Joint Operational Design, Re-imagined…

Joint Operational Design, Re-imagined…

By Andrew “Buster” Crabb

In July of 2013, Syria was in a full-blown civil war. Throughout the country, there were numerous armed groups vying for supremacy: the Syrian Armed Forces, Hezbollah militias, Iranian advisors, Al Nusra Front, Ahrar Al Sham, Syrian Democratic Forces, thousands of foreign jihadists and a superabundance of other violent groups. At the time, as the J5 Future Plans & Operations Officer for CENTCOM Forward – Jordan (CF-J), my team and I were tasked to come up with options and ideas in case CF-J was to form a Joint Task Force and interdict in the war-torn country. Unfortunately, for such a complex and unbounded problem, my team of SAMS graduates, ORSAs, and subject-matter experts found the Joint Planning Process lacking; operational design was in its infancy, not doctrine, and not well known by anyone on the staff.  We went on to improvise and develop operational concepts, but it was clear that there was a gap in the U.S. military’s planning and problem solving methodologies.    

     Since that time, operational design has been adopted into Joint Doctrine. The Armed Services and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) have also, in different forms, adopted operational design. In my later years in uniform, as well as in my current role as an Operational Planning Instructor at the Joint Special Operations University, I have become very familiar with Joint Operational Design and related schools of thought.  Yet, I still go back to those early days of CF-J and ask the question—would any of these methodologies have helped us analyze and address the very “wicked” (i.e. highly complex) problem of Syria circa 2013? Again and again, I find myself coming to the conclusion that the answer is, flatly, “no.” As currently captured in JP 5-0[1] (Joint Planning), Joint Operational Design is seriously limited in both its usefulness and application. Joint Operational Design needs to be re-imagined.

     What would a re-imagined Joint Operational Design methodology look like? It would need to borrow the best aspects of the existing design and planning processes.  It would be a methodology that encourages creative thought followed by analytical rigor. It would be a process that is simple to understand and execute, but is a completely thorough way of concept development.  Most importantly, it would be a process that can be used to problem-solve against a variety of problem-sets—operational, non-operational, straightforward, complex, defined and undefined.

Outside of JP 5-0’s Joint Operational Design, there is a great body of work upon which to draw.  The Joint Planning Process (JPP)[2] offers a thorough, methodical approach to planning based on task analysis and reductionism. The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC)[3], offers an expansive way to design campaigns utilizing a “competition continuum” and leveraging the whole of the government and international partners. Within certain sectors of the military, there is also a school of thought—simply called “Design”—that emphasizes creative thinking via rich discourse (i.e. group collaboration) and solution expression through metaphors. These metaphors can be relayed in many ways, including sketches, pictorials and even physical models. From the Services, the 2015 Army Design Methodology (ADM)[4] starts off brilliantly, showing how we can observe problems and different ways to think about them.  Unfortunately, all these methodologies fall short in various ways: JPP’s lack of flexibility, JCIC’s focus on operational problems, Design’s limited ability to transition concepts to plans, and ADM’s mirroring of JP 5-0’s operational design methodology.

That leads us to back to an examination of Joint Operational Design, its conception, evolution and adoption by the U.S. military. Operational design’s first advocate was Israeli General Shimon Naveh[5], who pioneered the concept to address what he saw as the intellectual shortfalls in military deliberate decision-making.  Those shortfalls came to life when the asymmetric threats that opposed Israel in the 2006 Lebanon war incurred a deadly cost for mission accomplishment; this led to Naveh’s work being embraced to a greater degree, both in the Israeli and in U.S. militaries.  Many in the U.S. military saw his systemic operational design (SOD) as a way to address the limitations of the Joint Planning Process (and its Service-led cousins such as the Army’s Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and the Marine Corps’ Planning Process (MCPP)). Many in US planning circles saw SOD as addressing the need for a methodology that promotes conception and expression of creative solutions.

Towards that end, in 2015 JP 5-0 added a Chapter for Joint Operational Design. In the follow-on 2017 version of JP 5-0, Joint Operational Design is a process that starts with a review of the elements of “operational art.” It then goes through an examination of the environment and an analysis of the actors involved in the problem-set. That leads to the outcome, described as an “operational approach.”  Simply stated, this “approach” is an operational concept for a campaign or complex operation.  JP 5-0’s Joint Operational Design methodology has many, many strengths, particularly when facing one or two main adversaries who preside over an ordered operational environment (OE).  Joint Operational Design begins with a strong emphasis on understanding the OE, understanding ourselves, our adversaries, and other significant actors involved in the problem-set.

Exploration and understanding the environment in which the problem exists is a critical step in problem solving and planning. There are many methodologies one can use to explore the environment or situation in which the problem exists.  In addition to products such as decision making templates, situational templates, there is an acronym soup of analytical tools available to study and research a problem’s environment. These intellectual guides include: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure (PMESII); Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events (ASCOPE); Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic (DIME). All of these are tools used to examine the operational environment from the vantage point of a variety of interests and facets.  The Joint Special Operations University’s Special Operations Planning Course utilizes a guide developed by the intelligence community. It was developed specifically to understand irregular warfare environments: IGIVO—Issues, Goals, Influencers, Vulnerabilities, and Outcomes. Regardless of which is most applicable, they are all means to end, which is to understand the problem-set’s environment from a variety of perspectives.

     To assess ourselves, our adversaries and other actors, JP 5-0 operational design relies on a Center of Gravity (COG) analysis. For years the idea of a COG has been controversial, often quickly devolving into debates concerning what the creator of the idea (19^th Century military leader, practitioner and theorist General Carl Von Clausewitz) meant in the original German text and other well-meaning but tiring arguments. In a significant shortfall, after spending much time discussing and defining what a COG is and is not, amazingly JP 5-0 does not clearly present a way to identify a center of gravity. Instead, it essentially says that through thorough analysis the COG will become obvious. Once the actor’s COG has been identified, JP 5-0 utilizes a “Critical Factors Analysis” (CFA), a concept originally developed by Dr. Joe Strange[6], to explore ways to attack and undermine our adversaries’ (or protect our own) COGs.  JP 5-0 instructs that once you have identified these critical factors, you can link them to decisive points, group those points into Lines of Operation and Lines of Effort (LOOs / LOEs), and link the outcomes of LOO & LOEs to your desired End State.  Collectively, this is your operational concept or campaign plan.

     Setting aside all the argumentation surrounding Clausewitz’s intent, the COG analysis can be extremely useful as it identifies the main strengths (Dr. Strange’s simple way of defining a COG) and aspects (critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities) of ourselves, our enemies and significant actors in the OE.  Identifying the critical factors underpinning the COG can lead to very creative ways to directly and indirectly undermine our adversaries’ COGs, protect our own COG, all towards achieving our ends.

     However, when one applies the Syria 2013 litmus test to JP 5-0’s operational design methodology, its limitations are quickly revealed. In a straightforward, binary competition (us against one nation state’s military), and in an ordered area of responsibility, JP 5-0’s Joint Operational Design works quite well.  As one begins to add additional foes and disorder to the OE, it loses its usefulness. For Syria July 2013, had we utilized Joint Operational Design as it is currently constructed, we would have done a COG analysis against 15 or more groups—yet would defeating any of those groups really have resulted in an increased ability to “impose our will” in the OE and achieve our desired end state? More likely, defeating one group would have emboldened and/or strengthened other competing groups, led to greater disorder and to a further challenge to achieving our end of defusing the crisis. In a disordered environment, with multiple foes, Joint Operational Design is at best limited, and very well could be counter-productive.

     Further, as currently constructed, would Joint Operational Design help us visualize a humanitarian assistance campaign?  What about below-the-threshold-of-violent-conflict campaigns—e.g. developing a Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) in a Theater not at war? Or perhaps developing a comprehensive plan to establish a country’s navy? Clearly, Joint Operational Design as laid out in JP 5-0 isn’t wholly suitable for developing a solution for any of those problem-sets. Finally, let’s not even consider using Joint Operational Design to problem solve for non-operational, wickedly complex and/or undefined problem-sets (e.g. Should we establish a Forward Headquarters in the Middle East?; What can we do in East Africa?).

     Knowing what we now know about irregular warfare, influence operations, gray zone operations, asymmetric warfare, hybrid warfare (do we need to go on?)—what does a grand theory for a re-imagined operational design look like?  Firstly, I would advocate that it must harness the best aspects of Design, Joint Operational Design, JCIC, ADM and even JPP.  That is, we need to build a simple, yet thorough methodology that promotes creative thinking for conceiving solutions, and then transitions to critical thinking to analyze and logically build on the original ideas.  Importantly, our re-imagined operational design must address the shortcomings that many of these methodologies have in common—designing plans that are uninformed or ill-informed by planners who lack context.

     As we build plans that expose thousands of individuals to death and disfigurement, and whole societies to disruption and destruction, is it unreasonable to ask that our planners gain context to the problem? I would call this the “Doctoral Approach” to problem solving: treat high-level planning with the same intellectual seriousness you would for a Ph.D. thesis or graduate project.  As ADM correctly calls for, before planning commences, individuals within the Joint Planning Group (JPG) should be assigned to research different components to the problem-set.  Back-briefing the results to the Commander, Staff Principals and JPG colleagues would be a forcing function to raise the collective awareness of the group. Of course, we should reach outside of problem-solving team and bring in subject-matter experts in pertinent fields. Naturally, this would all take time and effort, but this isn’t a process for time sensitive planning. The central idea is for all operational planners to gain context to the problem’s background and central components.

     Once our planners have context to the problem-set, they must the clearly identify the problem and the end state (“Envision the Problem”). Here is where we can harness creative thinking approaches.  The expression of the problem, potential solution pathways and the desired end state can be done through collaborative discourse and then expressed via Design-like pictorial representations, metaphors, or physical models. Ideally, that’s done first individually and then collaboratively at the group level. The outcome here is to creatively explore and demonstrate what the problem is and how it is resolved, mitigated or changed without a 12-page report and supporting PowerPoint slide decks.  This aids our next step.

     We progress to the next step by “Uncovering Sources of Resistance” to the end state. Here we can fully explore the problem’s environment: identifying the invisible estates of history and culture; fully understanding the current conditions; we can look at the resistance from inter-related human networks, systems, coalitions, and alliances at the individual and group levels; and importantly, we will still analyze the actors of the OE: adversaries, neutrals, and those groups with separate agendas.  JP 5-0’s COG identification, COG critical factors analysis and/or utilizing the other tools in our intellectual kitbag (the IGIVO’s, PMESII’s, and ASCOPE’s of the planning world) are all good instruments to examine those actors.

     The critical step in our re-imagined operational design is to “Formulate Mitigations” to these sources of resistance and to the problem itself. Understanding that in the 21^st century, there are many options besides targeting and physically destroying our adversaries, it is important that we explore all options.  Firstly, what can we repair and build to help achieve our ends? Next, who can we reconcile or coopt? Once we’ve addressed how to achieve our aims without physical confrontation, we can and should explore how do we confront and neutralize our adversaries and other sources of resistance through direct and indirect actions? The results of our previous COG analysis would be extremely helpful here. Lastly, all good solutions consider how we can use stratagems & deception to hide or obfuscate our actions and intentions, confuse our enemies, and trick them to revealing their own plans and actions. For non-operational problems, the first two may take more import; for operational problems, the last two may be more prominent. The bottom line is that we can apply the sub-steps as needed, designing the details of the methodology to suit the problem.

     Once we’ve Gained Context, Identified the Problem and the Desired End State, Uncovered Sources of Resistance, and Formulated Mitigations, we can complete our way forward by Finalizing a Solution Concept.  Mitigation pathways to the resistance and to the problem can be combined and prioritized (still need to identify main and supporting efforts!) to produce a multi-pronged approach towards achieving our desired end state.  Planners can express that concept via the tried-and-true Lines of Operation and Effort method with supporting decisive points and ending conditions that contribute to the overall end state. Conversely, we could utilize a Synch Matrix that shows how capabilities (perhaps the seven Joint Functions?) progressively build and are employed over time; or one that shows unit actions & activities sequenced over time.  Finally, if appropriate, we could simplify our Solution Concept expression by using combination of charts, graphics, or even Design-like pictorials along with limited narration.  The point is that the re-imagined expression should be flexible enough to match the presentation format to the type-problem, its proposed solution and knowing the preferences of the Commander. Presented this way, one can demonstrate the solution’s intellectual heft, yet still convey it in a clear and straightforward way. 

     So would such a re-imagined Joint Operational Design meet the challenge of the Syria 2013 litmus test?  How about those hybrid operations?  Humanitarian operations? Engagement strategies? Undefined, non-operational problems? And just as importantly, could this re-imagined process still be as effective as the current Joint Operational Design for conventional, binary-type conflicts? In my estimation, it is a step forward in the right direction, with plenty of room for improvement. 

     Regardless of my own vision, as currently constructed in JP 5-0, Joint Operational Design is not just in need of an overhaul—it needs to be completely re-imagined and replaced. When it is, we need to adopt a methodology that values context to the problem. It should be a process which encourages imaginative and thoughtful solutions to operational and non-operational problems that are defined, undefined, straightforward, and the wickedly complex. 

As originally conceived, operational design shattered the military’s approach to problem solving and challenged it to be better.  As formulated in JP 5-0, we have answered that challenge with a methodology that is limited in its application and usefulness. It’s time to do better and get better. The Joint Force, the executors of plans—flawed or not—deserve nothing less.  

NOTES

1. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 16 June 2017), IV 1-42.
2. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 16 June 2017), V 1-62.
3. Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (Washington D.C.: The Joint Staff, 16 March 2018).
4. Army Techniques Manual 5-0.1, Army Design Methodology (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 July 2015).
5. Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege (U.S. Army, Retired), “Systemic Operational Design.” Military Review Jan-Feb 2009, 2-12.
6. Dr. Joe Strange, 1996. “Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities.”   Marine Corps University. https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/3B_COG_and_Critical_Vulnerabilities.pdf