At their core, insurgencies are about political power struggles, usually between a central government and those who reject its authority, where the objective of the conflict is the population itself and the political right to lead it.
Thus, the center of gravity in this type of warfare is not the enemy's forces per se, but the population. The centrality of politics to this type of warfare means that counterinsurgent forces must craft a political strategy that is sensitive to the needs of the population, seeks to secure its loyalty to the government, mobilizes the community to identify, expel or fight the insurgent, and extends the authority and reach of the central government. To achieve these goals, a government must have a political strategy that separates the insurgents from popular support so they can be killed or imprisoned. If a political plan is implemented poorly, or not at all, insurgent forces will capitalize on the grievances and frustrated hopes of the community to entice it away from the government. The community may then assist the insurgent with a safe haven to rest, re-arm, re-equip, recuperate and redeploy to fight another day.
In the long run, because this conflict is not about how many casualties counterinsurgent forces impose on the insurgents but about the will to stay in the fight, foreign counterinsurgents tend to grow weary of the amount of blood and treasure they must expend. The insurgent could lose every military engagement, but still win the war if the government does not win the population over to its program, policies and plans...
More at Armed Forces Journal.
Comments
There is an excellent article in the Nov/Dec 09 Military Review that covers much of the same territory as Dan Green's article. However, these authors recommend a bottom-up, tribal/district approach to reconstruction:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryRev…
Dan,
You might want to check out Steven Pressfield's "Interview With a Tribal Chief #6: It Was Easier Fighting the Taliban."
http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/2009/11/interview-with-a-tribal-chief-…
I think Chief Zazai would probably agree with you.
Mike
Mr. Green's essay provides an operational construct to compliment MAJ Gant's One Tribe at a Time. They suggest that we work with the existing structures (decentralized) rather than working against the tide (centralized govt). Combined, they offer a viable alternative of decentralized population-centric counter-insurgency compared to the centralized government pop- centric COIN McChrystal proposal. This plan merits careful analysis and discussion.
Over the last four years, the military adapted and implemented COIN to provide security. We implemented measures to break the enemies will to fight in Iraq; however, we still lack comprehensive doctrine to implement the political arm of war that brings the peace. To date, this political maneuvering is more of an art than a science, and it is best represented by the charasmatic leadership of Crocker/Patraeus with the Maliki gov't.
Hopefully, we will see increased debate and analysis on clarifying the political aspect of warfare.
However, questions still remain. Back to Mr. Green's essay,
1. Do we have the wisdom, discretion, and discernment to implement an Afghan Political Service to conduct micro-politics?
2. What is the cost?
3. What is the endstate?