Intense debate has raged for weeks on whether President Obama should send 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan, but the dispute over numbers may be distracting attention from the more important decision he is facing: the need for a new strategy. "Additional forces are required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely," Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top US commander in Afghanistan, wrote in his now famous report to the president that was leaked to the press in September. Among the key decisions the president will make is whether to partner with an Afghan government hobbled by accusations of widespread fraud in a recent election, how to handle the prickly diplomatic situation in neighboring Pakistan, and how much effort to put into training the Afghan army.
But perhaps the most pivotal decision, however, is whether the Taliban is a force that must be completely defeated, or whether it can be bargained with. Peter Mansoor, a professor of military history at Ohio State University who served as a top adviser to Gen. David H. Petraeus in Iraq, said President Obama's military reviews "are addressing all three facets of strategy: ends, ways, and means." "The media, and by extension the American people, are focused on means, (troop numbers)," Mr. Mansoor said in an e-mail. "But as or more important than this factor are the administration's goals (ends) in Afghanistan and its concept for prosecution of the war (ways). You need to look at all three in unison to get a clear picture of the way ahead." ...
More at The Washington Times.
Obama Focuses on Civilian Effort in Afghanistan Strategy Review - Anne E. Kornblut and Scott Wilson, Washington Post.
President Obama, convening his fifth war council meeting in as many weeks, pressed his senior national security advisers Wednesday on the political situation in Afghanistan and the effort to train the country's security forces, officials said. Allegations of fraud in the Afghan presidential election over the summer have raised questions about the legitimacy of Hamid Karzai's government, complicating US efforts to partner with him. Meanwhile, the country's security forces are seen as ill-equipped to confront an insurgency that is gaining strength.
Such factors are figuring prominently in the debate over the Obama administration's strategy in Afghanistan, official say. Although the discussions also include making a decision on whether to deploy tens of thousands of additional US troops, an administration official said the president was "very focused on the complexity of the situation" Wednesday - looking past the military aspect of the equation and toward the civilian effort. Another official said the focus on the civilian effort grew out of a sense that the United States needs to better cultivate Afghan leaders and institutions. "We've been at war eight years, and we realize now we're starting from scratch because very little work has been done building a credible Afghan partner," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the talks...
More at The Washington Post.
US Officials Look at Scenarios for Afghanistan 'Middle Path' - Julian E. Barnes and Christi Parsons, Los Angeles Times.
As the Obama administration debates whether to shift its aims in Afghanistan, officials at the Pentagon and National Security Council have begun developing "middle path" strategies that would require fewer troops than their ground commander is seeking. Measures under consideration include closer cooperation with local tribal chiefs and regional warlords, using CIA agents as intermediaries and cash payments as incentives, said current and former officials who described the strategies on condition of anonymity.
Other steps would concentrate US and allied troops in cities, pulling out of Afghanistan's widely dispersed rural areas. At the same time, the allied forces would push ahead with plans to intensify training of Afghan troops, officials said. None of the strategies envision troop reductions, but officials said they would not require the 40,000-troop increase preferred by Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the US and allied commander. A number of White House officials favor sending fewer than 20,000 additional troops...
More at The Los Angeles Times.
Comments
The strategy in afghanistan should be a multi-national south asian force able to hold the peace and build a nation with us for decades.
This force should be able to go across the border between afghanistan and pakistan and fight AQ and taliban. This force should be able to do that because it would compromise of military personnel from pakistan and india and srilanka and bangladesh and china if willing. The force should be at 200,000 strong. The force will be large enough to implement the COIN strategy.
But how do we get both india and pakistan on-board. It is simple. The terrorists inside pakistan not only pose a danger to pakistan (now) but also to india. The as is situation would be a continuation of the cross border terrorism in india and in border terrorism in pakistan.
Carrots/sticks approach needs to be used. If Pakistan doesn't come on-board then we will increase military co-operation with india on a very high level giving the pakistanis no choice to be part of the solution. India has to be waived the carrot of more military arms supplies, visas and business co-operation and nuclear co-operation to the stick of cutting of the co-operation that we have already and putting the indian economy at risk because us/india economies are very co-dependant.
There has to be many other ways we can strong arm these two countries in contributing troops and to the idea of joint counterinsurgency/anti-terrorism force.
The war in afghanistan has a seperatist more than a terrorist agenda. Pashtun populace is not represented and marginailized by both pakistan and afghan governments. Second leg of the strategy requires creating an pashtun government independent of hardcore taliban and allied with both afghan/pak central government. This government should be able to sent representatives to both afghanistan/pakistan central government and be able to enforce law and order across the border regions. Law and order can be based on sharia law/tribal law whatever the pashtun populace votes for. The idea for the long-term being a creation of ASEAN union like the european union with strong democracies supporting and economically uplifting the weak.
The current strategy is bound to fail because it relies on pak military destroying taliban/AQ from the pakistani side. Its doing a half-ass job, because as long its doing a half-ass job we will be contributing money. They do not want to fight their own country-men and know that our appetite to stay in afghanistan is low. Pakistan military is defined by its conflicts with india and will funnel the money that we give to its military interest in fighting india. Once we leave they will go back to fighting proxy war in afghanistan and india via the taliban/AQ/Pak terrorist nexus. The truth is that the pakistan military cannot fight the taliban alone and there are not enough troops to implement the COIN strategy on the afghan and pakistan side.
We have to convince pakistan the only war worth fighting is the one within its border and india that it has to support pakistan's civilian government and better get involved. It should be a part of a greater regional strategy that eradicates terrorism by using the regional powers and our influence