The Changing Face of Warfare in the 21st Century by Audrey Kurth Cronin, The Strategist
Warfare is changing, and not just in the most obvious and visible ways. Yes, there are new technologies, newly assertive foes, and new ideologies. But to fully understand how it’s evolving, you must examine the broader context in which we are fighting.
There are tectonic shifts underway, gradual yet persistent, that we rarely think about as being a part of war. Yet they directly affect what our armed forces face on the battlefield, now and into the future. Here are two underappreciated dimensions of change…
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COL Maxwell, below, suggests that
a. While we must consider -- as contributory factors -- such things as the ideas, provided by the author here, on mobilization, cybermobilization and innovation,
b. We must, PRIMARILY, "acquire the knowledge and understanding of RRI (revolution, resistance and insurgency) in the 21st century;" this, "if we are going to be able to conduct effective national security affairs."
I concur.
Herein, I would offer that while RRI, in the second half of the 20th Century, related primarily to:
a. Efforts made then, by such communist nations as the former USSR, etc., to transform lesser states and societies more along communist political, economic and social lines. And
b. Our efforts to counter same.
RRI today, in the first half of the 21st Century, is related more to:
a. Our efforts, post-the Cold War, to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines. And
b. Our opponents' efforts to prevent/preclude such transformations.
That, in a nut-shell I suggest, is what you need to know about RRI in the 21st Century.
The implications, of course, of this "role-reversal" (and re: such things as legitimacy, UW, political warfare, use of force, etc.,) are astounding, and nearly impossible, at first, for folks like me -- who were raised and served during the Cold War -- to fathom.
But get our minds around this "role-reversal" dynamic we must, if we are going to do as COL Maxwell suggests above and understand RRI in the 21st Century.
Once you accept that, today,
a. "We" are the one's seeking to expand our ideas, our institutions, etc., into other parts of the world and that
b. "They," today, are the one's seeking to prevent/preclude our such expansion,
Then everything else seems to fall into place and, for example, explain our new (and for us) unusual difficulties, our new strengths and our new weaknesses and, indeed, those of our enemies.
(This such "role-reversal" dynamic explaining, for example, why, during the Cold War, the conservative elements of other states and societies were often seen as our "natural" allies, and as the "natural" enemies of our opponents. While, today, the reverse is true.)
The article focuses on mobilization and innovation. Two aspects captured in most defense documents addressing strategy or strategic estimates. The author suggests the following:
Taken together these two dimensions of change (mobilisation and innovation) mean that the causes of war are more unpredictable, and lethal arms are more accessible to a wider range of enemies. They are affecting who fights, why they fight, where they fight and with what means.
"First, we must confront the process of mobilisation, including attacking the message and avoiding the tendency to help the enemy mobilise. When we trumpet the latest ISIS claim of ‘credit’ for attacks they had nothing to do with, for example, we are lionising them and helping them draw recruits."
We have been attacking the message long before the tragic attacks on 9/11 with little effect. It is probably time to take two steps back and look at the bigger picture and see if there is a more viable approach. I agree with the author's comment about lionizing them in the media, but in a free society we can't control media outlets who make a lot of money doing so. Yes the problem is real, the proposed solution is lacking in substance.
"Second, rather than leave innovation mainly to the private sector, US and allied governments must invest more in the kinds of basic research and development that spawned all of this creativity years ago. There is no reason we cannot recapture the momentum we had then. But first we have to stop deluding ourselves that the current situation is sustainable."
Perhaps the budget has been cut, but the U.S. government and civilian sector are still innovating at pace no other country can match. I think the issue is what are we innovating for? What problems are we trying to solve? We spend billions on a Joint Strike Fighter, which is clearly innovative, but we still are struggling in the hybrid warfare domain.
"Third, we must use our own existing technological innovations more effectively, to help us more than they help them. Why are ISIS and Putin’s Russia giving us lessons in how to use them? Only by breaking out of simplistic 20th century arguments pitting free speech against security will we be able to develop a clear-eyed understanding of the broader historical threat and a willingness to work together to meet it."
Concur
My short assessment: It is becoming much easier to conduct revolution, resistance, and insurgency (RRI) in the modern world. Dr. Cronin's ideas on mobilization (and cybermobilization) and innovation contribute to this. We must acquire the knowledge and understanding of RRI in the 21st century if we are going to be able to conduct effective national security affairs.