In its continuing search for an alternative to General Stanley McChrystal's comprehensive counterinsurgency approach to the war in Afghanistan, and with President Obama having eliminated the minimalist counterterrorism plan of Vice President Joe Biden, the White House has lately been floating a split-the-difference trial balloon: "McChrystal Lite" or, to give the veep his due, "McChrystal for the cities, Biden for the countryside."
Last week the New York Times was allowed a sneak-peak of what this half-pregnant approach might look like. It reported that White House advisers are aiming to defend "about 10 top population centers." A number of press accounts indicate that the number of additional troops would be capped at around 20,000 - half the 40,000 recommended by McChrystal - no more than four brigade-sized units and the needed support. The Times also indicated that McChrystal had briefed the White House on how he would employ any reinforcements: "The first two additional brigades would be sent to the south, including one to Kandahar, while a third would be sent to eastern Afghanistan and a fourth would be used flexibly across the nation."
To the Washington punditocracy, half a loaf sounds about right; even if they don't think it's the right strategy, they think it's what Obama will do as a matter of domestic politics. But does it make any military sense? ...
More at The Weekly Standard.
Comments
It seems to me that the analysis done by General Stanley McChrystal is based on, in his opinion, what the military must do in order for the rest of the instruments of national power to achieve the US and International strategic objectives in Afghanistan. Given GEN McCrystal's credentials I tend to believe he is correct in his estimates. The fact that the administration is questioning the recommendation signals to me that there is no clear understanding of what the National Objective(s) is. The military is only one part of DIME. Tell the military what the National envisioned endstate is what other elements of national power need to accomplish, and the military will do its part to set the conditions for that success. Failing to do this leaves our Soldiers fighting daily and questioning why.
There seems to be a temptation to approach force levels as if dealing with a kitchen remodel: "If I go with tile instead of granite countertops, can I save a few thousand dollars?"
It is a legitimate question to ask what security force to population ratios are needed for a reasonable chance of success in COIN. There is certainly no consensus regarding the 20 per 1,000 rule of thumb.
However, it seems to defy logic to argue that "we don't think that 40,000 more troops can accomplish the mission so we are going to try it with adding only 20,000 instead."