A National Strategic Learning Disability? By Lieutenant General James M. Dubik (USA Ret.), Army Magazine. LTG Dubik’s BLUF:
At the national strategic level, we still appear to cling to the notion that war is best defined conventionally. America’s national security institutions as well as the international norms and conventions are optimized for this type of war. Ten years of evidence that war has more than one form seems to have been insufficient to prompt adequate adaptation—domestically or internationally. Current discussions often find adherents claiming that the conflict in Libya is not a war, for example, or that war cannot be waged in cyberspace. Without adequate strategic imagination, America perpetually risks not only applying a strategy that does not match the specific enemy and situation of a given case, but also having a set of institutions and procedures equivalent to attempting to fit a round peg into a square hole. Thus we risk more examples of spending our strategic capital— lives, sacrifice, money and will—in not attaining our strategic aims.
Comments
I can answer LTG Dubik's four questions.
"<i>Do we have the ability to construct and execute a coherent national strategy?</i>" No. Our political system and electoral cycle intrude on any ability to do that and lacking an existential threat, those impacts will preclude any real coherence.
"<i>Have we lost the ability to use force decisively?</i>" No. We can and will do that when it is necessary. In none of the cases the author cited was that required. It may have been -- surely was -- desirable but it was not required, therefor the Political masters precluded such efforts as they genrally will continue to try to do. The United State has not elected to use force decisively other than in Panama and Desert Storm (note short, sharp, sweet and all under one Adminsitration...) since 1950 and every instance of the deployment of forces including the two named exceptions was hamstrung by politically induced restrictions.
"<i>Do we confuse ending a war with an “exit strategy” to leave a war?</i>" I am unsure who constitutes that "we." Politicans? Probably they do. Flag Officers? They should not but may. Most American civilians? Generally not. Staff Sergeant Thudpucker? Never. PFC Joe Tentpeg? Almost never. The News Media? All of the above.
"Do we lack strategic imagination?" Yes.
I can also provide alternatives to three of the four. Our political milieu is well known, the problem has been failure in both the civilian and military sides of the government to embed that perhaps too well known schedule and adapt to that reality; that should be easily remedied. Decisive use of force when required is available but commitments to operations where it is not required play to opponents strengths and are to be avoided as the potential opponents know and exploit this phenomena; the Politicians will not try very hard to avoid them because our system has grown to need them for various reasons -- think of a Covering force, handy but always ordered to avoid decisive engagement -- thus the solution is to remove that specious 'need' (note that it is merely a need, probably a presumed one revolving around budgets and elections at that, rather than a necessity).
There is a side question on this issue. Decisive in what sense? If the operation is FID or SFA, there will likely be no 'win' or 'lose,' the best that can ever be achieved is an acceptable outcome. So if a decision is made to commit, part of the process should be to determine if it is a win / lose effort or if a lesser outcome is the goal. That goal need not, probably should not, be stated for public consumption but it should be achievable, clear and only changed if circumstance force that. If SFA is avoided as it should be -- the GPF will never be able to do it well nor should they -- then a win / lose effort may be possible and the force employed should be adequate for a decisive victory AND any necessary follow up or post conflict contingency; if a force of the required size or capability cannot be fielded, then a look for Plan B is in order. It should be noted that determinations of capability are a purely military call and in my opinion 'Yes, Sir' is not a good answer to a questionable commitment directive. That's not a carte blanche to say no but 'Can do' is not always the right answer.
The Exit Strategy foolishness is an unintended consequence of the Weinberger Doctrine and its offshoot, the Powell Doctrine. Those two well intentioned but doomed to fail concepts planted that seed. They were an attempt by DoD to shape national policy which never gained credence on the civil side -- who did seize upon the "Exit Strategy" ideas political gold. Shades of Nixon, departure with honor. Clinton used the phrase for the Balkans (in the event, it was, er, delayed in implementation...), Haiti too, I think. The brutal fact is that all our post World War II wars (including Panama but excluding a couple small scale successes like Greece) have ended. All messily -- and none really had an 'exit strategy.' The phrase simply needs to disappear.
The fourth question, "Do we lack strategic imagination" will not be fixed until we radically revise our flawed World War I design personnel system and its Congressionally forced 'fairness' and 'objective criteria' overlays. You cannot get imagination from a system that insists that it can place round pegs in triangular holes with no loss of fidelity. If you send those pegs to a training and educational shaping process that demands Rounded conformity, all extant imagination and sharp edges will be duly buried.
As are too many young Officers, Men and Women due to many failures of imagination -- which after all, drives the other three questions.