But this excerpt is most important because it succinctly explains the SF experience during the GWOT. And the conclusion tells the story.
Excerpt:
It seems that SF were in the middle of a ‘push and pull’ situation: conventional commanders pushed SFODAs to a more kinetic approach while the public hype surrounding JSOC units like SEAL Team Six likely pulled some SFODAs towards Direct Action. Cohen observed that ’[commando] unit prominence occurs only during a politico-military crisis, for it is then that the public searches for heroes and politicians look for panaceas’.89 At the same time, Cohen rightly contended that ‘[commando] units may be misleading or ambiguous symbols, distorting serious public and governmental discussion of complex issues, encouraging instead a preoccupation with martial theater’.90 Such preoccupation overshadowed UW.
Conclusion
This paper arrives belatedly. Ideally, it should have appeared two decades ago, following Donald Rumsfeld’s advocacy for a centre-stage role of SOCOM in the GWOT. It should have questioned how SOCOM’s emerging role and expansion integrated in the long-established military apparatus and the distinct military cultures. This might have prevented problematic assumptions such as the notion that ‘special operations forces are the darling of the military’, and might have facilitated a more nuanced understanding of U.S. SOF during the GWOT.107 Today, the MA theses corpus contributes to a deeper insight into SF’s challenges during OEF, indicating that deploying SF in their UW role within conventional military frameworks is paradoxical. In essence, conventional military structures and cultures restrict policymakers’ access to SF’s unconventional capabilities. Decision-makers should contemplate deploying SF in organisational structures that align more closely with those used by JSOC units. This might involve establishing tighter links and cooperation with intelligence agencies. Considering the CIA’s experience with UW, it may be the right partner.108 However, any cooperation between SF and an intelligence agency should be preceded by the creation of an appropriate legal framework to balance SF’s freedom of action with accountability to the U.S. people.109
Further research would be beneficial to explore additional topics present in the rich MA corpus. These topics include SF’s problematic reward and career progression system which may ultimately impede their capacity to refine UW skills.110 It is also vital to understand how the nation-builder versus door-kicker dichotomy plays out within SOCOM and whether it adversely affects SF to ensure a comprehensive understanding and application of this national security instrument in the UW context.111 Research on the integration of SF with the conventional military should concentrate more on operational and tactical levels. This could potentially reveal new perspectives on how SF and their conventional counterparts could complement each other.112 However, most crucially, there is a need for further research into the consequences of GWOT on SOF in general. Such research should include a detailed examination of the organisational changes that the SF authors propose as solutions to mitigate some of the adverse consequences of GWOT.
Most of the organisational and cultural obstacles encountered by SF during OEF could have been anticipated and, theoretically, mitigated. For instance, a national security adviser during the Vietnam War, Robert Komer, cautioned that a ’[Military] organization tends to contort policy to existing structures rather than adjusting structures to reflect changes in policy’. Cohen highlighted the cultural tension between the SOF and the conventional military in the late 1970s. During the 1980s, Builder discussed how the extent to which military services and organisations prioritised their sovereignty and survival sometimes diverged from and took precedence over national interests.113 In the 1990s, Amy Zegart pointed out inherent weaknesses in military structures.114
Organisational changes often happen at a glacial pace, undermining military strength and contributing to vulnerabilities in national security. In this case, the U.S. government possesses thousands of SF personnel trained and educated in UW, yet it lacks the military organisational structure necessary to lead a UW campaign as a part of a broader armed forces engagement.
Prima Donnas in Kevlar zones. Challenges to the Unconventional Warfare efforts of the U.S. Special Forces during Operation Enduring Freedom
ABSTRACT
When Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) commenced in October 2001, the U.S. Special Forces (SF) were the first U.S. military unit on the ground in Afghanistan, utilising their Unconventional Warfare (UW) capabilities. Despite their significant role at the initial stage of the military campaign, SF began to encounter numerous challenges from as early as 2002 and throughout OEF. Based on an analysis of forty-five master’s theses authored by SF officers, this paper discusses the structural-organisational and cultural-conceptual challenges. These obstacles led to the marginalisation of SF’s UW efforts. Scholarship on special operations forces (SOF) often regards the period of the so-called global war on terrorism (GWOT) as U.S. SOF’s golden age focusing predominantly on the activities of SOF units linked to the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command rather than on SF. By examining the challenges faced by SF, this article aims to contribute to a more nuanced discussion of SOF efforts during GWOT.