Obama's Military Policy: Down-Size While Threats Rise by Michael O’Hanlon, Wall Street Journal
The Obama administration’s official policy on U.S. military ground forces is that they should no longer be sized for possible “large-scale prolonged stability operations.” The policy was stated in the administration’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, and dutifully reasserted last year in the Pentagon’s signature planning document known as the Quadrennial Defense Review.
“Stabilization operations” can include the range of missions spanning counterinsurgency, state-building, large-scale counterterrorism, and large-scale relief activities conducted in anarchic conditions. Though constraints like sequestration have limited the money available for the U.S. military, the Obama policy calling for a smaller standing ground army reflects a deliberate strategy shift and not just a response to cost-cutting, since some other parts of the military are not being reduced.
It is understandable that in the aftermath of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, President Obama would want the military to avoid messy ground operations in the future and rely instead on drones, commandos and other specialized capabilities. But as a guide to long-term force planning, the order to end America’s ability to mount such large-scale missions is dangerous. It should be corrected by the next president before it does real harm to the nation’s military…
Comments
Re: my Koran conflict example below,
Which O'Hanlon uses, in part, to base his "future of land warfare" concepts (nation-building projects are unavoidable; thus, we must have, in our major combat formations, the large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization forces/capabilities needed to see these such missions through),
To consider the following from COL Maxwell's recent "Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting a Resistance:"
https://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_03_01.jsp?bid=DATA03&page=1&num=996&…
(Download Item 5)
BEGIN QUOTES
Planning for peaceful unification is much harder than unification after war or collapse. It requires planning for the complete integration of the Koreans living in the north into a modern political, economic and cultural paradigm that has been virtually unknown by the people in the North and for which they have no experience. From a free market to free elections to integration and transition of existing bureaucracies as well as militaries to recovery and proper disposition of nuclear weapons (just to name a few) peaceful unification is going to be very challenging and it is the realization of this complexity that has caused paralysis among many who should be planning for this and instead, we plan for deterrence and defense, defense against regime provocations and possible regime collapse. All of these contingencies prevent us from planning for the ultimate end state. What is missed, however, is that regardless of the path to unification, the basic requirements for integration and transition in a peaceful unification scenario will be required in various forms after war or collapse. This despite the fact that some view unification of Korea after war or collapse as easier because the North Korean political system, the military, and the infrastructure will be destroyed. The entire territory of the northern part of Korea will have to be rebuilt from the ground up.
This assumption that unification will be easier following war or collapse neglects the recognition that the Korean people living in the north, due to indoctrination, ignorance, fear, remnants of the North Korea regime and military, and various other reasons may in fact resist unification. Resistance by the Korean people living in the north is likely the most difficult condition that the ROK and the ROK-U.S. alliance will have to address ...
One of the reasons for such resistance might be because North Korea and the Kim family regime are a “guerrilla dynasty,” a phrase coined by author Adrian Buzo who gave that to his book on North Korea. He described the nation of the regime this way:
“In the course of this struggle against factional opponents, for the first time Kim began to emphasize nationalism as a means of rallying the population to the enormous sacrifices needed for post-war recovery. This was a nationalism that first took shape in the environment of the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement and developed into a creed through the destruction of both the non-Communist nationalist forces and much of the leftist intellectual tradition of the domestic Communists. Kim’s nationalism did not draw inspiration from Korean history, nor did it dwell on past cultural achievements, for the serious study of history and traditional culture soon effectively ceased in the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea]. Rather, DPRK nationalism drew inspiration from the Spartan outlook of the former Manchurian guerrillas. It was a harsh nationalism that dwelt on past wrongs and promises of retribution for “national traitors” and their foreign backers."
Because the Korean people living in the north have been indoctrinated with this “guerrilla ethos” remnants of the regime and the military, and as well as some of the population are likely to resist all outside intervention even from the ROK. We must not make the same erroneous assumption made in 2003 in Iraq: that the U.S. and coalition forces would be welcomed as liberators. In fact, although there was a positive welcome initially by many in Iraq, it is unlikely that there will be anything near that level in North Korea even after the collapse of the regime by whatever means. As I have written, I think resistance and insurgency in North Korea could make Iraq pale in comparison."
END QUOTES
Thus, from the standpoint of:
a. The resistance that COL Maxwell so carefully outlines above, and his notice that,
b. N. Korea must be "rebuilt from the ground up" -- along political, economic and social lines that are "virtually unknown by the people in the North," to understand why
c. "Nation-building" capabilities -- and the large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization forces/capabilities needed to see such missions through -- these must become organic (?) to our major combat formations?
Scope? These such conditions (the likelihood of war against very "different" states and societies; the likelihood of a fearful "people's" resistance; the need to rebuild these nations, following major combat operations, from the ground up -- this, along our alien and often profane political, economic and social lines); these such conditions -- and our associated "nation-building" requirements -- existing throughout the non-western/less-western world?
Of late, the idea that the U.S. Army:
a. Does not need to be organized, ordered and oriented to support "nation-building" (to wit: to support the forced transformation of outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines) and, thus,
b. Does not need to maintain -- in its main combat formations -- the large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization forces/capabilities needed to accomplish these such "nation-building" missions,
These such flawed ideas would seem to stem from:
a. The Bush administrations (fatal) belief in such things as our version of "universal values;" which suggested that, following liberation from their oppressive regimes, the populations of the liberated countries would, quickly, easily and mostly on their own, accept and adopt modern western ways. And from
b. The Obama administration's (potentially fatal) belief that it can simply avoid conflicts/confrontations which require "nation-building." (And, thus, can simply avoid maintaining the large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization forces needed to see such mission through). Herein, O'Hanlon telling us that -- what the Obama administration is ignoring -- is that "the enemy gets a vote" in these matters.
Thus, and as an example, to ask: Should the stuff hit the fan in Korea, and following a victory against N. Korea there, would the Republic of Korea (et. al.) allow that the North be organized, ordered and oriented along lines OTHER than modern western political, economic and social lines? (Even if this such alternative organizing/ordering was as per the wishes, and the will, of the brain-washed N. Korean people?) The answer would seem to be a resounding "NO."
This being the case, and as per this and other scenarios, then what O'Hanlon would seem to saying is that we MUST, of necessity:
a. Have large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization forces on board; this, so as to:
b. Deal with likely scenarios; scenarios which suggest that the requirement of "nation-building" -- whether we like it or not -- cannot be avoided.