Army’s ‘Pacific Pathways’ Initiative Sets Up Turf Battle With Marines by Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post.
The Army, which fights on terra firma, does not usually land its helicopters on ships — the domain of the Navy and the Marine Corps - but these are not usual times in the U.S. military. As the Obama administration winds down the Army-centric war in Afghanistan, Pentagon leaders are seeking to place the Air Force, Navy and Marines in dominant roles to counter threats in the Asia-Pacific region, which they have deemed to be the nation’s next big national security challenge.
Fearful that the new strategy will cut its share of the defense budget, the Army is launching an ambitious campaign to transform itself and assert its relevance in the Pacific. And that, in turn, is drawing the Army into a fight.
With the Marines…
Comments
RE: "Historically the United States has profited from our unique geostrategic situation that does not require sustaining a large active army in peace. Our geostrategy has not changed, so for us to go to a different (and much more expensive) model, there must be some change of mission or change of the environment demanding we maintain an Army in peace. I'm not sure I see the logic"
I'm curious as to what time period you are referring when our geostrategic situation allowed us to reduce the size of the Army? In 1940 the active army was approximately 250,00K but expanded to over 1.5 million prior to our entry into WWII. The active component has never been smaller than about 480K since. Current plans are to shrink to somewhere in the neighborhood of around 420K making it the smallest US Army in 70 years. Granted, it might be too big; but it might too small as well.
I do agree with you in concept, however, to reduce the active Army below level X presupposes diplomatic, economic and military strategic thought changes (i.e Grand Strategy) that aren't even being discussed by policy makers. There is currently no appetite by our civilian masters to reduce the military adventurism that has been a hallmark of post-Cold War foreign policy - see S. Sudan specifically and Africa in general.
To me the question on Army force structure is less "what's the requirement" and more "what do you want your Army to do" although technically they are probably different sides of the same coin.
So, we are still in sequestration, face economic collapse, high unemployment, massive RIFs looming on the horizon for both military and government civilians, but here we have two branches of the military still fighting over who gets to play with the toys in the new neighborhood we suddenly decided that we need to police?
Simply put...unbelievable that these two branches of service are still being allowed to even pursue this rivalry.
Why hasn't our SECDEF, along with the so-called smart guys at the pentagon, come up with a solid plan for the Pacific, delineating exactly what the roles are for each branch of the service, instead of allowing these perfumed princes to pursue their own agendas?
Once again...drastic realignment needs to take place in our military. These empire builders need to salute smartly, say "Aye, aye Sir" to the American people and carry out the goals of the nation, which are obviously lacking or they would not be pursuing their own service agendas.
Why do we really need to police the entire Pacific AOR?
It is not our back yard. Many of our current allies over here will not be loyal to us when the balloon goes up. We will not just be facing China if/when the balloon goes up...think a China-Russia-N. Korea, plus smaller countries indebted to China, 'United Front' against America with our logistics tail over-extended.
I say we pull back to a Line-in-the-H2O centered on the Marianas Islands, extending North to the Aleutians, and South to Australia, Indonesia, and Singapore. This will ensure that our sea lanes to the IO are protected.
All of these other Asian countries need to be treated in a way described by the various Generals...we need to proactively engage them through a robust annual training and exercise plan, but leaving only a very light footprint (read 'NO' bases). All of this talk about forward staging either troops or equipment in these countries is foolhardy. Have we forgotten the lessons of WWII already, where we lost everything to the Japanese?
One final note...the interested Asia Hand should really try to understand exactly how deep the hatred remains for Japan from both before WWII, during and after, with the U.S. rebuilding Japan, while largely ignoring the rest of Asia. Just to cite a few examples: The Rape of Nanking, The Korean occupation, the Russo-Japanese War (8 February 1904 – 5 September 1905), etc.
This is what is really driving the Chinese expansion...a thirst for revenge.
One question worth asking is "what is the requirement."
There is a seriously flawed narrative that has been attached to "Building Partner Capacity" in recent years. It has become seen as an end that cures conflicts, rather than as a vehicle to facilitate a presence that allows us to develop the types of understanding, influence and relationships necessary to avoid, mitigate or potentially resolve problems early and efficiently.
Clearly the Army is heavily influenced by a desire to preserve force structure in peace that they believe they will need in war. The National Guard is saying the way to do that is to preserve peacetime force structure in the Guard, and then mobilize that capacity for war. Obviously the active force prefers to maintain that structure in the active force.
Historically the United States has profited from our unique geostrategic situation that does not require sustaining a large active army in peace. Our geostrategy has not changed, so for us to go to a different (and much more expensive) model, there must be some change of mission or change of the environment demanding we maintain an Army in peace. I'm not sure I see the logic.
As to the Army vs. the USMC. The USMC is a ground force designed for peace that is pretty dang good at war. The army is a ground force designed for war that is not very good at peace. Are we at war or peace? Answer that question and one knows what type of force to sustain on the active rolls.
Before the pie filling is selected one needs to have the pie tin to bake it in . . . I am referring to amphibious shipping requirements and its availability?
Further, understanding task force sizing with its efficient (timely)embarkation/debarkation and ship-to-shore communication isn't an overnight learning curve.
Lastly, before any embarked Army element afloat also turns into a sea-going "road show," it might be advantageous to ponder the effect weather at sea has on air operations and the possible requirements for fast movement ashore by suitable water borne surface platforms?
While I agree with the Marines that they are better suited for the expeditionary, "traveling roadshow" set-up in the Pacific AOR, perhaps the Army can jump in on this by getting host-nation governments to agree to billet a relatively small contingent of Soldiers (no more than a battalion..?) on their own bases instead of building separate ones for US forces. Example, a US Army battalion based in Vietnam but on a Vietnamese army post...or maybe just a US company rotating through for such postings...?
Or, give each service their own piece of the pie.....USMC takes the Pacific Rim, the Army floats around the Indian Ocean AOR. Thoughts?