The Great Revamp: 11 Trends Shaping Future Conflict by Frank Hoffman, War on the Rocks
Our thinking about future wars is often held hostage by the tension between continuity and change. We tend to embrace the known past and continuity with it, sometimes too tightly. But thinking about future wars and preparing the Joint Force for success beyond today’s battles has to be based on more than extrapolating from history or clinging to the immutable realities of war. This is not a task for the faint of heart, as Colin Gray notes, “the further away from today one peers and tries to predict, the foggier the course of future events becomes.” Certainly we can benefit from deep immersion in history and its lessons, but we also must peek around the bend into the future. Since warfare often presents changes that are more than cosmetic, per Clausewitz, Joint Force developers must continuously balance their search for relevant lessons from the past while scanning for indicators of trends that will yield change in the future…
Comments
Move Forward said:
"Bill C.'s comment is totally unrelated to this article."
First, consider this from the article: "Certainly we can benefit from deep immersion in history and its lessons, but we also must peek around the bend into the future."
Thus, in my comment above, I begin by trying to point to that portion of American history which, I believe, is most similar to (and, thus, most relevant re:) our current times.
This being, in my mind, mid-19th Century American history where, then as now, we came to (rightfully?) believe that:
a. Certain people (residing in the American South and the American West), because of their alternative ways of life, alternative ways of governance and alternative values, attitudes and beliefs
b. Posed a direct threat to our national security and/or
c. Held our nation back as to where it needed to go and how it wanted to get there.
Thus, and in consideration of these authors' suggestion that we "benefit from deep immersion in history and its lessons," that is where I begin my argument.
Likewise you may wish to rethink your such suggestion -- that my comment is totally unrelated to this article -- when you consider that my argument is also framed in relation to (and therefore tends to agree with) the authors' first and foremost addressed "trend," to wit: our erroneous belief that future conflict will occur in "the commons" and not -- as per these authors and my suggestion -- in certain "contested areas."
Lastly, and as to my reference to and questions re: Africa and the Middle East (and, by logical extension, to all states and societies that are not adequately organized, ordered and oriented more along modern western lines):
a. Are these not the regions, states and societies of the world which currently plague and threaten the rest of the world -- and in a variety of different ways (disease, terrorism, internal and external strife/conflict, etc.)?
b. Had these regions, states and societies (at some earlier time and via war or some other method) been successfully organized, ordered and oriented more along modern western lines; if this had occurred, then do we believe that these such states, societies and regions would now plague and threaten the rest of the world -- much as they do today?
c. Thus, the argument, then as now, to cause such "transformations" (along modern western lines and via force of arms if necessary) to take place in these "outlying" regions, states and societies -- and sooner rather than later.
These questions ("a" and "b" immediately above) and this answer (at "c") being sufficiently related/relevant to this article by these authors and re: the trends that will shape future conflict? I think so.
Dude: The central underlying problem here -- that I have tried to address -- is that we cannot discuss the trend I jumped on (global commons or contested zones) and/or the others (open or complex terrain, forward force or periodic deployments, concentrated or distributed force, etc., etc, etc.) in a vacuum.
These matters, logically, can only be considered and discussed within a particular strategic context, which must, itself, address (1) what we are trying to accomplish, (2) why and (3) how do we hope to get there.
And here, I believe, history tends to (1) not only help us out but, also, (2) point a/the way.
This was a great article that I read days ago in War on the Rocks. It was the same day I listened to one of their podcasts about Asia...at least until they interrupted it by talking about their drinks. Talking about drinks and including it as the title for a blog are totally unrelated, or should be, to military topics.
But that point aside, Bill C's comment also is a wholly unrelated to the article.
<blockquote>In mid-19th Century America, these outlying states and societies were to be found in the American South and in the American West.
Here the essential task, then as now, was to subdue, and bring the "rule of law," to these "different" peoples and places; this, so as to, essentially:
a. Eliminate their way of life.
b. Install, in the place of these, our own way of life and, thereby,
c. Make these populations become dependent upon same.</blockquote>
I'm not sure where you've lived Bill C, but I grew up in Iowa, then California, did the Army for school in New Jersey and New York, and settled in the deep south (after a tour in Germany) in Alabama because I was an Army Aviator.
You're theory about outlying states and societies as usual is incorrect because you can't get much more outlying than the differences between all the states and societies where I've lived.
Item:
a) Who were the outlying states and societies in Virginia where the capitol of the Confederacy was in Richmond, VA not far from Washington D.C.
b) What about all the other states where half the people supported the south and half the north?
c) Do you believe there actually is much commonality in states and societies between the "northern" states of the Northeast and Midwest, let alone California?
d) Do you seriously believe we pushed West because the Native Americans were outlying societies we needed to convert...or did we want the land and safe routes West?
e) You don't actually think the Civil War ended the way of life in the South or that of Native Americans do you, per your a?
f) You don't truly believe that Southerners have adapted the Northern way of life, even today, per your b?
g) Are you actually claiming that Southerners are dependent on the North per your c?
Geez, dude. Think about it and reread history. The great thing about the U.S. is that we all consider ourselves Americans first. But there haven't been many days in my life where I wished I lived in the North or wished Southerners acted more like Californians. That doesn't mean I agree with much of what Southerners believe. I don't drink because of a family history I have no desire to mimic, and beer and most alcohol sucks taste-wise anyway. Stupid laws against the lottery and slot machines are utterly silly down here. But overall, call me proud to be an American, and thank goodness I didn't need to pay $500 grand to own a house down here, nor did I need to worry as much about my kids turning out to be overly liberal products of northern and western public schools.
We aren't and never have been in the Middle East because we want to make them more like us. We are there because the oil is there and they want to kill us because we won't be more like them. Your comment about Africa is unclear. Is that Ebola related? Have you forgotten about all the colonialism in the Middle East and Africa? Were the British and other countries there because they wanted to make Africans, Arabs, and Indians/Pakistanis, and Asians more like Europeans...or were they there to exploit their resources?
When one looks at trends shaping current and future conflict, one must, I believe, look to a similar period in history, for example: (1) American history, (2) cir. the mid-19th Century.
Then, as now, control of the "commons," per se, was not -- in any way, shape or form -- considered to be sufficient to provide for our nation's security.
Rather, then as now, what was deemed necessary -- to provide for adequate security -- was achieving greater control over the outlying states and their societies.
In mid-19th Century America, these outlying states and societies were to be found in the American South and in the American West.
Here the essential task, then as now, was to subdue, and bring the "rule of law," to these "different" peoples and places; this, so as to, essentially:
a. Eliminate their way of life.
b. Install, in the place of these, our own way of life and, thereby,
c. Make these populations become dependent upon same.
Then as now, attempts to use our "inspiration and example" (our shining cities on the hill and our not so universal values) to achieve, without violence, these goals and objective -- this proved to be pretty much useless.
Why? Because many of these folk, much like those resisting today:
a. Remained inspired by their own traditional ideas and history. And
b. Remained repulsed by our foreign and (in their eyes) often profane concepts.
This failure of inspiration and example, then as now, caused us to have to resort to force of arms -- to achieve the necessary state and societal transformations -- and, thereby, gain greater control over these regions and their human and other resources.
If one follows Clausewitz's dictate -- that war is simply a means to achieve one's political objective via other ways and other means -- then one might easily find, I believe, what one's political objective actually is. And, thus, easily understand such things as:
a. Why the United States, in the mid to late 19th Century, resorted to "war" in the then-outlying regions of its realm (the American South and the American West). (Answer: So as to transform these states and societies more along then-modern political, economic and social lines and, thereby, achieve greater control, utility and security.)
b. And why the United States, likewise today, has engaged in and must continue to prepare for conflict -- not in the "commons" -- but, rather, in those regions where our contemporary outlying states and societies reside. (Many of these folks desiring and/or clinging to -- in the present setting -- often dangerous and/or incompatible alternative ways of life.)
As to my suggestions here, let us, for the sake of argument, look to one example and ask: If the states and societies of the relevant countries of Africa had -- at some earlier time -- been transformed (via force of arms or in some other way) more along modern western political, economic and social lines; had this occurred, would our, and other people of the world's, safety and security be as significantly compromised as they might be today?
Same question re: the Middle East.
To conclude: As re: America in the mid-19th Century -- and again today -- the "trend" that defined the times was the requirement to transform, often via force of arms, outlying states and societies; this, so as to achieve sufficient security. Then as now, that was/is the job at hand. (Even if we did not/do not, for many different reasons, wish this to be so.) Inspiration and example, then as now, failed. Thus it appears that, then as now, we must prepare -- and act(?) -- accordingly.