Remember the Sons of Iraq?

A Review of Michal Harari's SoI Briefing

by Daniel R. DePetris

Most of the contention in Iraq over the past seven months has dealt with the inability of Iraqis to form an inclusive national government (although that apparently has changed with the formation of a unified Shia block). With both Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi refusing to moderate their demands, this concern is undoubtedly warranted. However important, this debate fails to analyze the full extent of Iraq's political climate. Michal Harari at the Institute for the Study of War attempts to improve this shortsightedness by expanding the discourse to a seemingly forgotten issue: the future of the Sons of Iraq (SoI) program. How did the Sons of Iraq originate, how effective is the program, and what can the U.S. do to help address the program's deficiencies in the future? While Harari's briefing is just a short history of the policy, it nonetheless provides some straightforward answers to these otherwise difficult questions.

In Iraq, the situation was anything but calming in 2006 and 2007. As Harari explicitly clarifies in his report, Iraq was quickly falling prey to a tumultuous and bloody civil war between its Sunni and Shia communities. Insurgents were launching daily attacks in Baghdad and across the country; hundreds of American soldiers were losing their lives; and thousands of Iraqis were held hostage to the constant terror on the streets. Sensing that a change in strategy was desperately needed, American commanders embarked upon a new counterinsurgency strategy with a two-step approach: 1) a surge of U.S. troops in Iraq's most dangerous neighborhoods and 2) the co-opting of Sunni tribal leaders that were increasingly becoming disillusioned by Al'Qaeda's violent agenda. It was this tribal outreach effort that led to the infamous Sons of Iraq program.

The result was nothing short of remarkable. Violence decreased to levels that were not seen in Iraq since the very beginning of the U.S. invasion, and Al'Qaeda militants were further disenfranchised by the mainstream Sunni population. These successes, however, were quickly accompanied by more problems. With violence in Iraq down, the Sons of Iraq were no longer needed in a full capacity. The program, now controlled and paid for by the Iraqi Government, was transforming into a burden for Baghdad rather than a tool.

Unfortunately, the burden continues to this day. Tens of thousands of SoI members are still without full employment, despite the Iraqi Government's pledge to provide police positions and vocational training for the Sunni paramilitary force. As of March 2010, only 40 percent of SoI's were fully transitioned into full-time jobs. Others have been struggling to collect their paychecks, and the Iraqi bureaucracy tasked with managing the SoI transition is so bogged down with administrative friction that Baghdad has been unable (or perhaps unwilling) to hold their end of the bargain.

But perhaps the biggest disappointment is the prevalent gap of trust between the predominately Sunni SoI and the Shia-led caretaker government in Iraq. Harari notes that "Elements within Prime Minister Nuri-al Maliki's government have long distrusted the SoI's, fearing they would threaten government authority." SoI's, in part, have responded with ferocity of their own, accusing Maliki's administration of discriminating against them based on their sectarian affiliations. The question now becomes how to reconcile these differences. Unfortunately, Iraqis are not addressing the question as if it was a top priority, despite the looming insurgent violence in the background.

It is this lack of a recommendation that diminishes the substance and credibility of Harari's piece. For all of Harari's research expertise, she simply states that the United States needs to insert itself more aggressively in the entire process, "keeping a close watch on the transition process and assisting in finding alternative employment." Yet Harari neglects to mention how the U.S. could possibly perform such a role in a substantial way. Given that America's combat mission has officially ended, effectively intervening in the SoI program would appear to be a tall order for the 50,000 troops who are responsible for other priorities. The Iraqi Government, newly empowered, could perhaps look upon an American intervention as a sign of foreign meddling; or worse, a deliberate violation of Iraqi sovereignty.

Whichever recommendations are effective, Washington and Baghdad would be wise to lend due attention to the Sons of Iraq. It was the brave work of these young men that helped rescue Iraq from a full-fledged civil war. Passing the buck or simply ignoring the issue would negate all of the personal sacrifices that the SoI have made in the last four years. With the news that Shia politicians have finally settled on Nouri al-Maliki for their Prime Ministerial choice, and with a new Iraqi Government hopefully in the works, whoever leads the country should double-down on the issue. Either transition the SoI into full employment, or maintain the program in hostile areas.

Daniel R. DePetris is an M.A. candidate in the Political Science Department at Syracuse University. He is a contributor to the Small Wars Journal.

Editor's Note: This opinion piece represents a review of Michal Harari's SoI Briefing, conducted by SWJ friend the Institute for the Study of War. The original piece can be found here.