over.
The US needs to own up to our major role in creating the current scope of the problem there.
We are the ones who enabled the current constitution that turned traditional Afghan patronage "corruption" into a centralized ponzi scheme vested in one man (of our choosing).
We are the ones who feed the ponzi scheme with vast amounts of development and security cash necessary for any Ponzi to continue to function.
We are the ones who secure that Ponzi against those internal forces who recognize it for what it is (a monopoly of government for the Northern Alliance that bars any competiton not blessed by the head of the Ponzi scheme) and seek to tear it down.
Corruption is a symptom. The Constitution is the Problem. Time to change our mantra and shift our focus. (It's also time for State to take a hard look at their positions on those three positions...)
Bob
Although a good article with some good ideas the solutions are too Westen Centric and will not work in Afghanistan. How the Afghan do buisness with outsiders is how they have been dealing with them for hundreds of years. ISAF is just the same as Alexander was, as the Persians were and the Soviets. The way the Afghan's take money from us is the same way they took it from everyone else, so why should they change their system.
One of the key assumptions to success in the article is getting the Afghan to believe they are taking or stealing from the Afghan State. And that again is Western thinking. Do the Afghan really see Afghanistan as a state the way the West does? I would argue they don't. What I have learned in my research is that what the Afghan do not understand, they have no obligation to believe in or be loyal to it. So it is difficult to fight corruption by telling them they are taking or stealing from the Afghan State when if they don't understand the Western concept then they are not taking or stealing from anything or anyone.
The key to success in fighting corruption in Afghanistan is to fight it the Afghan way, not the Western way. Success in COIN comes when you think in their culture not yours. If you ask an Afghan is there corruption in Afghanistan, they will tell you yes but their idea of what corruption is greatly differs from the Western idea. It is the Afghan view of corruption where we need to start to successfully fight corrupton, not the Wests.