The sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il comes at a particularly bad moment for the political leadership in Beijing. China has long been North Korea’s patron and protector, a task Beijing may not have wished for, but one it took on in order to maintain stability along its northeast frontier. Kim’s death unsettles the stability that Beijing has hoped to maintain, just as China’s leaders face growing internal instability themselves.
Kim Jong-Il’s death was premature (at least from Beijing’s perspective) because preparations for a smooth political transition in Pyongyang were almost certainly incomplete. Kim Jong-Il had several decades to prepare to take over from his father, Kim Il-Sung. By contrast, the 20-something near-child Kim Jong-un was selected for succession less than two years ago and has virtually no experience in political or military leadership. He undoubtedly will receive protection from more senior family members, but such protection is equally likely to create other fissures within North Korea’s ruling circles. By waiting so late in the game to finally settle on a successor, and choosing one so manifestly unprepared, Kim Jong-Il greatly increased the likelihood of political fragmentation inside North Korea.
As the major power with a closest working relationship with Pyongyang, China will also get the largest burden of responsibility for stabilizing North Korea, should that become necessary. Stability has been China’s goal all along; the current succession crisis will be the biggest test of China’s plans in this regard. And by refusing to discuss with the United States, South Korea, Japan, and others North Korean political reform and the possibility of life without the Kim Family Regime, China has only heaped more of the responsibility for North Korea onto its own back.
All of this comes at a bad time for China’s leaders. The open rebellion against local Communist Party officials in Wukan in Guangdong province threatens to spread. China’s real estate market, and thus its banking system, teeters on the edge. And the fact that China’s security authorities have imposed even harsher restrictions on electronic communications bodes ill for the regime’s legitimacy and for the future efficiency of the economy.
Can China’s leaders manage several significant crises at the same time? We may soon find out.
Comments
After their performance over the last 2 decades, no one should underestimate the Pulitburo, but if Pakistan has its way, they may find themselves managing an even bigger headache in the West...the word seems to be that they are not interested in taking up that responsibility, but if the current jedi negotiation between GHQ and the US embassy falls through, will they be able to stay out of that quicksand for too long?