Advances in Anticipatory Intelligence Workshop
- Is it possible to get early warnings of emerging events around the world?
- Why are some people better than others at forecasting future societal and economic events?
- With so much information out there, how do you separate the signal from the noise?
These are the kinds of questions we will address at a free day-long workshop on Advances in Anticipatory Intelligence on 25 March 2014. The conference will be held from 0830 to
1600 at the Patel Center for Global Solutions on the campus of the University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida.
The event is sponsored by USF¹s Program in National and Competitive Intelligence; the School of Information; and Cybersecurity at USF. A hot lunch will be provided, so please register (below) so we can get an accurate count.
Sessions will features the latest research from an innovative, highly successful IARPA (Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity) program exploring how best to combine and use information to forecast significant events around the world, including:
IARPA¹s ACE: Aggregative Contingent Estimation (ACE) Program, which was designed to dramatically enhance the accuracy, precision, and timeliness of intelligence forecasts for a broad range of event types, through the development of advanced techniques that elicit, weight, and combine the judgments of many intelligence analysts.
IARPA¹s Open Source Indicators (OSI) Program, which was designed to develop methods for continuous, automated analysis of publicly available data in order to anticipate and/or detect significant societal events, such as political crises, humanitarian crises, mass violence, riots, mass migrations, disease outbreaks, economic instability, resource shortages, and responses to natural disasters. Performers will be evaluated on the basis of warnings that they deliver about real-world events.
Event Agenda:
8:30-9:00 - Registration, Networking and Continental Breakfast
9:00-9:20 - Welcome and Introductory Remarks
9:20-10:45 - ACE: Aggregative Contingent Estimation: Using social science methods like the wisdom of crowds, prediction markets, aggregation algorithms, and teams to forecast international political and economic events. Michael C. Horowitz, University of Pennsylvania
10:45-11:00 - BREAK
11:00: 12:15 - EMBERS (Early Model-Based Event Recognition Using Surrogates): Generating forecasts and alerts for significant societal events using billions of pieces of information in the ocean of public communications, such as tweets, web queries, oil prices, and daily stock
market activity. Chris Walker, Virginia Tech
12:15-1:15 - Lunch (Provided)
1:15-2:30 - PULSE: Developing automated technology that draws and fuses data from social media and other publicly available sources to anticipate major societal events. David Allen, HRL
2:30-2:45 - BREAK (Snacks provided)
2:45-4:00 - JANUS: Early prediction of societal events through robust and efficient feature/indicator extraction from massive volumes of heterogeneous open-source data, time series analysis, and predictive models. Scott Miller, BBN
4:00 - Adjourn
You can register here (just name, email and organization).
Comments
Although it might be impolite for me to comment on this subject, I consider it worthwhile if only to give non-analyst readers of SWJ, and especially those who are likely to find themselves sent off to this or that backend of the universe to personally deal with some 'high probability' event which even their bosses Intelligence Officer (who's certainly a pretty sharp guy himself) gets that sour look on his face regarding during the briefing (heh).
When IARPA, a creature brought to life from the DNI's office, cooks up this or that program relating to "intelligence", they tend to miss an important difference between the core concept of DARPA, the entity they used as a conceptual model, and themselves: namely that developing and applying technology and the uses thereof is not merely a different genus from developing "intelligence", it is more akin to comparing fungi to fish! Or more accurate still, like comparing athlete's foot to a gunshot wound (when one contracts the former, it's an annoyance that can be cured after a trip to a nearby drug store, with the latter, it's literally YOUR life, not the analysts, that's at stake).
But hey guys! Don't sweat it…. I'm sure the wonk at the top of the intelligence food chain will get an invite TO WATCH via YOUR HELMET CAM, from a zillion miles away, LIVE, as your team hits the ground to discover ten times more bullets pinging all around you than expected. That's what politicians and wonks and suits actually mean when they say; "I FEEL your pain"! lol.
First, what does "Open Source" mean to a 'professional' intelligence analyst/manager? It means information that any random jerk living in his parents basement can access and collect. This doesn't mean this guy knows what to do with all this information, but the BIG SECRET that the civilian professionals don't advertise is that during the last Administration during the consolidation of the intelligence community and law enforcement community under the DHS and DNI, a handful of these amateurs, some journalists, some bloggers, some wildcards, were found to be able to consistently outperform 80% of the 'professionals', with absolutely ZERO access to classified material. A couple even did better than that… Consider the implications of this fact!
Now wise Generals, like Gen. McChrystal, who didn't particularly CARE if one of his civilian intelligence analysts was a freak as long as the guy's contribution added up to fewer of his command getting blown up or killed, quickly figured out the best way to apply said freaks talents (that was the guy with cheetos stains on his shirt staring at six TV screens and a couple computers at the same time). But the problem with Savants (which by all accounts describes McChrystal's guy) is that they can't exactly explain how they do what they do… they barely understand it themselves. Yet what IARPA, and the professional IC at large, wants is to systematize and reproduce and analytical process that is, in 95% of those they know of able to do it, chaotic, intuitive, and unique between individuals. This leaves them with the 5% (I'd guess less than ten individuals, maybe as few as five), and here is the problem…
Let's say for the sake of argument that I know a couple of these 5% guys. The first one could easily waltz into that IARPA convention, jump through the appropriate hoops using only open source data, and predict future 'real world event's', like that hurricane in asia last fall, or the Del Recho that hit the beltway a couple of years ago, or the financial crises in 2007, or etc. with such accuracy that his evaluators jaws would drop. Moreover he could explain the methods and processes he used in a rational and logical manner. Readers who aren't professional analysts will understand when I point out that this guy, who had predicted the financial crises, MAKES MILLIONS OF DOLLARS A YEAR (when he can be bothered) using this process of his, which seems to me a lot more rewarding than a pat on the head from IARPA. (Heck, it only costs $800,000 to buy an ambassadorship!). Outside the 'intelligence community' in the real world, where getting shot really freaking hurts, and where this guy lives, if someone walked up to you in the street holding a PENNY, and expected you to give them A DOLLAR in exchange, you'd think they were crazy… but not IARPA.
The second of the two 5% I hypothetically know I call "Bad Will Hunting", because he's not like the character in the movie Good Will Hunting. This guy would never be allowed through the front door of the IARPA convention in the first place… he probably wouldn't even get to the front door because as soon as he arrived in Tampa the FBI, or DEA, or IRS, or etc. would grab him at the baggage claim and grill him over something he might or might not have done (before finally releasing him). Why? Because he's a criminal, and has been his entire life. Ironically, this second guy is way more likely to cooperate with IARPA, because he's only a criminal by default, and like the first guy has plenty of money. He's more patriotic than the first guy, and way more motivated to prove he's not the Hollywood villain the FBI and DHS think he is. But whereas the first guy is an intellectual, this guy is streetwise and has committed any number of crimes in dozens of Countries; to him, it's easier to just go to Country X before the crises occurs, bribe or steal the "intelligence" he knows the U.S. government will want six months or a year in the future, and give it to them (eating the expense as a sign of good faith). In other words, as the second guy understands the universe, he's already done the heavy lifting, spent the money, taken the risk based on his ability to predict future events, and handed over raw intelligence to what he's assumed has been the appropriate authorities.
In the military, the State Department, and across the spectrum of the U.S. government, everyone is paid and expects their organization to acknowledge them as employees and to support them as they perform their duties, and this includes protecting them from other parts of the US government, as well as from foreign governments. To do what the second guy has done (several times), and to expect that he'll be appreciated or acknowledged by the wonks at IARPA, is, in my and the first guys opinion, naive and unrealistic. But how do you explain to a guy outside the system by definition, that it doesn't matter how many Forlorn Hopes he survives… the second guy thinks WE'RE crazy, and insists that RESULTS are themselves proof. It's very hard to argue against this point, other than to observe that if RESULTS were what the DNI or IC or DoD sincerely wanted, he'd have gotten a legit offer years ago.
This is my point… both the second guy, AND IARPA are like beautiful strippers who can't understand why their Prince Charming hasn't walked up out of nowhere and swept them off their feet. You'd think that smart people would know better.
Best,
A. Scott Crawford