Of Groundhogs and Ground Combat by Joseph J. Collins, Small Wars Journal.
Punxsutawney Phil is in big trouble. The Pennsylvania groundhog predicted an early spring, and it didn’t arrive. For his malfeasance, he may yet be indicted or sued by angry Americans from the snow belt. It’s a tough job being the Groundhog-of-record, but Phil has been right about 40% of the time. Ironically, our ability to predict wars appears to be less refined than the groundhog’s “power” to predict the onset of spring. Weak capability, however, does not stop program pruners from making predictions. One consistently wrong—but always convenient—prediction has been the improbability of ground wars and the declining utility of ground forces.
Since the beginning of the 20th century, surprise has been an element in most of the wars that we have fought. This includes the wars (and major stability operations) we have chosen, as well as those that appear to have chosen us. The size, shape, location, or types of war on the horizon have often been beyond our predictive capabilities. Force planners should take this into account and err on the side of balance and flexibility. To paraphrase Trotsky, we may not be interested in ground wars, but, over and over throughout the last century, they have been very interested in us. Perhaps, the past holds some lessons for the future…
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SWJ: In response to: VCJCS Winnefeld Tells Army: Forget Long Land Wars by Sydney Freedberg, Jr., Breaking Defense.