This year will be the third in a row that tens of thousands of new United States troops have arrived in Afghanistan with plans to "clear, hold and build" areas controlled by the Taliban. Those previous surges have achieved little success at holding or building, as the international coalition and Afghan government have inevitably failed to come up with realistic plans for what happens after the fighting is done. Is the campaign in Marja destined for the same fate?
The international coalition's strategic goal for Afghanistan is to build "an enduring stable, secure, prosperous and democratic state." Only by focusing on the messy medium-term stages of reconstruction - those months, and possibly years, after the fighting dies down - do we have any chance of achieving such a goal. In this regard, Marja presents us with four distinct hurdles...
More at The New York Times.
Comments
I could jump through the screen & strangle this guy. I understand & agree with his overall premise, but glossing over of the steps & successes, even the small ones, the Marines see are doing shows lack of balance & understanding.
""Those previous surges have achieved little success at holding or building, as the international coalition and Afghan government have inevitably failed to come up with realistic plans for what happens after the fighting is done.""
Does that include the 10,000 Marines inserted last year; who 7mths later even the most liberal of analysts who've been on the ground have commented on the 180 degree success they've achieved in their areas.
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""They shouldnt build a new base outside the town for this, or "commute" to the area from strongholds in Helmand like Camp Leatherneck. They should live right inside the town, providing security and guidance from within.""
That's the one that really pissed me off.
Is he an Idiot or does he not know that the BULK of Marine Forces have been Dispersed in Coy & Platoon-sized Units permanently living inside Afghan villages since they moved back into Afghanistan last year that & that Camp Leatherneck is just the Central Command Post for TF Leatherneck housing C2, Support, & Aviation.
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""Mr. Zahir has lived in Germany for the last 15 years and had never set foot in Marja until two weeks ago. He is also widely seen as an unassertive crony of Gulab Mangal, the provincial governor.""
No shat.
Problem is most local folk are illiterate or were in power before & proved to be local rapists. And you probably couldn't have a legitimate local election for a few weeks-months.
Neither of which is conducive to the fact that you need a city Administrator IMMEDIATELY! You can work toward grooming a local successor in the coming months.
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I could go on picking this article apart but who'd care
While this guy may have some points about the past involvement of NATO troops in the region. I think that he is not necessarily looking at the Durrani Pashtun way of life. If that many divisions were to stay in the 'city' of Marja, it would be seen as an occupied town by the residents. The Taliban did the same thing in Herat, Mazar, and eventually Kabul in the late 1990's. Why would we want to portray an occupier only to create animosity among the villagers? Wouldn't it make more sense, as was done in N. Ireland, to have troops readily available (Afghan Troops) for any major incursions by Taliban, drug traffickers, or Transport mafia, but have the police patrol the town to promote stability and assure the residents that the Afghan government is here to stay and to protect the population?
While having Mr. Zahir come from outside the normal structures may be seen by the villagers and the elders as userping the traditional authority or causing the community to see him as a total outsider, it perhaps can be couched in terms of an anti-corruption movement by the Afghan government. He has been out of the corrupt system for a long time. He doesn't necessarily need to play those types of politics. And, he understands how an effective democrtically run government is supposed to function. He is not a bad choice to start off with, even if it is a government in a box approach.
I echo your comments Eric & Jason. Author does have some decent observations about Afghanistan in general. However, for an 'intel analyst', I am not impressed with his knowledge or research on Helmand, the operations conducted there in the last year, or his understanding of military operations in general. In my opinion, he has essentially shot holes in other OEF COIN efforts with the assumption that Marines are conducting operations in the same manner.
See description from recent article about a Marine outpost established shortly after their arrival to Helmand in 2009...
"Outpost Man Bear Pig -- no electricity, no shelter, a handful of troops -- represents the raw front line of the counterinsurgency strategy. Afghan soldiers remark that their poorest farmers live better than the Marines, but progress is more important than living conditions to our troops morale."
Marines do not do 'COIN' from a FOB. There are numerous squad sized outposts throughout Helmand that puts Marines amongst the people which has fostered good results...see Nawa.
Poppy is a tough nut to crack. However, assuming that targeting drug processors and distributers is the same as ariel spraying or plowing under poppy fields is blatantly incorrect.
His comments about Zahir and Mangal are also incredibly simple. Nothing is black and white there. Further, Mangal is arguably the most respected political leader in Afghanistan.
I find comments fascinating, and alarming that somehow Abdul Zahir, having lived in Germany for over a decade, makes him an honest individual and a good choice for mayor of Marja?
Is this really a shared belief by those contributing to SWJ? If in fact it is, all discussion of COIN, and the principle of good governance stops!
In addition, did anyone bother to do a peripheral background on Zahir? There is a payoff here, and nothing more, and that's a shame considering the good faith efforts by our Marines, Soldiers, and many of their Afghan Army counterparts.