by Major Timothy R. Kreuttner, Small Wars Journal
The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and US COIN Doctrine (Full PDF Article)
Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the US Army has wrestled with how to apply socio-cultural factors in counterinsurgency. The case of Nepal provides an example of a state that failed to adequately address socio-cultural problems in an ethnically diverse country and consequently lost power to a Maoist insurgency. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN(M)) gained power by way of free elections after a twelve-year insurgency starting in 1996. While the government of Nepal focused on a military solution, the Maoists grew in strength by out-governing the state and building a solid popular base. After achieving a military stalemate, the CPN(M) transitioned from violence to political maneuvering by exploiting fissures between the parliamentary parties and the monarchy. A key to Maoist success was its ability to mobilize dissatisfied classes and ethnic groups. The government of Nepal was unable to gain or maintain the support of the people because of political upheaval, repressive tactics, and failure to solve social issues among the different groups. US and other foreign training and material support to Nepal were helpful militarily, but insufficient because they did little to address the core political, social, and economic problems unique to Nepal. The Maoist insurgency has implications for US counterinsurgency doctrine that suggest a need for a better understanding of the socio-cultural and political factors that motivate insurgency.
The US military, like the Nepalese Army, faces challenges in understanding the cultures of host nations and adversaries. US counterinsurgency doctrine, as articulated in US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, stresses gaining legitimacy and gives cultural considerations at the tactical level, but still lacks a comprehensive explanation of how to apply cultural expertise operationally for strategic success. The preface of FM 3-24 warns that the manual "is not intended to be a standalone reference. Users should assess information from other sources to help them decide how to apply the doctrine...to the specific circumstances facing them." The writers acknowledge that given the complexity and changing characteristics of counterinsurgency operations, FM 3-24 is incomplete. Professional journals and blog sites serve as forums for updating counterinsurgency methods. A case such as Nepal, where insurgents adapted Maoist strategy to the conditions of their country, illustrates the difficulty of formulating a counterinsurgency strategy in a challenging political environment with limited means.
The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and US COIN Doctrine (Full PDF Article)
