Small Wars Journal

Has Afghanistan Aid 'Failed'?

Thu, 06/03/2010 - 2:23pm
Has Afghanistan Aid 'Failed'? - Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., National Journal.

An article in the latest issue of the Army War College's official journal, Parameters, fires a shot across the bow of the current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan with its call for "Counterinsurgency 3.0." Authors James Gavrilis, a retired lieutenant colonel, and Peter Charles Coharis, an international consultant, bluntly state that "massive international development assistance" to Afghanistan -- over $225 billion from the U.S. alone since 9/11 -- has "failed" to win hearts and minds because "policy-makers have incorrectly assumed that international development aid is inherently beneficial... and invariably leads to a grateful populace." Instead, the article argues, "aid is inherently disruptive and potentially destabilizing, and development does not necessarily translate into pro-American or pro-Afghan government sentiments." ...

More at The National Journal.

Comments

Anonymous (not verified)

Fri, 06/04/2010 - 5:21pm

<blockquote><em>"The COIN 3.0 approach would challenge aid providers to go deeper into communities and, in turn, would call upon community members to evolve their traditions and practices, including empowering women, ethnic minorities, and other marginalized groups."</em></blockquote>
Why? How does this contribute to the mission? Does the Taliban derive its power from keeping women "unempowered"? The word "community" generally means a fairly small locale. Are there really that many "ethnic minorities" within a community? And does such a dynamic feed Taliban recruiting or something?

The paper also states:
<blockquote><em>"... aid projects should be designed and implemented to promote human rights, inclusiveness, peaceful conflict resolution, the rule of law, democracy..."</em></blockquote>
How does this square with its earlier assertions that:
<blockquote>1. <em>"... smart power proponents have unwittingly adopted the prior Administrations misguided notion that ... [others] ... want the same things that Americans desire, namely democracy, free markets, pluralism, and similar values..."</em><br /><br />
and<br />
2. <em>"Traditional societies of the Middle East and Central Asia, however, operate on a host of principles and values that may be at odds with western notions of justice, honor, and freedom... policy-makers will have to trust in the very people they want most to change, by ceding to them the choice of how to change and what to change."</em></blockquote>

Schmedlap

Fri, 06/04/2010 - 2:53pm

Development aid is about... wait for it... development. How anyone thinks that development necessarily, or even likely, leads to a more docile or permissive population that will cooperate with a COIN operation is beyond me. And even if one can make that argument, what are the odds of the development aid actually being used properly if you don't understand the culture/society that you're operating amongst? When you initiate a project, you alter some balance of power in that locale. If you don't understand the locale, you're not going to be able to anticipate the repercussions of that shift. All that you will know is that someone in the 3 shop just made this spiffy storyboard showing photos of a new well with a smiling child next to it.

alex azzam (not verified)

Fri, 06/04/2010 - 4:24am

it seems that foreign aid starts with the assumption that different countries and cultures supposed to be developed according to a Western Paradigm or European model. This assumption is really problematic and meets dead ends most of time. The Old British model was to aid an elite class that will be the executive native administration of the colony. Accordingly, the colonial power automatically creates a class society: A wealthy ruling serving class and a majority of poor population that is oppressed and deprived of most life comfort. Looking in Afghanistan as a de facto American colony since 9/11, we followed the old British colony model, we created a wealthy ruling class that is the administrative arm of the American occupying administration. On the other hand, we created the trickle down economy from the American to the local ruling class to the general population who is not happy with such model.
At the end, there is no real development to the country and we did not gain the trust of the population. In fact, the general population see the negative impact of the American policy and economic polices.
Afghanistan is very poor and have no roads, if the Americans were sincere about development, they would have set a general high way and construction companies that build a network of high ways and roads that employ tons of local workers. Building a rail road to connect the various villages and cities is the real road to the public's hearts, only then the locals will believe and trust America and a spontaneous economy will emerge and change forward will happen.

Remind me when the U.S. spent $225 billion on "development assistance?" Between 2002 and 2008, the U.S. had pledged about $10 billion in development money (and delivered only about $5 billion of that). Those numbers don't even kind of ballpark the amounts of money paid out by the entire international community.

In fact, the only way you get to $225 billion spent on Afghanistan is if you take only supplemental funds for the war, the majority of which is money for combat forces, not "development assistance."

Unless, that is, they're defining the war as development. Which would be a very bizarre thing to do.