News and Commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and Published by Riley Murray.
1. This Is Not the Time to Wrest Wartime Troop Control from U.S.
2. [INTERVIEW] Ex-US Forces Korea chief says combined drills must continue
3. Challenges Korea faces
4. Pukkuksong-5: Why North Korea's New Solid-Fuel Missile Is a Problem
5. North Korea's Hwasong-16 ICBM: What We Know
6. Unification minister says S. Korea 'sufficiently' communicating with U.S. on anti-leaflet law
7. South Korea urges U.S. flexibility on sanctions to restart North Korea talks
8. Opinion | A culture war is brewing in North Korea. It shows Kim Jong Un’s deepest fear.
9. Declare end to Korean War, activist groups unite to tell Biden
10. Seoul-Tokyo cooperation vital to regional peace: Pentagon
11. Seoul says it can't accept Japan's 'unjust complaint' over defense white paper
12. What South Korea and China Do Together on North Korea Depends on Biden
13. North Korea Mobilizes Citizens for Kim Jong Il Birth Celebration Amid Covid-19, Cold Temperatures
14. 19 sailors held by Iran to be released, but captain still detained
15. Nampho Container Port Remains Active Despite Continued Border Closures
16. North Korea creates new biotech information center in State Academy of Sciences
1. This Is Not the Time to Wrest Wartime Troop Control from U.S.
Please stop the madness. There is so much wrong with this article (but with a couple of good points). Korea is not wresting wartime control from the US. The ROK government will not be put in charge of US Forces Korea just as the US government is not in control of Korean forces in wartime. Yes, the US is not going to hand over control of nuclear weapons to anyone. It does not even provide nuclear weapons to the current US commander in Korea. The decision to launch or release US nuclear weapons will always remain with the US leadership in Washington. And I doubt any nuclear weapon employed against north Korea would be launched from South Korean territory. Neither a ROK or US commander of the ROK/US CFC will have control over US strategic weapons. Both would have to make recommendations and request their employment. But all of this illustrates the lack of understanding of the OPCON transition process.
This is the fundamental problem we have had with OPCON transition since Rumsfeld envisioned it in his office in January of 2003 when he informed (with no coordination among US government agencies or even with the US commander in Korea, General LaPorte who only learned of the intention in that meeting) then President-elect Roh's envoys he wanted to transition OPCON and move US forces out of Seoul and away from the DMZ to locations south of the Han River (out of north Korean artillery range). The alliance has never had an information plan to be able to inform and educate the press, the public (in both countries), the pundits, and the politicos.
But this question goes back to "first principles;" How should the ROK and US militaries organize, train, and equip their forces to accomplish the mission of deterrence, defense of the ROK, defeat of the nKPA, and support to achieving the acceptable durable political arrangement that will serve, protect, and advance alliance interests and ensure security? The objective answer to this question is what should guide the way ahead.
2. Ex-US Forces Korea chief says combined drills must continue
The Korea Times – by Kang Seung-woo - February 3, 2021
Of course I concur. And I would add that this simple statement needs to be emphasized and I will keep repeating it: Failure to meet the conditions of OPCON transition will put the security of the ROK at grave risk. The conditions based transition process is designed to ensure the security of the ROK and the safety of the Korean people.
And we need to conduct theater level computer assisted training in order to ensure the readiness of the ROK/US CFC headquarters and components and to move the OPCON transition process forward.
There is a real cognitive dissonance in South Korea. There is the demand for OPCON transition on a timeline while at the same time a willingness to negotiate away ROK/US combined training exercise as a concession to the north in the hopes that the north will not conduct a provocation or raise tensions and will instead return to talks. This equation does not add up for multiple reasons. The Korea military and professional diplomatic corps knows this but the politicians in the Moon administration with their peace at any cost agenda do not understand military operations let alone the nature and objectives of the Kim family regime.
We need to stand up to north Korea and the simplest way to do that is to sustain training and readiness exercises. Otherwise, Kim Jong-un will double down on his political warfare strategy and use of blackmail diplomacy to gain political and economic concessions. Giving into the north's demands on exercises will only embolden the regime and make things worse for diplomacy and the for the security of the ROK.
3. Challenges Korea faces
The Korea Times – by Park Yoon-bae - February 3, 2021
north Korea nuclear weapons and China-US competition.
On the one hand we can argue Korea must make a choice in dealing with both the nuclear threat and the competition challenge. On the other hand, the author and others argue for Korean "independence" and maintaining a balance between the two. I think this is a fantasy and wishful thinking. Walking the tightrope between China and the US along with the nuclear threat from the north will likely result in the Korean adage being realized; when whales wrestle, shrimp die. There is a third way that I have heard Korean diplomatic and military professionals understanding. The ROK long ago made a choice when it allied with the US. Regardless of the economic ties with China and their importance, the security of the ROK is ensured by its alliance with the US. That needs to be the first priority for the ROK; sustaining the alliance.
4. Pukkuksong-5: Why North Korea's New Solid-Fuel Missile Is a Problem
The National Interest · by Markus V. Garlauskas · February 1, 2021
I missed this the other day from the former National Intelligence Officer for Korea. We should worry about solid fueled ICBMs in the future.
Excerpts:
However, simply because it is difficult does not mean that North Korea will not eventually be able to build solid-propellant ICBMs. If these could be proven reliable and fielded in sufficient numbers, solid-fuel ICBMs would be a major step forward for North Korea’s military, presenting the potential for a robust and prompt North Korean “second strike” capability from mobile land-based launchers. “Second strike” capability is essentially the pinnacle of nuclear deterrence, meaning that a country, even after suffering an initial all-out attack from an adversary (a “first strike”) can still retaliate against the adversary’s homeland with nuclear weapons to inflict unacceptable losses.
In practical terms, solid-fuel ICBMs, more easily hidden and protected—with no requirement to be fueled before launch—could pose a far more viable threat of rapid retaliation against the continental United States. Though liquid-fueled ICBMs could play a “second strike” role if hidden in underground facilities, conventional wisdom suggests that such units would be less likely to remain operational and return fire before they or their fueling support are destroyed.
As a result, a solid-fuel ICBM force could provide Pyongyang with greater confidence in its ability to drive a confrontation while maintaining control of escalation. It could keep such missiles more safely in reserve as the ultimate threat to deter the US from ending the regime. Therefore, North Korea’s fielding of solid-fuel ICBMs would pose an expanded threat to regional stability and US interests, even if the odds are remote that North Korea would use them to strike the United States.
5. North Korea's Hwasong-16 ICBM: What We Know
19fortyfive.com · by Eli Fuhrman · February 2, 2021
Excerpt: "Beyond estimates of the Hwasong-16’s capabilities, questions exist regarding the new system’s strategic value. Some have suggested that the Hwasong-16 offers little that North Korea’s existing missiles – and the Hwasong-15 in particular – did not already offer; indeed, both systems appear capable of targeting the entirety of the U.S. mainland, while the extra payload capacity of the Hwasong-16 offers little extra strategic value. Others have focused on potential deficiencies in the design and capability of the new missile, pointing out that the missile’s size makes deploying the missile a challenge and highlighting the limited survivability of yet another liquid-fueled weapon system."
6. Unification minister says S. Korea 'sufficiently' communicating with U.S. on anti-leaflet law
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · February 3, 2021
So who is Mr. Lee's counterpart in the US government?
Let me reprise my previous comments on the anti-leaflet law. My comments include some of the arguments that I am sure are being communicated to the US government by ROK officials.
As much as I disagree with the law and think it is a major strategic national security mistake, I think it is important to examine the ROK rationale.
First and foremost, this seems to be about a "threat to life’ and "threat to property." There are 1.12 million South Korean residents near the DMZ. Some of them have also consistently called for a stop to leaflet drops since the North Korean firing of anti-aircraft rounds in 2014 to shoot down balloons carrying leaflets. The 2014 incident is one of the only incidents I recall where this has happened. I do not think there has ever been any loss of life due to leaflet operations. But as I have said the way to protect citizens and property is not through appeasement of the north which will only invite more threats and blackmail diplomacy from the Kim family regime.
The Moon administration defends its human rights approach by arguing along these lines: Every year, the ROK government formulates plans to promote North Korean human rights and is making multi-faceted efforts policy-wise to resolve humanitarian issues involving separated families, South Korean prisoners of war, and abductees and to raise public awareness about the importance of improving human rights conditions in North Korea. Color me skeptical.
The Moon administration also makes the case the leaflet law is in keeping with agreements between the South and north. They have repeatedly agreed to stop mutual slander and defamation and ban the scattering of leaflets, starting from the July 4 South-North Korea Joint Statement (1972) to the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North (1991) and to the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity, and Unification of the Korean Peninsula (2018). I respect the ROK for trying to maintain the moral high ground here and they could do this by helping the escapees to take a more professional and sophisticated approach to information and influence. There is no need to slander and defame Kim Jong-un and Kim Yo-jong. All they need to do is simply provide information and news, and the truth. There is no need for insults and derogatory attacks against the north. In fact one of the most powerful propaganda tools employed lately was the Netflix K-drama "Crash landing On You" that portrayed the north Korean People's Army soldiers as human beings and not ugly automatons and monsters. According to escapees one of the reasons for its powerful positive influence in the north was because of that and when I asked former north Korea soldiers how they thought current north Korean soldiers are reacting to the K-drama they said they desire to come to the South even more than than did before.
The Moon administration compares their actions to US actions and legal rulings. While guaranteeing the full exercise of freedom of expression as stipulated in the Constitution of the ROK, the amendment (law) puts limitations to the minimum extent necessary to protect people’s lives and safety and in a way that also conforms to the U.S. Supreme Court rulings. They will cite Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989): The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that restrictions of freedom of expression are permissible so long as they are without reference to the content of the regulated speech, narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. I am far from a legal scholar and while this may hold water legally I still think despite the apparent legality it is a strategic national security error because it is appeasing north Korean demands based on threats -it is giving in to coercion/extortion or blackmail diplomacy. And Kim Yo-jong and her brother and the regime should be expected to double down on its blackmail diplomacy to support its political warfare strategy.
In addition the ROK government argues the amendment does not run counter to the U.S. Government’s human rights policies that seek to enhance access to information for people living in repressed societies such as a socialist state. The ROK Government argues is of the same view that it is important that North Koreans have access to information and that it is necessary to bring about positive changes to North Korean society by promoting it. Korea is also striving to have external information flow into the North in various ways – for instance, Korea’s public broadcaster KBS is running ‘Korean National (Hanminjok) AM Radio’ channel transmitted to the North. The ROK government also argues Ø we should consider the fact that, even without leaflet drops, the North Korean society can already easily access South Korean TV series and movies through 6 million-plus mobile phones, 400-plus street markets (known as Jangmadang), and information exchanges in areas bordering China. Fundamentally the ROK government argues it is their basic position that it is more effective to create conditions for North Koreans to be naturally exposed to South Korean culture and information through inter-Korean movements and interactions rather than to send anti-North Korean leaflets that have various side effects. I do strongly agree with the ROK Government’s basic position that it is more effective to create conditions for North Koreans to be naturally exposed to South Korean culture and information through inter-Korean movements and interactions rather than to send anti-North Korean leaflets that have various side effects. However, I would also argue that the ROK government (with the help of the US and escapees from the north) must aggressively embrace their responsibility to get information into the north and use all means available to do so, despite north Korean regime opposition. And the ROK government could help the escapees with their messaging and shift from the blatant anti-north Korea derogatory and insulting rhetoric to more effective messaging. We shouldn't be throwing the baby out with the bathwater. There is too much good being done by the escapees and they could do much more with government and international help.
The answer to this issue is not to pass a law banning leaflets. it would be for the ROK, with US support, to adopt a sophisticated and holistic approach to information and influence activities. They should help the escapees with their mission and give them support and advise them on how to shape their activities to maintain the moral high ground and act in keeping with north-South agreements. They would maintain the human rights high ground by helping the Korean people in the north gain access to information that is denied by the regime.
Here are the recommendations my colleague Mathew Ha and I made in our Plan B strategy for north Korea (https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/12/3/maximum-pressure-2/)
7. South Korea urges U.S. flexibility on sanctions to restart North Korea talks
Reuters · by Hyonhee Shin · February 3, 2021
"Flexibility" means concessions - specifically sanctions relief.
I think we have to understand the two different clocks that the ROK and US are using. The Biden administration is just getting its feet on the ground and plans to conduct a north Korea policy review and chart a long term way ahead (which I hope will include the acceptable durable political arrangement on the Korean peninsula and the solution to the "Korea question."). On the US side the clock is moving slowly and deliberately and the Biden administration wants to develop effective long teng term policies and strategy. On the Korean side the clock is moving very fast. The Moon administration is coming to an end and by this fall it will be solely focused on the elections. Therefore it has very little time to accomplish something with north Korea, both to solidify Moon's legacy and help his party in the next election. I think we have to recognize the challenge the Moon administration faces on many issues (OPCON transition, SMA, China-US competition, etc) in addition to north Korea and it needs to show results in the coming months. I think this will be guiding Moon administration engagement and decision making.
8. Opinion | A culture war is brewing in North Korea. It shows Kim Jong Un’s deepest fear.
The Washington Post · by Opinion by Olivia Schieber · February 2, 2021
Excellent article.
Again to reprise Dr. Jung Pak's most important question: Who does Kim fear the most? The US or the Korean people living in the north?
Imagine if we planned and executed a comprehensive information and influence activities campaign.
Unfortunately there is this sober conclusion:
Ironically, totalitarian North Korea is being helped in its new Big Brother campaign by the government of South Korea. Human rights activists on the South Korean side periodically use balloons to send notes containing information about life in South Korea and anti-North Korean messages (as well as Bibles, food, medicine and mini-radios). Pyongyang has long viewed these airdrops as an “act of hostility.” Since defectors cite the leaflets as one catalyst for their defections, it’s no surprise that North Korea takes drastic measures to suppress them. Lately, however, North Korea has succeeded in bullying the South Korean government into playing along. Seoul has now banned the airdropping of materials over North Korea, threatening offenders with up to three years in jail or $27,400 in fines.
The United States and South Korea are favored scapegoats for North Korea’s woes. But as the Great Leader’s admission of trouble in socialist paradise at his own party congress and the ruthless crackdown on information make clear, the power Kim fears most is his people’s.
9. Declare end to Korean War, activist groups unite to tell Biden
Newsweek · by Tom O'Connor · February 2, 2021
It is important to understand the views and connections of people who make such recommendations. It is important to understand the north Korean influence over the "peace movement" here in the US. I call your attention to Joshua Stanton's assessment here: Christine Ahn, Pak Chol, and the United Front Department, https://freekorea.us/2019/11/christine-ahn-pak-chol-and-the-united-front-department/
That said you can download their new report here: https://koreapeacenow.org/new-report-shows-how-a-peace-first-approach-can-resolve-the-security-crisis-on-the-korean-peninsula/
Unfortunately, they cannot answer the question of how an end of war declaration with secure and protect the 50 millions Korean living in the South because there is no mechanisms for reducing the existential threat posed by the 4th largest army in the world offensively postured to attack south Korea to achieve the Kim family regime's objective to dominate the Korean peninsula. The "peace first" approach sounds nice, but it does not take into account the true nature and objectives of the Kim family regime. In addition, they fail to answer these two important questions:
1. Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
2. In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
That said here is my counter to their views. I often begin lectures on Korea with these statements.
- I support peace on the Korean peninsula
- I support a diplomatic solution to the north Korean nuclear threat
- I support ROK engagement with the north
- I do not support a weakening of the ROK and ROK/US defensive capabilities
- I believe there cannot be success for US, ROK, and Japanese interests without strong ROK/US and Japan/US alliances
- Despite the above I think we have to accept that north Korea may have a continued hostile strategy and therefore while we prioritize diplomacy we have to remain prepared for the worst cases. I hope I am wrong here and that Kim Jong-un will dismantle his nuclear weapons and seek peaceful co-existence. But I do not think that is likely so we need a superior political warfare and military strategy to achieve peace by settling the "Korea"question" once and for all.
- There are no ”experts” on north Korea – it is the most difficult intelligence target – the proverbial “hard target”
- At best we are students trying to understand the nature of the regime and the security problem on the Korean peninsula
- Anything I say can and should be challenged
- However, now that I am retired I am no longer constrained by doctrine, funding, or a chain of command so I can tell you how I really feel
10. Seoul-Tokyo cooperation vital to regional peace: Pentagon
koreaherald.com · February 3, 2021
Yes it is. But the new MND Defense White Paper is not helpful.
11. Seoul says it can't accept Japan's 'unjust complaint' over defense white paper
en.yna.co.kr · by 최수향 · February 3, 2021
The complaint is justified because the White Paper is politicized and puts historical animosity above national security and what should be a strong relationship between the ROK and Japan. And despite the politicization (e.g, to include GSOMIA threats) military cooperation between the two remains positive. In fact, if the politicians could be left out of it there would be very strong military- to military relations between the ROK and Japan.
12. What South Korea and China Do Together on North Korea Depends on Biden
The National Interest · by Jason Bartlett · February 2, 2021
But China will not solve ROK and US security issues for us. We cannot expect them to solve or even sincerely assist in trying to solve the nuclear threat.
Conclusion: As multilateral support from sanction-violating nations granted North Korea its ability to indigenize its own nuclear weapons capabilities, the Biden administration must also take a multilateral approach towards engaging China and denuclearizing North Korea. Washington must first reestablish confidence in its alliances and strengthen the faltering ties between Seoul and Tokyo to ensure equal accountability and cohesion on China and North Korea. As Beijing will pounce on any signs of wavering U.S. leadership or support, it is imperative for the Biden administration to quickly resume its leadership role in Asia through multilateral engagement.
Mathew Ha and I make this recommendation in our essay on Trump to Biden and recommendations for policy going forward:
Encourage Chinese and Russian support for denuclearization while holding them accountable for ongoing violations of UN sanctions they claim to support. The Biden administration should publicize this duplicity and blacklist entities identified as violating sanctions.
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/01/14/north-korea/
13. North Korea Mobilizes Citizens for Kim Jong Il Birth Celebration Amid Covid-19, Cold Temperatures
More suffering for the Korean people living in the north simply to glorify the Kim family regime. "Resentful" is probably not a strong enough word to describe the people's feelings.
14. 19 sailors held by Iran to be released, but captain still detained
15. Nampho Container Port Remains Active Despite Continued Border Closures
38north.org · by Martyn Williams · February 2, 2021
More graphics at the link: https://www.38north.org/2021/02/nampho-container-port-remains-active-despite-continued-border-closures/
16. North Korea creates new biotech information center in State Academy of Sciences
dailynk.com – by Jeong Tae Joo - February 3, 2021
Nothing good comes from party control.
Excerpts:
However, with the creation of the new center, scientists and researchers in the bioengineering field are vexed by the pressure of having to produce results.
“The party committee has been choosing the goals and research plans bioengineering scientists and researchers must achieve at every major industrial base in the people’s economy, allotting them by individual and research lab,” said the source. “Scientists and researchers preparing their own research fear that if they don’t prioritize national research tasks, they could get branded as counterrevolutionary elements.”
"When people reflect on what it takes to be mentally fit, the first idea that comes to mind is usually intelligence. The smarter you are, the more complex the problems you can solve - and the faster you can solve them. Intelligence is traditionally viewed as the ability to think and learn. Yet in a turbulent world, there’s another set of cognitive skills that might matter more: the ability to rethink and unlearn.
Mental horsepower doesn’t guarantee mental dexterity. No matter how much brainpower you have, if you lack the motivation to change your mind, you’ll miss many occasions to think again. Research reveals that the higher you score on an IQ test, the more likely you are to fall for stereotypes, because you’re faster at recognizing patterns. And recent experiments suggest that the smarter you are, the more you might struggle to update your beliefs.
The curse of knowledge is that it closes your mind to what you don’t know. Good judgment depends on having the skill - and the wil - to open your mind. A hallmark of wisdom is knowing when it’s time to abandon some of the most cherished parts of your identity."
- Adam Grant in Think Again