Five Questions Concerning Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s “We’re Ready to Go”
Only after a brutally honest assessment of certain critical issues should we even begin to discuss any form of overt intervention in Syria:
- What is crucial to the US regarding Syria?
- What if we did nothing?
- What are the potential consequences of each posited response by the US?
- What are the consequences of failing to achieve any of the above?
- What lengths/limits are we willing to commit/accept to achieve our goals?
Comments
More:
<a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/08/a_few_more… Few More Questions Before We Start Bombing</a> - Long War Journal
<a href="http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/questions-already-swirl-about-e… Already Swirl About Endgame, Objectives</a> - Associated Press
<a href="http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/08/28/5-questions-to-ask-b… Questions to Ask Before Bombing Syria</a> - The Diplomat
<a href="http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/08/27/long-term_strategy… in Syria Needs Long-Term Strategy</a> - Brookings
Dayuhan and Bill,
Interesting thoughts. Thank you. I have shared, in responses to previous articles, my thinking on this situation; no need to repeat here. On the other hand, I would like to share the feelings of a close friend and very good American diplomat on what his SYRIAN relatives think:
"As we wait around for the president's decision to launch an attack, I worry about the consequencesof an attack and the toll on the Syrian people. I have been in contact with my family and everyone is scared [w]itless. My family is concerned that the action taken will destroy what remains and divide the country and not really finish off Assad. On the other hand, they worry about punishment inflicted by the frantic rebels on the Druze for their neutral stance.
"I hope we can finish Assad off. Otherwise we will have to go back in again and prolong the pain like we did in Iraq..."
I suspect that at this point a strike will be less about compelling anyone to comply with our will (unlikely, as you say) than to demonstrate that we do respond when a "red line" is crossed. The strike will be calibrated to be enough to show that the administration was serious, not to accomplish any specific goal in Syria.
Not a particularly bright bit of business, and with all sorts of potential unintended consequences, most of them undesirable... but that's where "red lines" get you.
First off I don't know the answers to any of the questions, but I found Move Forward's suggesting of enabling Arab and Turk armies with our air power interesting, especially allowing them to redraw the boundaries afterwards. I doubt that any Arab and Turk armies truly want to commit to this effort, but still an interesting proposition.
What is crucial to the US regarding Syria?
What does crucial mean? Some interests are directly and others are indirectly related to the situation in Syria, and depending upon our assessment of the projected second the third effects we may find the situation to be crucial to our interests in the region or globally. On the same side of the coin we determine that a military intervention may increase the risk to our crucial national interests.
What if we did nothing?
Al-Qaeda and Iranian surrogates would continue to kill each other, but a lot of innocent people will die also, and the conflict will likely expand beyond the borders of Syria (already is to some extent in Lebanon). Again our intervention may actually make worse, so while doing nothing may not be an attractive option, it may not be our worst option.
What are the potential consequences of each posited response by the US?
We simply don't know, but the potential for bad is very high. If we conduct limited strikes, we'll most likely experience a response on their time line and in their way. Perhaps the downing a civilian airline? An attack on Turkey or Israel? How many wars and conflicts will it take to learn that cruise missiles and air strikes seldom compel nations or non-state actors to bend to our will, but it certainly will increase their hate and anger towards us and in their minds justifying striking back. Back to the first question, how crucial is Syria to us? How much risk are we willing to assume to help out? Help who exactly? To what end? Assad goes away and then what?
Too late now, but what if we quietly helped Assad in the beginning, or at least didn't make empty promises to the resistance so they didn't believe the world would ride to their rescue? Would the resistance have lost its wind? Is Assad the bastard we know and to some extent can control better than the bastard we don't know?
What are the consequences of failing to achieve any of the above?
Achieve what?
What lengths/limits are we willing to commit/accept to achieve our goals?
We better answer that one before anyone fires the first round.
I confess to not realizing that Turkey controlled much of Syria before WWI.
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/turkeys-tangled-syria-policy
A key quote from that link's article is this:
<blockquote>Regionally, the Syria conflict exemplifies how Turkey’s “zero problem” policy has become multiple problems. Moreover, Ankara allowed its bitter feud with Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad and its open support for opposition fighters to box in its options. The crisis blocked Turkey’s main trade routes to the Arab world and opened a new front in its Kurdish problem.</blockquote>
Turkey also has citizens ethnically-kin to the Alawites which could be either good in creating a protected area for them in the former Syria, or bad in terms of insurgency. One man's article here concerning the Turk's strong efforts in creating displaced personnel camps would bode well for Turks in any post-invasion stability operation. Muslim Sunni stable-states dominating the former Syria would be more acceptable than Sunni extremists or Hezbollah/Iran influence prevailing. The economic benefits for all surrounding states would be superior with stable rather than fractured insurgent rule. The three or more separate Sunni states in the former Syria with Kurd and Alawite areas also added would be smaller areas to control for Arab/Turk/Kurd/Alawite stability operations.
Agree that the chances of this happening are slim. It would require Saudi, Turk, and Jordan leaders to take a risk and their militaries may not be up to taking on a now combat-experienced Syria. I read that Prince Bandar had told the Russians that the U.S. was being weak and was not going to get involved and offered them up to $15 billion in arms sales if they would stop supporting Syria. The President's decision to seek Congressional approval is actually pretty brilliant because it gives him cover either way if approved or disapproved and prevents it from being a 2014 campaign issue.
The AirSea Battle reference to F-35s is because the President telegraphed his intentions to use cruise missiles which allowed dispersion of targets. Cruise missiles from what I've read have only limited time to loiter and find targets and if they aren't nearby, you are stuck with fixed targets. An F-35 or F-22 in contrast could survive and find/destroy the far stronger Syrian air defenses and other targets by loitering overhead with EA-18G helping to jam.
In 1982 the Israelis were about 80 to 0 in air-to-air losses over Syria/Lebanon and air defenses did little if I recall. Today's air defenses would be the bigger threat to 4th generation aircraft...something the F-35 bashers don't seem to comprehend.
If we're worried about destabilizing neighboring states, bringing in Turkish and Arab armies and carving up Syria hardly seems like a solution. I can think of few courses of action more likely to destabilize the region and create spillover conflict. This is a problem with many proposals: we complain that if we don't "do something" the conflict may escalate and spill over to the region, but the things we propose to do involve escalation and ratcheting up the regionalization of the conflict.
I don't think there's a snowball's chance in hell of getting Saudi or Gulf troops into Syria on any substantial scale... even if it was desirable, which I don't think it is. Even if you could, I don't think there's a snawflake's chance in hell that this would produce " stable countries running that key territory". We should know by now that "stable countries" are not installed by invading armies. More likely we get a continuous insurgence with all sorts of gravitational force pulling us into it, and open conflict between Iran and the Gulf, with us in the middle of it.
When you say "We could do this from an AirSea Battle standpoint rather easily", you mean we could do what rather easily?
<blockquote>Location relative to Israel might be a problem for the Israelis, but it needn't be for us. We are not their keeper.</blockquote>
Yeah, but you forgot the stable Muslim states that could become otherwise. Turkey is a NATO country that until recently has been pretty secular. Jordan's King is one of the few reasonable "younger" ones, however, that could change. Saudi Arabia has elder leaders but I've read that Prince Bandar is running around trying to work deals. Israel, if struck by Iran or Syria with serious casualties, might resort to nukes which would become a world problem sending oil prices through the roof and starting a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
<blockquote>A coalition land attack by larger Arab/Turk Armies with NATO/U.S. air support would end the matter rapidly leaving Arab Armies to stay behind and split up the former Syria. </blockquote> I saw retired MG Scales on Greta saying he did not believe the Arab/Turk armies were up to the job. Maybe he is right, maybe not given our airpower assistance. One Arab army I included was Saudi Arabia. Iraq was not included given their closer relations with Iran, although I suspect some Iraqi Kurds could be convinced to help out.
John Kerry and Samantha Power would need to reach some manner of agreement in principle with invading powers ahead of time. Madhu or someone posted about a pipeline running from Iran through Iraq and Syria. This would stop that in its tracks instead allowing one from Saudi Arabia etc up through Jordan, the former Syria to Turkey and the Mediterranean. Water could be funneled via pipeline down to Saudi Arabia as well. Jordan probably would need to provide some land or at least a rail line to new Saudi (Alaska-like) territory in the former Syria. The idea is to have stable countries running that key territory instead of Assad, Sunni Extremists, or Hezbollah/Iran while protecting Kurds and Alawites in their own small autonomous states.
Is this a realistic proposal? Probably not, especially given the President's recalcitrance to do anything serious about the problem. That plus the advisors surrounding him make such ideas of old school "to the victor go the spoils" an unlikely occurrence. However, old Prince Bandar is running around out there so who knows?
I was intrigued by a story that Fox ran claiming that someone intercepted phone calls from higher HQ asking who authorized the attack. It seemed to imply it was Assad's brother! Not sure what that does to the red line argument but the fact remains that doing nothing is a losing proposition that only will make the problem worse when we finally get involved...or Israel.
It also is pretty interesting that this appears to be a limited Navy-only affair with T-LAMs. What happened to AirSea Battle? Is this going to be another conflict that we leave the F-22 out of?? We could do this from an AirSea Battle standpoint rather easily if we had multiple squadrons of USAF and sea F-35s right now.
<i>Location, location, location relevant to who wins/loses next to Israel and many other currently somewhat stable Muslim states that could become otherwise.</i>
Location relative to Israel might be a problem for the Israelis, but it needn't be for us. We are not their keeper.
<i>A coalition land attack by larger Arab/Turk Armies with NATO/U.S. air support would end the matter rapidly leaving Arab Armies to stay behind and split up the former Syria. </i>
So we are to provide support while a group of "allies" (using the term very loosely indeed) drives in and carves up Syria according to their own whims? When they bog down fighting assorted insurgents, do we continue to provide support? Up to what extent?
Which Arab armies exactly did you have in mind?
Overall, it seems to me that we keep worrying that if we don't intervene the conflict will escalate and spill over to neighboring states, but the proposed interventions seem very likely to have exactly the same consequence.
MoveForward,
We have had our differences. These answers of yours are very insightful and helpful. Thank you. I get the sinking feeling that many of the current civilian leaders have posed many questions with few thinking out concrete answers and then thinking forward to possible consequences as well as their management. I hope they read this response by you.
Ned.
<blockquote>What is crucial to the US regarding Syria?</blockquote>
Location, location, location relevant to who wins/loses next to Israel and many other <strong>currently</strong> somewhat stable Muslim states that could become <strong>otherwise.</strong>
<blockquote>What if we did nothing?</blockquote>The "otherwise" from above and increased terror attacks on Israel by whichever extreme side prevails leading to a Sunni Extremist-Israel or Israel-Assad-Hezbollah-Iran war. Also access by extremist groups to chemical weapons.
<blockquote>What are the potential consequences of each posited response by the US?</blockquote>Chemical weapons affecting adjacent civilians if we bomb those, or being used by Assad against Israel or Jordan if we don't. The same latter response is possible if we go after Assad directly or military C2 nodes leading to lower level leaders making decisions to use chemical weapons without higher authorization. Limited strikes against Assad's aircraft and air defenses leave him only SCUDs with chemical weapons used potentially against civilians or Israel/Jordan/Turkey. Cruise missile strikes alone could be largely ineffective against a warned Assad who disperses aircraft/forces and shoots down many missiles.
A coalition land attack by larger Arab/Turk Armies with NATO/U.S. air support would end the matter rapidly leaving Arab Armies to stay behind and split up the former Syria. New borders and smaller subset territories would be shared by Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey and separate autonomous Alawite and Kurd states. U.S. SOF forces could air assault in to secure chemical sites with B-2/F-22 air cover to preclude counterattack while other U.S. forces remained in Jordan and Turkey protecting their borders/people and shooting down SCUDs and Syrian aircraft. Few if any U.S. ground forces would drive into Syria.
<blockquote>What are the consequences of failing to achieve any of the above?</blockquote>A long war due to a limited insufficient strike with Assad attacking Israel, Jordan, and/or Turkey and increasing use of chemical attacks against its own civilians. A long inadequate no-fly zone attempt with continued missile strikes by Assad. Genocide of Sunnis. A possible nuclear strike by Israel if Assad attacks there with chemical weapons because he is desperate and still can due to our limited attacks.
<blockquote>What lengths/limits are we willing to commit/accept to achieve our goals?</blockquote>No drive-in ground forces in Syria. Air assaults and raids only. Ample U.S. ground forces in Jordan and Turkey to protect them. Ample dollars provided to coalition Arab/Turk armies to remain and stabilize along with agreed upon split up of the former Syria into new territories of the combatant coalition Arab/Turk nations.