Deep Inside the Insurgent's Mind

To continue John Robb's foco insurgency concepts---written by John in 2006---so yes there were initial comments on the application of Che's theory to the Iraqi Sunni insurgency-just no one took the theory and did further analysis. Kilcullens theory of "conflict ecosystem" would have been the closest but no one continued that research as well.

Thursday, 08 June 2006
IRAQ: ZARQAWI IS DEAD
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced that a US air strike had killed Musab al-Zarqawi. The information that led to his death was the result of following the trail of custody on the distribution of his most recent video tape (or it could have been lucky given the number of air strikes that that have been made on reported Zarqawi positions in the past years).

This is excellent news, but it needs to be put into context (this is a brief for decision makers/analysts/thinkers and not motivation for the rank and file, so don't expect fluff -- as is often said, only the paranoid survive and every good commander I know understands this). Zarqawi is best categorized as violence capitalist, very similar to bin Laden, that supported and incubated guerrilla entrepreneurs of the new open source warfare model. In this role he was instigator of violence and not the leader of a vast hierarchical insurgency.

Zarqawi in Context

Here's how Zarqawi's role evolved:
•In the early phases of the guerrilla war in Iraq, Zarqawi was operational as the commander of a small cell. His group was able, through early large scale attacks, to set a plausible promise (an idea that many other groups could rally around) for the Iraqi insurgency. Namely, that it was possible to successfully fight the US occupation.
•During late 2004 and early 2005, his operational value diminished as the number of groups that were engaged in the war proliferated. During that time, he was focused on expanding the target set of the insurgency to include infrastructure, corporations and Iraqi military units. Later in 2005, his operational activities were focused on shifting the plausible promise of the insurgency from ousting the Americans to fighting Shiite domination (sectarian war) through attacks on Shiite civilians and symbols.
•By early 2006, Zarqawi's operational activities were all but over. He had succeeded in seeding the original insurgency and shifting the plausible promise to include sectarian warfare. During this final phase, Zarqawi moved into a role of strategic communicator, much like bin Laden's role today. In this role, he produced videos that were distributed to a global audience through the Internet and global media.
Epilogue

Unfortunately, Zarqawi proved to be rather good at his role. Here's how to rate his abilities:
•He successfully seeded the insurgency.
•Innovation and adaptability. He expanded the target set for the insurgency, changed tactics when they proved disadvantageous (ie. beheadings were stopped and he ceded Iraqis control of the jihadi effort), and expanded the plausible promise of the insurgency to include sectarian war.
•His main failure was that he didn't fully appreciate the value of systems disruption. His only attack on a systems target (the Basra terminal) was a failure. He also proved unable to give up operational roles in favor of becoming a strategic communicator (which ultimately led to his death).
ONE final note: If we put Zarqawi within a historical context, he was able to do what Che hoped to do with a foco insurgency (for more on this, read the brief on "Iraq and Foco Insurgency"). In essence, he proved that within a modern context (open source warfare and systems disruption), it is possible to seed the collapse of a state (or more precisely, keep a state in a perpetual failure).

The author is coming to close to John Robb's theory of open source warfare but he is headed in the right direction-the question is how many of those that blog into SWJ will understand a foco insurgency?

Written by John in 2004:

Saturday, 07 August 2004
IRAQ AND FOCO INSURGENCY
When Che Guevara crossed into Bolivia in 1966, his intent was to create a rural foco insurgency. A foco insurgency is one that forgoes the methodical political indoctrination of the population in favor of small bands of fast moving guerrillas that gain victories against state forces. In Che's model, the victories of these guerrillas would ignite an organic revolution that would overthrow the government. His hope was that it would avoid the innevitable corruption he saw in communist revolutionary parties. Foco insurgencies didn't work for a variety of factors related to the time, to wit: Che died in 1967, hunted by government forces. The urban guerrilla/terrorists (who felt that urban environments provided better protection than the rural terrain that Che favored) that followed him, suffered the same fate.

Che's theory lives on
Iraq's insurgency is a variant of Che's foco insurgency in that it operates without a need popular support. However, the environment today differs in many important ways that provide it with the opportunity of success. Here's why Iraq's insurgency has gained traction:

•Multiplexed loyalties. Iraq is riven by ethinic, tribal, political, and religious loyalties. This provides numerous fault lines for guerrillas to exploit.

•An occupation. The US occupation serves as a focal point for guerrilla activity. The elimination of the Baathist military sufficiently weakened the state in ways that made it easy for a foco insurgency to gain momentum.

•Modern networks. Iraq has a modern (although dilapidated) infrastructure that is ripe for attack. This infrastructure is critical for its economic recovery and is in stark contrast to the sparse networks of developing nations ~40 years ago. Additionally, a diverse set of global media networks allow guerrillas to circumvent state controls on information to amplify fault lines.

The Bazaar vs. the Foco
A series of tactical innovations allows global guerrillas to both survive and thrive in Iraq. These innovations (cumulatively called the bazaar) allow it to survive state counter-pressure, learn/advance, and deplete the ruling government of funds/authority/legitimacy. In contrast, the foco was unable to accomplish this. Also, unlike the foco, the end point of the bazaar isn't a new state but the destruction of the state. Here's how global guerrillas have improved on the model:

•A diverse set of small groups with different motivations. These groups don't have a center of mass (hierarchy) that can be targeted. Their small size provides them excellent OPSEC and the collapse any subset of groups doesn't disrupt the whole. Strength through diversity.

•A bazaar of violence. This bazaar provides a clearinghouse of money, information, and other resources necessary for rapid group learning and improvement. This complex system enables small groups to exceed the rate of improvement of centralized organizations.

•Leverage from markets and networks. These networks provide Iraq's guerrillas rates of return far in excess of those expected for groups of their size.

What this means
A vibrant bazaar insurgency in Iraq will set the stage for the following events:

•Iraq's bazaar will outlast the US occupation. The choice for the US will be to either continue to write a blank check for Iraq and run up deficits or withdraw. It is only a matter of time before the decision to withdraw is made.

•Organic Islamic order. The goal of this insurgency is very much in line with Che's vision (an organic order that arises out of state weakness). However, in Iraq, the complete disruption of state power isn't replaced with another state but rather organic Islamic order -- the Fallujah and Taliban model.

•How this will spread. Given the factors that power Iraq's bazaar, it will be difficult but not impossible to export this insurgency to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan without one of the following events (here's what to look for): Intervention by the US military in Saudi Arabia to prevent collapse, a coup or open conflict between factions in Pakistan's military (triggered through assassination of Musharref and other key people), and a civil war in Iraq that draws in adjacent states.

NOTE: More on Zarqawi and Foco insurgency

The author is coming to close to John Robb's theory of open source warfare but he is headed in the right direction-the question is how many of those that blog into SWJ will understand a foco insurgency?

Written by John in 2004:

Saturday, 07 August 2004
IRAQ AND FOCO INSURGENCY
When Che Guevara crossed into Bolivia in 1966, his intent was to create a rural foco insurgency. A foco insurgency is one that forgoes the methodical political indoctrination of the population in favor of small bands of fast moving guerrillas that gain victories against state forces. In Che's model, the victories of these guerrillas would ignite an organic revolution that would overthrow the government. His hope was that it would avoid the innevitable corruption he saw in communist revolutionary parties. Foco insurgencies didn't work for a variety of factors related to the time, to wit: Che died in 1967, hunted by government forces. The urban guerrilla/terrorists (who felt that urban environments provided better protection than the rural terrain that Che favored) that followed him, suffered the same fate.

Che's theory lives on
Iraq's insurgency is a variant of Che's foco insurgency in that it operates without a need popular support. However, the environment today differs in many important ways that provide it with the opportunity of success. Here's why Iraq's insurgency has gained traction:

•Multiplexed loyalties. Iraq is riven by ethinic, tribal, political, and religious loyalties. This provides numerous fault lines for guerrillas to exploit.

•An occupation. The US occupation serves as a focal point for guerrilla activity. The elimination of the Baathist military sufficiently weakened the state in ways that made it easy for a foco insurgency to gain momentum.

•Modern networks. Iraq has a modern (although dilapidated) infrastructure that is ripe for attack. This infrastructure is critical for its economic recovery and is in stark contrast to the sparse networks of developing nations ~40 years ago. Additionally, a diverse set of global media networks allow guerrillas to circumvent state controls on information to amplify fault lines.

The Bazaar vs. the Foco
A series of tactical innovations allows global guerrillas to both survive and thrive in Iraq. These innovations (cumulatively called the bazaar) allow it to survive state counter-pressure, learn/advance, and deplete the ruling government of funds/authority/legitimacy. In contrast, the foco was unable to accomplish this. Also, unlike the foco, the end point of the bazaar isn't a new state but the destruction of the state. Here's how global guerrillas have improved on the model:

•A diverse set of small groups with different motivations. These groups don't have a center of mass (hierarchy) that can be targeted. Their small size provides them excellent OPSEC and the collapse any subset of groups doesn't disrupt the whole. Strength through diversity.

•A bazaar of violence. This bazaar provides a clearinghouse of money, information, and other resources necessary for rapid group learning and improvement. This complex system enables small groups to exceed the rate of improvement of centralized organizations.

•Leverage from markets and networks. These networks provide Iraq's guerrillas rates of return far in excess of those expected for groups of their size.

What this means
A vibrant bazaar insurgency in Iraq will set the stage for the following events:

•Iraq's bazaar will outlast the US occupation. The choice for the US will be to either continue to write a blank check for Iraq and run up deficits or withdraw. It is only a matter of time before the decision to withdraw is made.

•Organic Islamic order. The goal of this insurgency is very much in line with Che's vision (an organic order that arises out of state weakness). However, in Iraq, the complete disruption of state power isn't replaced with another state but rather organic Islamic order -- the Fallujah and Taliban model.

•How this will spread. Given the factors that power Iraq's bazaar, it will be difficult but not impossible to export this insurgency to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan without one of the following events (here's what to look for): Intervention by the US military in Saudi Arabia to prevent collapse, a coup or open conflict between factions in Pakistan's military (triggered through assassination of Musharref and other key people), and a civil war in Iraq that draws in adjacent states.

NOTE: More on Zarqawi and Foco insurgency