Twin Insurgency, Irregular War, and Oil Theft in Nigeria and Brazil: An Overview

Zachary Z. Horsington

This article reviews the concept of twin insurgency and its constituent components of criminal  insurgency and plutocratic insurgency in order to illuminate case studies of oil theft in Nigeria and Brazil. Gilman’s concept of twin insurgency represents a fusion of Sullivan’s concept of criminal insurgency, and Bunker’s concept of plutocratic insurgency.[1] Mutually, these concepts are essential to perceiving the threat environment associated with Nigerian and Brazilian oil theft, as both cases feature blurred criminality and politics conducted by a range of networked twin insurgent threat actors and their accomplices. As such, Gilman, Sullivan, and Bunker’s concepts concerning the criminal-plutocratic insurgent nexus will be examined, as well as a number of other corresponding irregular warfare theories, before the Nigerian and Brazilian oil theft case studies are investigated in detail.   

Crude Oil Barrells, Niger Delta, Stakeholder Democracy, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Twin Insurgency

Sullivan’s theory of criminal insurgency describes a threat spectrum of criminal evolution between first generation ‘turf’ gangs, and third generation insurgent criminals, differentiated by their politicization, internationalization, and sophistication.[2]

First generation gangs are highly territorial, localized, and limited in political scope, though they nonetheless “undermine the ability of the state to perform its legitimizing security and public service functions” through their low-level unlawfulness.[3] They are typically confined to neighborhoods, where their activities are not highly sophisticated, as compared to subsequent generations.[4]

Second generation criminal organizations, on the other hand, attempt to coopt “bureaucrats and elected officials of a targeted political or security entity,” for profit motivated reasons.[5] “They may embrace a broader political agenda (albeit market focused), operate in a broader (sometimes multi-state) context, and conduct more sophisticated operations,” as they typically leverage emerging net-warrior capabilities.[6] As compared to first generation gangs, there is more expanded territorial and international reach, more complex internal self-organization, more diversified criminal activity, and typically an increase in violence and/or threats of violence against non-aligned individuals.[7]

Finally, third generation entities seek exclusive zones of autonomy, to “de facto (in fact, whether legally or not) transform [themselves] into states-within-a-state,” which are able to leverage “authoritative allocation of values [and resources] in that social or physical terrain”.[8] Thus, “third generation gangs are mercenary/political gangs able to exert a combination of market and political influence to control territory”.[9] Their “evolved political and economic aims” contest, if necessary “the state monopoly of violence in a particular geographic space,” exploiting warlordism, “corruption, privatization of public goods and relativism of all kinds”.[10] Sophisticated criminal insurgents may also leverage near full-spectrum, all-domain capabilities to support their activities when required.[11]

Gilman argues criminal insurgents are often fashioned from “the global disenfranchised,” and concurs with Sullivan that they espouse micro-sovereignties beyond mere profit motivation.[12] Such entities “resist, coopt, and route around states as they seek ways to empower and enrich themselves in the shadows of the global economy”.[13] Simultaneously they “deploy their resources to corrupt, coopt, or challenge incumbent political actors,” although the distinction between criminal and political violence is certainly blurred.[14]

Conversely, Bunker describes plutocratic insurgents as “high net worth globalized elites,” who seek to insulate themselves from “public spaces and obligations—including taxation—and to maximize their ability to generate profits transnationally”.[15] Through predatory capitalism, corruption, public looting, the privatization of public spaces, stateless tax avoidance, and lobbied tax cuts, plutocratic insurgents evade both the law and accountability in luxurious techno-palaces.[16] Often in consort with criminal insurgents, such threat actors also seek to consolidate favorable transnational micro-sovereign enclaves.[17]

Gilman observes that transnational plutocrats increasingly disassociate their personal accomplishments “from the success of the national societies in which they reside”.[18] While some individuals continue to perceive a “debt of obligation to the societies in which they have enriched themselves,” this is a scant and shrinking minority.[19] This has resulted in self-reinforcing positive feedback loops whereby: “plutocratic insurgents increasingly see no reason to contribute anything to their host societies and, indeed, actively contest the idea that citizenship comes with economic responsibilities”.[20] Thus, many are highly open to engaging in corruption, as they see no reflective value or responsibility in influencing efficacious and equitable state functions.

Criminal and plutocratic insurgents “thrive in (and indeed try to foster) weak-state environments,” while at the same time their operations reinforce conditions of weakness.[21] They may migrate and attempt to reshape their environment to exclude competitors and insulate themselves from legal and public accountability. Plutocrats have insurgent potential to exploit transnational systems and local grievances overseas to expand their operations.

The intersection, overlap, and symbiosis between criminal and plutocratic insurgency is a polycephaly Gilman describes through the concept of “twin insurgency”.[22] Both insurgents frequently cooperate and compete with each other to carve out de facto micro-sovereignties and zones of autonomy by disemboweling and decimating anyone’s capacities to constrain their activities.

The final landscape consists of “diverse enclaves of heterogeneous political authority and of non-standardized social-service provisioning arrangements”.[23] As these non-standard arrangements materialize, “national and local authorities proliferate a variety of increasingly one-off exceptions to the general rules, incrementally traducing the liberal notion of equality before the law”.[24] The subsequent “proliferation of exceptional and unique micro sovereignties” enables further “jurisdictional arbitrage,” and non-state demands for “sovereign exceptions”.[25] 

The twin insurgency may also privately run select services and security traditionally provided by the state, and the civilians who live in these pseudo/semi-autonomous sectors of insurgent control “increasingly recognize the insurgents rather than the hollowed-out state as the real source of local power and authority”.[26]

Organized Crime as Irregular Warfare

Ucko and Marks argue there may be merit in applying irregular warfare/counterinsurgency approaches to respond to sophisticated organized crime.[27]

“The point is not to militarize further the response to organized crime. Instead, counterinsurgency in its theory is a political activity. Its contribution to consideration of organized crime is to cast the phenomenon as fueled by specific political and social drivers which must, alongside the criminal actors, also be addressed”.[28]

While Ucko and Marks do not explicitly delineate the threshold whereby a criminal threat actor should be responded to with irregular war/fare approaches beyond traditional law enforcement, Sullivan, Bunker and Gilman’s arguments regarding criminal sovereignty interests transcending greed befittingly provide more clarity on this.[29] 

This demands the population be considered the center of gravity regarding warfare aspects, and sovereign dysfunction concerning the war itself.[30]

Nonetheless, Ucko and Marks highlight how traditional organized crime responses have a “tendency to view the state unquestioningly as a provider, and its enemies as the threat,” which ignores “the very heart of the problem: a lack of government legitimacy and split loyalties among the population”.[31] They emphasize how legitimacy is not static, and instead “subjective, fluid, contextual, and contested; nothing can be taken for granted”.[32] Thus, “the state cannot in any way assume to hold legitimacy merely because it is duly constituted or has legal status”.[33]

Ucko and Marks argue that political elites oftentimes are “more interested in retaining power and privilege than addressing the reasons for strife” when tackling irregular war/fare threats.[34] They note tendencies “to militarize even ‘whole-of-government’ endeavors,” and resource allocations in favor of kinetic operations in such situations, both of which realize actions disconnected from any “viable political process that gives military activity strategic meaning”.[35]

Legitimacy can be shaped through coercion, although “sustaining cooperation is made easier if co-option also plays a role. Either way, gaining legitimacy means more than emotive affinity; it also involves a self-interested calculation that such loyalty is likely to pay off”.[36]

Their arguments reflect “the artificiality of the state in many insurgency-threatened contexts,” and highlight how “in such contexts, the attempted imposition of the state can be deeply counterproductive”.[37] Ucko and Marks advise instead interfacing with “local structures that regulate life away from the state, so that they may be co-opted to benefit both center and periphery within the context of a loosely unified national compact,” as these “local institutions are often seen as more legitimate by the local population”.[38]

Ucko and Marks champion “the state underwriting and empowering informal variations on the periphery, thereby satisfying local needs, empowering local political allies, and contributing to a desire to be part of, rather than resist, the state at the heart of it all”.[39] This is – of course – easier to write than realize. However, their arguments provide nuance in perceiving organized crime as “not an extension of a foreign body to the existing system, country or infrastructure,” but instead as a “product of a country’s history, its social conditions, its economic system, its political elite and its law enforcement regime”.[40] They remark that “this is not an invitation to moral relativism”.[41]

Instead, their arguments offer a kaleidoscope to consider “why social contracts and political settlements are fueling organized crime,” in order to better “distinguish between crime as a coping mechanism and crime as exploitation,” while – of course – scrutinizing “the state’s role in enabling either”.[42] Doing so may enable better differentiation “between foot-soldiers, who in dysfunctional conditions can readily be replaced, and the organizers of criminal activity, who are more inaccessible and may even enjoy some level of state protection”.[43]

Discursive Institutionalism and Irregular War/fare

Hackett argues that sovereignty defines irregular war.[44] While the population may be considered the center of gravity regarding the warfare, the dynamic construct of sovereignty should be considered the center of gravity for the war itself.[45] Previous discussions surrounding the motivations behind Irregular Warfare are highly dichotomous: there is ‘our’ political will and ‘theirs’.[46] Thus, Hackett’s arguments go beyond and consider dis/functional sovereignty as publicly dynamic and intersocial.[47]

Hackett defines irregular war as: “the apotheosis of conflict between the people and the state, a violent dialectic between a faction and a sovereign expressed outside existing political institutions”.[48] He argues that the “intervening factor is sovereign dysfunction, and its presence in the conflict leads to irregular wars in which insurgents, conventional forces, and ­third-party interventions seek to preserve, destroy, or transform the state through organized political violence”.[49]

Hackett describes sovereign dysfunction as “the disconnect between a state’s de jure (legally recognized) structure and its de facto behaviour, especially in the liminal space between what the people demand, what the state promises, and what is delivered”.[50]

Counterinsurgency understands that there is no military solution, but instead a “military component to a larger strategy that is framed in political ends, flanked by all instruments of national power, working in concert through the direction of a single, unified leadership and grand strategy”.[51]

While this seems a basic understanding, Hackett observes throughout the Cold War and the Global War on Terror that thought, practice, and disconnection expose enduring institutional gaps associated with reconciling and interfacing ‘sovereignty’ and public opinion to extinguish irregular threat actors.[52] It is how McChrystal’s Task Force 714 were able to defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) highly efficiently, but could not comprehend the genesis of Islamic State.[53] It is why Afghanistan is governed by the Taliban again today, and how Islamic State and al-Qaeda continue to gain territory across Africa and Asia. This discussion related to sovereignty and irregular war is all the more significant considering climate change and the climate-conflict nexus.[54]

Schmidt’s concept of Discursive Institutionalism is particularly relevant here, as is Däniker’s concept of The Guardian Solider.[55] If state security apparatuses seriously want to better understand Irregular War/fare, in identifying the population and sovereignty as its center of gravity, they must function as more dynamic, socially discursive institutions. Lythgoe (2020) argues against hyper-decentralized command: it is not so much how centralized or decentralized your system is, but how dynamic it is in fluidly interpreting the right state, at the right time, for the right context.[56] The same elasticity is required to inform dialogic interactions in the public domain. However, this is all highly counterintuitive for state security apparatuses, which typically consider secrecy/transparency as binary, see public exposure negatively, and seek minimal partnership.[57]

It is understood that the Information Revolution has transformed state/non-state capacities into self-organized, leveraged instruments of power in novel, efficient ways. The fields of Netwar and Chaoplexic Warfare examine this potential.[58] General Stanley McChrystal’s concepts of a ‘Team of Teams’ and F3EAD (i.e., find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, disseminate) represent applications of these ideas at the most sophisticated and classified level.[59] These theories accentuate complex adaptivity and decentralized operations, although they do not explain how the system should best treat independent feedback in the public domain and public partnership.

Indeed, a critical short-coming concerning Information Operations (IO) identified by Lieutenant Colonel Norman E. Emery, of the US Army, is that it “neglects a key target of irregular warfare: the relevant population not categorized as adversarial”.[60] Security apparatus-public affairs currently function as a one-way street: operations are coordinated through public channels to either support ‘friendly’ forces or disadvantage ‘adversary’.[61]

It is clear that the global threat environment has changed dramatically in the last 25 years. While many of the components of twin insurgency have existed long before Gilman, Sullivan and Bunker, their nexus, hybridization, and capacities today manifest in novel ways that challenge current institutional understanding, jurisdiction, and best practice.[62] As highlighted by Ucko and Marks and Hackett, institutional gaps concerning these threats are not unique to the past or any one nation: more clarity is needed and more discursive methods need to be tested.[63]

All these theories are highly relevant to consider when examining Nigerian and Brazilian oil theft, as state responses have been, and continue to largely be, highly securitized/militarized.

Nigeria

Oil Production and Losses to Theft

Nigeria functions as a mono-economy, depending on oil for over 95% of its export revenue, 6-9% of its GDP, and 70% of its total budget expenditure.[64] More than 90% of its oil production occurs in the Niger Delta Region and offshore.[65]

The magnitude of oil theft in Nigeria is astronomical. Between 2009-2020, the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) found that 619.7m barrels of crude were lost due to theft and sabotage, valued at ₦16.25t (USD46.16b).[66] Security, repairs, and maintenance of damaged assets cost the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) ₦136b (USD91.48m) in 2023.[67] This is slightly less than the ₦147b (USD98.88m) they spent in 2022.[68]

Unprecedented revenue losses were observed between 2019-2022 (USD2.1b, USD1.9b, USD7.2b and USD22.4b respectively).[69] In 2022, losses to theft were upwards of 700,000 barrels per day (bpd).[70] In 2023, National Security Adviser Nuhu Ribadu cited loses of 400,000bpd to thieves.[71] Losses for this year are estimated at 470,000bpd, although many speculate the figures are much higher.[72] This equates to roughly USD700m lost to theft and vandalism each month.[73]

In January 2023, Nigeria’s national oil production rate was 1.4m bpd (condensate and crude) [74] – 1.5m bpd was reported in February, falling to 1.2m bpd in March.[75] For the same three-month period this year (2024), the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC) reported: 1.6m bpd, 1.5m bpd, and 1.4m bpd respectively (condensate and crude).[76]

However, separating crude from condensate reveals: 1.32m bpd in February, 1.23m bpd in March, and 1.28m bpd in April.[77] While the situation may be slightly improving, Nigeria is nonetheless tight-rope walking its OPEC quota of 1.5m barrels per day, and clearly relying on condensate to veneer its production.[78]

The state of Nigeria’s oil facilities is also dire. The Federal Government owns four refineries, although none are currently operational.[79] Two may be online by the end of this year.[80] Likewise, out of 57 Petroleum Prospecting Licences (PPL) displayed by the NUPRC, about 33 are non-producing oil blocs.[81]

Government security efforts offshore have been successful, although they have arguably displaced and entrenched threats onshore. The International Maritime Bureau indicates a decline in offshore criminality within the Gulf of Guinea since 2021.[82] Nigeria accounted for 17% of reported incidents in 2021, compared to 42% in 2020.[83] While no incidents were reported offshore in 2022, onshore oil theft that year was the worst Nigeria has ever experienced. Indeed, most incidents offshore in 2021 occurred in anchorages, ports and harbors, which should have signaled signs of threat displacement.[84]

Considering Nigeria’s oil is produced mainly in the Niger Delta, it is here where the majority of oil theft occurs. The displacement of the pirates closer to the coastline and back ashore since 2022 has only magnified onshore oil theft and the diversity of threat actors involved.

The graph below shows NNPC reported weekly cases of theft for the first few months of 2024.[85] Igbintade finds monthly case numbers oscillate around 1,337.[86] Udi (2024) finds the majority of reported theft cases occur in the Central and Eastern regions of the Niger Delta, with less and less occurring offshore in deep water.[87] 

Figure 1: NNPC Weekly Reported Theft Cases [85]

The situation is so bad that Shell recently decided to completely divest its onshore assets and exclusively operate offshore.[88] While the Federal Government recently announced that Shell, Total Energies, and Exxon Mobil have committed to invest USD13.5b over the next two years to increase Nigerian oil output overall, a number of significant challenges need to be overcome before any robust security can be realized.[89]

Enduring Grievances and Livelihood Security in the Niger Delta Region

The 1966 anti-Igbo pogrom contributed to the outbreak of Nigeria’s Civil War, although Biafra’s oil wealth and Federal Government opportunism should not be understated as causes as well.[90] As argued by Okwelum, “Biafra’s independence would certainly have cut the nation’s [potential] oil wealth production in half,” which they argue influenced the Federal Government to extinguish any chance at Biafra secessionism.[91] Niger Delta communities continue to experience ethnic disenfranchisement, external exploitation, and livelihood insecurity.

Niger Delta underdevelopment and persistent pollution is not merely a product of local criminality and oil theft: persistent federal mismanagement, corruption, and greed define national resource allocation and economic activity.[92] It has been estimated that more than 80% of Nigeria’s oil and gas revenues benefit just 1% of the populous.[93] Simultaneously, 50% of Nigeria has been designated impoverished by the World Bank, and 40% of those under age 25 in the Niger Delta Region are unemployed.[94] The recent removal of government fuel subsidies has not helped to remedy the situation.[95] 

In 2007, Nigeria’s unemployment rate was 6%; in 2019, it was 30%.[96] More generally, the Nigerian Federal Government has not harmonized economic development and reinvestment into the country’s surging population.[97] Currently at 200m, Nigeria’s population is set to double by 2050.[98] Current policy and practice cannot accommodate such growth. Recent protests highlight how government disenfranchisement is fervent nationwide.

Nigerian food inflation stands at 40%, and according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the country already has the highest number of food insecure people on the planet (31.8 million).[99] The naira (currency) has lost 70% of its value against the US dollar over the past two years, following two devaluations.[100] Petrol prices are rising sharply, and electricity droughts continue to plague large swaths of the population.[101] National food, economic, and power insecurity will continue to magnify instability across the Niger Delta, unless more substantive internal transformation occurs. As such, Niger Delta grievances are likely to persist and deepen.   

Animosity is also directed against foreign oil corporations, who are perceived to be a neo-colonial presence in-country. They have long been considered by many Nigerians to be dishonest, exploitative, and/or ethnically/religiously prejudiced. In 1993, Shell operations were affected by over 100 communal disturbances, which contributed to the loss of approximately 12m barrels of oil, worth around ₦369b (USD248m).[102] Shell’s recent decision to move exclusively offshore reveals the company’s reduced risk appetite, although the decision is perhaps also influenced by the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in favor of Shell regarding a USD878m oil spill case, which had previously halted the sale of its onshore assets.[103] Local apathy towards foreign oil conglomerates also stems from their reputation (whether warranted or not) for environmental degradation.

Corporate community development initiatives have also been lackluster and at times outright counterproductive. They have willing called for harsh security responses against demonstrators, and have paid out millions to co-opt local chiefs.[104] The formal authority of chiefs is still not officially constitutionally defined, and is currently being reviewed.[105]

Conflict has spiked before, and will continue to do so, until underlying dysfunctional sovereignty and the Niger Delta’s underdevelopment are addressed. Hundreds of oil facilities were vandalized between 1998-2003, and ethnic militias escalated between 2005-2010 to taking hostages, detonating cars, and attacking installations on-land and at-sea.[106] Losses in revenue related to direct attacks against Nigerian oil infrastructure cost the Federal Government USD6.8b between 1999-2004, and losses sharply increased again around 2006/7.[107]

Bish et al. highlight that, while amnesty programs were introduced after the 2008 surge in Niger Delta violence, persistent low intensity conflict since 2012 indicates unaddressed and simmering grievances and tensions.[108] Indeed, the amnesty program itself has been scrutinized for its inconsistent Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) principles, lack of supplementary employment for many militants, sporadic salaries, discrimination, and generous stipends to select militant leadership.[109] The failure of demobilization and youth movements has further augmented the influence of cults, militia, and street gangs.[110]

Thus, as argued by Okwelum, the disenfranchised communities of the Niger Delta region perceive oil theft to be a “display of local expertise and an entrepreneurial free market response to local economic dysfunction, chronic energy shortages, and government’s failure to deliver on basic public services,” rather than a criminal activity.[111] Historical legacy, underdevelopment, external exploitation and environmental devastation continue to fuel local resentments which transliterate into criminality, namely oil theft, in an attempt to alleviate “their impoverished condition”.[112]

While many Nigerian Criminal Armed Groups (CAGs) espouse separatism or flaunt ethnic and religious sentiments, considering the dire economic situation in the Niger Delta, significant scrutiny is required to decipher and distinguish socio-political interests from financial motivations. Such distinction is necessary to discriminate criminal insurgents from organized criminals. While it is clear that dysfunctional sovereignty is apparent in the Niger Delta Region, clearer differentiation between these threat actors is necessary to better tailor state response. 

As argued by Okwelum: “The face of the jerry-can-wielding-rural-poor is not the face of oil theft.” Considering the flagrant and widespread corruption, “they are [merely] the foot soldiers paraded before the public as a decoy and deceit”.[113] As argued by Katsina, and Moliki, Nkwede, and Dauda, structural, socio-economic, and political imbalances predominantly fuel Nigeria’s national security threats.[114] Until such factors are adequately addressed, twin insurgency will continue to thrive in Nigeria.

Theft Techniques, Capabilities and Criminal Insurgents

Nigerian oil theft is not technologically sophisticated. Basic hot and cold tapping and scooping practices are widespread. Tanker interdiction occurs in littoral waters, and so-called artisanal refineries are pervasive across the Niger Delta Region.

A spokesperson for Tantita Security Services Nigeria Limited, a Nigerian private security company led by former militant leader Government Ekpemupolo (a.k.a. Tompolo), recently said that: “Most of the [stolen] oil is locally refined from the Niger Delta. A vessel can bring 10,000tons from Europe, take 60,000tons from Niger Delta, and falsify the documents, claiming it is from Europe”.[115]

Trucks are also used to transport stolen oil to “neighboring Cameroon, Niger Republic, Chad and so on. Nigerian oil goes everywhere”.[116] Oil is stored in sacks for handling purposes and camouflage.[117] To pass through the abundance of road blocks in Nigeria, a single number plate will be legitimately registered for transit, and forgeries of the relevant documentation will be used by multiple trucks.[118]

No sooner is one tap or distillery shutdown before multiple replacements appear, “in a few hours”.[119] Moreover, “you will find women and children inside the bush working and contributing their share to the oil theft”.[120] Thieves often install CCTV around their taps to provide early warning against security forces.[121]

Threat actors have attacked oil facilities with light weapons and explosives; industry personnel have been kidnapped; and many are implicated in egregious inter-ethnic/religious/community human rights abuses. Coordinated industrial action has also occurred. 

Threat actors are typically armed with indigenously produced small arms, although looting government stores and smuggling have provided more sophisticated weapons. In 2021, The Organized Crime Index ranked Nigeria far higher than the West African average (8 vs 5.5).[122] The Eastern Security Network (ESN) and Boko Haram are both known to loot government stockpiles, and the Cameroonian border towards the Southeast is known to be assailable.[123] Simultaneously, Nigeria’s indigenous arms manufacturing industry is ever-expanding.

Indigenously produced models are typically four times cheaper than imported pieces, and a rudimentary pistol can cost as little as ₦3,500 (USD2.4).[124] For perspective, Nigeria’s official minimum wage is ₦70,000 (USD43) per month, although it is likely to be much less in practice. In 2022, a Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons estimated that 60% of illegal arms in circulation in Southeast Nigeria are artisanal pieces.[125] Nigeria’s artisanal light arms production is now a fully-fledged local industry, which will significantly complicate future DDR.

Irregular threat actor groups associated with oil theft typically operate as cellular networks rather than as hierarchies.[126] Nearly all threat groups are resilient to leadership decapitation as well, as they operate cells, frequently referred to as ‘houses’ or ‘decks’.[127]

Most oil thieves do not associate themselves with a specific threat actor group. Group affiliation and overt marketing typically attracts government attention and fierce response. Thus, most oil thieves affiliate informally across ethnic, religious, and community lines. Groups may be temporarily formed or revived, and criminals may participate across multiple groups and localities.

Despite the opaque threat environment a few notable groups may be differentiated as insurgent criminals. Other, purely profit-motivated groups exist too, as do other less publicized separatist movements involved in oil theft.

Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB): A separatist group founded in 2012 that seeks to re-establish an independent Biafran state.[128] The group commands significant influence over Nigeria’s ethnic Igbo community and claims resource/land rights within Biafra’s historic borders (present-day Abia, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bayelsa, Cross River, Ebonyi, Enugu, Rivers, Imo States, Nigeria).[129] Mazi Chika Edoziem (previously deputy) is its new leader, as Nnamdi Kanu (leader since 2013 and British citizen) is currently imprisoned by the Department of State Services (DSS).[130] The group’s spokesman is Emma Powerful. Dr. Fredrick Onyeali and Onyekachukwu Ezemba are the original founders of the current IPOB movement.

The group operates the Eastern Security Network (ESN) and Black Marines as security forces. ESN is quite a sophisticated paramilitary entity, evidenced by a prison break in Imo State in 2021, which freed 1,800 IPOB inmates.[131] The group is still very active, and recently claimed the lives of six civilians and five soldiers in Aba.[132] The military responded by launching a raid which attempted to arrest those responsible, although six IPOB were killed in a firefight.[133]

In April, 2021, IPOB formally allied itself with the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC) and the Ambazonia Defence Forces.[134] The alliance was denounced by the Interim Government of Ambazonia as well as by other Biafran separatist groups.

Niger Delta Avengers (NDA): Openly seeks to cripple oil production.[135] Threatened ‘Operation Humble’ in June 2021, a campaign of violence against the NFG, as well as the destruction of oil installations, although no attacks were publicly attributed to them after this statement.[136] Field Commander Tu-ere, (AKA Queen of the Creeks) was assigned to lead the operation, who was previously involved in bombing the Chevron Valve offshore platform in May, 2016; the Shell Forcados 48-inch Export line in June, 2016; and the Exxon Mobil Qua Iboe 48 Crude Oil Pipeline in July, 2016. Known to operate in Ondo, Bayelsa, Edo, Delta, Imo, Abia and Akwa Ibom States, Nigeria.[137] In June last year, NDA spokesperson Mudoch Agbinibo called for:

“The international community to come and support the restoration of our rights to peaceful self-determination… Since the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914 to date, our resources have been used to sustain the political administrative livewire of Nigeria to the exclusion of the Niger Delta… We want our resources back to restore the essence of human life in our region for generations to come because Nigeria has failed to do that. The world should not wait until we go the Sudan way”.[138]

Unyekisong Akwa Ibom (UAI): Comprises former members of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta Volunteer Force, Movement for the Actualization of the Niger Delta Republic, Niger Delta People’s Salvation Force, Niger Delta Avengers, Niger Delta Liberation Force and Niger Delta Movement for Justice and Niger Delta Warrior.[139]

Akwa Ibom indigenes argue militant amnesty programs have consistently discriminated against them.[140] UAI views government amnesty/peace initiatives in the Niger Delta as inherently discriminatory and enablers of corruption. The group seeks to secure oil facilities within their territory, and issued ultimatums to the Nigerian government in 2021 and 2022, although no action followed.[141] UAI is believed to still be led by General Dede Udofia and Major Ibanga Ekang.

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND): Despite the group having officially dissolved, it is understood that factions/ethno-religious groups previously under the umbrella of MEND continue to operate independently to this day.

Other groups that have previously attacked/threatened oil operations which may be active or have members acting autonomously: Niger-Delta People’s Volunteer Force; Red Egbesu Water Lions; Joint Niger-Delta Liberation Force; Niger-Delta Red Squad; Niger-Delta Greenland Justice Mandate; Niger-Delta Youth Movement; Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People; Federated Niger-Delta Ijaw Communities; Niger-Delta Liberation Force; Niger-Delta Civil Society Coalition; Coalition of Niger-Delta Agitators; Bakassi Strike Force; Niger Delta Vigilante; the Icelanders; and the Outlaws.[142] This list is not exhaustive.

Cult groups are also influential, leveraging “whole communities, churches, schools- universities, secondary schools and even primary schools, government positions and political structures in the Niger Delta”.[143] Both cults and militia function strong traditional spiritual elements, “mainly based on the revival and strong influence of the Egbesu deity in Ijaw communities”.[144]

Finally, many of these threat actors are sophisticated net-warriors as they involve themselves in complex and robust networks, however they may not be technologically elaborate and benefit from the ancillary operational security.

The Nigerian Armed Forces

Bala argues: “Nigerian security is influenced by a garrison military mentality”.[145] Joab-Peterside also argues that the “state’s approach to security is dominated by the character of deterrence exhibited by unrestrained willingness to show maximum force at the slightest hint of insecurity”.[146]

Nigeria’s history of colonialism and 36 years of post-independence military dictatorship have influenced a status quo whereby “force is used for punitive rather than preventative and corrective purposes of civil law enforcement and justice delivery”.[147] Despite over two decades of democracy in Nigeria, its armed forces continue to preponderate over the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) regarding internal security operations. This is despite the NPF being “constitutionally created for and mandated for the task”.[148] The armed forces have displayed steadfast interest in managing internal security operations, oftentimes directly interfering with police efforts.[149] Simultaneously, the military persistently laments how overstretched its forces are and how distracted it is from its primary constitutional responsibility: defending Nigeria’s territorial integrity.[150]

The tendency to militarize internal security response has resulted in significant internal distrust and rivalry between the armed forces and its civilian counterparts.[151] Agencies operate as silos and intelligence is more often hoarded, rather than shared.[152]

Despite an inordinate amount of disbursement towards the armed forces and numerous kinetic and non-kinetic operations in the Niger Delta Region, oil theft and criminal insurgency remain entrenched. As argued by Hackett, there should only be a “military component” to a holistic grand strategy, “flanked by all instruments of national power, working in concert,” which maneuvers a political end.[153] Nigeria’s military has dominated internal security operations since its independence, although the threat environment in the Niger Delta Region has not much improved. It is time to consider alternative methods and more efficacious and equitable federal resource allocation. 

Hybrid Sovereign Actors

The severity of the security situation in Southeastern Nigeria has seen the emergence of hybrid sovereign, non-state (often armed) groups in response to the criminality and weaponary.

As mentioned previously, former Niger Delta warlord Government Ekpemupolo (a.k.a. Tompolo) leads Tantita Security Services Nigeria Limited. In August, 2023 Tantita was awarded a one-year contract worth ₦48b (USD32.3m) to provide security services to the Niger Delta Region.[154] This is not the first time the Federal Government has allegedly been contractually involved with Tompolo, as it bought 20 maritime patrol vessels worth over ₦15b (USD103.4m) from Global West Vessel Specialist Limited in 2012, a company widely believed to be owned by him.[155] Tantita currently claims to oversee 9m of its own staff, 38m community youth, and 22m intelligence agents.[156] There appears a clear conflict of interest, or at the very least collusion. Yet, Tompolo’s efforts have attracted praise, and his security forces have displayed successes in-field. Other private security entities do exist, such as Galaxy Security Services.[157]

State governments have also established their own hybrid sovereign organizations to maintain security. In January 2020, all six Southern Nigerian states united to establish the Western Nigeria Security Network (WNSN) (a.k.a. Operation Àmò̩té̩kùn, i.e., Operation ‘to kill as fast as a cheetah’ in Yorùbá).[158] Àmò̩té̩kùncontinues to operate across all Southwestern Nigerian states except Lagos, with personnel comprising of “vigilantes, local hunters, community youths, farmers and menial workers”.[159]

In April 2021, Ebonyi State setup the Ebube Agu Security apparatus.[160] This was formally disbanded by Nigerian courts early 2023 after evidence suggested the group was involved in “human rights abuses, extortions, illegal arrests and [illegal] use of fire arms”.[161] State governments command no constitutional power to arm indigenous security networks they form, and thus, many groups are in direct breach of Nigeria’s separation of powers and its monopoly over violence.[162]

As argued by Bish et al. and Joab-Peterside, many of these state-level hybrid sovereign entities are politicized in the run-up to elections to support or deter certain candidates.[163] This not only undermines public confidence regarding the efficacy of the existence of such groups, but also erodes Nigeria’s democratic process, and contributes to escalating violence.

Hybrid sovereign/private actors can provide stability if they are properly overseen and managed within legal frameworks. The presence of so many such actors, and the legacies of misuse, clearly dilute the Federal Government’s monopoly on violence and erodes Nigeria’s sovereignty.

The Nigerian Police Force

The NPF is significantly impeded in its ability to respond to threats associated with systematic oil theft in Nigeria. It functions as a federal police force. As argued by Baje, NPF officers are “inadequately trained, live in dilapidated barracks, and are poorly paid”.[164] At the same time, they are understaffed and/or are diverted to conduct personal private protection.

The NPF officially employed over 370,000 officers in August 2023. Nigeria’s population stands at approximately 220m.[165] The International Association of Chiefs of Police recommended ratio of officers to citizens is 3.4:1000, and United Nations’ stands at 1:450.[166] Nigeria currently sits around 1:600, which is insufficient considering the domestic security situation.

As argued by Ibrahim, this statistic is also undermined by the fact that around 150,000 of the officers are “engaged in VIP protection, rather than routine policing”.[167] While many Inspector Generals have committed to ceasing rented private protection services from NPF officers, the widespread practice continues.[168]

A significant community policing initiative was launched in September 2020, whereby the government allocated ₦13b (USD35m) to absorb 10,000 new constables.[169] Not much has been gained from this, as underlying issues associated with NPF have not been rectified; corruption and mismanagement continue to be widespread; and the oil theft situation has not improved.

Corruption, Dysfunctional Sovereignty and Legislative Gaps 

As argued by Nigerian senator Orji Uzor Kalu, tapping and illegal refining “only make up for a small portion of the theft,” although their “environmental impact is vast”.[170] As argued by Senator Kalu, Okwelum and Tantita spokesmen, the plutocratic insurgency associated with coordinating and managing Nigerian oil theft represents a significant threat to national security.[171]

Okwelum highlights there is a tendency to “inflate the quantity stolen in order to magnify the enormity of the scourge and justify the need for deploying the armed forces,” or to “minimize the quantity stolen in order to attenuate the adverse publicity it exposes the industry internationally and collaterally and in order to attract direct foreign investment,” when it suits the “state-oil-complex”.[172] Simultaneously, as argued by Garuba, the presidency of Ibrahim Babangida (1986-1993) also entrenched nepotistic Federal appointments regarding Nigerian oil officials who supervise the industry.[173]

As argued by Moses, on the one hand “corrupt resident oil authority officials allow for the successful tapping of oil pipelines,” and on the other “the Nigerian security forces or militant organizations offer guided escorts for the transportation of stolen refined crude oil products”.[174] Indeed, security forces have frequently been accused of “facilitating the disappearance of captured vessels and re-appropriated sale of seized products to foreign markets”.[175]

While the Nigerian Navy may report historic destructions of illegal oil refineries, as argued by Bish et al., oil thieves and site owners merely interpret crackdowns as “attempts to pressure them into paying bribes”.[176] Former Governor of Rivers State, Nyesom Wike, openly accused the Nigerian military of actively and systematically colluding with oil thieves, and Human Rights Watch cites widespread corruption across all Nigeria’s service branches.[177] On-land state security operations are known to be plagued with corruption too. For example, the Governor of Borno State, Professor Babagana Zulum, personally witnessed state security forces associated with ‘Operation Positive Identification’ collect illegal tolls at a checkpoint along the Maiduguri-Damaturu highway.[178] Such extortion justifiably ignites public outcry, and continues to undermine public perceptions of the Armed Forces.

As argued by Bamidele Ademola-Olateju, a former commissioner in Ondo State: “[Nigerian] oil theft is not for the poor, it is an extensive racket involving the military, security apparatchiks, politicians, dubious industrial moguls and the oil companies”.[179] Nigerian plutocratic insurgency is naturally obscure, although plenty of admonitions exist, and persisting legislative gaps and elastic legal instruments continue to appear. 

Both the Ayo Irikefe Commission of Inquiry – an investigation instigated by the Shagari against the Obasanjo administration regarding missing oil assets worth ₦2.8b (USD1.9m) – and the Pius Okigbo Panel of Inquiry – an investigation instigated by the Abacha against the Babangida administration following the post-Gulf War oil bounce of the 1990s – were obfuscated and subdued by corruption.[180] Formal transparency and accountability measures associated with oil theft and federal inquiry have not improved at all.

The Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Mallam Sanusi Lamido, has cited that between January 2012 and July 2013, the NNPC itself was defrauded of 594m barrels of crude valued at approximately USD65.3b, and was only able to recover approximately USD15.5b (24% of the total value) of this lost oil, therefore failing to account for roughly USD49.8b.[181]

A more recent controversy involved the Deep Blue Project (DBP), an integrated maritime awareness scheme, led by the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA). DBP was funded from the Cabotage Vessel Financing Fund (CVFF).[182] The CVFF was established under the Coastal and Inland Shipping Act (a.k.a. the Cabotage Act of 2003) to foster indigenous tonnage to work within Nigerian waters.[183] Two percent of the CVFF was allocated to Nigerian ship owners so that they could borrow money from the fund at single digit interest rates for littoral cabotage trading.[184] However, in December 2021, a member of the House of Representatives accused NIMASA and then-Minister of Transportation Rotimi Amaechi of diverting USD195m from the CVFF to fund the DBP without House approval.[185] This is despite the fact that no ship owner has successfully accessed the CVFF since its inception.[186]

Extra-budgetary expenditures known as ‘security votes’ are also known to be flagrantly abused.[187] As highlighted by Bala, these funds are “not subject to the government executives’ declaration and not under the scrutiny of the public or even the established government auditing institutions of the anti-corruption agencies”.[188] These pseudo slush funds operate formally and informally, and are used to realize political and personal objectives. Transparency International exposed these ‘security votes’ account for around USD670m annually.[189] As argued by Bala, this dwarfs the annual international security assistance Nigeria receives. It is more than the Nigerian Army’s budget, more than the Nigerian Navy and Air Force’s annual budgets combined, and exceeds 70% of the Nigerian Police Force’s annual budget.[190] More transparent frameworks are necessary in order to restore public confidence, and more impartial resource allocation is desperately needed.

Ex parte law is also brazenly abused, with the use of emergency judicial decisions in legal cases. Convener of the Transparent Bar Initiative, Douglas Ogbankwa, has faulted some law enforcement agencies regarding their frequently arbitrary and coercive use.[191] He highlighted that many ex parte motions “were done without the knowledge of the account holders, who should be aware of the situation in order to defend themselves”.[192]

Senate President, Godswill Akpabio, also recently stated that the abuse of ex parte orders in political cases by judges should be curbed.[193] “To curb it, it is imperative that the National Judicial Council exercises stringent oversight. We recommend prompt and decisive punishment for judges who are found to abuse their authority in this manner”.[194]

Significant legislative gaps also exist. Both Nigeria’s Terrorist Acts (2011 and 2013) lack a national definition for terrorism, and the Federal Government’s stance regarding negotiation with threat actors is not clear.[195] Likewise, no laws currently regulate the management of ill-gotten-gains associated with kidnapping and piracy following criminal capture.[196] Seized illegal proceeds are always forfeited to the Federal Government.

Pervasive and systematic nepotism also undermines rule of law and due process. As highlighted by Bala, government/military appointments are typically defined across ethno-religious and political lines rather than meritocracy.[197] Such practices “breed disregard for the rule of law,” and jeopardize interagency synergy.[198] Prevalent corruption across Nigeria continues to create dysfunctional sovereignty, which will continue to encourage irregular threat actors.

State Police?

Nigeria currently does not operate State Police, although discussion regarding their formation is occurring in government. While some local police forces did exist in the 1960s, all were either eventually absorbed into the NPF or dismantled following military dictatorship.[199] The topic of state police has been fiercely contested, as many believe they should have been reinstated in 1999, following the end of military dictatorship.[200]

House of Assembly speakers from across all 36 states recently announced their support for the proposal in a communiqué.[201] State legislators still need to endorse an official amendment to be passed onto the National Assembly.[202] However, two-thirds of Nigeria’s National Assembly must endorse it, followed by the President, for it to be realized.[203] President Bola Tinubu has championed and campaigned for State Police for decades, and thus he is unlikely to reject it.[204] Noticeable supporters include Senate President Godswill Akpabio and former President Goodluck Jonathan.[205] Although, while the Minister of Police Affairs, Senator Ibrahim Gaidam has shown his support, the Inspector General of Police directly contradicts him.[206]

Many have argued for a long time that the adoption of state police would enable more effective and efficient policing.[207] Advocates highlight current limitations regarding the highly centralized command associated with the NPF. Nwogwugwu and Kupoluyi explain that a federally centralized police system alienates police as an institution and a service from rural communities.[208] As argued by Moliki, Nkwede, and Dauda: “The peculiarity of the security challenges of each state can be better managed by the officers who understands the language, geography and the peculiar security challenge of the people they would be policing”.[209] Considering Nigeria is home to over 300 ethnic groups who vary across a range of social, religious, economic, and geographic factors, Tony also highlights the need for “a policing model that is adaptable and sensitive to local contexts”.[210] It is this line of argument, focused around “local exclusiveness”, which Senator Ibrahim Gaidam, Minister of Police Affairs, champions too. While states currently administer their own magistrates, high courts, assemblies and legislators, they do not command the concomitant powers to police their own territories.[211] While this does consolidate the Federal Government’s monopoly on violence, state sovereignty is affected, and the NPF remain spread thin across 774 localities commanded from Abuja.[212]

Conversely, ex-Lagos police commissioner, Abubakar Tsav, stated that the “establishment of state police will signal the beginning of the disintegration of the country,” as he believes that state governments would deploy their new forces “against their perceived political opponents”.[213] In 2018 he argued that politicians “are not civilized enough and tolerant of opposing views and cannot preside over a competent and impartial police force”.[214] His sentiments have been echoed by many, including the Inspector General of Police (IGP) Kayode Egbetokun, although such arguments often extend to also include ethnic, community, and religious adversaries too.[215] As observed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives Abbas Tajudeen, “there is a palpable fear among our citizens – a fear of potential tyranny and the misuse of police powers if control is devolved to the state level”.[216] Indeed, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) in 1958 and the Willink Commission both opposed regional police on these grounds.[217]

Alternatively, Emeritus Catholic Archbishop of Abuja, John Cardinal Onaiyekan, Assistant Inspector General of Police, Ben Okolo, and the Oluwo of Iwo, Oba Abdulrosheed Akanbi all suggest mending the dire state of the NPF first.[218] This includes hiring more officers, improving their welfare package, and enhancing overall NPF capabilities and infrastructure. Simultaneously, the Assistant Inspector General suggested merging the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Commission (NSCDC) and the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC) under the command of the NPF.[219]

State police could very well be misused, and punishing such practices would represent a new responsibility for the NPF. Considering that the current separation of powers is murky, appropriate transparency and accountability measures could enhance state-federal cooperation, facilitate more autonomous state level security, and ultimately contribute to healthier national unity.

In order to tackle the twin insurgency, the Federal Government must not merely continue to invest in improving its police and military, but also seriously consider more substantive and equitable socioeconomic development and DDR in the Niger Delta Region.

Brazil

Oil Theft and Threat Actor Overview

Romsom argues that both Nigeria and Brazil “show characteristics of the state as smuggler model”.[220] While criminal insurgency is not so prevalent in Brazil, as the majority of criminals stealing oil do not overtly espouse sovereignty aspirations, plutocratic insurgency is nonetheless rife.

Oil theft has evolved into a conspicuous threat in Brazil since around 2014, when it reported a single incident.[221] In 2016, 73 incidents were reported.[222] Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras), the Brazilian state oil company observed that most of the oil theft that year occurred on the São Paulo-Rio de Janeiro axis, which is where five of the company’s largest refineries are located.[223]

Above and below ground, hot and cold taps are erected by Brazilian oil thieves, much like in Nigeria, although the quantities they steal is markedly less significant.[224] In November 2023, approximately 30,000 liters of stolen fuel were intercepted by police, taken from the São Paulo-Brasília (Osbra) pipeline, which supplies the International Airport of Brasilia.[225] Four men were arrested, and around R$780,000 (USD138,000) worth of damage was inflicted.[226] Killings have been linked to oil theft operations, and there are indications that ‘turf’ wars exist between gangs regarding where their taps reside.[227] A few incidents have caused spills too.[228]

Much like in Nigeria, criminals use tanker and water trucks to smuggle stolen fuel to concealed artisanal refineries, after which it is sold at illegal service stations or small-town, streetside vendors.[229] Brazil’s Federal Highway Police have increased the number of roadblocks they operate between Rio and São Paulo, although as observed in Nigeria, these may be easily circumvented by organized criminals.[230] Brazilian groups have previously generated false cargo invoices to deceive police.[231] Roadside hijackings of fuel trucks also regularly occur, with around ten cases a week occurring between the Gabriel Passos Refinery and the Ring Road.[232] Drivers do not typically suffer any injuries during these incidents, although the frequency with which they occur is increasing.[233]

Brazilian law enforcement has responded and successfully dismantled many gangs associated with oil theft. Indeed, Transpetro, the logistics unit of Petrobras, reported a 60% decline in fuel theft at its pipes in São Paulo in 2020.[234] In June, three full and four empty trucks were seized in Fazenda Garcia, in Guapimirim, in the Baixada Fluminense, following an anonymous tip, which cited seeing 15 armed men.[235] A 100,000 liters of stolen fuel were seized, and one man was eventually detained.[236]

Likewise, in May 2024 an adulterated fuel laboratory was dismantled by police, in Dias d'Ávila, Salvador, Bahia.[237] 600,000 liters of adulterated fuel were seized, including diesel, gasoline and ethanol, which was likely destined to be resold to gas stations.[238] Ten trucks and three fixed tanks were found (storing cargo worth R$3.3m [USD584,000]), as well as suction machines, hoses, gloves, dye, fuel symbology plates, samples of fuel types, and accounting documents.[239] Another adulterated fuel laboratory was also previously shut down by police in Feira de Santana, in January 2024.[240]

Overall, theft overall costs Transpetro over R$150m (USD28.2m) a year.[241] Gangs may be quickly formed and dismantled, and may steal millions in less than a year.[242]

A police operation in July 2023, which served 47 search and seizure warrants across Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Espírito Santo and Paraná exposed one such group.[243] Three chiefs oversaw the organization: one was responsible for scouts and drivers; another managed logistics and clandestine fuel derivation and extraction; and one was the financial director.[244] Specialists also included tap installers, recruiters who targeted professionals who worked mainly on oil platforms, welders, truck suppliers and false invoice forgers.[245]

Harsher penalties were recently introduced specifically concerning fuel theft. In April, Brazil’s Infrastructure Commission passed bill 828/2022, which increased the punishment regarding theft of petroleum or derivatives, natural gas, hydrated ethyl alcohol, fuel, or other fuel fluids from four to ten years imprisonment, plus a fine.[246] Receipt of such illicit products will earn the same punishment.[247] Senator Alessandro Vieira also partially accepted an amendment proposed by Senator Luis Carlos Heinze to include biofuels as well.[248] The rapporteur added that the storage of such illegal fuel products may also be considered a crime.[249]

Nonetheless, oil thieves in Brazil are markedly white-collar. Indeed, as argued by Slattery, Brazilian criminals “have infiltrated the four largest gasoline chains in Brazil,” whereby they are estimated to control “hundreds, if not thousands,” of service stations.[250] Paulo Miranda, head of the industry group Fecombustíveis, cites that First Capital Command (one of Brazil's most notorious organized criminal groups) controls approximately 300 gas stations in São Paulo state alone, which accounts for 3% of Brazil’s pumps.[251] Oil grafting at stations is lucrative, and Instituto Combustive Legal estimates the illicit industry to be valued at around R$23b (USD4.2b) a year.[252] Many groups also fence illicit petroleum products through asphalt companies too.[253]

Oil criminals in Brazil also exploit petroleum tax regimes between states, as they vary widely region-to-region.[254] Ethanol tax in Rio de Janeiro is 32%, compared to 13% in neighboring São Paulo.[255] This creates huge incentive to conduct criminality across state lines. Brazilian think tank Fundação Getúlio Vargasestimated that criminals reaped approximately R$7.2b (USD1.3b) in 2019 through such fuel tax evasion alone.[256]

Oil theft in Mexico has divulged into a glaringly similar situation to Nigeria, whereby billions of dollars of oil are unaccounted for each year by the state oil company Pemex. Colombia and Venezuela are also affected, although to a lesser degree. In Colombia, siphoned oil is increasingly refined into “pategrillo,” a low-grade fuel fabricated at illegal refineries used to produce cocaine.[257] Smith observes a positive relationship in Colombia between increased cocaine production and increased oil theft.[258] Considering that at least 22 organized crime groups operate across approximately one-quarter of Brazil’s Amazon rainforest, it is likely that a similar dynamic functions in Brazil.[259]

Hybrid Sovereign Actors

A myriad of similar, different, and competing hybrid sovereign and private security actors function policing across Brazil.[260] As argued by Durão, Larkins, and Argentin, the Brazilian federal police have not effectively regulated state branches regarding the widespread practice of ‘bico’, whereby police establish or participate in private security. Through a series of interviews, they discovered that such practices are “not only tolerated, but even encouraged by police superiors”.[261]

“Rather than seeing the blurring between different fields of security and police and crime as signs of incomplete democratization or incomplete regulation,” Durão, Larkins and Argentin (2023) observe jurisdictional ambiguity as an “intentional productive force which allows for material gain for key actors, in this case police officers themselves”.[262]

Nonetheless, they argue that “the confusion between public and private policing for some may essentially mean earning extra money, but for many others it constitutes an endless extension of power, violence, entrepreneurship and political influence”.[263] Such is the case in Nigeria as well, and both the Brazilian and the Nigerian government must do more to better regulate these non-state security forces to ameliorate public confidence, and/or strengthen and consolidate official state forces so that there may be no need for extraneous redundancies.

Corruption

Transparency International attributed a score of 36/100 (i.e., 0=highly corrupt and 100=very clean) to Brazil in 2023, placing it 104/180 on its global corruption perceptions index.[264] In 2012, Brazil scored 43/100, an all-time historic peak, just before the massive Lava Jato corruption scandal enveloped the state oil company Petrobras, and numerous contractors and politicians.[265] Brazil’s overall corruption is incrementally worsening, which will likely exacerbate oil theft across the country. Its security architecture has also been observed to be significantly affected by a lack of transparency, police brutality, machismo, and prejudice toward certain minority groups.[266]

Simultaneously, Milícia have existed across Brazil for more than half a century.[267] Their current form spawned from Rio de Janeiro’s favelas in the late 1990s and early 2000s, under the pretense of residential narco protection.[268] Predominantly comprised of active-duty and retired police officers, milícia extort rent from communities under their assumed control.[269] In 2013, it was found that across approximately 1,000 favelas in Rio de Janeiro, 45% were controlled by milícia organizations and 37% by narcos.[270]

Milícia are known to control telecommunication towers, internet cables, and TV providers, so much so, a special police task force had to be created in October 2020 to respond.[271] By May 2021, over 20 clandestine internet and cable TV providers were ceased and over 600 milícia members were arrested.[272] Losses to the economy were estimated near R$1.1b (USD195m).[273] 26 telecommunication masts across Rio de Janeiro were also compromised that year.[274] Milícia are known to participate in oil theft and the sale of bootleg product to service stations.[275] As argued by Sullivan and Bunker, “the state-militia nexus amplifies criminal competition for control yielding a hybrid form of criminal-political violence.[276]

Information regarding corruption associated with Brazilian oil theft is scarce. Although in 2017, Brazilian police suspected insider threats in Petrobras to have helped setup illegal taps near the Duque de Caxias refinery, as they were observed to be precisely engineered.[277] Moreover, Marcelo Queiroz dos Anjos, a captain in the Military Police, was the head of an oil theft gang which operated in the municipalities of the Baixada Fluminense.[278] Although he surrendered to police in 2021, which accelerated the demise of his organization, the group nonetheless stole a total of 169,500 liters of oil and caused Transpetro/Petrobras a loss of about R$2m (USD354,000).[279] Police eventually arrested four others and served 14 search and seizure warrants.[280] Another gang dismantled in July 2023 involved three brothers, two military police officers, and an outsourced Transpetro employee.[281] The group had managed to inflict losses worth around R$1b (USD175m).[282]

Considering that oil theft continues in Brazil, and the scale of influence organized criminals command across it, it is highly likely that insider threats persist. Petrobras is also a state-owned entity, so it is likely that insider threats extend into the Brazilian government as well, as Lava Jato revealed.

Concluding Remarks

Oil theft in Nigeria is dire, and the situation in Brazil reveals symptoms previously observed in Mexico. There is no universal response to threats associated with oil theft, although both the Brazilian and Nigerian governments can do more to remedy dysfunctional sovereignty and underdevelopment. Plenty of information is available regarding Nigerian oil theft, although more transparency, accountability, and enforcement around the issue is necessary. The prospect of State Police represents an exciting, albeit precarious opportunity for Nigeria, as their presence may be used to refocus state responses around more indigenous law enforcement, rather than predominantly kinetic military activities. Nonetheless, all Nigerian security forces must demonstrate better behaviour regarding discrimination, brutality, corruption, and extra-judicial abuse in order to mend public trust and de jure authority more generally. Industrial actors must also rehabilitate community sentiment regarding environmental degradation and exploitation.

The Patriotic Liberation Front in Niger also recently attacked the PetroChina-funded Niger-Benin crude oil pipeline, paralyzing the pipeline and killing six, to coerce the cancellation of a USD400m China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) oil deal signed in April.[283] Onshore oil investment across West Africa will continue to be stifled if the security situation more generally does not improve, and the Nigerian government should be wary of how regional oil related instabilities influence violence and theft dynamics across the Niger Delta, and vice versa.

Information regarding oil theft in Brazil as a whole is scare, although it is clear that elements of Gilman’s twin insurgency function at the pipes, the pumps, and among Brazil’s plutocratic elite. State security forces, much like Nigerian ones, have frequently dismantled oil theft gangs, criminal extractive tools, and illegal refineries, although the problem persists. 

Both countries are observed to operate/allow hybrid sovereign and/or private security contractors to combat oil theft. While a few have proven themselves, the patchwork of security actors involved nonetheless undermines and complicates state sovereignty, its monopoly on violence, and creates jurisdictional ambiguities. Regulation rather than standardization/absorption may realize more efficacious and fair security, as positive aspects of local tailoring may be exploited under adequate legal frameworks and oversights, although this is easier said than done.

Nonetheless, all security sector reform must to be paired with significant government-community dialog and socio-economic development in order to dismantle environmental drivers which influence crime and insurgency. The Nigerian government has a lot of work to do before it can claim symbiosis with Niger Delta Communities, assuage foreign investors, and dethrone Algeria to once again become the leading African oil producer. Likewise, the Brazilian government must also do more to prevent the oil theft situation from deteriorating into that observed in Mexico.[284]

Endnotes

[1] Robert J. Bunker and Pamela Ligouri Bunker, Eds., Plutocratic Insurgency Reader. Bloomington: Xlibris, 2019; Nils Gilman, “The Twin Insurgency.” Political Economy & The State. Vol. 6, no. 7. 2014: pp. 3–11, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270893360_The_Twin_Insurgency; Robert J. Bunker, “Plutocratic Insurgency.” Small Wars Journal. 6 September 2012, https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/plutocratic-insurgency; John P. Sullivan, “Third Generation Street Gangs: Turf, Cartels, and Net Warriors.” Transnational Organized Crime. Vol. 3, no. 3. 1997: pp. 95–108, https://www.academia.edu/1117258/Third_Generation_Street_Gangs_Turf_Cartels_and_Net_Warriors. 

[2] Ibid., Sullivan.

[3] Ibid., p. 95; John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, Eds., Strategic Notes on Third Generation Gangs. Bloomington: Xlibris, 2020, p. liii.

[4] John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, Eds., Competition in Order and Progress: Criminal Insurgencies and Governance in Brazil. Bloomington: Xlibris, 2022, p. 15.  

[5] Op. cit., Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker at Note 3.

[6] Op. cit., Sullivan at Note 1, pp. 95–6.

[7] Op. cit., Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker at Note 4; Ibid., p. 96.

[8] Op. cit. John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker at Note 3.

[9] Ibid., p. lxi.

[10] Op. cit., Sullivan and Bunker at Note 4.

[11] John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, Eds., Illicit Tactical Progress: Mexican Cartel Tactical Notes 2013-2020. Bloomington: Xlibris, 2021; John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, Eds., Criminal Drone Evolution: Cartel Weaponization of Aerial IEDs. Xlibris, 2021.

[12] Op. cit. Nils Gilman at Note 1, p. 3.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.; Op. cit. John P. Sullivan at Note 1, p. 97.

[15] Op. cit., Bunker and Bunker at Note 1, pp. xxvi–1.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid., pp. 12–38.

[18] Op. cit., Gilman at Note 1, p. 6.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid., p. 7.

[21] Ibid., p. 8.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid., p. 9.

[27] David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks, “Organized Crime as Irregular Warfare: Strategic Lessons for Assessment and Response.” PRISM. Vol. 10, no. 3. 2023: pp. 93–117, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3512123/organized-crime-as-irregular-warfare-strategic-lessons-for-assessment-and-respo/.

[28] Ibid., p. 95.

[29] Ibid.; Op. cit. Sullivan and Bunker at Note 3; Op. cit., Gilman at Note 1.

[30] Jonathan W. Hackett, Theory of Irregular War. Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2024; William J. Hurley, Joel B. Resnick, and Alec Wahlman, Improving Capabilities for Irregular Warfare: Framework and Applications (Vol. I). Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2007, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA484796.

[31] Op. cit., Ucko and Marks at Note 27, p. 95.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., p. 96.

[35] Ibid., p. 97.

[36] Ibid., p. 95.

[37] Ibid., p. 98.

[38] Ibid., p. 99.

[39] Ibid., p. 100.

[40] Ibid., p. 102.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Op. cit. Hackett at Note 30.

[45] Ibid.; Op. cit., Hurley, Resnick, and Wahlman at Note 30.

[46] Andrew R. Ballow, Why Irregulars Win: Asymmetry of Motivations and the Outcomes of Irregular Warfare. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School. 2016, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1030693.  

[47] Op. cit., Hackett at Note 30.

[48] Ibid., p. 13.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid., p. 25.

[51] Ibid., p. 127.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Richard H. Shultz Jr., Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization; A Case Study of Task Force 714 in Iraq. Tampa: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2016.

[54] Zachary Z. Horsington, “Review Essay – Climate Change, Conflict, and (In)Security: Hot War.” Small Wars Journal. 5 March 2024, https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/swj-review-essay-climate-change-conflict-and-insecurity-hot-war; Timothy Clack, Ziya Meral and Louise Selisny, Climate Change, Conflict, and (In)Security: Hot War. Abingdon: Routledge, 2024.

[55] Vivien A. Schmidt, “Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory power of ideas and discourse.” Annual Review of Political Science. Vol. 11, 2008: pp. 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060606.135342; Gustav Däniker, The Guardian Soldier: On the Nature and Use of Future Armed Forces.. New York: United Nations, 1995.

[56] Trent J. Lythgoe, “Beyond Auftragstaktik: The Case Against Hyper-Decentralized Command.” Joint Force Quarterly.  Vol. 96, 2020: pp. 29–36, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-96/JFQ-96_29-36_Lythgoe.pdf?ver=2020-02-07-150501-897.

[57] Rory Cormac and Richard J. Aldrich, “Grey is the New Black: Covert Action and Implausible Deniability.” International Affairs. Vol. 94, no. 3. 2018: pp. 477–494, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/94/3/477/4992414; Austin Carson and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Covert Communication: The intelligibility and Credibility of Signaling in Secret.” Security Studies. Vol. 26, no. 1. 2017: pp. 124–156, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2017.1243921; Thomas C. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University, 1997.

[58] Antoine J. Bousquet, “The Persistent Appeal of Chaoplexic Warfare: Towards an Autonomous S(War)m Machine?” in Artur Gruszczak and Sebastian Kaempf, Eds., Routledge Handbook of the Future of Warfare. Abingdon: Routledge, 2024; Antoine J. Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity. New York: Colombia University Press, 2009; Antoine J. Bousquet, “Chaoplexic Warfare and the Future of Military Organization.” International Affairs. Vol. 84, no. 5. 2008: pp. 915–929, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00746.x; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Eds., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. Santa Monica: RAND, 2001; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar: Analytic Background.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Vol. 22, no. 3. 1999: pp. 193–206, https://doi.org/10.1080/105761099265720; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar. Santa Monica: RAND, 1996.

[59] Richard H. Shultz Jr., Transforming US Intelligence for Irregular War: Task Force 714 in Iraq. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2020; Op. cit., Shultz at Note 53; Stanley McChrystal, Tantum Collins, David Silverman and Chris Fussell, Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World. London: Portfolio, 2015.

[60] Norman E. Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations: Understanding the Role of People, Capabilities, and Effects.” Army Combined Arms Center Fort Leavenworth KS Military Review. November/December 2008, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA547305. p. 30.

[61] “Defense Primer: Operations in the Information Environment.” Congressional Research Service. 14 December 2023, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF10771.pdf; “Allied Joint Publication AJP-10.1, Edition A, Version 1.” NATO. January 2023, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/650c03bf52e73c000d9425bb/AJP_10_1_Info_Ops_UK_web.pdf. 

[62] Op. cit., Sullivan and Bunker at Note 3; Op. cit.,Gilman at Note 1.

[63] Op. cit., Hackett at Note 30; Op. cit., Ucko and Marks at Note 27, p. 95.

[64] Sylvester Efe Owhojeta, “Surveying of Oil Theft Activities in Wetlands Nigeria – A Case Study of Niger Delta Region.” International Federation of Surveyors. 2024: pp. 1–13, https://www.fig.net/resources/proceedings/fig_proceedings/fig2024/papers/ts05f/TS05F_owhojeta_12640.pdf; Bakpo T. Moses, “Economic Implication of Crude Oil Theft in Nigeria.” Social Science, Humanities and Sustainability Research. Vol. 4, no. 4. 2023: pp. 1–9, https://doi.org/10.22158/sshsr.v4n4p1. pp. 1–2.

[65] Ibid., Bakpo T. Moses, p. 1; Olanrewaju Oyedeji, “Growing Crude Heists Persist as NNPC Spends N147bn on Pipeline Security, Repairs.” Dataphyte. 24 October 2022, https://www.dataphyte.com/latest-reports/growing-crude-heists-persist-as-nnpc-spends-n147bn-on-pipeline-security-repairs/.

[66] Cee Harmon, “Declining Petroleum Production: How Nigeria Can End Oil Theft, Vandalism in 2024 – Experts.” National Economy. January 2024, https://nationaleconomy.com/declining-petroleum-production-how-nigeria-can-end-oil-theft-vandalism-in-2024-experts/; Remi Bello, “NEITI Backs FG Investigative Panel on Oil Theft, Calls for Action on Glencore Bribery Scandal!” Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative News Site. January 2024, https://neiti.gov.ng/cms/neiti-backs-fg-investigative-panel-on-oil-theft-calls-for-action-on-glencore-bribery-scandal/.

[67] “Oil Theft Still Poses Grave Risk to Nigeria.” Punch. 16 April 2024, https://punchng.com/oil-theft-still-poses-grave-risk-to-nigeria/.

[68] Op. cit., Oyedeji at Note 65.

[69] C. A Dimkpa, F. O Chukwuma, Achadu M. Abah, F. M Tele, and I. H Dimkpa, “Economic Losses Through Oil Theft in Nigeria: A 4-year (2019 – 2022) Analysis.” European Modern Studies Journal. Vol. 7, no. 3. 2023: pp. 68–76. https://doi.org/10.59573/emsj.7(3).2023.8, p. 68.

[70] Op. cit., “Oil Theft Still Poses Grave Risk to Nigeria” at Note 67.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Op. cit., Owhojeta at Note 64.

[73] Ibid.

[74]Wale Igbintade, “Unending Threat of Crude Oil Theft.” This Day. May 2024, https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2024/05/19/unending-threat-of-crude-oil-theft/.

[75] Ibid.

[76]Op. cit., “Oil Theft Still Poses Grave Risk to Nigeria” at Note 67.

[77] Ibid.; Op. cit., Igbintade at Note 74; Obas Esiedesa, “Nigeria's Oil Production Grows Marginally by 4% to 1.28mbpd.” Vanguard. 12 May 2024, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2024/05/nigerias-oil-production-grows-marginally-by-4-to-1-28mbpd/.

[78] Ibid., Esiedesa.

[79] Op. cit., Dimkpa, F. O Chukwuma, Abah, Tele, and Dimkpa at Note 69, p. 69.

[80] Udeme Akpan and Ediri Ejoh, “Port Harcourt, Warri Refineries to be Fully Operational in 2024 – Senate Assures Nigerians.” Vanguard. 8 May 2024, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2024/05/port-harcourt-warri-refineries-to-be-fully-operational-in-2024-senate-assures-nigerians/#:~:text=As%20Nigeria's%20fuel%20scarcity%20lingers,by%20the%20end%20of%202024.

[81]Oladehinde Oladipo, “Natural Gas Untapped as Oil Rot Reigns Under Tinubu.” Business Day. 29 May 2024, https://businessday.ng/may-29-specials/article/natural-gas-untapped-as-oil-rot-reigns-under-tinubu/.  

[82] “Securing the Gulf of Guinea: Evaluating Nigeria's Anti-Piracy Initiatives for Enhanced Maritime Governance.” Accra: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre. 2023: pp. 1–18, https://www.kaiptc.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/occasional-paper-54.pdf. p. 4.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Op. cit., Igbintade at Note 74.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Aghogho Udi, “NNPCL Reports 157 Cases of Crude Oil Theft in One Week.” Nairametrics. January 2024, https://nairametrics.com/2024/01/17/nnpcl-reports-157-cases-of-crude-oil-theft-in-one-week/.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Camillus Eboh, “Nigeria Aims to Raise Oil, Condensates Output to 2.6 mln bpd by 2026.” Reuters. 1 January 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-aims-raise-oil-condensates-output-26-mln-bpd-by-2026-2024-01-01/.

[90] C.O. Okwelum, “Resource Curse Thesis: Nigerian Experience of Oil Theft.” African Journal of Law, Political Research and Administration. Vol. 4, no. 1. 2021: pp. 70–84, https://doi.org/10.52589/AJLPRA-FD6HEQ0T. p. 72.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Michael J. Watts and Ibaba Samuel Ibaba, “Turbulent Oil: Conflict and Insecurity in the Niger Delta.” African Security. Vol. 4, no. 1. March 2011: pp. 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2011.563181.

[93] Op. cit., ALamptey at Note 82.

[94]Op. cit.,  Moses at Note 64, p. 5; “The Crime Paradox: Illicit Markets, Violence and Instability in Nigeria.” Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/GI-TOC-Nigeria_The-crime-paradox-web.pdf. p. 24.

[95] Op. cit., Oladipo at Note 81.

[96] “Nigeria's Security Architecture for the Future: State of National Security Agencies' Coordination and Cooperation.” Lagos: Freidrich-Ebert-Stiftung Nigeria. 2020, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/17637.pdf. p. 2.

[97] Op. cit., “The Crime Paradox: Illicit Markets, Violence and Instability in Nigeria” at Note 94, p. 11.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Pelumi Salako, “‘Nigerians are tired’: Protesters fed up with bad governance, soaring costs.” Al-Jazeera. 2 August 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/8/2/nigerians-are-tired-protesters-fed-up-with-bad-governance-soaring-costs.

[100]Aanu Adeoye, “Nigerians take to the streets for second day of nationwide protests.” Financial Times. 2 August 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/75abed7a-f154-4122-944d-83c247b6f3a9.

[101] Op. cit., Salako at Note 99.

[102] Op. cit., Okwelum at Note 90, p. 74.

[103] Op. cit., Udi at note 87.

[104] Michael Watts, “The Anatomy of a Nigerian Oil Insurgency.” Institute of International Studies, University of California. Working Paper no. 17, 2008: pp. 1–20, https://geography.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/17-watts.pdf. p. 16; Sofiri Joab-Peterside, “On the Militarization of Nigeria’s Niger Delta: The Genesis of Ethnic Militia in Rivers State, Nigeria.” Institute of International Studies, University of California. Working Paper no. 21, 2007: p. 1–21, https://geography.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/21-joab-peterside.pdf. p. 10.

[105] Bakare Majeed, “Constitution Review: NASS to Consider Role for Traditional Rulers in Constitution – Reps Deputy Speaker.” Premium Times. 29 April 2024, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/689926-constitution-review-nass-to-consider-role-for-traditional-rulers-in-constitution-reps-deputy-speaker.html.

[106] Dimieari Von Kemedi, “Fueling the Violence: Non-State Armed Actors (Militia, Cults, and Gangs) in the Niger Delta.” Institute of International Studies, University of California. Working Paper no. 10, 2006: pp. 1–25, https://geography.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/10-vonkemedi.pdf. pp. 1–2; Michael Watts, “Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict, Violence and Political Disorder in the Niger Delta.” Institute of International Studies, University of California. Working Paper no. 16, 2008: pp. 1–36, https://geography.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/16-watts.pdf. pp. 4 and 19.

[107] Ibid., Watts, p. 5.

[108]   Op. cit. “The Crime Paradox: Illicit Markets, Violence and Instability in Nigeria” at Note 94.

[109] Ibid., p. 27.

[110] Op. cit., Kemedi at Note 106, p. 4.

[111] Op. cit., Okwelum at Note 90, p. 78.

[112] Op. cit., Bakpo T. Moses at Note 64, p. 5.

[113] Op. cit., Okwelum at Note 90, p. 80.

[114] Aliyu Mukhtar Katsina, “Nigeria's Security Challenges and the Crisis of Development: Towards a New Framework for Analysis.” International Journal of Developing Societies. Vol. 1, no. 3. 2012: pp. 107–116, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259757951_Nigeria's_Security_Challenges_and_the_Crisis_of_Development_Towards_a_New_Framework_for_Analysis; Ahmed Olawale Moliki, Joseph Okwesili Nkwede and Kazeem Oluwaseun Dauda, “Federalism, National Security and State Policing System in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.” Islamic University Multidisciplinary Journal. Vol. 7, no. 2. 2020: pp. 95–104, https://www.iuiu.ac.ug/journaladmin/iumj/ArticleFiles/35505.pdf.

[115] Dapo Olawuni, “Tompolo's Security Company; Tantita Reveals How Crude Thieves Mount CCTV Inside Bushes.” Daily Trend. 3 December 2023, https://dailytrend.com.ng/2023/12/03/tompolos-security-company-tantita-reveals-how-crude-thieves-mount-cctv-inside-bushes/.

[116] Ibid.

[117] Ibid.

[118] Ibid.

[119] Op. cit., Okwelum at Note 90, p. 77.

[120] Op. cit.,Olawuni at Note 115.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Op. cit., “The Crime Paradox: Illicit Markets, Violence and Instability in Nigeria” at Note 94, p. 18.

[123] Ibid., p. 21.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Ibid., p. 22.

[126] Op. cit., Sylvester Efe Owhojeta at Note 64.

[127] Op. cit., Von Kemedi at Note 106, p. 4.

[128] Tochukwu Faith Onichabor, “The Indigenous People of Biafra: A Noble Cause Gone South?” Global History Dialogues. 2022, https://globalhistorydialogues.org/projects/the-independent-people-of-biafra-as-an-impediment-to-national-integration-in-nigeria-2012-2022/.

[129] Jess Craig, “Separatist Movements in Nigeria and Cameroon Are Joining Forces.” Foreign Policy. 20 May 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/20/separatists-nigeria-cameroon-biafra-ipob-ambazonia-anglophone-joining-forces/.

[130] Ibid.; Seun Opejobi, “Biafra: IPOB Names Chika Edoziem as Nnamdi Kanu’s Replacement.” Daily Post. 8 August 2022, https://dailypost.ng/2022/08/08/biafra-ipob-names-chika-edoziem-as-nnamdi-kanus-replacement/; “IPOB Reacts to Killing of Oil Workers in Imo.” Sahara Reporters. 19 August 2021, https://saharareporters.com/2021/08/19/ipob-reacts-killing-oil-workers-imo; “Internal Crisis Threatens IPOB, Cameroon Separatist Union.” The Sun. 25 May 2021, https://thesun.ng/internal-crisis-threatens-ipob-cameroon-separatist-union/; Awka Uzoma Nzeagwu, “IPOB Denies Killing Oil Workers in Imo.” The Guardian. 20 August 2021, https://guardian.ng/news/ipob-denies-killing-oil-workers-in-imo/.

[131] Tife Owolabi, “Gunmen Free More Than 1,800 Inmates in Attack on Nigerian Prison.” Reuters. 6 April 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN2BT0C0/.

[132] Chinedu Asadu, “Soldiers Among 11 Killed by Separatist Militants in Southeast Nigeria.” Associated Press. 31 May 2024, https://apnews.com/article/nigeria-abia-ipob-separatists-lockdown-c627da1a1e0e790a06979d7d001d5ad3; “Separatists Kill at least 11 People in Southeast Nigeria, Army Says.” Al Jazeera. 31 May 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/31/nigeria-114.

[133] Deborah Sanusi, “Soldiers Killing: Army Raids IPOB Camp in Abia, Kills Six.” Punch. 9 June 2024, https://punchng.com/soldiers-killing-army-raids-ipob-camp-in-abia-kills-six/.

[134] Op. cit., Jess Craig at Note 129; Sahara Reporters, Op. cit. “IPOB Reacts to Killing of Oil Workers in Imo” at Note 130; Op. cit. “Internal Crisis Threatens IPOB, Cameroon Separatist Union” at Note 130; Op. cit. Awka Uzoma Nzeagwu at Note 130.

[135] Musa Ajiya, “The Rise of Non-State Actors in Nigeria’s Niger-Delta Region, Their Unending Clamour for Secession and a Threat to National Security.” Ahmadu Bello University. 9 January 2023: pp. 1–52,http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4319403. p. 12.

[136] Ann Godwin, “Niger Delta Avengers Threaten Return, Vow to Crash Economy.” The Guardian. 27 June 2021, https://guardian.ng/news/niger-delta-avengers-threaten-return-vow-to-crash-economy/; Mary Ugbodaga, “Niger Delta Avengers Threatens to 'Bring Down' Oil Facilities and 'Humble the Economy'.” The Cable. 26 June 2021, https://www.thecable.ng/niger-delta-avengers-threatens-to-bring-down-oil-facilities-humble-the-economy/.

[137] Jacob O'Hare, “Niger Delta Avengers.” Grey Dynamics. 15 April 2021, https://greydynamics.com/niger-delta-avengers/.

[138] “Niger Delta Avengers Seek International Support, Say Attack on Pipelines will Continue.” CGTN. 15 June 2023, https://africa.cgtn.com/niger-delta-avengers-seek-international-support-say-attack-on-pipelines-will-continue/.

[139] Lovina Anthony, “Again, Akwa Ibom Ex-militants Give FG, NNPC Ultimatum to Award Them Pipeline Contract.” Daily Post. 14 October 2022, https://dailypost.ng/2022/10/14/again-akwa-ibom-ex-militants-give-fg-nnpc-ultimatum-to-award-them-pipeline-contract/; “Withdraw Security Agents from Akwa Ibom Creeks, Territories Immediately or Risk Total Destruction of Oil Facilities– Militant Group Threatens Nigerian Government.” Sahara Reporters. 29 August 2022, https://saharareporters.com/2022/08/29/withdraw-security-agents-akwa-ibom-creeks-territories-immediately-or-risk-total.

[140] Ibid.

[141] Op. cit., “Withdraw Security Agents from Akwa Ibom Creeks, Territories Immediately or Risk Total Destruction of Oil Facilities – Militant Group Threatens Nigerian Government;” Inemesit Akpan-Nsoh, “Militants Issue Quit Notice to Oil Companies in Akwa Ibom.” The Guardian. 22 March 2021, https://guardian.ng/news/militants-issue-quit-notice-to-oil-companies-in-akwa-ibom/.

[142] Op. cit., Ajiya, at Note 135, pp. 12 and 31; Op. cit. Michael Watts at Note 106, p. 21.

[143] Op. cit., Von Kemedi at Note 106, p. 4.

[144] Ibid., p. 7.

[145] Op. cit., “Nigeria's Security Architecture for the Future: State of National Security Agencies' Coordination and Cooperation” at Note 96, p. 10.

[146] Op. cit., Joab-Peterside at Note 104, p. 4.

[147] Op. cit., “Nigeria's Security Architecture for the Future: State of National Security Agencies' Coordination and Cooperation” at Note 96, p. 10.

[148] Ibid.

[149] Ibid.

[150] Ibid.

[151] Ibid.

[152 ]Ibid.

[153] Op. cit., Hackett at Note 30, p. 127.

[154] Mary Izuaka, “Why We Awarded Multi-Billion Naira Pipeline Protection Contract to Tompolo – NNPC.” Premium Times. 30 August 2022, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/551584-why-we-awarded-multi-billion-naira-pipeline-protection-contract-to-tompolo-nnpc.html?tztc=1.

[155] Temitayo Odunlami, “Tompolo: The Billionaire Militant.” Sahara Reporters. 16 August 2012, https://saharareporters.com/2012/08/16/tompolo-billionaire-militant-thenews-africa.

[156] Op. cit., Olawuni at Note 115.

[157] Op. cit., Dimkpa, Chukwuma, Abah, F. M Tele, and Dimkpa at Note 69, p. 70.

[158] Op. cit., “The Crime Paradox: Illicit Markets, Violence and Instability in Nigeria” at Note 94, p. 39; Aremu Adeola Jr., “Nigeria's Operation Àmò̩té̩kùn: Was it Named After a Leopard, Cheetah or Tiger?” Global Voices. 30 January 2020, https://globalvoices.org/2020/01/30/nigerias-operation-amo%cc%a9te%cc%a9kun-was-it-named-after-a-leopard-cheetah-or-tiger/.

[159] Op. cit., “The Crime Paradox: Illicit Markets, Violence and Instability in Nigeria” at Note 94, p. 40.

[160] Ibid., p. 39.

[161] Sharon Osaji, “Court Disbands Ebubeagu Security Outfit.” Punch. 14 February 2023, https://punchng.com/breaking-court-disbands-ebubeagu-security-outfit/.

[162] Op. cit., “The Crime Paradox: Illicit Markets, Violence and Instability in Nigeria” at Note 94, p. 40.

[163] Ibid. p. 43; Op. cit. Sofiri Joab-Peterside at Note 104.

[164] Ayo Oyoze Baje, “In Support of State Police.” The Guardian. 6 May 2024, https://guardian.ng/opinion/in-support-of-state-police-2/.

[165] “Nigerian Population (LIVE).” WorldOMeter. https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population/.

[166] Op. cit., Baje at Note 164.

[167] Jibrin Ibrahim, “The Dangers of Introducing State Police Today.” Premium Times. 16 February 2024, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/opinion/668882-the-dangers-of-introducing-state-police-today-by-jibrin-ibrahim.html.

[168] Ibid.

[169] Ibid.

[170] Op. cit., Okwelum at Note 90, p. 78.

[171]Ibid.

[172] Ibid., p. 81.

[173] Op. cit., Moses at Note 64, p. 5; “Trans-Border Economic Crimes, Illegal Oil Bunke ring and Economic Reforms in Nigeria.” Global Consortium on Security Transformation. 2010, https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/Trans-Border_Economic_Crimes_Illegal_Oil_Bunkering_and_Economic_Reforms_in_Nigeria.pdf.

[174] Op. cit., Moses at Note 64, p. 4.

[175] Ibid., p. 5.

[176] Op. cit., “The Crime Paradox: Illicit Markets, Violence and Instability in Nigeria” at Note 94, p. 36.

[177] Op. cit., “Oil Theft Still Poses Grave Risk to Nigeria” at Note 67; Op. cit. “Nigeria's Security Architecture for the Future: State of National Security Agencies' Coordination and Cooperation” at Note 96.

[178]Abdulkareem Haruna, “Furious Borno Governor Accuses Soldiers of Extortion.” Premium Times. 6 January 2020, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/371382-just-in-furious-borno-governor-accuses-soldiers-of-extortion.html; Op. cit. “Nigeria's Security Architecture for the Future: State of National Security Agencies' Coordination and Cooperation” at Note 96.

[179] Op. cit., Okwelum at Note 90, p. 80.

[180] Ibid., p. 81.

[181] Ibid., p. 75.

[182] Op. cit., “Securing the Gulf of Guinea: Evaluating Nigeria's Anti-Piracy Initiatives for Enhanced Maritime Governance” at Note 82, p. 9.

[183] Ibid.

[184] Ibid.

[185] Ibid.

[186] Ibid.

[187] Op. cit., “Nigeria's Security Architecture for the Future: State of National Security Agencies' Coordination and Cooperation” at Note 96, p. 15.

[188] Ibid.

[189] Ibid.

[190] Ibid.

[191] Ibrahim Ramalan, “Nigerians Using Ex Parte Orders Arbitrarily.” Daily Nigerian. 30 April 2024, https://dailynigerian.com/nigerians-parte-orders/.

[192] Ibid.

[193] Ibid.

[194] Ibid.

[195] Op. cit., “Nigeria's Security Architecture for the Future: State of National Security Agencies' Coordination and Cooperation” at Note 96, p. 10.

[196] Op. cit., “Securing the Gulf of Guinea: Evaluating Nigeria's Anti-Piracy Initiatives for Enhanced Maritime Governance” at Note 82, p. 6.

[197] Op. cit., “Nigeria's Security Architecture for the Future: State of National Security Agencies' Coordination and Cooperation” at Note 96, p. 12.

[198] Ibid.

[199] Simon Kolawole, “Announcing the Arrival of State Police.” The Cable. 18 May 2024, https://www.thecable.ng/announcing-the-arrival-of-state-police/.

[200] Ahmed Olawale Moliki, Joseph Okwesili Nkwede, and Kazeem Oluwaseun Dauda, “Federalism, National Security and State Policing System in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.” Islamic University Multidisciplinary Journal. Vol. 7, no. 2. 2020: pp. 95–104, https://www.iuiu.ac.ug/journaladmin/iumj/ArticleFiles/35505.pdf. p. 100; Okechukwu Innocent Eme and Anyadike O. Nkechi, “Security Challenges and the Imperatives of State Police.” Review of Public Administration and Management. Vol. 1, no. 2. 2012: pp. 203–218, https://www.arabianjbmr.com/pdfs/RPAM_VOL_1_2/15.pdf.

[201] Kunle Daramola, “36 House of Assembly Speakers Back Creation of State Police.” The Cable. 16 May 2024, https://www.thecable.ng/36-house-of-assembly-speakers-back-creation-of-state-police/#:~:text=The%20speakers%20of%20Nigeria's%2036,held%20in%20Abuja%20on%20Thursday.

[202] Op. cit., Kolawole at Note 199.

[203] Ibid.

[204] Ibid.

[205] Op. cit., Baje at Note 164.

[206] Ibid.; Braeyi Ekiye, “State Police: To Be or Not to Be.” Vanguard. 25 April 2024, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2024/04/state-police-to-be-or-not-to-be-2/; Terhemba Daka, Sodiq Omolaoye, John Akubo, and Rotimi Agboluaje, “IGP Counters Tinubu, Says Nigeria Not Mature, Ready for State Police.” The Guardian. 24 April 2024, https://guardian.ng/news/igp-counters-tinubu-says-nigeria-not-mature-ready-for-state-police/.

[207]   Op. cit., Ahmed Olawale Moliki at Note 200, p. 95; Odeh Adiza Mercy and Umoh Nanji, “State Policing and National Security in Nigeria.” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences. Vol. 6, no. 1. 2015: pp. 412–422, http://dx.doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n1s1p412; Olong Matthew Adefi and Agbonika Josephine Aladi Achor, “Re-Awakening the State Police Controversy in Nigeria: Need for Rethink.” International Journal of Asian Social Science. Vol. 3, no. 11. 2013: pp. 2307–2314, https://archive.aessweb.com/index.php/5007/article/view/2584; Op. cit., Eme and Nkechi at Note 200; Chukwuka E. Ugwu, Donatus Ngige and Bartholomew Ugwuanyi, “Calls for State Police in Nigeria: Options For Sustainable National Security.” International Journal of Research in Arts and Social Sciences. Vol. 5, 2013: pp. 402–415, https://academicexcellencesociety.com/calls_for_state_police_in_nigeria_options_for_sustainable_national_security.pdf.

[208] Op. cit., Moliki at Note 200, p. 100.

[209]   Ibid.

[210]Tony Akowe, “State Police: Nigerians have lost trust in policing system, says Speaker Abbas.” The Nation. 22 April 2024, https://thenationonlineng.net/state-police-nigerians-have-lost-trust-in-policing-system-says-speaker-abbas/.

[211] Op. cit., Moliki at Note 200, p. 100.

[212] Op. cit., Kolawole at Note 199.

[213]   Jibrin Ibrahim, “The Dangers of Introducing State Police Today.” Premium Times. 16 February 2024, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/opinion/668882-the-dangers-of-introducing-state-police-today-by-jibrin-ibrahim.html.

[214] Ibid.

[215] Op. cit., Ekiye at Note 206; Op. cit., Daka, Omolaoye, Akubo, and Agboluaje at Note 206; Op. cit., Moliki at Note 200, p. 95; Ngozi Nwogwugwu and Adewale K. Kupoluyi, “Interrogating the Desirability of State Policing in Nigeria.” IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS). Vol. 20, no. 5. 2015: pp. 1–7, https://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol20-issue5/Version-4/A020540107.pdf; Destiny Eze Agwanwo, “State Policing and Police Efficiency in Nigeria.” Research on Humanities and Social Sciences. Vol. 4, no. 25. 2014: 165–173, https://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol20-issue5/Version-4/A020540107.pdf.

[216] Op. cit., Akowe at Note 210.

[217] Op. cit., Kolawole at Note 199.

[218] Op. cit., Daka, Omolaoye, Akubo, and Agboluaje at Note 206; Op. cit., Baje at Note 164.

[219] Ibid., Daka, Omolaoye, Akubo, and Agboluaje.

[220] “Countering Global Oil Theft: Responses and Solutions.” Helsinki: United Nations World Institute for Developmental Economics. 2022, https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2022/166-2.

[221] John P. Sullivan, José de Arimatéia da Cruz, and Robert J. Bunker, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 20: Fuel Theft in Brazil—Gangs and Militias Target Petrobras.” Small Wars Journal. 16 October 2019, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-20-fuel-theft-brazil-gangs-and-militias-target.

[222] Rodrigo Viga Gaier, “Brazil's Black-Market Pipeline: Gangs Hijack Petrobras' Oil, Fuel.” Reuters. 4 April 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1760BV/.

[223] Ibid.; Parker Asmann, “Brazil Crime Groups Expanding Oil Theft Operations.” InSight Crime. 5 April 2017, https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/brazilian-crime-groups-expanding-oil-theft-operations/.

[224] Ibid., Asmann.

[225] Rafaela Martins, “Gasolina era Roubada de Oleoduto.” Correio Braziliense. 1 November 2023, https://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/cidades-df/2023/01/5065255-gasolina-era-roubada-de-oleoduto.html.

[226] Ibid.

[227] Op. cit., Asmann at Note 223; Op. cit., Gaier at Note 222.

[228] Ibid.; “Petrobras Oil Pipe Spills 377 Barrels After Theft Attempt.” Hart Energy. 10 December 2018, https://www.hartenergy.com/news/petrobras-oil-pipe-spills-377-barrels-after-theft-attempt-118821.

[229] Op. cit., Asmann at Note 22.

[230] Op. cit., Gaier at Note 222.

[231] “Gravações Revelam Esquema de Roubo de Petróleo na Baixada Fluminense.” R7 (Record). 13 August 2018, https://record.r7.com/cidade-alerta-rj/videos/gravacoes-revelam-esquema-de-roubo-de-petroleo-na-baixada-fluminense-30112022/.

[232] Luiz Tito, “Roubo de Petróleo.” Otempo. 5 June 2024, https://www.otempo.com.br/blogs/luiz-tito/2024/6/5/roubo-de-petroleo.

[233] Ibid.

[234] “Pipeline Theft Falls in Brazil's Sao Paulo, as Petrobras Cracks Down.” Reuters. 19 June 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1N2DW13K/.

[235] “Em cerco, PM retém carretas com 100 mil litros de combustível furtados de dutos da Petrobras.” G1 (Globo). 16 June 2024, https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2024/06/16/em-cerco-pm-retem-carretas-com-100-mil-litros-de-combustivel-furtados-de-dutos-da-petrobras.ghtml.

[236] Ibid.

[237] Camila Tíssia, “Polícia apreende quase 600 mil litros de combustível adulterado na Bahia.” CNN Brazil. 28 May 2024, https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/nacional/policia-apreende-quase-600-mil-litros-de-combustivel-adulterado-na-bahia//.

[238] Ibid.

[239] Ibid.

[240] Ibid.

[241] Op. cit., “Pipeline Theft Falls in Brazil's Sao Paulo, as Petrobras Cracks Down” at Note 234.

[242] Op. cit., Asmann at Note 223; Op. cit., Gaier at Note 222.

[243] Adriana Cruz, Márcia Brasil and Mariana Queiroz, “Operação em 5 estados mira furto de combustível através da perfuração de dutos da Transpetro.” G1 (Globo). 26 July 2023, https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2023/07/26/operacao-mira-furto-de-combustivel-em-dutos-da-transpetro.ghtml.

[244] Ibid.

[245] Ibid.

[246] “CI aprova aumento das penas por furto e receptação de combustíveis.” Senado Federal. 9 April 2024, https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2024/04/09/ci-aprova-aumento-das-penas-por-furto-e-receptacao-de-combustiveis.

[247] Ibid.

[248] Ibid.

[249] Ibid.

[250] Gram Slattery, “Special Report: In Brazil, Organized Crime Siphons Billions from Gas Stations.” Reuters. 12 March 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN2B41BE/.

[251] Gram Slattery and Marta Nogueira, “Brazil's Petrobras Confronts New Foe: Fuel Thieves.” Reuters. 20 September 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1W5114/.

[252] Op. cit. Gram Slattery at Note 250.

[253] Op. cit. Gram Slattery and Marta Nogueira at Note 251.

[254] Op. cit. Gram Slattery at Note 250.

[255] Ibid.

[256] Ibid.

[257] Natalia Suárez, “‘Pategrillo’ – The New Boon for Colombia’s Cocaine Labs.” InSight Crime. 2 April 2020, https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/pategrillo-colombia-cocaine-labs/.

[258] Matthew Smith, “Colombia's Cocaine Boom is Fueling an Unprecedented Spike in Oil Theft.” Oil Price. 13 November 2023, https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Colombias-Cocaine-Boom-Is-Fueling-An-Unprecedented-Spike-In-Oil-Theft.html; Matthew Smith, “How Colombia's Booming Cocaine Business is Driving Rampant Oil Theft.” Oil Price. 29 August 2023, https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/How-Colombias-Booming-Cocaine-Business-Is-Driving-Rampant-Oil-Theft.html.

[259] Cedê Silva, “Drug Gangs are Active in One-Quarter of Brazil's Amazon.” The Brazilian Report. 23 May 2024, https://brazilian.report/society/2024/05/23/drug-gangs-active-brazil-amazon/.

[260] Susana Durãoa, Erika Robb Larkins and Paola Argentina, “In the Shadows of Protection: Brazilian Police in Private Security.” Policing and Society. Vol. 34, no, 1–2. 2023: pp. 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2023.2223738. pp. 3–4.

[261] Ibid., p. 5.

[262] Ibid., p. 11.

[263] Ibid., p. 12.

[264] “Corruption Perception Index.” Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023/index/bra.

[265] “Brazil Corruption Index.” Trading Economics, https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/corruption-index.

[266] Rafael Alcadipani, Gustavo Matarazzo Rezende, Fernando Vianna, Alan Fernandes and Renato Sérgio de Lima, “The Reform of Police Organizations in Brazil through the Perspective of Organizational Studies.” Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo (EAESP). Vol. 29, 2024: pp. 1–20, https://doi.org/10.12660/cgpc.v29.88374.85204. p. 9.

[267]Op. cit., Sullivan and Bunker at Note 4, p. 160.

[268] Ibid.

[269] Ibid.

[270] Ibid.

[271] Ibid., p. 88.

[272] Ibid.

[273] Ibid.

[274] Ibid.

[275] Ibid., p. 61.

[276] Ibid.

[277]   Op. cit., Gaier at Note 222.

[278] “Policial Militar envolvido em roubo de petróleo se entrega.” Meia Hora. 2 March 2021, https://www.meiahora.com.br/geral/2021/03/6095965-policial-militar-envolvido-em-roubo-de-petroleo-se-entrega.html#foto=1.

[279] Ibid.

[280] Ibid.

[281] Júlia Zanon and Marcus Sadok, “Roubo de Petróleo: 27 são réus por furtar combustível em dutos da Transpetro.” Band (Rio). 26 July 2023, https://www.band.uol.com.br/rio-de-janeiro/noticias/roubo-de-petroleo-27-sao-reus-por-furtar-combustivel-em-dutos-da-transpetro-16619763.

[282] Ibid.

[283] Chinedu Asadu, “Coup-Hit Niger was Betting on a China-Backed Oil Pipeline as a Lifeline. Then the Troubles Began.” Associated Press. 23 June 2024, https://apnews.com/article/niger-benin-oil-pipeline-china-agadem-coup-01891707e30450361eeaedbb3daf7bce; James Tasamba, “Niger Rebels Claim Responsibility for Attack on China-Backed Pipeline.” AA. 18 June 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/niger-rebels-claim-responsibility-for-attack-on-china-backed-pipeline/3252944.

[284] Nathan P. Jones and John P. Sullivan "Huachicoleros: Criminal Cartels, Fuel Theft, and Violence in Mexico." Journal of Strategic Security. Vol. 12, no. 4. 2019: pp. 1–24, https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss4/1/.