Rebuilding the Army, Again

It is probably worth discussing Killebrew's three options at some length:

• Draw down the present force to a smaller version of itself, with reserve component support, ready to deploy on short notice while the country mobilizes.

The implication here is that the drawdown is, and arguably out to be straight line reductions across the entire Army force structure. A slight correction to this comment: "Cuts in the defense budget almost certainly will result in a smaller ground force than existed even in 1974-80". This comment is a bit misleading, since the base force in the 1974-1980 period was 16 divisions. Smaller than Vietnam, but absolutely much larger than any force baseline since 1992. While, admittedly, a portion of that 16 division baseline consisted of RC brigades rounding out AC divisions, it begs the question as to whether the post-Afghanistan baseline force will be self-sustaining, and capable of deployment without RC augmentation, and in what circumstances a reserve callup is necessary. Just setting the topline force structure tells us nothing about how force generation will change - or not.

• Shift to a mobilization-based Army with more structure and active-force advisers in the reserve components and with an expanded training and education base to keep professional skills sharp.

Here again, the issue is not merely the impact of a given option on readiness and deployability, but on the relationships that drive force generation. How much of the Army's core competency gets transferred to the Reserve Components ? How does the Army ensure that the Reserve Components -both Army Reserve and National Guard - are actually resourced and prepared for the missions and roles they are taking on ? What changes need to be considered between the roles assigned to the National Guard versus Army Reserve ? In the post-Vietnam war era past, NG units took on virtually all RC combat arms missions and roles, while USAR units could be - and were mobilized more rapidly and sent into theater with fewer restrictions and requirements, the theory being that a lesser level of readiness for combat was acceptable for "rear area" troops. Is this assumption still valid at all ? Given the likely light-heavy force balance between active and reserve forces - along the lines of the Reimer report, continuing the current policy of NG - combat units, USAR - combat support and service support units only increases the likelihood of poor combat readiness, elongated force generation cycles, and simple waste of resources. Adding active "advisors" to the RC force structure has only one use - to justify bloated AC field grade ranks in a resource constrained environment, with no commensurate benefit to either active or reserve field grade officer development. It would be a lot better to merge AGR and AC advisor slots, and give these people real jobs. (Which, BTW, is how almost every other army around the world - including the Russians, Israelis and Germans - does this sort of thing.) We need to stop lying to ourselves with the fiction that it is possible to grow a battalion or brigade commander in his or her spare time. And commanding a reserve battalion or brigade could be a very rewarding experience for an AC field grade officer on the way up.

• Shift a greater number of the active force into quasi-Special Forces-type skills for training and advising other security forces, and to fight low-level counterinsurgency-type operations conducted by different kinds of forces than its present “conventional” structures.

Given the concerns I raised with respect to the second option, this option also requires active force officers to switch context between one form of war to another, with the implicit assumption that if you can master low intensity conflict, scaling up to mid and high intensity conflict is QED. I beg the reader to study the record of the British Army in the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries to determine whether or not this is the case. Indeed - what about the record of the US Army during the same period ? The solution of the 70s and 80s was the creation of a "two-tier" force that had little contact with itself, beyond the officer rotation patterns in and out of Fort Bragg, Fort Leavenworth and the Pentagon. Note that I do NOT include Germany here. One inevitable result of a shrinking force becomes that the porportion of officers and enlisted men who have served in the 82d Airborne Division becomes ever larger in relation to the total force. This ought not be taken to imply that holding the baseline Army SF force structure - or even increasing it - may not be the right thing to do. My point is that it is hardly a sign of a healthy army, when ONLY the airborne, ranger and special forces units can be considered "elite".

Of course both the "Vietnam Army" and the "post-Vietnam Army" were variations of the "Cold War, adopt the geostrategic reality of a European nation and deter the Soviets from invading west" army.

We thankfully no longer have that mission and can build an army based upon the geostrategic reality of the United States of America. And we hold the global key terrain.

As a maritime nation with no neighboring land threat, the US could always assume risk in regards to land power. Build Armies when needed, disband armies when not needed. Our very Constitution was written with this reality in mind.

Sadly we have abandoned fundamental aspects of strategic thinking rooted in a keen understanding of truly vital national interests, geostrategically vital key terrain analysis, and an appreciation of the vital interests and spheres of influences of our major competitors. Instead we chase shadows and focus on what public opinion and intel, or just pure fantasy, tell us the threats are today.

How does one build a real army based on fantasy and opinion??

It is time to return to strategy. It is time to appreciate and understand once again who the United States of America is. It is time to finally step back from that obsolete Cold War footing and return to an American peacetime military designed for the realities of securing the peace and deterring war. That is largely not an Army mission. Time for the Army to compress into a smart, tight coiled spring that is postured and prepared to do what American Armies do: Rapidly grow when the next war comes, and then win that war.

But I do have questions on these recommendations:

"Draw down the present force to a smaller version of itself, with reserve component support, ready to deploy on short notice while the country mobilizes."

- A smaller version of now? Or a much smaller army designed to expand and fight the next war. There is a difference. Also, key must be a recognition that the RC is designed to be a warfighting force. The massive peacetime mobilizations for these conflict of choice in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc tear at the fabric of the RC. One ends up with a lesser version of the AC in the RC. Our strength in the past has been that the RC was filled with solid professionals from across a wide range of civilian professions. Men and Women of that caliber of civilian contribution cannot participate in an RC that demands constant long deployments of them. They are warfighters, and these recent messy adventures we started are not the types of conflicts the reserves were intended for.

• "Shift to a mobilization-based Army with more structure and active-force advisers in the reserve components and with an expanded training and education base to keep professional skills sharp."

- When I left the regular force and joined the Guard in '92 I was soon beset upon by "active-force advisors." God help me. The active conventional army sucks even worse at doing FID at home than they do overseas. By in large these advisors made no attempt to understand the culture of the Guard or the reality of the Guard mission. They simply came with their AC manuals and mindsets, tried to force a 2-day a month unit to meet 30-day a month standards; all the while expressing their disdain for how bad the RC sucked for not being like them. Do not repeat the mistake of the 90's and build a bunch of AC to RC training units. They do not work and both the AC and RC soldiers hated the experience.

• "Shift a greater number of the active force into quasi-Special Forces-type skills for training and advising other security forces, and to fight low-level counterinsurgency-type operations conducted by different kinds of forces than its present “conventional” structures."

- We already have adequate actual Special Forces capacity to do Special Forces missions in the Army. Sustain that. The conventional force does not need to become quasi-Green Berets, they need to focus on being good at what the conventional force is missioned to do. Fight and win wars. Peace is not a mission the conventional force does well, nor is it much needed. Less is more. Mature, small units trained organized and equipped for working with and supporting State Department objectives are best. Large, young conventional formations are the wrong tool. Focus on training for the difficult mission of warfighting.