The Taliban launched a set of coordinated attacks across Afghanistan. The attacks were centered in Kabul where fighting appears to be still on-going, but also included a suicide attack against the Jalalabad airbase, and in Paktika and Logar Provinces. In Kabul, reports indicate that the Taliban occupied numerous buildings in order to target NATO headquarters, parliament, and multiple western embassies, as well as attacking the presidential palace.
These attacks will surely spawn narrative and counter-narrative: the boldest coordinated attack yet in the form of a mini-Tet Offensive, or a pathetic attempt by a few die-hards that reflects the incapacity of the insurgency. With U.S. public support for the war already at new lows, with only 30% of respondents in support, (a low not seen in polls on Vietnam until May 1972), one wonders if this attack can really shake that last third of die-hard supporters. More broadly, though, how will this shape the U.S. domestic political narrative during the coming months ramping up to the election and what effect, if any, will it have on perceptions inside Afghanistan?
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I am guessing Gawker is infrequently found on SWJ.
Also, I hope the fairly nasty and mean-spirited tone of the article does not render it "inadmissible" on SWJ. (Seriously.)
Still, the article does suggest something of the "game change" dynamic that I suspected would not be forthcoming.
http://gawker.com/5903725/winning-the-war-against-yesterday-mike-ohanlo…
Best
ADTS
The missing point here is that this attack fits the pattern of a previous attack, on iconic targets in Kabul, where the attackers have assembled stocks of ammunition and weapons within the 'iron ring'. How they bypassed the security is unknown.
It is worth checking the reporting by FRI: http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/
That is not an intelligence failure by NATO / ISAF or the Afghan state.
If you didnt get enough commentary on the attacks here is a link to an interview I gave along with MAJGEN Jim Molan (Rtd) former COO in Iraq. I dont refer myself as a COIN consultant. That title mysteriously came from the ABC:
Radio National with Waleed Aly: http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/drive/panel-discussion3a-a…
Thanks
Jason
Where did they fail tactically? Admittedly they didn't detect the threat, but there isn't any nation in the world that is immune to a surprise attack despite best efforts to prevent one. If it was Haqanni, they're a capable of infiltrating and conducting complex attacks in Kabul, but they're not capable of taking over Kabul.
Aghanistan is a nation at war with itself,and elements from Pakistan, and others from the global extremist movement, so attacks are going to happen. Admittedly the overall trend line isn't positive, but that is due more to government failures than military ones. Locally, it was just another tactical battle that the insurgents lost. Globally it may have been a strategic victory for the insurgents, which simply points out that we're terrible at producing a narrative that reflects the actual context of the attack.
I think years from now historians will state it was a physically insignificant attack that had strategic communications implications due to the global political environment at the time. Nations were struggling economically, victory appeared elusive, the Afghanistan government was hopelessly corrupt, and this event that was in reality relatively minor in scale was blown out of proportion into strategic effect by the growing choir that thought the war unwinnable. It may be unwinnable, but not due to the enemy's military capabilities (they don't have any real capability), but due to the Afghanistan government's unwillingness reform. The strategic center of gravity isn't the Afghan security forces.
Bill M:
To push back a bit, if the ANSF response was good (which you yourself concede is "hard to assess..."), to what extent was this because this episode involved (among others) the Afghan Crisis Response Unit operating in Kabul (in other words, an atypically good unit acting on its home turf)?
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ADTS
There appears to be a good news story here that few are discussing and that is the Afghanistan security force response. While hard to assess from a few media reports, what I did see appeared to competent and effective. The insurgents on the other hand appeared to be incompetent tactically, but no denying the attack will have some, even if limited, strategic impact. The area of concern is the intelligence failure (both coalition and Afghanistan), and based on the scale of the attack (this has other implications), and the skill of this insurgent group to bypass the security mechanisms in Kabul and conduct a coordinated (even if unskilled in execution) attack.
Carl:
Your comment raised for me the option the insurgent enjoys of "going to ground," and the related observation that "the insurgent wins by not losing," etc. It is perhaps appropriate to be reminded of those maxims* on a website that explicitly dedicates itself to exploring small wars, and my failure to recognize this is a feasible (and indeed perhaps desirable) course of action says nothing good about me. In sum: thanks!
*As well as the issue of transnational sanctuary and the complexity surrounding "the war" "in Afghanistan."
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ADTS
[Whoops - Note to Editor: I failed to utilize the "Reply" feature as intended and place this as a response to Carl's comment in particular; please move, and edit this comment, as needed]
The "Taliban commander" can do nothing at all to alter anything anywhere if not permitted to by the Pak Army/ISI. So the question should be what would the Pak Army/ISI commander do. In my view, that answer is nothing. Things are going swimmingly right now and it doesn't look as if there is anything that will change that.
The thing's mass murder will change nothing at all, in the US. If it is noticed much in the future it will just be as the latest bit of very entertaining legal theatre. Even that won't last once the true black brutality of the crime is detailed.
It may or may not intensify the ongoing pattern of ANSF people murdering ISAF people.
First, an intellectual exercise of sorts, should you care to pursue it on what presumably has the potential to be an enjoyably "lazy Sunday" best spent on other pursuits: If one were "the Taliban commander" (Haqqani?) wishing to alter either facts "on the ground" in Afghanistan or in DC, what would one do? Presumably, in large part for obvious reasons (namely, the Tet precedent), the Kabul US Embassy compound is well-fortified and -guarded* (and actually I have received specific information to this effect in particular), as are similar installations. And I do not think there is a figure comparable to Walter Cronkite in the US today, although I think the closest equivalent would probably be Jon Stewart, the larger point of which is that in an era of Facebook and the like (or blogs like SWJ for that matter), the ways people receive and process news and information is fundamentally different. Hence, once more, what would one do if the Taliban commander? I can offer no renumeration or permanent (or even temporary) employment on a Red Team or OpFor, but would of course greatly appreciate and enjoy receiving your perspective.
*As it so happens, "The Who," "Won't Get Fooled Again," came to mind while composing this.
Quite frankly, I think the biggest game change for some time is the - alleged - massacre committed by Robert Bales. I think, moreover, the reason it resonates largely comports well with many of the themes you noticed: an arguably broken Army and an apathetic citizenry in which service is performed by some rather than shared by all. I suspect, furthermore, people are able to relate to Bales and his wife (a blogger in this day and age, no less, although - admirably - it appears her blog has been taken down and is not being reposted or hosted on alternative websites or venues). How many American citizens can locate Afghanistan on a map or provide the name of its capital? (I am less cynical regarding how many Americans know someone who has served.) To reiterate, I doubt news of actions in a distant war matter much, if at all. But another American, kind of just like you or me, who may have "snapped," appeals more in many ways to a celebrity-obsessed, People Magazine/US Weekly culture.
ADTS
Agree with ADTS.
Even though polls show most Americans to be not in support of the war this latest Taliban offensive will be seen as just another "drip" because there is no moral connection between the American people and the war. They simply dont really care in a deep, moral way. In Vietnam because there was a draft and a moral connection to the war it produced protests and a political establishment after Tet that was committed to withdrawal.
In theory therefore, and perhaps even in practice, the United States could remain in Afghanistan in force well beyond 2014 (depending on the American presidential election and other factors) since there is no overriding political commitment on the part of the American people to get out. As ADTS points out this latest Taliban offensive is just another "drip."
It is the worst of all possible worlds: a broken strategy in Afghanistan wasting good American blood and treasure all the while the American people remain on the sidelines while the political and military establishment maintain their strident belief that things will work out in the place as long as we maintain the will to do so. The irony is that the will of the American people does not matter, it is the will of the senior military and defense and political leaders that matters, and their will up to now is unbroken.
My own take with response to the last question presented: Hardly any, if at all. This is part of a consistent "drip-drip" that has been going on for over a decade now. The post quite incisively notes that many peoples' preferences have, at this point, solidified. Even for a person like myself, with some fixation with current events and foreign policy, the headlines make a small impression at most in terms of information, and probably none whatsoever, and change preferences not a whit. Other than a dramatic "game change" akin to the televised seizure of the Saigon Embassy, whatever its contemporary equivalent would happen to be, this really is ephemeral.
It was not solicited, but I will provide my forecast (although my track record is probably downright shameful): Obama will defeat Romney (handily) in the general election, and then potentially seize upon any opportunity to accelerate the timetable he already (in remarkably self-defeating fashion) announced in tandem with the "Surge." Perhaps a new National Intelligence Estimate will be called for, and if it determines some degree of success, that will be cited as justification for reducing troop levels; conversely, a finding of failure will be cited as justification for reducing troop levels as a way to cut losses.
It is difficult to see this affecting facts in Washington, and what in fact would do so does not come particularly readily.
ADTS