In a blast from the past, Kennedy and Johnson staffer turned Harvard professor James C. Thompson looks at how the tragedy that was the Vietnam War unfolded. This Atlantic article was originally published in April 1968. He opens with a straightforward inquiry. "One question that will certainly be asked: How did men of superior ability, sound training, and high ideals—American policy-makers of the 1960s—create such costly and divisive policy?" He goes into a lengthy and illuminating look at the institutional and historical factors that crippled the national security decision-making apparatus. This is a fascinating read in and of itself. But if you are to do nothing else, read the below excerpt with which he closed his essay and ask yourself if we will ever learn.
Long before I went into government, I was told a story about Henry L. Stimson that seemed to me pertinent during the years that I watched the Vietnam tragedy unfold—and participated in that tragedy. It seems to me more pertinent than ever as we move toward the election of 1968.
In his waning years Stimson was asked by an anxious questioner, "Mr. Secretary, how on earth can we ever bring peace to the world?" Stimson is said to have answered: "You begin by bringing to Washington a small handful of able men who believe that the achievement of peace is possible.
"You work them to the bone until they no longer believe that it is possible.
"And then you throw them out—and bring in a new bunch who believe that it is possible."
Comments
It is with great apology that I note the absence of the Pribbenow comment and translations about DRV advisers to Communists in South America.
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/e-dossier-no-27-vietnam-trained…
There is a wealth of post-war materials to indicate the closeness between Castro and Le Duan-- after the Vietnam Waras during and before-- making both nations Moscow's hands in revolutions there. This is particularly INTERESTING BECAUSE IT WAS Mao who insisted on: "One, two, three...many revolutions” in the 3rd World. Yet Thompson was one of those "liberals" (as in intellectually libertine) for whom the later phases of the Cold War constituted bureaucratic opportunities rather than strategic duties. Whatever flag waving does to you in the field of battle, back in Wash DC, the glitter makes you think: "Oooooo, I want some," like a kid in a candy store. This was the main problem with the "Cold War" as opposed to the "War on Terror(sic)" for DoS and civilian careerists. The Cold War was a constant series of probes in resources rich countries vital to the stability of the Western World (but not USA as it was almost self-sufficient, a distinction we were learning in West European high schools). America may have been moved to “topping” all the cheap foreign economics level it accessed, and one could say that for much of the Ike years the CIA served as the strong arm of corporate interests. But over time, American power was allowed to be the recipient of first resort" by most 3rd World nations as it gave them a better deal than any other former imperial masters. The reason was that the US DEEPLY BELIEVED that fair economic relations can paralyze Communism (kids with spare cash buy "Keds"-- before Nikes-- rather than Kalashnikovs with which to fight against "Neo-imperialism," a Soviet term carefully crafted to distinguish American current investment for later digestion of 3rd World nations with natural assets from the devouring by past European masters. Back then Wall Streeters made quite a case for their Capitalist development as solution to Communism. Capitalists-- here's where Marx had it all wrong-- plunge their profits back into production rather than just take them away. Alas, the less they feared Communism, the less they plowed back into thse nations.
Please recall that LBJ offered Hanoi a TVA-- before he started bombing—if only Hanoi would settle for a coalition govt instead of armed takeover. But once the "guerrilla war of Southerners”-- TOTALLY COMMANDED BY Southern born Southerners taken North in 1954 and kept on a short leach by Hanoi-- escalated to PAVN regulars , reunification ceased to be discussed . HANOI REFUSAL WAS TOTALLY IDEOLOGICAL; *INSISTING* THAT A UNITED VIETNAM WAS NOT ITS GOAL BUT THAT WORLD SOCIALISM WAS in DLD documents, it told the members of its candy-coating coalition that its goal was “reunification” only. In other words, success in Vietnam was to be proof that global victory of "World Socialism" would be an inevitable accelerated with guns. The "nationalism" stuff was just the essence of the model Lenin had left them to dupe the non-ideological. ALL of Hanoi's INTERNAL strategy papers were translations of Soviet manuals of that genre. It was only when in 1962 that Hanoi turned to China, when Khrushchev betrayed the World Socialist Movement tactically-- with a Geneva Accord for Laos he had hoped would force the US to amass forces under China's soft-underbelly in the belief that in this way the frightened Chinese would dump Mao and replace him with Soviet agent Liu Shaochi. Desperate, Hanoi chose to stand with Mao. This in no way meant a change whatever in Hanoi's line or strategy. However, when the US assassinated Diem, Hanoi came to believe that the US desperately wanted,-- NOT the capitulationist "ente nous vietnamiens" peace that Nhu was working out with Hanoi-- but total domination of SE Asia. Cuba was critical to the Vietnam War; feeling betrayed, Castro saw in Hanoi the only reliable "internationalist" ally imaginable.
Talking to Thompson and other DoS types at that time, one realized that you're dealing with schizoid JFK-hands who thought SecState Rusk in such a feeble position that they all had a shot at a slot up. Once LBJ replaced JFK, no one knew if the same game was on anymore until LBJ refused to act on China's first nuke in 1964, much as Obama is acting with Iran’s nuke prospects. DoS documents, particularly, Thompson’s on famine relief to China kind of seals his claim to idealism in foreign policy. His duality thereafter is a stinking trail of on-again, off-again-- a luxury nobody in MACV could permit himself through the Vietnam War.
Later LBJ actions relative to Hanoi do not represent a change of view from earlier ones as to whether the DRV was the most dynamic element of World Socialism next to Cuba, but simply reflect the civilian belief that WE ARE LOOSING BECAUSE OUR COMMANDERS ARE IDIOTS AND LIARS! Sounds familiar? Well, it was the same as will be Obama's withdrawal in defeat from Afghanistan, knowing that he is safe in documenting that Petraeus and the other battlefield commanders totally deceived him, as they had Bush. We are seeing, once again, Colonels serving as the spear-chuckers aiming for the commanders' hearts. Trouble is that Old Westy didn't deserve it because Tet 1968 was-- ACCORDING TO HANOI—necessary because he had succeed in what he was trying to do (the same reason, by the way, for the Paris peace talk). Valentine's version in J. of Military History should not go unanswered. Alas we're all too old and too disgusted to do it. It would demand that this be the burden to our last breaths...but then no one would read it, anyway, because only Lefty academics read books about Vietnam these days!
Afghanistan was a fraud because Bush chose to go after the TALIBAN instead of the airlines execs who chose to violate the law and kept the pilot's cabin door WIDE OPEN from 1970s to 9/11/2001. Using Afghanistan as an excuse for Iraq, Bush focused on the latter and sent in only blind killers with no strategic vision to keep in power an obedient midget of a mind (in the eyes of Afghans). We now know from a Colonel-- sent in by the Obama White House to set the record straight in order to set the scene for our exit from the mess the military made by lying-- just as another Colonel was assigned to blame MACV command for Nixon's withdrawal from Vietnam.
But look at what we got from Vietnam: the beginning of Cold War victory!
Ike told Nixon that RVN wasn't worth a damn but that it and Laos were the "cork" that would stop the "Commie spillage” (like mercury) into all of SE Asia ("If Laos goes Thailand is next"-- from NSC minutes, as I recall). From the day Ike threatened JFK with denunciation if he doesn't hold Laos to the day LBJ stopped the bombing, the issue was: HOW DO WE AVOID LOOKING BAD AS WE LOSE? Afterall Korea, to many minds, proved that Dems start wars and Reps win them. What Nixon did was to risk a lot and lose a little. He quit South Vietnam, proving to China that US wants no base below its soft underbelly (what Khrushchev fooled JFK into establishing). But then, in exchange for protecting the North of China from Soviet nuclear attack, Nixon got China to promise to halt Hanoi's march West to the border of India (as a Soviet ally then) in order encircle China. Nixon kept his word and so did China. In the end, China stopped Hanoi at Cambodia, taking Laos until Hanoi accepted withdrawal from Cambodia.
We’re not likely to see similar success in Iraq/Afghan War because of Petraeus. Believing, per his PhD thesis that media management is the essence of gaining time to win COIN warfare, he deceived everyone, giving a green light to anyone in uniform motivated to hold off withdrawal, to tell any tall tails he thinks might work. The rest is all out now , thanks to yet another Colonel, so indeed, as Santayana said: THOSE WHO DON'T LEARN FROM HISTORY ARE DOOMED TO REPEAT IT!
Vietnam, like Afghanistan, both produced years of good and bad operational designs and tactical operations. Both also were not "lost" by the merits of those designs and actions, but rather were lost in flawed strategic level understanding of the issues that brought us to those places to begin with.
EVERY country in Asia was working to get out from under the controlling impacts of hundreds of years of Western colonialism, from China to Indonesia; from Vietnam to India. The people were restless and they wanted self-determination. Most looked to America as the example of a people who had succeeded in this task, made good, and proclaimed to stand for a principle that all people everywhere had this right to self-determine. But when China fell and the Cold War deepened into a much darker, uncertain place, there was a tremendous and reasonable fear that the Eurasian Landmass might soon become dominated by a vast coalition of nations joined by a common form of governance and ideology that was counter to that of America.
We lost a great deal of influence and credibility in the region when following the end of WWII we empowered and allowed European nations to scurry back out and reclaim their colonies. Strike one.
We then threw the principle of self-determination out the window altogether when we subscribed to the "domino theory" in south East Asia and dedicated ourselves to the prevention of the spread of communism and the preservation of Western-approved governments as a counterweight. We shifted from encouraging legitimacy of government to imposing illegitimacy of government. Strike two.
By the time Kennedy and Johnson stepped up to the plate we were already well down in the count. They made mistakes too, but those mistakes only changed the flavor of the loss, not what caused or could have prevented the loss.
We acted reasonably for the times we were in during Truman and Ike's tenure, and perhaps those were the decisions necessary to prevail in the Cold War. Our big mistake was not simply recognizing the manipulations of governance in the Middle East, Latin America and across Asia as the necessary evils one sometimes must commit in war, but rather came to see them as normal, accepted, and reasonable practices of peacetime foreign policy. They weren't, and they aren't. We need to learn to let people make their own mistakes, and learn how to work with those "mistakes" when they happen. People will respect us more, and attack us less. And we'll have a lot fewer GIs earning combat patches and purple hearts is odd little corners of the world that few at home could pinpoint on a map.
To understand Thompson's commentary one should look at his own flip-flopping on recognition of China with JFK &LBJ. America's response to Vietnam was TOTALLY in response to the invasion of South Vietnam AS PART OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, NOT FOR NATIONAL REUNIFICATION.
Merle Pribbenow, one of the ablest students of DRV war history documents Hanoi's role in SOUTH AMERICA as its "INTERNATIONALIST DUTY." Thompson was one of those guys who poo-pooed all that, until it threatened his careerist path. The "wise Men" around LBJ were not men of great accomplishment so neither their pro nor anti-war positions made sense. In the end, everything was a political tool. I despise Petraeus because he believed that Vietnam was lost because of PR and he would win in the Crusade Against Islam through PR manipulation. And look where we are now, AGAIN TOTALLY SELF DECEPTIVE!!!!
Why can't generals be held accountable in the same way as you hold your personal physician?
Move Forward---betting that alot of other Officers in both the Services in the junior range up to an including MAJs are getting out.
They cannot change the system as it exists today especially with the RIFs coming in both Services.
Saw the same thing happen in the Desert Storm RIFs. The best leave---only the yes men remain.
Outlaw 09,
Agreed, but I also agree with Bob's post that while we were tactically successful we had and have serious strategic level flaws in our plans. I had a commander that told everyone to stay in their lane and do their mission well, which implied we shouldn't be concerned with the larger picture. SF for the most part did and is doing their tactical mission well, as are the other special operations organizations, but to what end? I don't see where the lanes converge most times. This gets back to Sun Tzu's comment about tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.
Looking at it in hindsight it seems our national leaders tend to develop some overly idealistic goals, and then send in the military to pursue them. Normally there is euphoria due to the initial successes, but when they realize the strategic goals we went in for are rather elusive, they encourage the military to experiment at the tactical level to achieve a victory.
For a while, a long while normally, the successes at the tactical level convince the senior decision makers that we're making progress, but it is usually just the illusion of strategic success enabled through tactical success, sometimes brillant tactical successes. The implied question from our national leadership is how did you guys do so well initially and then drop the ball?
Eventually we tire and pull out after our political will reaches its expiration point, and pretty much let the situation unfold on its natural course. We in the military resist doing that because we sacrificed so much, and often can't see beyond our tactical successes, so we wonder how Washington can be so blind. There is a certain psychology behind this whole intervention process that can't be ignored.
While I definitely understand where my former commander was coming from when he encouraged/directed his guys to stay in their lanes (change the things you can, ignore those you can't), I think we need more of our tactical levels leaders to transition to the strategic level to provide a doze of reality to those who tend to view the world through rose colored glasses. We need some of these guys to get out of their lane, and explain yes we have forces that can accomplish these tasks, but that won't achieve your strategic objective, so before we deploy them let's go back to whiteboard and come up with strategic goals that are less idealistic and more realistic.
Won't happen, but one can dream.
Moving Forward:
Don't get trapped by <u>your</u> preferred metrics, look at all of them. Tanks are okay if you're in a wide not too rocky desert. Thus they'll be okay in Khuizestan and near the coast where you envision operating. Can't speak for the Iraniha but if I were them, I'd never take the US on in a mechanized battle. Unless 'we' moved those M1s further north where terrain of almost unbelievable complexity will channelize them badly -- then I'd plop a couple of Kornets into each one as they appeared. Or drop a couple of RKGs on 'em. IEDS are us...
Nor are they likely to try to take on the USAF other than indirectly. My opinion is not colored by the Iran I knew back when; they're in a much stronger position now than they were then. The equipment may not be as new and good but there are a lot more of them and they now train better. They have experience gained in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. they have some old weapons, big stuff -- and some new, the small stuff they'd need to fight us in other than a full conventional conflict. As I wrote earlier, the Ayatollahs are strange but they are not stupid.
Yeah, they only have about a thousand Tanks which, if they were smart, they'd park to attract a waste of munitions on our part -- even those dumb Serbs got us on that old trick. However, recall they also have the terrain on their side and they have about 75M persons -- few of whom are Arabs -- and that means about about 20M militarily capable males who generally like Americans and do not want to fight them but would do so in a second if the US invaded. If one wanted to insure the continuation of the rule of the Ayatollahs, there would be no better way. They are internally fractious but will unite in a second if invaded
You mention how easily we handled Iraq twice. Desert Storm was an aberration and no one should consider it as representative of anything other than that, 100 US casualties in 100 hours is not a war. Saddam was a military idiot; so was Khomeini, which is the reason for Iran's lack of success in the Iraq-Iran fiasco. He would not trust his Commanders and he insisted on human wave attacks (which while tactically unsound do have a message that should probably not be ignored. Having been on the receiving end of a couple of those long ago and far away, they can be rather, umm, disconcerting...). Khomeini no longer can do that, he's dead.
Twice, you said. Hmm. Seems to me that the second handling took seven plus years and was not all that easy. A large part of the reason it wasn't that easy lay with the fact that Russia sent two Generals down there to advise Saddam. He did what they suggested. He spread arms around, enough for everyone. Opened his ammo dumps, told his forces to delay in order for the populace to prepare to rise up and catch the probably victorious in the attack infidels with a nation on fire. He even let all his prisoners out of jail so they could join in -- and they did. And he told us he was going to do all those things and we didn't believe him. More fool us. Nope, seven years including a whole lot of missteps by us wasn't "handling" in my book. Those seven years in a nation slightly larger than California with 27M or so bods, mostly Arabs would be the proverbial cake walk compared to the fury of those 75M mostly Persian, Azeri and Baluch, very proud xenophobes in a nation almost four times larger, almost as big as Alaska, and whose terrain isn't nearly as friendly or benign as was Iraq.
Your proposal to fight over only a small part of that geography is interesting. You propose not to cross the Zagros range. Can you be sure the Iraniha will stay on their side of that range? You say our countermine warfare game is up to date. Too many folks I know who have been to or are in Afghanistan (or Iraq) don't agree with you. If you're speaking of Naval countermine ops, they have some problems also.<blockquote>"If nothing else, it's an option, just as was a Marine attack of the Iraq-held Kuwaiti shores...except this is more realistic."</blockquote>We can differ on that. Neither idea is very realistic IMO and attacking Iran is a couple of orders of magnitude more so. The math alone indicates that.<blockquote>"The bottom line is that if Israel starts it, Iran will shut the Straits and we need more of a response than the band-aid of short-lived air and seapower against recurring mine and small boat attacks and missile launches against the other side of the Gulf. Missile attacks against oil facilities and into Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Saudi airfields and our JAOC can occur on a recurring basis if we only attempt temporary air strikes."</blockquote>In order, How do you know that bottom line? I doubt it for a number of reasons, I doubt they'd try and if they did I doubt it would be successful. Aside from the fact that China and India do a lot of business with Iran and like their oil flow uninterrupted and that the Saudis, UAE and others in the neighborhood might be prone to do more than just talk about it, once again, the Mullahs aren't stupid.
I don't know anyone but you who has said that if the closure were to occur all we'd do is mount air strikes. Nor do I know that Iran would launch rockets or missiles as you suggest. I believe your overall military assessment to be mistaken and it seems you have done no political assessment and no assessment of the character and culture of your nominal enemy. They aren't Arabs...
Ken said: <i>"That may not be the most dangerous thing I’ve read thus far this year but it’s in the top five. As one who spent a couple of years in Iran working with the Iranian armed forces, speaks a teeny bit of Farsi and still communicates with Iranians and others who were there, it speaks volumes about the ‘conventional wisdom’ in the US. It shows little appreciation for Persian xenophobia and pride or current Iranian strategies and capabilities. It also shows even less appreciation for our limitations.</i>
Consider that Iran has only about 1000 tanks (fewer than 500 T-72 as most modern) and fewer quality APCs, all of questionable operational maintenance. The Iranian Army and Air Forces you knew about prior to 1979 are in poor shape after Iraq pounded them for nearly a decade with the primary Iranian response being human wave attacks. Sanctions and old age have not helped them either. Considering how easily we handled Iraq twice, it seems probable that the conventional part of defeating Iran would be just as easy provided we make no attempt to cross the Zagros mountains and stay close to shore and its supply lines and airpower.
The sole worrisome IRGC capabilities are its missiles and Navy. We would have great difficulty finding their missiles if prior SCUD experiences are any indication. Why not seize the terrain from which anti-ship missiles and naval boats may launch? Many of these are near the Straits in a few key cities/ports. The terrain adjacent to the coast between Pakistan and the Straits appears an obvious axis of advance, and our countermine warfare game is certainly up to date, with additional armor nearby in Afghanistan.
If nothing else, it's an option, just as was a Marine attack of the Iraq-held Kuwaiti shores...except this is more realistic.
We have ample airborne and air assault assets that can reach Iran from the opposite side of the Straits. Amphibious entry could follow or Pakistan might allow entry through their ports. The bottom line is that if Israel starts it, Iran will shut the Straits and we need more of a response than the band-aid of short-lived air and seapower against recurring mine and small boat attacks and missile launches against the other side of the Gulf. Missile attacks against oil facilities and into Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Saudi airfields and our JAOC can occur on a recurring basis if we only attempt temporary air strikes.
Move Forward:
While I frequently disparage our attempt at fighting a land war in Europe while in the rice paddies of SE Asia, your comment indicates that the common wisdom on Viet Nam is as pervasive as it is wrong. That war was far more complex than you indicate…<blockquote>”due to inadequate resources. Even Bing West's article cites inadequate resources despite 1000 COPs/FOBs due to sanctuaries and mobility of the Taliban.”</blockquote>Two points. We could have 5,000 COPs / FOBs and it would make little difference. Indeed, those are a part of the problem.‘Inadequate resources’ is poor shorthand for not enough Mass. In such campaigns, the need is not for Mass but for finesse. Sadly, the British, Canadian and US Armies are all descended from the European hearth of military tradition and do not do finesse.<blockquote>” No military strategy alternative is provided other than 1) pull out early, or 2) never go at all, or 3) go with a light footprint from the get go. The latter is precisely what did NOT work in either Iraq or Afghanistan…”</blockquote>In reverse order, not correct. A Light Footprint would be or would have been pure SF -- <u>not</u> SOF, just SF – and Diplomatic / Aid types. Afghanistan, initially was just that and it worked. Iraq was a hybrid but it worked also. UNTIL in May 2003, the rules and missions were changed.
The changed missions were not possible with the forces and policies available so lack of success was guaranteed. Both will work out sort of okay but neither was the success it could have been had we been cognizant of the limitations that we impose upon ourselves – apparently no one in real power was so aware…
The alternatives you list are in fact the possibilities and they are dictated not by a lack of imagination but by a lack of ‘resources’ or Mass. We simply do not have the force structure (or policies but that’s another thread) to support a heavy footprint and long term mission.<blockquote>” But now we have policymakers who will believe that instead of surging early and hitting the enemy with counter-terror SOF, we should instead either avoid conflict altogether or only employ air and seapower.”</blockquote>I’m not at all sure that’s correct but if it is, it’s vastly preferable to committing the GPF to missions that offer only huge costs with little chance of success. Like this:<blockquote>In Iran, a more limited seizure and occupation of land around the Straits of Hormuz likely would hasten regime change when that occupation coincided with continued sanctions. No need to cross the Zagros mountains or overthrow Iran's government by force. Let the people do it as the Syrians will eventually. In Iran's case, both the WMD and threats of closing oil shipments through the Straits must be addressed and diplomacy is unlikely to work. However, if we do seize the Straits, we need to have sufficient force...something unlikely to occur if we draw down the Army and Marines too much.”</blockquote>That may not be the most dangerous thing I’ve read thus far this year but it’s in the top five. As one who spent a couple of years in Iran working with the Iranian armed forces, speaks a teeny bit of Farsi and still communicates with Iranians and others who were there, it speaks volumes about the ‘conventional wisdom’ in the US. It shows little appreciation for Persian xenophobia and pride or current Iranian strategies and capabilities. It also shows even less appreciation for our limitations. All told, it’s reminiscent of the hubris and flawed reasoning of Kennedy, Bundy, et.al. in Laos and Viet Nam and that of the Bush and Obama crews that blew successful missions in Afghanistan and Iraq to replace them with an expensive and ultimately unworkable sets of options. Our arrogance and egos are not our friends. Thomson's article lives...
Policymakers will never "<i>surge from the get go</i>" because it is not politically safe to do that and, far more to the point, we are NOT capable of doing that. The Armed Forces of the US never have been. Not even in World War II (it took us four years to really get rolling...). One can argue that we should be but we are not and that is unlikely to change in the absence of a demonstrated need. Iran (and North Korea -- or China) do not rise to such a level. Nowhere near it.
Yes, in the latter part of the Vietnam war, programs like Operation Phoenix and others that you describe improved the situation vs. strictly search and destroy that killed and maimed hundreds of thousands of Soldiers/Marines with little positive effect. If we had chased elusive Taliban through the mountains or been more inclined to shoot up villages and kill civilians while trying to kill Taliban, we would have more closely mimicked the early failures of Vietnam.
General Allen, Petraeus, and McChrystal seemed to mimic that latter Vietnam success with night raids, and a surge to secure Kandahar and Helmand provinces in a manner that the Canadians and Brits never could...due to inadequate resources. Even Bing West's article cites inadequate resources despite 1000 COPs/FOBs due to sanctuaries and mobility of the Taliban.
But others would argue that strategies to secure populations (and preclude the bad blood of appearing to occupy) and using SOF operations to clear enemy leaders has failed. No military strategy alternative is provided other than 1) pull out early, or 2) never go at all, or 3) go with a light footprint from the get go. The latter is precisely what did NOT work in either Iraq or Afghanistan. But now we have policymakers who will believe that instead of surging early and hitting the enemy with counter-terror SOF, we should instead either avoid conflict altogether or only employ air and seapower.
My concern with both MikeF and now Pete Munson is that both are getting out of the military rather than attempting to fix problems from within. Criticism without constructive alternatives (other than don't go at all) does little to help current and future Soldiers/Marines/Airmen/Sailors who still have wars to fight...and don't want to be stuck in long wars because the policymakers won't surge from the get go.
Let me add that more limited objectives and diplomatic solutions of dividing up conquered countries prior to elections could be a future strategy in such "small" wars. Without tribal, Sunni vs Shia, and ethnic division leaving many underrepresented, there would be less inclination to fight each other or the coaltion attempting to bring peace. State departments solutions alone sound great but seldom work due to lack of security and the need for contract security. How effective are the 11,000 civilians left behind in Iraq?
In Iran, a more limited seizure and occupation of land around the Straits of Hormuz likely would hasten regime change when that occupation coincided with continued sanctions. No need to cross the Zagros mountains or overthrow Iran's government by force. Let the people do it as the Syrians will eventually. In Iran's case, both the WMD and threats of closing oil shipments through the Straits must be addressed and diplomacy is unlikely to work. However, if we do seize the Straits, we need to have sufficient force...something unlikely to occur if we draw down the Army and Marines too much.
As strange as it sounds---I think you can equate VN to Afghanistan at least at the tactical level announced today see below.
"U.S. Plans Shift to Elite Units as It Winds Down in Afghanistan"
There was an internal US/ISAF briefing in March 2011 which laid out exactly this above announcement which is built on the premise of three core SF experiences taken straight out of VN of the late 60s early 70s.
1. the CIDG proram equates straight to the VSO program with some modifications for the Afghan culture aspect
2. the SF VN program that we ran so effectively called MIKE Forces---mobile strike forces located in every region of VN and built around local SF trained strike forces that could respond anywhere---exactly what is being proposed in AFG
3. SF built multiple different strike and raid programs using local nationals in VN---equates to their building AFG SF and Commando units for raiding across the country
So while there may not be any comparisons politically between VN and AFG---Tactical Lessons Learned are in fact being cross used.
The board statement of there is no comparison needs to often be examined in far more detail than we normally give it----
Move Forward:
Dare I say that there really are no other "options" for you for Iraq and Afghanistan other than once we are in to stay, stay, stay, and simply tweak around the edges what we are already doing. What Peter's post is all about (and Ken's excellent comments as well)is to suggest that in limited wars of choice there is always the option to do nothing, or something very limited, and then once these wars start, ending them with vital interests in mind might not mean staying for a long time with the idea of trying to move forward under the same broken strategy.
thanks
gian
Move Forward:
Thomson was a Far East specialist so he concentrated on aspects particular to that area. He did touch on Cuba. From the article:<blockquote>"Finally, the legacy of the fifties was apparently compounded by an uneasy sense of a worldwide Communist challenge to the new Administration after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. A first manifestation was the President's traumatic Vienna meeting with Khrushchev in June, 1961; then came the Berlin crisis of the summer..."</blockquote>He did not specifically mention the Missile'Crisis.' That was a vastly overblown piece of political theater wherein we agreed to pull our Missiles out Greece and Turkey in return for Kruschev removing his from Cuba -- Though I have to admit I wasn't looking forward to my mission of seizing the Bank of Cuba offices at Jose Marti Airport with one little Recon Platoon and two SPATS...
In any event, that occurred in the Fall of '62 -- by then events in SE Asia were on autopilot and McGeorge Bundy was fiddling with the trim tabs. The Brothers Kennedy entered office determined to turn the economy around and show how tough they were -- and that the Democrats were not going to become Socialists. They thought a small war would do the trick. No sooner was Kennedy sworn in than the escalation accelerated. Thus my comment by late '61, he realized he'd erred -- small wars tend to turn into large ones and folks with big egos hate to admit they made mistakes...
I disagree on the reasoned fear of Kruschev and Communisim. Neither was ever the monumental problem they were made out to be to allow several Administrations, not just Kennedy, to have a Dog to wag the tail of. So it was overblown but you're correct, it did exist in the minds of many; my belief is that the policy makers overhyped the problem and then couldn't admit how badly they'd screwed it up. In any event, it helped keep budgets plumped up for many years.
As one who went to Korea, I sure didn't think it had "worked" and I do not know many who did think that. Still I take your point, the civilian academic 'strategists' didn't know any better and they are the ones who did think that war worked. Many Folks in the Army did not though a few did (and do...) -- but Kennedy and McNamara just moved those who disagreed and installed compliant -- perhaps more cooperative might be a better phrase -- senior people.
One cannot equate Viet Nam to Afghanistan (or Iraq) other than in one sense and I think that's what Peter Munson is trying to illustrate -- the civilian policy makers didn't know any better and they are the ones who think that military force can adjust attitudes. It cannot. Military force can kill people and destroy things and it really does that quite well. It cannot do attitude adjustment. The errors in Afghanistan are those of the civilian policy maker who thought they -- we -- could adjust attitudes. That was an error in Viet Nam, it is one with respect to Afghanistan and Iraq. That is the almost the sole similarity and it is a quite valid comparison IMO.
We've screwed up with Iran since 1976. Carter set us on the road to ruin there. They aren't blameless but neither are we. Hopefully, sooner rather than later somebody with some sense will appear on the scene in both nations at the same time and we can get a little more sensible. The Ayatollahs are blusterers and they're different -- but they aren't stupid.
No mass protest occurred over Afghanistan (and not much of any over Iraq...) because we were aggrieved and retribution bound and everyone was generally okay with that. Even the Pushtuns understood that. Had we deposed the Talibs and departed, we'd have been okay. As it is, we're still going to be okay, staying just vastly increased the costs in all aspects.
Back to the article and the Munson premise -- yeah, the area is a mess -- but we can't fix it. We were never going to be able to do so and we were foolish to try. I have no quarrel with the use of force; encourage it in fact -- but it has to be done with a little sense. IMO Going around the world trying to bear any burden and pay any price with little as to what constitutes -- or much hope of -- success is not very sensible...
Ken, perhaps I missed it, but there is no reference to the Cuban missile crisis...only the Bay of Pigs which I neglected to mention along with the cited Berlin airlift of the time. It was not unreasonable to fear Krushchev or communism. I certainly did and was only a very young kid going through drills hiding under desks and hearing about fallout shelters. Also keep in mind this was only a decade after the completion of the Korean War (prompted by communism) which appeared to work. If it worked, it was not unreasonable to believe war could work in Vietnam. Recall Andrew Bacevich's thesis that policymakers had been conditioned to believe that war works.
What I find troubling is an attempt to correlate Vietnam to Afghanistan. We continue to see ample Monday morning quarterbacks decry the mistakes of both Iraq and Afghanistan with few concrete and constructive alternatives offered. There is no attempt made to argue why pulling out sooner would have been beneficial. Instead, the inadequate resources provided Afghanistan due to Iraq are conveniently overlooked as naysayers blame generals and politicians alike for the duration and cost of Afghanistan.
I think it is instructive that no mass protest ever occurred in the US or Europe over Afghanistan, or for that matter the more costly-in-lives Iraq. Some of that is due to the draft and lack thereof now. Some is due to at least an appearance of rectifying a wrong in a region where that is continually needed...and will be again shortly at Israel's self-defense prompting. Let Syria stew in its own juices. Iran is the undeniable problem that no amount of diplomacy can solve.
Move Forward:
The author of the article cited all the points made in your first two paragraphs to one degree or another. All, that is, save the reference to Kennedy's World War II experience and his medications (which Professor Thomson may have understood but which eludes me) The issue was, I thought, how a <i>large number</i> of people -- not just Kennedy -- lost the bubble with respect to Viet Nam. As Major Munson said in his introduction to the article:<blockquote>"He goes into a lengthy and illuminating look at the institutional and historical factors <u>that crippled the national security decision-making apparatus</u>. This is a fascinating read in and of itself. But if you are to do nothing else, read the below excerpt with which he closed his essay and ask yourself if we will ever learn." (emphasis added / kw)</blockquote>The point in posting the article was to illustrate how the policy apparatus erred and to note that we're still making the same general sorts of mistakes, thus the "ask yourself if we will ever learn?"
Professor Thomson also touched on some but obviously not the more recent elements mentioned in your third paragraph. I do not grasp the point of that paragraph other than the bit about keeping nukes out of the hands of extremists which I understand even if I do not particularly agree. What precisely is your point?
This was interesting, but let's not forget the context of the early 60s that may have shaped intervention in Vietnam. First we had the Cuban missile crisis and close call with nuclear war and nearby communist nuclear weapons. Both Soviet and Chinese leader behavior was much more like the talk of those like Amadinejad, and there was no hint of Chinese or Russian capitalism or friendship. Was Kennedy also affected by his WWII experiences and medication for injuries incurred?
But given the draft and the hippie movement of the 60s, it was probably pretty hard for normal folks, administration officials, and Army officer professionals to admit that the druggie, idiot protesters might have a point. It's far easier to identify with doubters today who act and appear far less radical, and do not give aid and comfort to the enemy. Given the extreme casualties, it's amazing the Vietnam war lasted as long as it did. But it was equally obvious that a strictly enemy-centric approach did not work in that insurgency.
Let's also acknowledge that both China and Russia actively aided North Vietnam which made it a proxy war against them to limit further expansion. We saw similar behavior in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with the U.S. actively aided the resistance. Today there is no such appearance of Russian or Chinese aid to the Taliban or al Qaeda. Perhaps Russia wants fewer drugs and Islamic extremism in their own world. China wants the contracts after we leave. We want to keep nukes out of the hands of extremists...a none too trivial cause given the potential consequences.
That would have been about the time he discovered that escalating an unnecessary war to boost the US economy while at the same time hopefully slightly enhancing his and his party's credibility was unwise...
As that old Pennsylvania Dutch farmer said, "Ve are too zoon oldt und too late schmart..."
We refuse to learn the lesson due to egos. However, our major error is allowing domestic politics to intrude excessively into foreign policy decisions. Add the two together, throw in an overly pliant military more concerned with protecting their institutions than doing what's right for the nation and you have an invitation to intervene promiscuously around the world for all the wrong reasons including next years budget dollars...
Many US policy makers pay lip service to the fact that we cannot impose our will on the other 94% and cannot right most wrongs, much less every one, yet they continue to try to do both those things and cement their and their party's reputation or position in the process. They are not the best and the brightest, they're borderline fools, only marginally honest and with an overweening sense of self esteem, usually not a lot of self confidence and little understanding of the use of military power. Bad mix, that.
Kennedy also said the following in November 1961, but no one paid much attention:
“[W]e must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent or omniscient—that we are only 6 percent of the world's population—that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94 percent of mankind—that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity—and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.”
Good find. While the Stimson quote is interesting, I believe the important elements of Professor Thomson's article are these two salient points:<blockquote>"Finally, no discussion of the factors and forces at work on Vietnam policy- makers can ignore the central fact of human ego investment. Men who have participated in a decision develop a stake in that decision. As they participate in further, related decisions, their stake increases. It might have been possible to dissuade a man of strong self-confidence at an early stage of the ladder of decision; but it is infinitely harder at later stages since a change of mind there usually involves implicit or explicit repudiation of a chain of previous decisions."</blockquote> That factor outweighs by far all the other quite valid if terribly flawed reasons he cited for the misadventure that was Viet Nam. Regrettably, the same characteristic applies to today's small wars -- as do most of the others. Means, I suppose the answer to your question is "No, we won't learn. Because 'WE' are doing it instead of those earlier fools..." Egos will be the death of too many.
Almost equally at fault is this attitude:<blockquote>"I have in mind those men in Washington who have given a new life to the missionary impulse in American foreign relations: who believe that this nation, in this era, has received a threefold endowment that can transform the world. As they see it, that endowment is composed of, first, our unsurpassed military might; second, our clear technological supremacy; and third, our allegedly invincible benevolence (our "altruism," our affluence, our lack of territorial aspirations)."</blockquote>When John Kennedy made his "...<i>that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe</i>..." speech, he was older, theoretically more experienced and better educated than I at the time I heard the words as he gave the speech. Yet, I thought then 'This guys is dangerous. If he believes that, he's an idiot.' Not much including three later trips to the SE Asia Games has occurred to induce me to change my mind. He was indeed and he surrounded himself with those of his ilk. They're still about, doing unspeakable harm in the name of doing good.
Indeed, I marvel that today there exist many people who failed to learn from his errors and allow their egos and a misplaced sense of rectitude to put troops to work on 'missions' wherein they cannot possibly succeed...