News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Duncan Moore.
1. A worried Asia wonders: what will Joe Biden do?
2. N. Korea keeps mum on Biden's victory
3. Biden urged to avoid repeating Obama’s mistakes in Asia
4. N. Korean authorities order state security agency to "secretly" arrest defectors overseas
5. Biden sees step-by-step approach to disarming N. Korea: experts
6. U.S. Congress warns anti-China initiative alienates Korea
7. FM Kang arrives in U.S. for talks with Pompeo after Biden victory
8. Moon vows close communication with Biden, efforts to prevent any 'vacuum' in alliance, Korea peace process
9. It's not just over there: the American commitment to the Korean Peninsula
10. Defense ministry vows to continue close work with Pentagon under Biden
11. Joe Biden on North Korea: will he build on Donald Trump's legacy?
12. New virus cases above 100 for 2nd day; cluster infections veer out of control
13. FEATURE: Animated film shines light into North Korea's darkest corners
14. Time to hit the reset button (South Korea)
15. Japanese abductees' kin ask Biden to press issue with North Korea
1. A worried Asia wonders: what will Joe Biden do?
AP · Foster Klug · November 9, 2020
NK News is already reporting on the Biden priorities and lamenting that North Korea is not one of the four priorities: COVID 19, economic recovery, racial equality, and climate change. All the pundits are looking for their niche issue to be on the priority list.
First of all, strategy is about priorities. Everything cannot be a priority. To paraphrase, "he who prioritizes everything, prioritizes nothing."
On North Korea not being on the priority list: if it was on the list, China, Russia, Iran, and violent extremist organizations (to name a few) must be, too. So would the Quad and Quad Plus. So would Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and many more.
No one should feel slighted because their niche issue is not on the list. No one should read too much into this initial priority list. I am sure there are members of the Biden national security team working on all these issues. Some things may be better left to be worked behind the scenes.
Now if the pundits make too big a deal about North Korea not being on this priority list, it might cause Kim to feel slighted and he might lash out to make sure he is noticed. He, more than any of the Korean pundits, will want to be on the priority list.
On the other hand, as I have written many times, North Korea is a long-term problem to be managed and solved through resolution of the Korea question. The ROK/US alliance has to be sustained with deterrence and defense capabilities to prevent war and to be prepared to address the full range of contingencies. But it is going to take a long-term political warfare strategy in conjunction with coordination with South Korea to bring peace and stability to the Korean peninsula. The first step toward that outcome is the requirement that South Korea re-examine its assumption about the nature of the Kim family regime and its strategies and objectives.
But Korea watchers should take heart from Biden's Yonhap op-ed. I do not think he published anything similar in any other allied country. This letter seems to ensure the Korean peninsula has sufficient visibility to the president-elect.
2. N. Korea keeps mum on Biden's victory
Yonhap News Agency · 이원주 · November 9, 2020
I am afraid that Kim may intend to follow the adage that actions speak louder than words. And the 70+ days of the transition period is an especially vulnerable time.
3. Biden urged to avoid repeating Obama’s mistakes in Asia
Financial Times · Edward White et al. · November 8, 2020
I do not understand why some think there may be an automatic return to "strategic patience." I think we might find the new national security team will be looking for opportunities to build on what the current national security team has accomplished. For all the likely criticism, the ball has been advanced and conditions have changed—some good and some less good. But there needs to be the examination of the fundamental assumptions about Kim's willingness to denuclearize. I think we have a lot of useful information from the past four years that will contribute to an objective analysis.
4. N. Korean authorities order state security agency to "secretly" arrest defectors overseas
Daily NK · Kim Yoo Jin · November 9, 2020
If China and Russia turn a blind eye to this issue, they become complicit in North Korea's human rights abuses and must be held accountable right along with North Korea.
5. Biden sees step-by-step approach to disarming N. Korea: experts
Korea Herald · Choi Si-young · November 9, 2020
This reporter asked me to respond to 7 questions and the only quote he used is only half in context. For those with an interest, here is my entire Q&A exchange with the reporter.
(1) So, do you see a potentially more effective, coherent North Korea policy being drafted by Seoul and Washington this time, or is it just a wishful thinking that that could happen anytime soon?
There will be no coherent ROK/US alliance policy and strategy unless there is an agreement on the fundamental nature of the Kim family regime, its strategies, and objectives. The Moon administration is laboring under the false assumption that Kim Jong-Un shares his vision for peace and reconciliation and will engage and negotiate like a responsible member of the international community if sanctions are lifted and concessions are provided. If he continues ROK policy and strategy based on those assumptions, there is unlikely to be a coherent alliance strategy toward North Korea. President-elect Biden will want to base US strategy on what President Moon said in his congratulatory tweet: a "rock-solid alliance" and shared values. He will want to ensure there is a strong foundation of military deterrence and defense so that negotiations can occur from a position of strength, not one of appeasement. He will encourage President Moon to seek engagement based on strength, not weakness or the appearance of wanting engagement more than Kim Jong-Un does.
(2) President Moon is adamant on signing a peace declaration, which he says will usher in North Korea disarmament. The Trump administration is saying no to that, saying NK denuclearization leads to the peace declaration. Would the Biden administration get on board with Moon with that?
The two important questions to ask are: 1) What evidence is there that a peace declaration (or end of war declaration) will result in a change in Kim Jong-Un's behavior and decision making? 2) How will such a peace or end of war declaration ensure the security of the ROK when it faces a 1.2 million-man, active duty military posture for offensive operations across the DMZ? We have seen the North's military modernization on October 10th of not only a possible new ICBM and SLBM but also improved and advanced conventional military capabilities that have been developed over the past few years despite the maximum pressure of sanctions. This is an indication of the regime's true intent, which is to dominate the entire Korean peninsula. A declaration of the end war will be symbolic only. There must be a legal peace treaty between North and South Korea (the two designated belligerents in UN Security Council Resolutions of 1950). But this can only occur after there is a significant threat reduction on the Korean peninsula. We have seen the Compressive Military Agreement fail to bring about any threat reductions from the North while the South has faithfully implemented the one-sided confidence and trust building measures of the agreement. The North has not reciprocated and instead has conducted more than 20 missile and rocket tests of new systems that range US and South Korea military bases. Until North Korea negotiates in good faith and reduces its threat to the South, it should not be rewarded with the symbolic gesture of an end of war declaration.
(3) North Korea appears set to stage a provocation (a missile launch perhaps) early next year as Biden will be reading his new cabinet. Experts project leader Kim Jong-un would want to set the tone and dictate the terms of the stalled nuclear talks when America would be least ready to respond to threat. How would the Biden government react to that and what impact would that have on the stalled nuclear talks?
The key to understanding the regime's blackmail diplomacy and "long con" (to get political and economic concessions as a result of provocations and increased tensions without giving up its nuclear and missile programs) can be seen in the October 10th military display during the Korean Workers Party 75th anniversary celebration. The two new missile systems (SLBM and ICBM) that have never been tested may have been deployed to set the groundwork for negation. Kim may very well conduct a test with the intention of causing fear in the ROK/US alliance and, in particular, the US due to the potential threat to the US homeland. Then Kim will negotiate and attempt to bargain away the new ICBM and/or SLBM in return for sanctions relief and concessions. This is typical North Korean negotiating behavior through which it attempts to get something for nothing. If the new ICBM and SLBM are not actually weapons that can or will be produced, Kim can bargain them away and not give up any of his current proven capabilities in return for concessions. We should expect some kind of missile or other significant test during the 70 days or so of the upcoming US administration transition process.
(4) Many speculate Biden will prefer a series of working-level talks to one big summit which Trump has favored to tackle North Korea disarmament. How would that bring a traction to the deadlocked nuclear talks? And what’s the downside to the approach?
Trump's national security team tried to implement substantive working level talks and it is likely the Biden administration will, too. However, it is Kim Jong-Un who has prevented them from occurring. Kim has been and will likely continue to be the barrier to progress. On the one hand, I do not recommend any president meet with Kim (whether Trump had been re-elected or now with President-elect Biden) unless substantive working level talks are held that develop the details of an agreement that can then be brought to the two leaders for approval. But this cannot happen unless Kim makes the choice to allow it to happen. On the other hand, I very doubt that Kim will want a summit meeting unless he has guarantees that sanctions, at least in part, will be lifted. He has failed to get sanctions relief from President Trump and this fact has put him under enormous internal pressure, because he raised expectations in Pyongyang that he could "play" Trump and get sanctions relief while maintaining his nuclear and missile systems. It would be a mistake for the ROK, the US, or the UN to lift sanctions merely to have talks—whether at the working-level or the summit level. Kim Jong-Un has to continue to feel the pressure from inside Pyongyang for his failure to get sanctions relief. When the pressure is sufficient, he may then make the choice to allow substantive working level negotiations. The ROK and the US must never again make the mistake of providing concessions in return for promises or talks. Kim Jong-Un will only view that as weakness and he will make more demands and continue to conduct his political warfare with Juche characteristics.
(5) Biden said in a contribution sent to a local news agency here that he would not leverage a troop pullout to extort Korea but would make stronger the alliance. But some say the Pentagon is making adjustments in American troop deployment worldwide, so a troop cut isn’t off the table entirely. Do you share that view?
These are two separate issues. Yes, President-elect Biden will not use the level of US troops in the ROK as part of a negotiating strategy. He sincerely wants to ensure the foundation of a strong ROK/US alliance. While he will work to resolve the SMA stalemate as quickly as possible, he will not give the ROK a pass and his national security team will seek to negotiate a fair SMA agreement that strengthens the alliance.
However, the US military continually assesses its global force posture as it has global responsibilities. It may assess that, in order to best support US national security interests, it may have to make adjustments to the size, capability, and stationing locations of US forces. This is unrelated to the SMA and will not be used as negotiating level. The US has to determine what is the proper force posture to meet its global responsibilities and protect US national interests. The US, both the incoming administration and the American people, is committed to deterrence and defense on the Korean peninsula and it will honor that commitment. However, it will do that in the way that best suits protection of US interests in accordance with strategy, funding constraints, and resource availability,
As the alliance evolves through OPCON transition, there will be changes that need to be made in US forces structure and posture. One of the ways to ensure US forces remain on the peninsula will be a shift from USFK as a "committed force" available for only one mission. The ROK will have to come to accept that US forces need "strategic flexibility" to train and operate throughout the INDOPACIFIC to ensure readiness of US forces (because of the declining availability of training areas for US forces due to ROK government decisions such as support for the Comprehensive Military Agreement as well as civilian encroachment on training areas traditionally used by US forces).
(6) The US has not been enthusiastic about handing over the wartime operational command back to Korea, which is looking to secure that by 2022. The US military chief in Korea isn’t either. But the US seems interested in adding up more of its Terminal High Altitude-Area Defense (THAAD) batteries here. Do you think Washington would transfer the wartime role to Seoul when Biden is president, and would Biden go for more THAAD missile shields while in office?
The US fully supports OPCON transition. It is not trying to block the process in any way. The process must be conditions based and those conditions must be met for one reason: to ensure the security of the ROK. If those conditions are not met, the security of the ROK and the Korean people will face increased risk. Second, President Moon has expressed a desire to complete the process during his administration, but he has given no such order for that to happen. The process has been hindered by two factors. One, the reduction in combined training since the Singapore Summit and the COVID 19 outbreak (a major training event was cancelled this past March due to COVID). Because of that, August's training had to be focused on readiness of the ROK/US CFC and could not allocate the time and resources for the FOC evaluation.
The US desires to deploy the most effective missile defense capabilities to ensure the defense of the ROK from North Korean attack. THAAD is an effective system for destroying North Korean missiles that threaten all of South Korea. Ideally, a missile defense system would be completely integrated between the ROK and US, orchestrating all radars, command and control, and firing systems to provide the most effective defense of South Korea. In the best case the ROK, US, and Japan would integrate their missile defense systems. But given the political friction between the ROK and Japan, that is not likely in the near term at least.
But the bottom line is the US is committed to deterrence and defense and doing that in the most militarily effective manner. It supports OPCON transition as a natural evolution of the alliance, but the conditions for transition must be met or the ROK and the Korean people will be at risk.
(7) Last, Seoul and Washington have yet to agree on the defense cost-sharing talks. They don’t agree on how much Seoul should pay more this time to keep 28,500 American troops here. Trump insisted on a dramatic hike in Seoul’s contributions because America was being taken advantage of keeping the “rich” country safe. Would Biden stick to that same strategy?
I think the Biden national security will want to resolve the SMA stalemate in accordance with the SOFA process and ensure the incremental costs for the stationing of US troops in Korea are properly distributed between the US and the ROK. The proper amount of funding will be determined through negotiation and not through demands. But there are increasing costs for the stationing of US troops that are caused by the reduction in access to training areas for US forces and the necessity for some US forces to have to conduct training outside of Korea or back in the US. negotiations will work out these issues.
President-elect Biden will not take a transactional view of alliance but instead will return to a view that is based on shared interests, shared values, and shared strategy. The US troops are in South Korea because it is in the US interests to deter war on the Korean peninsula. They are not there simply to defend South Korea. It is an important US interest to deter war and if deterrence fails to support the ROK in its defense of freedom. The costs for doing so can and must be properly distributed but the US will not be "selling" its services" to the ROK. It will continue to be committed to the alliance partnership of mutual defense.
6. U.S. Congress warns anti-China initiative alienates Korea
Chosun Ilbo · Roh Suk-jo · November 9, 2020
While it may "alienate" South Korea, it does not mean the concept of the Quad and Quad Plus is wrong, especially for South Korea. South Korea is not really feeling alienated—it is being held as an economic hostage by China. It is going to have to figure out the best way to protect its national interests (security and economic), and it is going to have to decide what kind of relationship it should have with China.
I previously sent out this CRS report. It can be accessed here: The "Quad": Security Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia.
7. FM Kang arrives in U.S. for talks with Pompeo after Biden victory
Yonhap News Agency · by 변덕근 · November 9, 2020
Here is my assessment of the issues for Minister Kang's visit.
I think Foreign Minister Kang will likely be making her last visit to the US as there are rumors that she will be replaced in the Moon Administration. This will likely be her last opportunity to try to repair some of the friction within the alliance.
- The Moon Administration likely hopes that the election will be decided by the time she visits so she may engage with the right people, who will be influential in the next administration: either those currently in DOS or those advisors to an incoming administration.
- Her number one priority is likely to re-engage on the SMA statement (cost-sharing of US forces). This is a major diplomatic issue and the negotiations are led by State and MOFA (not the military).
- She will likely inform the US that President Moon wants to double down on North-South engagement activities and continue to pursue an end of war declaration and steps toward a peace regime.
- She will want to explain how the Moon Administration’s “Southern Strategy” is complementary to the US strategy for a free and open Indo-Pacific.
- She will be trying to "thread the needle" on US-China great power competition, noting that, while South Korea is a committed security partner to the US, it is an "economic hostage" to China (though she will not use those words) and asking the US to be respectful of the tightrope South Korea is walking between the two great powers.
- She will likely discuss the US desire for a Quad Plus. She likely will not be able to offer any commitments to joining it overtly but she is likely to inform her counterparts that, while the South supports it in principle, it is difficult for it to publicly support it (the ROK fears renewed economic warfare by China just as was conducted when the US deployed the THAAD missile defense system to the peninsula).
- She will likely not address this issue, but I expect she will be asked about Korea-Japan friction and the impact it has on the two US bilateral alliances in Northeast Asia.
- Other issues that she may address peripherally because they are not directly in her portfolio: OPCON transition process (conditions-based versus time-based) and support to US forces manning the THAAD battery (local protests inhibit support).
8. Moon vows close communication with Biden, efforts to prevent any ‘vacuum’ in alliance, Korea peace process
Yonhap News Agency · Lee Chi-dong · November 9, 2020
I am scratching my head on the "vacuum" in the alliance comment. We have in place multiple channels of communication from the Security and Military Consultative meetings, the Military Committee, multiple lines of communication in South through the embassy, the military, and, of course, the MOFA-State strategy working group. It is this last channel that I think is most important and has done important work in coordinating ROK/US policy and strategy toward North Korea. However, it has come under unwarranted criticism by uniformed politicos and pundits in South Korea. So, if the president does not want a vacuum, he needs to make sure his administration supports and uses these multiple communications channels, and he should not listen to the uninformed criticism from his pundits.
9. It's not just over there: the American commitment to the Korean Peninsula
War On the Rocks · Gen. (Ret.) Vincent Brooks, Sheena Greitens, & Clink Work · November 6, 2020
10. Defense ministry vows to continue close work with Pentagon under Biden
Yonhap News Agency ·최수향 · November 9, 2020
11. Joe Biden on North Korea: will he build on Donald Trump's legacy?
National Interest · William Jeynes · November 6, 2020
He would be wrong to adopt a "not invented here" policy and throw out all the past work even as he develops "new" policies and strategies (as someone once remarked, every course of action and strategy on North Korea has been tried over the past 2 or 3 decades… though I would argue the one policy we have never pursued is aggressive pursuit of the solution to the Korea question). I think we also need to separate the public rhetoric from the behind the scenes work that has been done. Biden and his team should not throw the baby out with the bath water.
12. New virus cases above 100 for 2nd day; cluster infections veer out of control
Yonhap News Agency ·강윤승 · November 9, 2020
13. FEATURE: Animated film shines light into North Korea's darkest corners
Kyodo News · Donican Lam · November 8, 2020
14. Time to hit the reset button (South Korea)
Korea Joong Ang Daily · November 8, 2020
Yes, South Korea needs to reset its policies. As I have written, the Moon administration needs to conduct a thorough review of its assumptions about the nature of the Kim family regime and the North's strategy to dominate the peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
15. Japanese abductees' kin ask Biden to press issue with North Korea
Kyodo News · November 8, 2020
Japan will never waiver on the abduction issue.
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