The US Army War College Quarterly, Parameters

The lead commentary by War College history professor Tami Davis Biddle includes this final paragraph in disputing LTG Bolger regarding who "lost" the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan:

<blockquote>If the US Army is responsible for fighting and winning the nation’s wars, senior officers must accept the fact that most of the work of “winning” will come well after the major combat phase has drawn to a close. Contingent events will break in unexpected ways and the ground will shift constantly under one’s feet. The choices political leaders make will be just as important as the ones military officers make. And, in the end, the extent to which the two sets of choices can be reconciled, coordinated, and harmonized will determine, in all likelihood, the success or failure of the strategy. At every turn, civil-military relations will matter profoundly. And the obligation to get them right will rest with both sides.</blockquote>

This combined with results in Libya and now Yemen call into question two recent strategies for solving geopolitical problems. The first is bomb it and let them sort it out which occurred unsuccessfully in Libya. The recent events in Yemen are the second example where civil leaders concluded (and even prematurely bragged) that SF/SOF and manned/unmanned airpower were sufficient to solve the problem. Both situations involved large land masses, diverse populations, and the influence of Islamic extremism. This similarly calls into question our current strategy in the third and largest problem: Iraq/Syria and the influence of ISIS and Iran on both. The stalled assault on Tikrit and its similar reliance on airpower and SF/SOF are not working to re-seize terrain rapidly. Likewise the half-hearted bombing strategy to deal with ISIS in "Syria," guarantees no re-seizure of terrain and ensures that Assad is unobstructed in continuing to "rule" a nation that, like Iraq, no longer should exist as a single state under one group's rule.

Not every challenge is worthy of U.S. involvement. But at some point, contrary to LTG Bolger's assessment, U.S. military ground forces must be part of stability operations in a massed manner. You break it, you bought it or plan to return to the store later to pay for it after the "lawsuit." Ground and airpower mass is the sole means of ensuring territorial stability while simultaneously transitioning host nation militaries to control of wide area security. The other article in the blog about $500 million in lost equipment in Yemen, combined with similar problems in Iraq when ISIS seized our gear illustrate that complete reliance on host nation forces is problematic. Until host nation forces are prepared, have local approval, and possess motivation within legitimate rather than contrived states, the different populations within old colonial borders will continue to seek self-rule.