Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict - Strategic Studies Institute Monograph by Dr. Michael J. Mazarr
Synopsis:
Discussions of an emerging practice of “gray zone” conflict have become increasingly common throughout the U.S. Army and the wider national security community, but the concept remains ill-defined and poorly understood. This monograph aims to contribute to the emerging dialogue about competition and rivalry in the gray zone by defining the term, comparing and contrasting it with related theories, and offering tentative hypotheses about this increasingly important form of state competition. The idea of operating gradually and somewhat covertly to remain below key thresholds of response is hardly new. Many approaches being used today—such as support for proxy forces and insurgent militias—have been employed for millennia. The monograph argues that the emergence of this more coherent and intentional form of gray zone conflict is best understood as the confluence of three factors. Understood in this context, gray zone strategies can be defined as a form of conflict that pursues political objectives through integrated campaigns; employs mostly nonmilitary or nonkinetic tools; strives to remain under key escalatory or red line thresholds to avoid outright conventional conflict; and moves gradually toward its objectives rather than seeking conclusive results in a relatively limited period of time. Having examined the scope and character of gray zone conflict, the monograph offers seven hypotheses about this emerging form of rivalry. Finally, the monograph offers recommendations for the United States and its friends and allies to deal with this challenge.
Comments
I suggest that we consider the "gray zone" generally, and China, Russia and Iran's contemporary activities in the "gray zone specifically -- not from the "revisionist powers" perspective offered by the author here.
Rather, I suggest that we consider the "gray zone" generally -- and these nations' current operations in the "gray zone" specifically -- more from the standpoint of:
a. These nations (China, Russia and Iran)
b. Adopting and employing
c. In today's New/Reverse Cold War (think the U.S./the West today in the "expansionist" mode)
d. Our highly successful Old Cold War "containment" and "roll back" strategies against us
e. This, specifically, in what these nations consider as their own "backyard"/their own "sphere of interest." (Russia: think Ukraine, Syria, etc.; China: think the areas surrounding the South China Sea; Iran: think the Middle East.)
Thus, our job in this New/Reverse Cold War -- and re: the "gray zone" activities of our "containment"/"roll back" opponents therein -- is much the same as the job that the Soviets/the communists had in the Old Cold War.
This being to:
a. Overcome the "containment" and "roll back" efforts of our opponents and
b. Advance, in spite of these such efforts, our unique way of life, our unique way of governance and our correspondingly unique values, attitudes and beliefs.
c. This, in these "opposed" nations' own backyard/own sphere of interest -- and beyond.
Note:
One can hardly argue that the efforts of the U.S./the West today are not "expansionist" in nature; this, after the immediate announcement of such following the end of the Old Cold War. http://fas.org/news/usa/1993/usa-930921.htm
Excerpt: "Throughout the Cold War, we contained a global threat to market democracies; now we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significance to us."
Herein, to understand why it is the U.S./the West -- and not revisionist Russia, China or Iran -- who must be seen as the entity that (a) is not satisfied with the status quo and which, accordingly, (b) seeks to alter same.