From Small Unit Leaders to Rugged Diplomats by Steve Thomas, Real Clear Defense
American foreign policy and its current generation of practitioners suffer from an almost complete lack of understanding of the critical concept of “feasibility” as it relates to statecraft in conflict zones. Broadly speaking, the people who shape foreign policy are highly educated, can speak the languages associated with their area of expertise, and have spent many years living abroad. Unfortunately, in state-building scenarios such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the professional experience of most policymakers is limited to brief tours in the Green Zone or Bagram. These places, while technically in-country, have absolutely no resemblance to the larger situation on the ground.
The problem, stated simply, is a massive disconnect between the tactical reality and the strategic objective. From my perspective in Afghanistan in 2010, there were some really fine foreign policy ideas being promulgated down to the tactical level. Unfortunately, no one had bothered to ask about the feasibility of implementation…
Comments
The problem with foreign internal defense (from what little I know of it), is that it appears to offer little or no value -- or utility -- re: our strategic objective; which is, (1) to better provide for our security and prosperity by (2) transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines. (Let's call this the "Security via Expanding the Franchise" strategic argument.)
FID seems to be wedded to a entirely different strategic objective, which we might label "Security by Holding What Ya Got." This, because FID looks to be an exceptionally limited concept; wherein, one is allowed:
a. To work only with "friends, partners or allies" and
b. Only in states and societies that have, generally speaking, (1) already formed viable nations and (2) already adopted ways of life and ways of governance similar to our own.
Thus FID would not seem to address:
a. Either the states and societies wherein our problems are said to lie or
b. The characteristics within these states and societies (their different political, economic and social orientation) that are seen as the root cause of many of our difficulties.
Now to the idea of self-determination. As a comparison, let us ask whether it would have been wise (from a security point of view):
a. For the United States to have adopted a "self-determination" philosophy and approach re: the American Indians and the American Southerners?
b. For the United States to have adopted a "self-determination" philosophy and approach re: Western Europe, Latin America and Asia following World War II?
What I am attempting to say here is that while "self-determination" sounds good, it does not provide security; this, given the fact that it does not allow one to either "Hold What Ya Got" (see the American South, etc.) or "Expand the Franchise" (think the American West, et al); both such capabilities/options/approaches, it would seem, being required for security.
On the one hand I am heartened to read a former Armor officer calling for Foreign Internal Defense. Had this logic been applied years ago we might never had to kill so many trees developing the nearly redundant mission of Security Force Assistance.
QUOTE The model that American policy makers should look to for appropriate engagement of foreign governments in conflict zones is the Foreign Internal Defense and irregular warfare conducted by American special operations forces. The ability to gain the trust of local leaders, build their capability and capacity, and provide them with the tools to govern their own spaces with a modicum of justice is the hallmark of American Special Forces.
Unfortunately, SOF operates on a limited scope and scale. And American policymakers too often assume that once American conventional forces are deployed en masse, the arrival Jeffersonian democracy is simply a matter of time. Rather, it requires living day-to-day under conditions of significant hardship to forge relationships of trust in order to influence the governance and development models of war-torn nations. This is the kind of mission small unit leaders from Afghanistan and Iraq are well-suited to carry out. END QUOTE
On the other hand I am discouraged in the belief that any US military force, SOF or conventional forces, can bring Jeffersonian democracy to another country. This is our fundamental problem in that we think we can impose our way of life or values or system of government on another country. If we truly understand our ideals we would realize that a fundamental American value is respect for self determination of government and we should support that rather than trying to create another country in our image. This is why the FID mission is a good model: US government (military and civilian) provide advice and assistance to friends, partners, or allies in support of their internal defense and development programs so they can defend themselves against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism. We have to cease believing that we can build nations and instead provide support (perhaps stability operations which is one of the five activities of US irregular warfare operations in accordance with DODI 3000.07) to allow indigenous people to build their own nation.
But I do like the Elvis Presley theory of foreign policy:
QUOTE As former Army Sergeant Elvis Presley once said: “We’re caught in a trap. I can’t walk out, because I love you too much baby.” Strategic thinkers and tactical implementers need each other in order to successfully address thorny American foreign policy issues with feasible recommendations from a holistic perspective. END QUOTE