Obama’s ‘Boots on the Ground’: U.S. Special Forces Are Sent to Tackle Global Threats by Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, New York Times
They are taking on a larger combat role in Afghanistan, where the war was supposed to be over. They are headed to Syria to help fight the Islamic State in its stronghold. And President Obama recently ordered nearly 300 of them to Cameroon to assist African troops in their battle against a militant group that has pledged loyalty to the Islamic State.
With the Middle East in tumult, radical groups holding swaths of territory in Africa, and a presidential campaign fanning fears of a growing terrorism threat, the White House has steadily expanded the global missions of American Special Operations troops.
Even as Mr. Obama has repeatedly said that he opposes American “boots on the ground” in far-flung parts of the world, his administration continues to carve out exceptions for Special Operations forces — with American officials often resorting to linguistic contortions to mask the forces’ combat role.
The Obama administration long ago showed its inclination to rely on Special Operations troops and clandestine missions as an alternative to large wars of occupation. But the spread of the Islamic State over the past year — from its hubs in Syria and Iraq to affiliates in Africa and South Asia — has led the White House to turn to elite troops to try to snuff out crises in numerous locations.
These deployments, as well as other missions being considered, have upended the Obama administration’s goal of withdrawing from countries that for more than a decade have been crucibles of combat for the American military…
Comments
Bill M:
Above you said:
"If we want to transform or integrate an outlier state we send in the big Army to do that. It requires that we occupy, control, and nurture the form of governance the U.S. thinks is best for that country ... "
Note that such might not be the case, as GEN Votel appears to point out here:
“We recognized that with a little bit of assistance from Special Operations Forces from the United States, a relatively small footprint, that we could really enable and help them and move forward,” said Votel. “And we were able to do that. And we were able to start that early and we were able to get our political leadership behind it. We were able to explain to them what the opportunity was. They saw it and they allowed us to get in there and do that and it’s allowed the African Union forces in Somalia to be much more effective ..."
"... It is Somalia and they’ve had a lot of challenges for a lot of years. But, today, they’ve got an elected president. They’ve got a parliament. They’ve got a constitution. They are now establishing a national army. And those are all good and positive things."
“Again, it’s not perfect, it’s far from perfect, but it is about identifying those types of opportunities and getting them teed up and then trying to move forward on them.”
http://www.tbo.com/list/military-news/gray-zone-conflicts-far-more-comp…
Thus the mission of transforming (more along modern western political, economic and social lines) and of incorporating (more into the global economy and the international community) outlying states and societies (such as Somalia and Columbia); these such primary missions appear not to have been abandoned simply because of big Army's failures.
Rather, these critical missions look like they will now be accomplished via other, more-sustainable ways, and other, more-sustainable means. Example, and re: the military side of things, more via the help/the use of special operations and air forces; as GEN Votel appears to point out above?
@ Bill C.
If we want to transform or integrate an outlier state we send in the big Army to do that. It requires that we occupy, control, and nurture the form of governance the U.S. thinks is best for that country. In almost all cases, with the major exceptions being Japan and Germany, we failed miserably with this approach. I suggest that relying on SOF and airpower is a recognition of that failure and of our limitations to transform societies, at least at an acceptable cost in treasure and blood.
On the other hand, any state to remain legitimate must protect its citizens. Realizing we can't solve the complex problems that underlie these security challenges in many parts of the world, we have instead adapting a strategy of disrupting terrorists. Disruption can be a strategy, but it is one without ends. If it ultimately results in a better peace, that will be due to these groups imploded over time, much like the USSR did, based on their own shortcomings.
I liken it to a law enforcement approach. There will always be crime, and pre-emptive strikes are better than arrests after the crime, especially when the crime we're talking about is a major terrorist attack. Time will tell if this approach works or not. We saw how a perhaps misguided disruption strategy in Yemen contributed to state collapse, so as the experts like to say, there is no such thing as strategy without risks.
Suggest that we see Obama's (and future presidents') use primarily of special operations and air forces from a strategic point of view.
Thus, as a means/method of (1) defeating our enemies' "political attrition" strategy and of (2) prevailing in the continuing "long war" (to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western lines).
Our enemies' "political attrition" strategy is designed to provide that the U.S./the West, via over-extension, over-commitment and associated political exhaustion might, as in Vietnam, have to (1) come home and (2) leave the region entirely in the hands of our enemies; this, with:
a. Our political objective (of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western lines) not accomplished and
b. Our enemies' political objective (of transforming outlying states and societies along NON-western lines) realized.
Thus, by using primarily special operations and air forces, U.S./Western leaders hope to:
a. Overcome/defeat our enemies such "political attrition" strategy.
b. Never have to go home/never have to leave the field of battle or the region entirely in the hands of our enemies and, thus, be able to
1. Continue to pursue our goal -- of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines -- indefinitely and
2. Continue to thwart (via disenchantment, demoralization and exhaustion) our enemies' goal of transforming outlying states and societies more along NON-western/less-western political, economic and social lines.
Thus, via the "limited engagement" means outlined above (the use primarily of special operations and air forces) we might, unlike Vietnam, "stay on" and "fight on" indefinitely.
Such would not be the case if we played by the enemies' rules, took the enemies' bait and "over-committed" via the use of large numbers of ground forces.
This, in:
a. The endless number of places that the enemy might choose to appear/reappear and in
b. The endless number of guise (AQ; ISIS, etc.) that the enemy might decide to take on.
Accordingly, the endless commitment of large numbers of ground forces is not considered to be a reasonable and/or sustainable means of (a) preventing our enemies from achieving their goal (of unfavorable state and societal transformation) and/or of (b) achieving our goal (the transformation of outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines).
Although Anthony Cordesman is quoted in this article they did not use his money quote from his article earlier this month when he called the use of Special Operations Forces by the Administration "strategic tokenism." (it can be accessed here: http://bit.ly/1PYsPJj)
Also it would be useful if the media began to describe the two broad mission activities of special operations forces, surgical strike and special warfare, so readers might better understand the breath of special operations capabilities rather than the ones we associate with taking down bin Laden:
Surgical Strike is the execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence adversaries and threats.
Special Warfare is the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.