My Foreign Policy column discusses four reasons why -- this time -- you should believe the hype about Israel attacking Iran.
Washington Post columnist David Ignatius created a tempest last week when he reported U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's prediction that Israel will attack Iran and its nuclear complex "in April, May or June." Ignatius's column was as startling as it was exasperating. When the sitting U.S. defense secretary -- presumably privy to facts not generally available to the public -- makes such a prediction, observers have good reasons to pay attention. On the other hand, the international community has been openly dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue for nearly a decade, with similar crescendos of anticipation having occurred before, all to no effect. Why would this time be different?
Further, an Israeli air campaign against Iran would seem like an amazingly reckless act. And an unnecessary one, too, since international sanctions against Iran's banks and oil market are just now tightening dramatically.
Yet from Israel's point of view, time really has run out. The sanctions have come too late. And when Israeli policymakers consider their advantages and all of the alternatives available, an air campaign, while both regrettable and risky, is not reckless.
Here's why:
1. Time pressure
In his column, Ignatius mentioned this spring as the likely deadline for an Israeli strike. Why so soon? After all, the Iranian program is still under the supervision of IAEA inspectors and Iran has not made any moves to "break out" toward the production of bomb-grade highly enriched uranium.
But as a new report from the Bipartisan Policy Center discusses, Iran's uranium enrichment effort continues to advance, even after the Stuxnet computer attack and the assassination of several of its nuclear scientists. According to the report, Iran seems to be successfully installing advanced, high-efficiency uranium-enrichment centrifuges, which foreshadows a significant increase in enrichment capacity and output in the near future. More ominously from Israel's perspective, Iran is now installing centrifuge cascades into the Fordow mountain site near Qom, a bunker that is too deep for Israeli bombs to penetrate.
On-site IAEA inspectors are currently monitoring Iran's nuclear fuel production and would report any diversions to military use. As Tehran undoubtedly assumes, such a "breakout" (tossing out the inspectors and quickly enriching to the bomb-grade level) would be a casus belli, with air strikes from Israel likely to soon follow. Israeli leaders may have concluded that Iran could break out with impunity after the Fordow site is operational and the enrichment effort has produced enough low-enriched uranium feedstock for several bombs. According to the Bipartisan Center report, Iran will be in this position later this year. According to the New York Times, U.S. and Israeli officials differ over their calculations of when Iran will have crossed into a "zone of immunity." Given their more precarious position, it is understandable that Israeli policymakers are adopting a more conservative assessment.
2. Alternatives to military action now fall short
Israeli leaders undoubtedly understand that starting a war is risky. There should be convincing reasons for discarding the non-military alternatives.
The international sanctions effort against Iran's banking system and oil industry are inflicting damage on the country's economy and seem to be delivering political punishment to the regime. But they have not slowed the nuclear program, nor are they likely to have any effect on the timeline described above. And as long as Russia, China, India, and others continue to support Iran economically and politically, the sanctions regime is unlikely to be harsh enough to change Israel's calculation of the risks, at least within a meaningful time frame.
Why can't Israel's secret but widely assumed nuclear arsenal deter an Iranian nuclear strike? Israel's territory and population are so small that even one nuclear blast would be devastating. Israel would very much like to possess a survivable and stabilizing second-strike retaliatory capability. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union achieved this mainly with their ballistic missile submarine fleets, which were always on patrol and held each others' cities at risk. Israel does not have large numbers of submarines or any nuclear-powered subs capable of long submerged patrols. Nor can it be confident that its policymakers or command-and-control systems would survive an Iranian nuclear first strike.
Even if Iran sought a nuclear weapons capability solely to establish its own defensive deterrent, the outcome would be gross instability in the region, very likely leading to one side or the other attempting a preemptive attack (the Iranian government denies that its nuclear program has a military purpose). Very short missile flight times, fragile early-warning and command systems, and no survivable second-strike forces would lead to a hair-trigger "use it or lose it" dynamic. An Israeli attack now on Iran's nuclear program would be an attempt to prevent this situation from occurring.
3. The benefits of escalation
A strike on Iran's nuclear complex would be at the outer boundary of the Israeli Air Force's capabilities. The important targets in Iran are near the maximum range of Israel's fighter-bombers. The fact that Iraq's airspace, on the direct line between Israel and Iran, is for now undefended is one more reason why Israel's leaders would want to strike sooner rather than later. Israel's small inventory of bunker-buster bombs may damage the underground uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, but they will likely have no effect on the Fordow mountain complex. Iran has undoubtedly dispersed and hidden many other nuclear facilities. An Israeli strike is thus likely to have only a limited and temporary effect on Iran's nuclear program.
If so, why bother, especially when such a strike risks sparking a wider war? Israel's leaders may actually prefer a wider escalating conflict, especially before Iran becomes a nuclear weapons state. Under this theory, Israel would take the first shot with a narrowly tailored attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Paradoxically, Israel's leaders might then prefer Iranian retaliation, which would then give Israel the justification for broader strikes against Iran's oil industry, power grid, and communication systems. Even better if Iran were to block the Strait of Hormuz or attack U.S. forces in the region, which would bring U.S. Central Command into the war and result in even more punishment for Iran. Israel's leaders may believe that they enjoy "escalation dominance," meaning that the more the war escalates, the worse the consequences for Iran compared to Israel. Israel raided Iraq's nuclear program in 1981 and Syria's in 2007. Neither Saddam Hussein nor Bashar al-Assad opted to retaliate, very likely because both knew that Israel, with its air power, possessed escalation dominance. Israel's leaders have good reason to assume that Iran's leaders will reach the same conclusion.
What about the rockets possessed by Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran's proxies north and south of Israel's population centers? Israel's leaders may believe that they are much better prepared to respond to these threats than they were in 2006, when the Israeli army struggled against Hezbollah. There is no guarantee that Hezbollah and Hamas will follow orders from Tehran to attack -- they understand the punishment the reformed Israeli army would inflict. Hezbollah may now have an excellent reason to exercise caution. Should the Assad regime in Damascus collapse, Hezbollah would likely lose its most important protector and could soon find itself cut off and surrounded by enemies. It would thus be a particularly bad time for Hezbollah to invite an Israeli ground assault into southern Lebanon.
4. Managing the endgame
An Israeli raid on Iran's nuclear complex would probably not lead to the permanent collapse of the program. Iran could dig out the entrances to the Fordow site and establish new covert research and production facilities elsewhere, perhaps in bunkers dug under residential areas. Israel inflicted a major setback on Iraq's program when it destroyed the unfinished Osirak reactor in 1981. Even so, Saddam Hussein covertly restarted the program. Israel should expect the same persistence from Iran.
So is there any favorable end-state for Israel? Israeli leaders may envision a long term war of attrition against Iran's program, hoping to slow its progress to a crawl while waiting for regime change in Tehran. Through sporadic follow-up strikes against nuclear targets, Israel would attempt to demoralize the industry's workforce, disrupt its operations, and greatly increase the costs of the program. Israeli leaders might hope that their attrition tactics, delivered through occasional air strikes, would bog down the nuclear program while international sanctions weaken the civilian economy and reduce political support for the regime. The stable and favorable outcome for Israel would be either Tehran's abandonment of its nuclear program or an internal rebellion against the regime. Israel would be counting more on hope rather than a convincing set of actions to achieve these outcomes. But the imperative now for Israel is to halt the program, especially since no one else is under the same time pressure they are.
Israel should expect Tehran to mount a vigorous defense. Iran would attempt to acquire modern air defense systems from Russia or China. It would attempt to rally international support against Israeli aggression and get its international sanctions lifted and imposed on Israel instead. An Israeli assault on Iran would disrupt oil and financial markets with harmful consequences for the global economy. Israel would take the blame, with adverse political and economic consequences to follow.
But none of these consequences are likely enough to dissuade Israel from attacking. A nuclear capability is a red line that Israel has twice prevented its opponents from crossing. Iran won't get across the line either. Just as happened in 1981 and 2007, Israel's leaders have good reasons to conclude that its possession of escalation dominance will minimize the worst concerns about retaliation. Perhaps most importantly, Israel is under the greatest time pressure, which is why it will have to go it alone and start what will be a long and nerve-wracking war.
Comments
Sometimes we need to look the situation and prospects through a different lens. This maybe a little OTT, but it does make one ponder and under the headline 'Iran Worried U.S. Might Be Building 8,500th Nuclear Weapon'. Yes from The Onion: http://www.theonion.com/articles/iran-worried-us-might-be-building-8500…
For economy of effort this is the last sentence:'Iranian intelligence experts also warned of the very real, and very frightening, possibility of the U.S. providing weapons and resources to a rogue third-party state such as Israel'.
re: Mark Pyruz
Although I don’t know what context Gen Hayden’s comments were meant to convey when he said the Israel’s aren’t going to attack Iran, it’s beyond their capability? Because, although there is little tactical margin for error on Israel’s part, they do have a limited capability to attack Iran, and as Robert Haddick pointed out, “A nuclear capability is a red line that Israel has twice prevented its opponents from crossing.
Beyond the rhetoric and political posturing, this should be the defining military qualification on the matter:
USAF General Michael Hayden, who served as the head of the Pentagon's National Security Agency from 1999 to 2005, told a small group convened at the Center for National Interest a few weeks ago that top Bush national security officials had concluded that a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities - whether by Israel or the US - would be counter-productive. The Israelis, he reportedly said, "aren't going to [attack Iran]. They can't do it, it's beyond their capacity."
God save us all from the consequences of Israeli strategic thought.
Time pressure: All concede the Iranian program will only be delayed, not stopped, so the clock starts ticking again immediately.
Alternatives to military action now fall short: With Russian, China and India backing you, they have always fallen short and will always fall short. After an Israeli attack you can add a lot of other countries to that list.
Benefits of escalation: One of those is thought to be escalation dominance and that depends on us, the Americans, getting dragged into another war whether we like it or not.
Hezbollah won't get involved they figure. Yea, and they won't because they are afraid of what the Israelis will do to them...while they are involved with a knock down drag out long range fight with Iran that will use up the Israeli Air Force quick. And if Assad falls the people who replace him aren't going to be inclined to support Hezbollah if Israel attacks a Muslim country...again.
Managing the endgame: They figure sporadic follow up attacks will demoralize the workforce and reduce political support for the regime. That didn't work with the British, the Germans, the Japanese, the North Koreans nor the North Vietnamese. Nor did sporadic Iraqi missile attacks work against the Iranians. But now they may figure it will work against the Iranians. I don't think so.
Finally Mr. Haddick states that Israel "will have to go it alone and start what will be a long and nerve-wracking war." with American weapons, American money and escalation dominance provided by the Americans.
Ironically, the Israelis are a lot like the Germans of old, real good at tactics and shooting, not so good at thinking about who and when to shoot at and exercise their tactical skill upon.
If we were to invade Iran and seize the Straits of Hormuz, we would insure the complete and enthusiastic unification of the Iranian people behind the current regime immediately and for a generation or two to come. The message that "you give us the government we want and we'll leave you alone" probably will be very effective in stimulating them to fight.
Remember all those Libyan SA-24s that went walkabout? If we invaded Iran or got involved supporting Israel in this adventure, we may get quick confirmation of where they ended up.
Ike, come back. We need you.
Agree completely.
1. Time Pressure
The window is available due to the absence of U.S. airpower and air defenses over Iraq. The Israelis may even choose to lose some older fighters after running out of fuel over the ocean, Caspian Sea, or Iraq after they finish bombing. Other Arab states may provide airspace or safe haven for Iraeli aircraft.
2. Alternatives to Military Action Now Fall Short
As if the Israelis would accept an alternative. Twice before they saw military action as the sole reliable action. Let's hope they don't use low yield nukes to counter deeply buried sites.
3. The Benefits of Escalation
If Iran blocks the Straits of Hormuz in response to an attack, the US will get involved. Other Arab states would join and provide airspace for US aerial refueling and port/base access.
4. Managing the Endgame
While I absorb and respect everything Ken White says about Iran, especially since he has been there as an advisor, believe the endgame is manageable. If you go to the Wikipedia for "Demographics of Iran," you note two telling maps. One shows that the far southeast along the coast is either sparsely populated or inhabited by Sunni Balochs. As few as 20 "Iranians" per square kilometer live in that area, and any attempt by the Iranian Army to reach that area in force would be decimated by airpower and our land forces. Our armored land force and dug in infantry could easily survive the A2/AD attempts.
If the US was to invade that southeastern Iranian territory to seize the Straits of Hormuz, the Iranian outrage could be dissuaded through an effective media campaign. The message: Overthrow the current regime and we leave Iran immediately and remove all sanctions. Let the regime remain and the sanctions continue. That is the sole means of preventing underground facilities under populated areas and an eventual nuclear capability.